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ABSTRACT 
 
Southeast Asia is the rising star of the global market, however, contrary to its impressive economic 
achievements, many countries in the region have suffered diverse social problems because of 
economic growth. Given that a key mechanism to hold businesses accountable is their disclosure 
practices, this study is looking to expand the understanding of the influences of institutional 
environment and corporate governance on Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure (CSRD) in six 
Southeast Asian countries: Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines and Vietnam. A 
multi-theoretical framework, including institutional theory, agency theory, stakeholder theory and 
legitimacy theory, was applied. For the purpose of this study, 2013 annual reports of 30 largest 
companies in the stock exchanges of the six countries were collected. The final sample consists of 171 
companies.  
Firstly, empirical findings of CSRD levels across the countries showed that Thailand has the highest 
level of disclosure, followed by Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines and finally Vietnam. 
There were significant differences between the extent of CSRD of the two countries with highest 
disclosure (Thailand and Indonesia) and the lowest disclosure group (Philippines and Vietnam). The 
findings are interesting in a sense that the levels of CSRD do not reflect the stages of economic 
development, and therefore, the differences in CSRD levels could be attributable to the impact of 
other institutional factors.  
Secondly, in relation to internal determinants and based on the existing literature and the context of 
Southeast Asia, six corporate governance practices were identified to examine the impact of corporate 
governance on CSRD. The results of OLS regression supported the negative impact of block 
ownership and the positive impact of board size as well as the presence of CSR committee on CSRD. 
Contrary to the theoretical and empirical expectations, board gender diversity was found to have 
significantly negative relationship with CSRD, and board independence had no impact on CSRD. 
These differences could be explained by the context of the study where the presentation of women on 
board is very low and independent directors might not be wholly independent.  
Thirdly, in order to examine the impact of the institutional environment on CSRD in a comprehensive 
way, institutional theory, the Scott’s institutional framework (1995) and existing literature are used to 
identify relevant institutional factors that potentially influence CSRD. The effect of six institutional 
factors representing the three pillars, regulative (legal origin and mandatory disclosure), cultural-
cognitive (uncertainty avoidance and masculinity cultural dimensions), and normative (the adoption 
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of GRI standard and membership of CSR-related associations), were evaluated in this study. The 
empirical results indicate that mandatory disclosure, uncertainty avoidance dimension and the 
adoption of GRI standard have positive impact on CSRD, while the masculinity dimension has 
negative relationship with CSRD. The findings imply that institutional environment influences CSRD 
through all the three pillars with some institutional factors have greater impact than others.  
The study, therefore, has contributed empirically to the existing literature by providing deeper insights 
into CSRD levels in Southeast Asia, identifying the effectiveness of corporate governance practices 
in emerging economies and the Asian context, particularly in relation to CSRD, including further 
examination of the role of diverse external determinants on CSRD. Theoretically, the study is one of 
a few that have attempted to quantify institutional environment into measurable institutional factors. 
These factors, hence, could be re-used in future research to advance understanding on the role of 
institutional environment in shaping a country’s CSRD practice. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
1.1 Overview 
 
The chapter offers an overview of the thesis. It begins with background information on concepts of 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure (CSRD), 
followed by a brief discussion of relevant literature. Based on the review of previous literature, 
empirical and theoretical gaps are identified, from which motivations for conducting this research are 
presented. The chapter then displays the scope of this study, research aims, research questions and 
research objectives. The context of Southeast Asia and each of the six examined countries is also 
provided. Finally, a summary of the research’s findings and contributions concludes the chapter along 
with the presentation of the thesis’s structure.  
1.2 Background 
 
The concept of CSR has grown significantly over the decades with the idea that businesses have 
responsibilities to society beyond that of making profit (Caroll and Shabana, 2010). According to the 
World Business Council for Sustainable Development (1998, p.3), CSR is defined as “the continuing 
commitment by business to behave ethically and contribute to economic development while 
improving the quality of life of the workforce and their families as well as of the local community and 
society at large”. The concept of CSR was driven by the idea that corporations can have a positive 
and powerful influence on social change, in addition to reaping potential benefits that corporations 
can receive from implementing CSR (Du, Bhattacharya and Sen, 2010). Weber (2008) identified five 
potential benefits firms could gain from engaging in CSR activities. Firstly, CSR could have positive 
effects on their image and reputation (see Arendt and Brettel, 2010; Dutot, Galvez and Versailles, 
2016) which in turn influences company competitiveness (see Gray and Balmer, 1998). CSR also has 
a positive impact on employee motivation, retention and recruitment, as employees tend to be more 
motivated when working in a stimulated environment (Pedersen, 2015) or participating in CSR 
activities. Equally, CSR programs and activities can make firms more attractive to potential 
employees (Weber, 2008). The third potential benefit for firms is cost savings. The study of Epstein 
and Roy (2001) argued that by implementing a sustainability strategy or developing positive 
relationships with certain stakeholders, such as regulators, can help firms with efficiency, save time 
and improve access to capital. Moreover, previous studies provided evidence that CSR could lead to 
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an increase in revenue through higher sales and market share, which tend to be achieved indirectly 
through respectable brand image. Finally, through involvement in CSR activities, firms can reduce 
and manage certain risks stemming from negative press, boycotts or customers (Weber, 2008).  
Major corporate ethical disasters have led to an increase in CSR awareness and to a variety of 
stakeholders demanding firms to be accountable for their social and ecological impact as well as their 
supply chains, in addition to their financial performance (Vehkapera, 2004). As a result, some firms 
have responded to this increased attention by demonstrating their accountability for and managing 
their sustainability footprint (Belal and Momin, 2009). At the same time, companies have gradually 
tried to communicate their efforts to incorporate CSR into diverse aspects of their business 
(Vehkapera, 2004). Consequently, communicating CSR activities has become a prominent issue in 
the business world (Waller and Lanis, 2009). Despite being discussed by many scholars (Golob and 
Bartlett, 2007; Gray, Javad, Power and Sinclair, 2001; Mathew, 1984;), the definition and scope of 
CSR reporting remains diverse and utilising multiple terminologies, such as social and environmental 
disclosure (CSRD), sustainability reporting, sustainability disclosure, social accounting, stakeholder 
dialogue reporting, or social auditing (Gray, 2002; Parker, 1986). For instance, Gray et al. (2001, 
p.329) specifically defined social and environmental disclosure “as comprising information relating 
to a corporation's activities, aspirations and public image with regards to environmental, community, 
employee and consumer issues”. Another definition of Mathews (1984, p.204) simply considered CSR 
reporting as “voluntary disclosure of information, both qualitative and quantitative, made by 
organisations to inform or influence a range of audiences”. Despite the inconsistency in terminologies 
and the lack of agreement on the definition of CSR reporting, most definitions have mentioned it as a 
way for firms to communicate their CSR activities to diverse stakeholders (see Golob and Barlett, 
2007; Gray, Owen and Maunders, 1987; Perez, 2015).  In this study, to avoid confusion, CSR 
reporting is used to mention CSR-related information reported by companies through diverse 
channels, such as annual reports, standalone reports, booklet, etc., while CSRD is specifically used to 
address information disclosed only through annual reports.  
1.3 Justifications and Motivations of the study 
The development of CSR reporting literature in recent decades has resulted in an increase of CSRD 
studies (see Amran and Devi, 2008; El-Halaby and Hussainey, 2015; Hamid, 2004; Hossain, Islam 
and Andrew, 2006; Naser and Hassan, 2013). Most of these studies, however, tend to focus on the 
context of Anglo-Saxon and Western European countries (Fifka, 2013; Prieto-Carron, Lund-
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Thomsen, Chan, Muro and Bhushan, 2006; van der Laan Smith, Adhikari and Tondkar, 2005). The 
context of developing, or less developed countries, therefore, has received limited attention 
(Beddewela and Herzig, 2013; Belal, Cooper and Roberts, 2013; Gao, 2011). According to Kisenyi 
and Gray (1998), while researchers have focused on learning more about CSRD in English speaking 
and European countries, little is understood about this practice in post-colonial, smaller and, or, 
emerging countries. Consequently, learning more about these countries opens the region to ‘the jaded 
palates of Western scholars’ (Kisenyi and Gray, 1998, p.16). As a result, the first empirical gap 
demonstrated through the review of previous literature is the need for more CSRD studies conducted 
within the context of smaller and, or, developing countries that have had limited attention. With the 
expectation of filling this gap, the current study looks at the extent of CSRD in the context of six 
Southeast Asian countries, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and 
Vietnam. Arising from the empirical gap, the choice of six Southeast Asian countries would be 
appropriate as most of CSRD studies in this region have concentrated solely on Malaysia. Therefore, 
the study will provide insight into the CSRD practices of less focused countries such as Thailand, 
Singapore, Philippines and Vietnam.  
Furthermore, the choice of Southeast Asian countries stems from the practical need for further 
development of CSRD practice in these countries. Despite many achievements in terms of economy, 
less developed smaller countries have struggled with pallet of social problems, including, but not 
limited to human rights violations, social exploitation, climate change, and poverty (Belal et al., 2013). 
Additionally, various social and environmental issues have pressured some Asian countries to develop 
CSR strategies with the need to maintain companies’ credibility through improving their CSRD 
(Calderon, 2011). As a result, it is important to garner greater understanding of the current levels of 
CSRD in these countries and factors influencing their CSRD practices, as this information could form 
foundations for solutions that motivate firms’ involvement in CSRD. Moreover, Southeast Asia 
provides an ideal context to examine the effect of country-level factors, considering the importance 
of the ‘context specificity’ on CSR content development and subsequent implementation has been 
discussed in the literature (see Prieto-Carron et al., 2006). Particularly, the context of Southeast Asia 
is captivating due to its diversity. Contrary to the expectation that countries in the same region would 
share some similarities in institutional contexts, the institutional environments of countries in the 
region remain heterogeneous and diverse (Hoskisson et al., 2000). Additionally, with the diversity in 
institutional environments across the six countries (Hoskinsson, Eden, Lau and Wright, 2000), the 
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role of corporations and the level of CSR and CSRD practices also differ (Adams, Hill and Roberts, 
1998). A cross-national study of CSRD across the region will not only provide interesting 
comparisons but also define whether economic development influences firms’ CSRD in annual 
reports. The cross-national comparison also allows countries with low levels of CSRD to learn from 
experiences of those with better practices and improve their own institutional environments.  
In terms of CSRD determinants, various determinants have been identified and examined (see Amran 
and Devi, 2008; Jizi, Salama, Dixon and Stratling, 2014; Naser and Hassan, 2013). Following the 
classification of Fifka (2013), CSRD determinants can be divided into two main categories, internal 
determinants and external determinants. Regarding internal determinants, the majority of CSRD 
studies have strongly focused on organisational characteristics, such as firm size (e.g. Rahman, Zain 
and Al-Haj, 2011; Naser and Hassan, 2013), industry (e.g. Amran and Devi, 2008; Gao, Heravi and 
Xiao, 2005), and profitability (e.g. Esa and Ghazali, 2010; Sharif and Rashid, 2014), leaving the 
impact of other important internal factors such as corporate governance with limited attention. The 
effect of corporate governance on CSRD, however, cannot be ignored as CSRD is the result of choices, 
motives and values of people who are responsible for formulating and making decisions within 
organisations (Khan, Muttakin and Siddiqui, 2013a). Therefore, corporate governance mechanisms, 
such as ownership structure, board composition and board structure, are integral elements of CSRD 
(Gibbins, Richardson and Waterhouse, 1990; Khan et al., 2013a). According to Mahadeo, Hanuman 
and Soobaroyen (2011b), future CSRD studies should pay more attention to the influence of specific 
characteristics of emerging economies such as ownership concentration and corporate governance 
implementation on corporate CSRD, especially in larger cross-country context. Examining the impact 
of corporate governance on CSRD in the context of emerging countries is important for several 
reasons. Firstly, owing to the differences in ownership structure, and institutional environment as well 
as assumptions from well-established governance models, the adaptation and evolvement of corporate 
governance in developing countries is unclear (Mahadeo and Soobaroyen, 2016). Emerging countries 
have increasingly adopted the Western-oriented model of corporate governance as a response to the 
pressures from international agencies despite the debatable suitability of these mechanisms in the 
emerging context (Soobaroyen and Mahadeo, 2012; Uddin and Choudhurry, 2008). With distinct 
characteristics developed from traditional societal norms, such as corruption, family dominance and 
political interference (Khan et al., 2013a), traditional agency problems may not be applicable in this 
context (Cheung, Tan, Ahn and Zhang, 2010). As a result, given the still maturing capital market and 
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weak institutional environments in developing nations (Muttakin and Subramaniam, 2015), the 
effectiveness of corporate governance models from developed countries in these contexts has been 
questioned (Khan et al., 2013a) and the influence of corporate governance practices might also differ. 
Therefore, the second empirical gap based on the existing literature is the lack of CSRD studies 
researching the impact of corporate governance in the context of emerging countries. In response to 
the second empirical gap, this study examines the impact of various corporate governance practices 
on CSRD in the context of six Southeast Asian countries, five of which, according to the classification 
of International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2017) are emerging economies. Moreover, Asian business 
systems are characterised with concentrated ownership and family control (Millar, Eldomiaty, Choi 
and Hilton, 2005; Welford, 2007). With these two characteristics, these Southeast Asian countries 
provide an interesting context to examine the effectiveness of corporate governance practices adopted 
from developed countries in shaping CSRD practice in emerging economies.   
Additionally, according to a review conducted by Fifka (2013), many CSRD studies have solely 
looked at the internal determinants without considering the impact of external determinants. Only a 
few recent studies have attempted to examine the effect of one or two external determinants together 
with other internal factors (see Anas, Rashid and Annuar, 2015; Chakroun and Matoussi, 2012; 
Othman, Darus and Arshad, 2011). Despite the lack of attention to the impact of the external 
environment on CSRD, the role of the institutional environment cannot be underestimated as the 
concept of CSR and CSR practices (including CSRD) strongly depend on national culture and are 
institution bound (Campbell, 2007). Due to the differences in political, legal, social, economic and 
environmental conditions, every country tends to report its own CSR information to diverse 
stakeholders differently (Gunawan and Hermawan, 2012). Several studies have only addressed one or 
two elements of the institutional environment (see Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Mio and Verturelli, 2013; 
Othman et al., 2011), therefore limiting the ability to examine the effect of institutional environment 
from diverse aspects. This argument leads to the third empirical gap identified in this study which is 
the lack of CSRD studies examining the impact of external determinants in a comprehensive way. To 
purposefully respond to this empirical gap, in terms of external determinants, this study seeks to 
identify systematically relevant institutional factors that potentially influence the level of CSRD based 
on institutional theory and Scott’s institutional framework (1995), as well as examine the impact of 
such factors on CSRD. Compared to other theories, such as stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory, and 
political economy theory, institutional theory has not been widely used in CSRD literature until 
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recently (e.g. Amran and Devi, 2008; Othman et al., 2011). However, the use of institutional theory 
as the theoretical framework to examine the effect of institutional factors on CSRD is considered 
appropriate as the theory not only provides an insight into the impact of institutional environment on 
organisational behaviour (Oliver, 1991) but also complements both stakeholder and legitimacy 
theories in providing an understanding of organisations’ response to social and institutional pressures 
as well as their expectations to maintain legitimacy (Deegan and Unerman, 2006). Based on the 
literature review, very few studies have attempted to quantitively consider the role of institutional 
pressures in defining CSRD, by using institutional theory and Scott’s institutional framework (1995). 
The only study found in the literature that takes this approach is a recent paper of Garcia-Sanchez, 
Cuadrado-Ballesteros and Frias-Aceituno (2016) in which diverse factors, such as culture systems, 
legal and ownership characteristics, were identified to examine the impact of normative and coercive 
forces on the extent to which firms from different countries adopt GRI indicators in their CSR reports.  
This particular research, therefore, contributes theoretically to the existing literature by a providing a 
different way of quantifying institutional pressures by using all of the three pillars (regulative, 
normative and cultural-cognitive); and examining the impact of such pressures on CSRD through the 
identified institutional factors.  
Another theoretical gap that has been highlighted by previous literature (see Belal and Momin, 2009; 
Ali, Frynas and Mahmood, 2017) is the under theorised problem of CSRD research in emerging 
economies. As most of the examined countries are emerging markets, the study hopes to overcome 
this criticism by developing the research based on appropriate theoretical frameworks. The study 
examines the impact of both internal determinants (corporate governance practices) and external 
determinants (institutional factors) on CSRD. According to Haider (2010), the choice of theories 
should be based on the factors that influence corporate decision to participate in CSRD. Therefore, 
two separate theoretical frameworks are developed for internal and external factors. As justified 
above, the use of institutional theory is considered well-suited for identifying the impact of 
institutional factors. In terms of corporate governance, a multi-theoretical framework, including 
agency theory, stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory, is used. Agency theory has been applied in 
many studies related to voluntary disclosure to explain the role of diverse corporate governance 
practices (see Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Michelon and Parbonetti, 2012), as the theory provides a 
strong framework to link disclosure practice to corporate governance and considered to be appropriate 
for an organisation’s behaviour topics related to information asymmetry (Barako, Hancock and Izan, 
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2006). However, as the study targets CSRD, which is based on the broader view of stakeholders, the 
use of agency theory on its own to examine the effect of CG on CSRD is inadequate as the theory 
overlooks other types of stakeholders (Freeman, 2010). Therefore, to overcome this issue, following 
the suggestion of Eisenhardt (1989), agency theory is used in combination with other complementary 
theories to capture greater complexity of organisations. As a result, stakeholder theory and legitimacy 
theory, the two theories that have been dominant in many CSRD studies (see Anas et al., 2015; Chan, 
Watson and Woodliff, 2014; Tan, Benni and Liani, 2016), are also applied. The multi-theoretical 
framework of agency theory, stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory not only allows the argument 
for the effect of corporate governance on voluntary disclosure like CSRD to be developed but also 
explains corporations’ involvement in CSRD. 
In conclusion, three empirical gaps and two theoretical gaps have been identified. More specifically, 
justifications and motivations of the current study have been discussed to address each of these gaps. 
In the next section, the scope of the study will be explained in detail.  
1.4 Scope of Study 
 
The study examines the impact of corporate governance and institutional factors on CSRD. CSRD in 
this study is defined as ‘the process of communicating firms’ social and environmental performance, 
either mandatory or voluntary, to diverse stakeholders regarding activities in areas of environment, 
employees, consumers, products and community involvement, through the use of annual reports’. 
CSRD in this study is examined under four categories adopted from Branco and Rodrigues (2008), 
environmental disclosure, human resources disclosure, consumers and products disclosure and finally 
community-involvement disclosure. Despite the inconsistency in the literature regarding the 
classification of CSRD, the classification of CSRD into the four previously mentioned categories is 
considered appropriate for this study as all four areas have been the key categories of CSRD and 
mentioned in most classifications (see Anas et al., 2015; Gray et al., 1995; Jizi et al., 2016; Mirfazli, 
2008; Sobhani, Amran and Zainuddin, 2009).  
Moreover, the categories and items mentioned in Branco and Rodrigues (2008) articulate similar 
information with what has been used in other instruments to examine CSR reporting and CSRD 
amongst Southeast Asian countries (see Chapple and Moon, 2005; Mirfazli, 2008; Newson and 
Deegan, 2002; Nguyen et al., 2015; Ratanajongkol, Davey and Low, 2006; Tsang, 1998). 
Consequently, the use of this CSRD instrument can be considered appropriate for the context of this 
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study. Finally, the CSRD instrument of Branco and Rodrigues (2008) was developed based on other 
well-established CSRD instruments, for instance, Adams et al., (1998), Gray et al., (1995a; 1995b), 
Hackston and Milne, (1996), Williams and Pei, (1999), and Purushothaman, Tower, Hancock and 
Taplin, (2000). The two earliest established CSRD instruments are from the work of Ernst and Ernst 
(1978), and, Guthrie and Mathews (1985). Based on these original works, CSRD instruments have 
been adopted and developed through Gray et al. (1995b), Hackston and Milne (1996), Williams and 
Pei (1999) and Adams et al. (1998). By adopting these CSRD instruments to build theirs, Branco and 
Rodrigues’s instrument (2008) can be considered an updated version of the CSRD instruments 
developed in previous studies. Although the instrument of Branco and Rodrigues (2008) has not been 
used in the context of Southeast Asia, the older versions of this instrument have been widely applied 
in studies related to this context (see Ahmad, Sulaiman and Siswantoro, 2003; Gunawan, Djajadikerta 
and Smith, 2009; Michell Williams and Pei, 1999; Ratanajongkol et al., 2006). Therefore, the use of 
Branco and Rodrigues (2008) as a more updated CSRD instrument is considered appropriate.  
In this study, CSRD in annual reports is examined exclusively. Despite some criticism for using annual 
reports alone in CSRD studies (see Neimark, 1992; Roberts, 1992; Unerman, 2000), the use of annual 
reports to examine CSRD in the six countries is considered appropriate for this study due to the 
following reasons. Firstly, companies could publish competing types of documents related to their 
CSR activities, however, there is no specific guidance on how many documents should be reviewed 
to achieve a complete picture of CSR information. In addition, it is also impossible to identify all 
corporate communication on CSR information, especially for large firms (Gray, Kouhy and Lavers, 
1995b). As companies communicate their CSR information differently, applying the same set of 
documents on all companies could create an incomplete data set, increase bias, and reduce the 
inconsistency of the results (Gray et al., 1995b). Especially in the case of cross-national study, the 
differences in CSR communication among firms are more diverse due to the differences in 
institutional environment. In the case of the six examined countries, the annual reports were often 
published twice, an English version and a native language version. Other types of non-annual reports 
documents tend to be published in the native language which would be pose significant difficulties 
when sourcing and analysing data. Another justification is that annual reports possess a high degree 
of credibility that are not associated with other corporate communication media (Neu, Warsame and 
Pedwell, 1998). Therefore, according to Alnajjar (2000) and Haider (2010), annual reports are the 
main channel for disclosing CSR practices to stakeholders and are the dominant source of information 
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used by stakeholder groups with interests in a firms’ CSR (Deegan and Rankin, 1997). Subsequently, 
consistent with previous studies conducted on Southeast Asia countries (see Amran and Devi, 2008; 
Hamid, 2004; Suteja, Gunardi and Mirawati, 2016; Suttipun and Stanton, 2012), annual reports are 
used to analyse the level of CSRD. With regards to the location of disclosure, each annual report was 
analysed manually as a whole without identifying any specific location as there is no persuasive 
argument to justify why only a specific location should be preferred when examining CSRD (Gray et 
al., 1995b). Moreover, according to the study of Utama (2011) on CSRD in Indonesia, due to the lack 
of globally accepted standards or guidance, firms can report CSR activities in annual reports in 
whatever format they want. Hence, to avoid losing the richness of information, all the sections of 
annual reports are reviewed.   
The Southeast Asia region includes eleven countries, Brunei, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, 
Malaysia, Myanmar (formerly known as Burma), Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. For 
the purpose of this study, however, only six countries are chosen to be examined, including Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. The main reason for selecting these six 
countries is to ensure the availability of data and sufficient sample size for each of the countries. 
Whilst these six countries are considered as the main and most dynamic economies in Southeast Asia 
with sufficient stock exchange markets, countries such as East Tomor, Brunei and Myanmar, did not 
have a national stock exchange at the time of data collection. The other countries, Cambodia and Laos, 
had only two and three listed companies respectively at the data collection time, which is not a 
sufficient sample size to conduct statistical analysis. Furthermore, as the stock exchanges in these 
countries are only at the infant stage, without the need to attract and communicate with foreign 
investors, not all the firms in these countries have an English version of their annual reports, which is 
important for the process of data collection and analysis. Finally, due to the low level of economic 
development in some of these countries, CSR or CSRD is not the priority concern of companies. 
Hence, the use of these countries could result in the incompleteness of the data set. After these careful 
considerations, only data from the six countries, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, was collected in this study.  
The objects of this study are large listed corporations. The sample selection is based on the FTSE 
(Financial Time Stock Exchange) ASEAN all-stars index’s methodology (FTSE, 2015) in which 30 
largest companies are chosen from each stock exchange market to reflect the breadth and depth of the 
ASEAN economy. The selection of only large corporations is justified by the public pressure and 
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elevated level of publicity. Large listed companies consistently publish their annual reports and tend 
to disclose more CSRD information than small and medium companies (Gray et al., 1995b). 
Moreover, across the countries, large listed firms tend to have English versions of their annual reports 
rather than written solely in their native languages. Therefore, the use of large listed firms helps to 
ensure the completeness of the data set and sufficient CSRD from each of the countries. Additionally, 
a large volume of CSRD studies have similarly used large firm samples, therefore increasing the 
potential for comparability of results with previous literature (Branco and Rodrigues, 2007).  
1.5 Research Aims, Objectives and Questions 
 
The study aims to examine the levels and types of CSRD across the six Southeast Asian countries and 
identify the impact of internal (corporate governance mechanisms) and external factors (institutional 
environment) on CSRD. In order to achieve these research aims, the following research objectives 
have been formulated: 
1) To identify and compare the levels of CSRD across the six countries  
2) To identify and examine the effect of relevant corporate governance practices on the level 
of CSRD in the context of Southeast Asian countries 
3) To identify and examine the effect of relevant institutional factors on the level of CSRD in 
the context of these countries 
To achieve the mentioned research objectives, the research questions have been developed as follows: 
Research Question1: 
 To what extent do companies in each of the six Southeast Asia disclose their CSR information 
in annual reports and what type of CSR information (categories) is the most disclosed? 
Research Question 2: 
 What are the differences, if any, among the levels of CSRD across the six Southeast Asian 
countries? 
Research Question 3: 
 What are the important corporate governance determinants of CSRD and to what extent do 
these corporate governance practices influence the level of CSRD in Southeast Asia? 
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Research Question 4: 
 What are the important institutional determinants of CSRD and to what extent do these 
institutional factors influence the level of CSRD in Southeast Asia? 
1.6 Research Settings – Southeast Asia 
1.6.1 Southeast Asia – General Context 
Compared to other regional descriptions, the term Southeast Asia does not have a long or resonant 
history. The term was firstly used during World War II, and the region is now more politically 
understood to be ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) which is the sole inter-
governmental body of the region. ASEAN includes ten full member states, Brunei, Burma (also named 
Myanmar), Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam 
(Lunn and Thompson, 2011). Southeast Asia is home to over 600 million people, making up 9% of 
the global population. One of the key characteristics of Southeast Asia is its cultural and geographical 
diversity, which encompasses a variety history, languages, governments and traditions 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers [PwC], 2012). Significantly, countries in the region appear to be at various 
stages of economic development. For instance, while Myanmar and Cambodia are classified in the 
group of 35 low-income countries by World Bank, Singapore is third in the world in terms of GDP 
(Gross Domestic Product) per capita. Between these extremes are Malaysia, which is expected to be 
at high-income status within the next decade, and Indonesia and Vietnam, where there is a rapid 
increase of living standards but likely to remain in the middle-income group for the near future (Lunn 
and Thompson, 2011).  
The region is also diverse in terms of religion, history, geography and ethnicity. According to SarDesai 
(2012), there are four predominant religions in the region, namely Buddhism, Christianity, Islam and 
Hinduism. Islam is the main religion in Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei, Buddhism is common in 
various forms in Vietnam, Thailand, Burma/ Myanmar, Singapore, Cambodia, and Laos; Christianity 
is dominant in Philippines. Along with the diversity of ethnic groups, there are many different 
languages in the region (Stubbs, 2009). This unique characteristic of diversity in Southeast Asia has 
led to many geographers considering the region’s distinctiveness being its common diversity rather 
than unity, which brings in the perception that Southeast Asia’s regional identity is attributed to its 
external incoherence, rather than internal coherence (Rigg, 1991). ASEAN, it could be argued, has 
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also used this variety to form and promote its regionalism internally among the different countries 
(Sutherland, 2005). 
Southeast Asia is also one of the most dynamic regions in terms of economic development 
(Sundarasen, 2015). Many countries in the region have followed similar paths of development, 
moving from inward-looking agricultural economies to outward-looking, market-oriented 
industrialised economies, which has resulted in openness in trade and capital flow (Lunn and 
Thompson, 2011). To encourage FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) flow into the region, several 
ASEAN countries have conducted domestic reforms by opening sectors that were previously closed 
for foreign investment, such as financial services and telecommunications (KPMG, 2016). Whilst 
there has been greater progress in liberalisation, de-regulation and a reduction in impediments to 
business operations (PwC, 2012), a significant factor that has contributed to the growth of Southeast 
Asia is the attractive labour cost which is sought by multi-national enterprises and local companies 
(Odulukwe, 2011). This competitive advantage is considered as the region’s greatest asset for the 
foreseeable future (PwC, 2012). 
1.6.2 Indonesia 
Indonesia is the largest economy in Southeast Asia (World Bank, 2016a). The country was a former 
colony of the Netherlands and gained its independence in 1945. Indonesia has become the world’s 
third most populous democracy and a diverse archipelago nation with more than 300 ethnic groups 
(World Bank, 2016a; PwC, 2012). The country consists of 18,000 islands of which only 6,000 are 
inhabited, including large islands such as Java, Sumatera, Kalimantan, Sulawasi and Papua, as well 
as popular tourist destinations like Bali, Lombok and Komodo. The capital is Jakarta with a substantial 
proportion of the population living on Java and Bali (Lunn and Thompson, 2011).  
Due to the historical influence of the Dutch colonial administration which lasted 350 years, Indonesia 
follows civil law system with influences from customary laws (Central Intelligence Agency [C.I.A], 
2017a), Islamic law and other Western laws. Judicial power is carried out by the Supreme Court and 
judicial institutions under it (general courts, religious courts, military courts, administrative courts, 
and constitutional court) (Santosa, 2009). The country’s main religion is Islam which is makes up 
approximately 89% of the population (C.I.A, 2017b). Other religions, such as Protestantism, 
Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism, have also been recognised by the government 
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(PwC, 2012). In terms of languages, there are over 450 languages in the country with two main 
language groups, Austronesian and Papuan. The national language is Indonesian, a variant of Malay. 
As the largest economy in the region, Indonesia has a consistent growth of 5% or better since 1998. 
The country’s gross national income per capita has increased from $560 in the year of 2000 to $3,374 
in 2015. Today, Indonesia is the world’s 10th largest economy based on purchasing power parity and 
the only country in Southeast Asia which is a member of the G20. According to the recent report of 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2016), Indonesia’s growth 
continues to be higher than that of most other countries. The increase in demand, mostly by household 
consumption, has been recorded as a result of healthy labour market outcomes and strong wage gains. 
The country has also made impressive strides in reducing its poverty rate to more than half since 1999 
to 11.2% in 2015, (World Bank, 2016a) which could also be attributed to Indonesia’s economic 
openness (Agusalim, 2017). Despite this impressive achievement, a more liberal trade relationship 
has meant that the country has suffered from major deforestation since 1950 and is also the world’s 
3rd largest greenhouse gas emitter (Lunn and Thompson, 2011; Oktavilia and Firmansyah, 2016). 
1.6.3 Malaysia 
 
Malaysia is a former British colony which became independence in 1957. The country is divided into 
two non-contiguous regions by the South China Sea, the Malaysian Peninsular region bordering 
Thailand and the Malaysia-Borneo region bordering Indonesia and Brunei (Airriess, 2000; PwC, 
2012). The country has a diverse range of ethnic groups consisting of Malay (50.1%), Chinese 
(22.6%), indigenous (11.8%) and Indian (6.7%), providing an array of spoken languages that include 
Bahasa Malaysia (official language), English, Tamil, Thai and Chinese (Cantonese, Mandarin, 
Hokkein etc.) (C.I.A, 2017b). 
Malaysia follows the common law system (Kouwenberg, Salomons and Thontirawong, 2014), 
however, its legal system is also influenced by other law practices, such as Islamic law, customary 
law, and judicial review of legislative acts (C.I.A, 2017b). Malaysia’s politics is centred on a strong-
state parliamentary democracy that could be characterised as autocratic due to the longevity and 
influence of the ruling party, Barisan Nasional (Slater, 2012). The country is characterised by a 
Federal system, where thirteen states absolve some powers such as defence, economic and education 
to the centralised government. Malaysia is also characterised by a constitutional monarchy which 
safeguard specific traditions and customs. 
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With Malaysia’s richness in natural resources, the country has been long dependent on agriculture 
and primary commodities. Over the past 20 years, however, Malaysia has made substantial 
progress and moved from exporting commodities to manufacturing and exporting in capital-
intensive, high-technology and knowledge-based industries (Airriess, 2000). As a result it is now 
an open and industrialised market economy. The role of government in directing economic activity 
has declined but is still significant. In terms of economic growth, the country has been one of the 
best in the region due to the impressive economic records after independence (Lunn and 
Thompson, 2011). Malaysia was listed as one of the 13 countries with the recorded growth of 7% 
per year for 25 years or more. The country now is classified as upper-middle income economy 
with a significant middle class of consumers. Malaysia is also one of the founding members of the 
WTO and continues to be active in multilateral liberalisation, as well as regional and bilateral 
cooperation (PwC, 2012). The country aims to become a high income country by 2020 (OECD, 
2016). 
Together with these economic achievements, the Malaysian government has also been successful 
in reducing poverty with the decrease of $2 per day poverty rate from 12% in 1984 to 2% in 2009 
(Lunn and Thompson, 2011) and continues to reduce income inequality substantially (Hooi, 
Nguyen and Su, 2013). Disparities, however, still exist, especially between rural and urban 
households, and between different ethnic groups. For instance, although the difference has been 
reduced since independence, Chinese and Indian-origin households continue to have a higher 
income than the indigenous population. The government has subsequently attempted to reduce 
these gaps, through actions such as allowing indigenous people to have preferential access to 
universities and government jobs, increasing the involvement of the corporate sector, and 
transferring state assets to these groups (Lunn and Thompson, 2011). The government has to some 
extent been successful in preventing ethnic conflict and maintaining social stability despite 
inequalities between the different ethnic groups (Segawa, 2017).  
1.6.4 Philippines 
 
The Philippines is an archipelago of 7,107 islands located off the south eastern coast of mainland 
Asia. The country was colonized by Spain for over 300 years before it was ceded to America in 
1898, and only in 1846 did the country gain its independence (PwC, 2012). Luzon and Mindanao, 
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the two largest islands, together with 9 other largest islands, make up 92% of the country’s total 
land mass. The country is densely populated, second to Singapore in the region. The indigenous 
people of Philippines, Filipinos, have the highest population while the Chinese population is 
around 1%. Between these two groups, Filipinos of mixed race form a large proportion of the 
country’s elite, which widely use English for communication despite the country’s official national 
language being Tagalog (Lunn and Thompson, 2011). In terms of religion, the majority of the 
population are Catholic and subsequently, this has had a significant effect on the culture of the 
country. Other religions that have been recognised in the country include Islam, Evangelical, and 
Iglesia ni Kristo (C.I.A, 2017c).  
The Philippines is a democratic republic. The country follows a presidential form of Government 
adopted from the United States in which national and local elections are frequently held in freedom 
and fairness. There are three branches in the government, the Executive, Legislative and Judicial 
branches. Mirroring the US system, the president heads the executive branch, and a bicameral 
Congress comprise the Legislative branch. The members of the House of Representatives are 
elected by district and Senators are elected at large. The Judiciary functions on a system of courts 
led by the Chief Justice along with 14 Associate Justices (PwC, 2012). Philippines’ legal system 
is influenced by the civil law origin (Kouwenberg et al., 2014).  
Similar with most countries in Southeast Asia, Philippines’ economic system is open and market-
oriented, however, the government still regulates the pricing mechanism in a few sectors to protect 
consumers. Philippines is an emerging economy which has transited from agriculture-based one 
to services and manufacturing based (Roy and Chatterjee, 2013). Although the economy retains a 
large agricultural sector, services have become more dominant (PwC, 2012). Projections indicate 
that the economic growth of Philippines will tend to be limited by low domestic savings and 
investment rates in future. The country has also failed to translate economic growth into poverty 
reduction and education improvements, especially compared with Indonesia and Malaysia (Lunn 
and Thompson, 2011). Despite the strong economic performance from 1997, the severe $1.25 per 
day poverty rate around 23% has remained unchanged since 1997. The main reason for the 
country’s struggle in poverty reduction is the poor administration of public expensive on social 
programmes. 
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1.6.5 Singapore 
 
Singapore is a small city-state island located to the south of peninsular Malaysia and is one of the 
world’s most densely populated areas (Lunn and Thompson, 2011). The country’s total land mass 
is around 710 square kilometres, making it the smallest country in Southeast Asia and one of the 
smallest in the world (PwC, 2012). Singapore’s population is made up by three main groups, 
Chinese (77%), Malay (14%), and Indian (8%). The country has four official languages, Chinese, 
English, Malay and Tamil (Lunn and Thompson, 2011).  
The rapid growth of the country is highly attributed to the stable and competent ruling government, 
a system of which is highly coveted throughout the World (Ho, 2016). The political system 
concentrates on democracy, with a parliamentary system of government in which an elected 
President is the Head of State. The Singapore Parliament has a single house and its member is 
elected every five years through a general election. The political scene of Singapore is, however, 
dominated by the People’s Action Party (PAP) which has won 13 successive elections since 1959, 
and similar to Malaysia, has lead the country’s governing practices to be labelled autocratic 
(Morgenbesser, 2016; PwC, 2012). Singapore’s legal system follows the English common law 
(C.I.A, 2017d).  
Singapore is the only developed country in Southeast Asia region (Roy and Chatterjee, 2013). 
Although the country does not have an advantage in natural resources, Singapore is strategically 
located on the sea route from the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea, with a strong and highly 
globalised economy specialising in trade, electronics and financial services. The country has 
impressively moved from third world to first world status since its independence in 1965, 
considering its similar starting point with other countries in the region and lack of natural 
resources. Although the country has historically not been completely urban, it has not felt the 
burden and struggles of a large agricultural sector (Peebles and Wilson, 2002). With the GDP per 
capita at $59,000 in 2011, the country became the third-highest in the world in terms of living 
standards, only behind Luxembourg and Qatar. The average wage, however, is relatively low 
compared to other high-income countries (Lunn and Thompson, 2011).  
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1.6.6 Thailand 
Thailand, previously named Siam, is the only country in the region that has never been formally 
colonised. The country is located at the centre of Southeast Asia and borders Myanmar, Laos, 
Cambodia and Malaysia (Lunn and Thompson, 2011). Due to its historical development, 
Thailand’s population, compared with other countries, is relatively homogeneous, with more than 
85% of the population speaking Thai and sharing a similar culture. Apart from the language of the 
central Thai population that was used in government and taught at school, there are several smaller 
groups speaking other languages such as the Shan, Lue and Phutai (Zebioli, 2009). The majority 
of the population live in rural areas surrounding rice-growing areas of central north-eastern and 
northern regions. The urban population (31.6% of the total population), mostly contained in the 
Bangkok area, is growing substantially. The main religion, in which more than approximately 95% 
of Thai people follow is Buddhism. Spirit worship and animism are also widely practiced. Aside 
from Buddhism, the government also allows religious diversity and other regions to co-exist 
(Zebioli, 2009), such as Islam (4.9%) and Christianity (1.2%) (C.I.A, 2017e) 
The Kingdom of Thailand has been under monarchical rule since the 13th century. The political 
system, therefore, is a constitutional monarchy with the King as the head of state and an elected 
prime minister as the head of government (PwC, 2012). Different from other countries with a 
monarchy, the King has substantial power over the legislative process and law. Moreover, the King 
is held in high esteem by all Thais, regardless of their political views and affiliation.  Despite this 
popularity, the country’s civil politics has become intense and volatile, with multiple coups in the 
last eighty years (PwC, 2012). Thailand’s legal system is influenced by the common law 
(Kouwenberg et al., 2014).  
Thailand is the second-largest economy in Southeast Asia, second to Indonesia. International trade 
and foreign capital has also helped to transform the country from a traditional agricultural economy 
to an upper middle-income industrial exporter (Lunn and Thompson, 2011). Like Malaysia and 
Vietnam, Thailand is an export-dependent country (Zebioli, 2009), focusing on major 
manufacturing industries (such as textiles, electronics and auto components), agricultural 
commodities and seafood. Tourism and other services are also vital for the economy. Although 
manufacturing for exports will still be the largest component of Thai economy, due to the growing 
middle class there has been an acceleration to a more consumer driven economy (PwC, 2012).  
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Due to economic development, Thailand’s poverty rate has been reduced significantly from 67% 
in 1986 to 11% in 2014. Poverty and inequality, however, remain huge challenges considering 
falling economic growth, a drop in agricultural prices and increasing droughts (World Bank, 
2016e). Over 80% of poor people live in rural areas, only adding to the unequal distribution of 
wealth in Thailand when compared with many countries in East Asia (World Bank, 2016e). 
1.6.7 Vietnam 
 
Vietnam covers the total area of 331,210 square kilometres and borders the Gulf of Thailand, Gulf 
of Tonkin, South China Sea, Cambodia, China and Laos (C.I.A, 2017f). The country was divided 
into two following French colonial rule, with North Vietnam following Communism and South 
Vietnam allied to the United States. When the socialists of North Vietnam won the war again the 
US in 1975, the country became independent. The capital of Vietnam is Hanoi, however, Ho Chi 
Minh City, formerly named Saigon, is the largest city. In 2015, Vietnam was ranked the 14th in 
terms of population with more than 90 million people (World Bank, 2016f). The south is more 
urbanised and contains a large population, however, 70% of the total population still lives in rural 
areas (Lunn and Thompson, 2011). The country has high diversity with 54 ethnic groups 
recognised by the government with largest percentage of the population, the Kinh (Viet) people 
(85.7%). Regarding languages, the country uses Vietnamese as the official language. The use of 
English has also been favoured as the second language, and similarly other languages are spoken 
such as French, Chinese, Khmer as well as mountainous area languages.  
The country’s official name is the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. As a socialist country, Vietnam 
has only one political party, the Communist Party of Vietnam which has led the country since its 
reunification in 1975 (PwC, 2012). The National Party Congress is held every five years to define 
the country’s orientation and strategies for social and economic development. The highest law-
making body is the National Assembly. The country follows the European-style civil law system 
(C.I.A, 2017f). The Head of State representing Vietnam in domestic and foreign affairs is the 
President, while the Prime Minister is the leader of the government and responsible for its 
operations. With the consistency of a one-party political system, Vietnam’s political landscape is 
known for being stable (PwC, 2012). 
36 
 
In terms of economic development, with the launch of the Doi Moi (economic renovation) reforms 
in 1980s to move from a centralised planned economy to a globally integrated socialist-orientated 
market economy, the country has become an example of development success. In less than a 
generation, the country has moved from being one of the poorest countries in the world to a middle-
income economy. Vietnam’s GDP per capita growth, with the average of 6.4% in the 2000s, is one 
of the fastest in the world. With impressive economic growth, the country has achieved rapid 
reduction in poverty and an improvement in social outcomes. The number of people living in 
extreme poverty has decreased from 50% in early 1990s to 3% in 2012 (World Bank, 2016f). 
Vietnamese people are also better educated and have higher life expectancy compared with most 
countries with similar incomes, however, the fast economic growth has had a negative influence 
on the environment over the past 25 years, causing water and air pollution, as well as dramatic 
depletion of natural resources. Consequently, the country was ranked in the top five countries most 
affected by climate change (World Bank, 2016f). 
The section has provided an overview of the Southeast Asia region in general and the six examined 
countries in particular. Table 1, below, presents further information and figures such as key social 
and economic indicators of these six countries. The indicators demonstrate the diversity across the 
six countries. In terms of socio demography, several indicators in relation to land area, population, 
life expectancy, literacy rate and unemployment rate, are presented. The ASEAN region has 
population of nearly 650 million people and a land area of 4.5 million square kilometres, with one 
extreme being Singapore with the population of over 5 million people and 0.7 million square 
kilometres in land area. As a result of its small territory, Singapore has a very high level of 
population density despite the low population. The average of population density across the 
ASEAN member states is approximately 141 people per square kilometres. Apart from the 
extremely high density of Singapore, Philippines also has a higher than average level of density. 
The percentage of population growth in ASEAN is relatively low with 1.3%. Among the six 
countries, the population growth rate is ranging from the lowest in the case of Thailand (0.3%) to 
the highest of Philippines (1.6%). All of the countries, however, have the  population growth rate 
less than 2%. According to Hock and Teng (2014), the populations of all ASEAN state members 
are expected to become aged by 2050, six of which, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam by 2025. On the other hand, life expectancy has increased 
throughout the years with variations among the countries. The average life expectancy in ASEAN 
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is nearly 71 years. There exists large variations in life expectancy across the six countries with 
most of the countries, except for the case of Philippines (70.4 years), having the same or higher 
life expectancy than the average. Singapore, as expected from a developed country, has the highest 
life expentacy (82.9 years), while Malaysia and Thailand follow with 74.8 and 74.3 years 
respectively. The life expectancy is relatively comparable with each country’s level of economic 
development. Regarding poverty indicators, the poverty levels among ASEAN countries based on 
the national poverty lines ranges from 0.6% to 25.6% with six state members have at least 10% of 
the populations living in poverty (ASEAN, 2017a). Among the six presented countries, Philippines 
has very high proportion of population living below the national poverty line (22%), followed by 
the cases of Thailand (14%) and Indonesia (11%). In total, across all the member nations, within 
ASEAN 14% of the population lives under the national poverty lines. Despite the different 
minimum standards of poverty, ASEAN state members have made substantive progress in 
reducing poverty, particularly extreme poverty, over the past fifteen years.  
One of the more pronounced features amongst many ASEAN countires is the rural-urban divide 
in relation to weath distribution. The urban population varies across the countries. While Vietnam 
only has 34% of the population living in urban areas, this percentage is higher in the other 
countries, particularly Thailand (75%) or Indonesia (54%). Singapore, as a city-state, undoubtedly 
has a 100% urban population. Poverty in these countries is highly relevant in rural areas than urban 
areas. For instance, in Vietnam, the rural poverty rate is four times higher than the urban poverty 
rate (ASEAN, 2017a). Despite the relatively high percentage of poverty in some of the countries, 
adult literacy rates are very high in the region. The unemployement rates also vary across the 
countries. While Thailand has only 1% unemployement rate, the percentage of unemployment is 
higher in Indonesia (5.6%) and Philippines (5.5%). 
In realtion to economic indicators, ASEAN is one of the fastest growing economic regions in the 
world. In 2016, the total GDP in the region was approximately 2.6 trillion US$. The region’s GDP 
makes up 6.2% of the World’s GDP. The percentage has significantly increased from 3.4% in 1967 
(ASEAN, 2017b). Indonesia is the largest economy in ASEAN with the total GDP of 931 million 
US dollars. GDP of the other countries ranges from 198 million US dollars (Vietnam) to 407 
million US dollars (Thailand). Among the six countries, Philippines, Vietnam and Indonesia have 
high GDP growth rate with the percentages of 6.9%, 6.2% and 5.0% respectively. The countries 
38 
 
also have moderate levels of inflation, with the exception of Singapore. Singapore’s inflation 
deflated 0.5% at the end of 2016. The total FDI inflows in the region was approximately 98 billion 
US dollars. Although the FDI flows remained at the high level in 2016, flows have declined by 
20%, in congruence with the general decline in FDI flows worldwide and in flows to developing 
countries (ASEAN, 2017b). The level of FDI inflows to ASEAN, however, is still much higher 
than in any other regional association in the developing world. The region is accountable for over 
20% of all the FDI stock in developing economies; and its FDI inflows make up 8% of the global 
inward FDI. The inflows in the region has been diversed to many industries with the focus on 
manufacturing and services sectors. Among the six countries, in 2016, Singapore had significantly 
higher total FDI inflows (53,912 million US dollars) than the other five countries, despite the 
decline of 13.7% compared to the previous year. In relation to the rates of growth of FDI inflows, 
Philippines has very high percentage of growth (40.7%), demonstrating the attractiveness of this 
market for foreign investment. In contrast, the FDI inflows have significantly decreased in the case 
of Indonesia and Thailand in 2016 by 78.8% and 68.2% respectively. The following table also 
presents the total trade in goods and services in ASEAN and across the six countries specifically.  
 
 
39 
 
Table 1: Selected socio-economic indicators 
Indicators Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam ASEAN 
Socio Demography 
Land area (Sqkm) 1,913,578.7 331,388.0 300,000 719.2 513,119.5 331,230.8 4,500,000 
Population, total (in thousand) 258,705 31,633.5 103,242.9 5,607.3 67,454.7 92,695.1 634,500 
Population growth (annual %) 
(2015) 
1.2 1.4 1.6 1.2 0.3 1.1 1.3 
Population density (persons per 
sqkm) 
135.2 95.5 344.1 7,796.6 131.5 279.9 141.3 
Life expectancy (years) 70.9 74.8 70.4 82.9 74.3 73.4 70.9 
Urban population (%) 54.0 75.0 44.0 100.0 
 
52.0 34.0 49.0 
Proportion of population below 
national poverty line (%) 
11.0 1.0 22.0 n.a 14.0 7.0 14.0 
Adult Literacy rate (%) 95.9 94.9 96.5 97.0 96.1 95.0 94.9 
Unemployment rate (%) 
 
5.6 3.4 5.5 3.0 
 
1.0 2.1 1.0-6.9 
Economy 
GDP (current million US$) 931,216.2 299,632.2 311,452.5 296,977.4 407,048.0 198,196.3 2,559,462.7 
GDP growth (annual %) 5.0 4.2 6.9 2.0 3.2 6.2 4.8 
Inflation rate (%) 3.0 2.1 1.8 (0.5) 0.2 2.7 n.a 
Total FDI inflows (US$mn) 3,520.8 11,328.8 7,933.1 
 
53,912.2 2,553.2 12,600.0 98,042.5 
Rate of growth of FDI inflows 
(%) 
(78.8) 11.3 40.7 (13.7) (68.2) 6.8 (18.6) 
Total trade in goods (US$m) 280,839.0 357,806.6 142,248.0 629,992.6 409,994.2 351,038.5 2,236,343.3 
Total services trade (US$m) 53,999.5 75,143.2 55,590.0 305,233.0 108,023.0 28,705.0 643,407.8 
Notes: All statistics are in the year 2016 unless otherwise stated 
Source: ASEAN
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1.7 Methodology 
 
With the purpose of examining the causal relationship between independent variables (institutional 
factors and corporate governance practices) and the dependent variable (CSRD) that were 
established in the literature review based on the theoretical frameworks, a deductive approach with 
quantitative strategy is the appropriate methodology for this study (Bryman, 2016; Bryman and 
Bell, 2011; Gray, 2014). Data for this study was collected mostly from annual reports. Information 
that could not be collected in annual reports, such as membership of CSR-related associations, or 
participation in GRI reporting standard, were collected from relevant websites. The level of CSRD 
was identified based on information provided in annual reports in which content analysis technique 
is used. The use of content analysis is an appropriate data collection method for this study due to 
the following justifications. Firstly, according to Babbie (2013), content analysis technique is well-
suited for study of communication in which CSRD is a form of corporate communication. Content 
analysis has been traditionally used to collect data in CSRD studies (see Gray et al., 2001; 
Hackston and Milne, 1996; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Mirfazli, 2008; Othman et al., 2011; Tan et 
al., 2016; Trotman and Bradley, 1981). As a result, consistent with previous literature, this study 
also applies content analysis to determine the level of CSRD. The use of this data collection 
technique also arises from the practical approach that data accessibility is restricted in this study 
due to the limited ability to travel across all the six countries.  
The content analysis template is adapted from the study of Branco and Rodrigues (2008). The 
template with its classification of CSRD into four main categories, environmental disclosure, 
human resources disclosure, consumers and products disclosure and community involvement 
disclosure, as explained previously, is appropriate to examine CSRD in Southeast Asia context. 
Moreover, the template also has a high level of credibility as it was developed based on previous 
well-established studies, however, the only drawback of the template is that it only provides 
general information regarding categories and subcategories which may cause confusion during the 
analysis process. The detailed description for each item in the template (Appendix 2) is developed 
based on pilot examination of 18 annual reports as well as previous studies to ensure the detail 
guidance address all the relevant CSRD of firms in the six countries.  
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After obtaining all the relevant data, the data analysis process was conducted as follows. Firstly, 
all data went through the data examination process to identify any potential problem with the data, 
such as errors, missing data, or outliers. With the two main aims of the research; comparing levels 
across the region and identifying the impact of determinants on CSRD, two main analysis 
techniques, ANOVA and multiple regressions, are applied respectively. ANOVA data analysis 
with post-hoc tests is used to identify differences between the levels of CSRD across the six 
countries, while multiple regressions are run to identify the effect of external and internal factors 
on CSRD. These two techniques have been widely applied in previous CSRD studies (see Adams 
et al., 1998; Hamid, 2004; Hossain et al., 2006; Naser, Al-Hussaini, Al-Kwari and Nuseibeh, 
2006). All the relevant assumptions to the two analysis techniques were also carefully examined 
and additional analyses are conducted to ensure the consistency and robustness of the empirical 
findings.   
1.8 Research Findings and Contributions 
 
Based on the review of current literature and the gaps identified in section 1.2, the data from 171 
companies in the six Southeast Asian countries was collected and analysed to answer the research 
questions addressed in section 1.4. The findings of this study provide multiple empirical and 
theoretical contributions. 
Firstly, the study has identified the levels of CSRD in six Southeast Asian countries, including 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. Therefore, in response to the 
gap that majority of CSRD determinants studies conducted in Southeast Asia have strongly 
focused on a few countries, such as Indonesia and Malaysia (table 3), the study provided a better 
understanding of CSRD across the region, as individual countries were only studied in a limited 
manner in previous research. Moreover, due to the lack of comparative studies in the region, the 
study has attempted to provide an empirical contribution examining whether there are any 
differences in the level of CSRD across the six countries. The findings concluded that the two 
countries with the highest level of CSRD are Thailand and Indonesia, while the Philippines and 
Vietnam were found to have the lowest CSRD. Between these two extremes are Singapore and 
Malaysia. The finding is interesting in the sense that the level of CSRD does not reflect a country’s 
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economic development stage, thereby attributing these differences in the level of CSRD to other 
institutional factors.   
Secondly, in response to the lack of studies considering the impact of external determinants on 
CSRD, the study has examined the role of institutional factors. The study also contributes 
theoretically to the growing literature emphasising the role of the institutional environment in 
shaping firms’ CSR practices (see Brammer, Jackson and Matten, 2012; Campbell, 2007; Cormier, 
Magnan and van Velthoven, 2005; Lee, 2011; Marquis, Glynn and Davis, 2007) and by identifying 
relevant institutional factors influencing CSRD based on the institutions’ framework of Scott 
(1995). Consequently, the study is one of few studies that has attempted to quantify relevant 
institutional factors and examine the impact of these factors on CSRD. The impact of the external 
institutional environment was examined through different institutional pillars, including 
regulative, cultural-cognitive and normative. Based on the institutional theory, Scott’s framework 
(1995) and existing literature, the two institutional factors, legal origin and mandatory disclosure, 
are identified to present the impact of regulative pillars, Hofstede’s (2005) uncertainty avoidance 
and masculinity cultural dimensions representing cultural-cognitive pillar, and finally, the 
adoption of GRI standard and membership of CSR-related associations representing the effect of 
normative pillar. The empirical findings showed that mandatory disclosure, the two cultural 
dimensions and the adoption of GRI standard have significant impact on the level of CSRD in the 
context of the six countries. While mandatory disclosure, GRI reporting standard and uncertainty 
avoidance have a positive impact on CSRD, the effect of the masculinity dimension was found to 
be negative. Amongst the four significant institutional factors, mandatory disclosure representative 
of the regulative pillar is the strongest indicator of CSRD, followed by the two cultural dimensions 
representing cultural-cognitive pillar, and finally, the adoption of GRI standard of normative pillar. 
Similar with the observation of Muthuri and Gilbert (2011), the results imply that institutional 
environment influences the level of CSRD through all three pillars with certain institutional factors 
having more impact than others. Moreover, the strongest effect of mandatory disclosure among all 
the institutional factors found in this study supports the statement of Campbell (2006) that 
corporations tend to act more responsibly if there are strong and well-enforced regulations 
supporting such behaviour.  
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Thirdly, as discussed in section 1.2, there is a need for more studies examining the impact of 
corporate governance on CSRD in Southeast Asia. The findings of this study, therefore, contribute 
to the limited literature considering the effect of corporate governance on CSRD in this context. 
As expected, the findings provide some different points of view on this matter compared with 
previous studies (e.g. Barako and Brown, 2008; Htay, Rashid, Adnan and Meera, 2012; Jizi et al., 
2014). Four corporate governance factors were found to have a significant impact on CSRD, 
including board size, board gender diversity, block ownership and the presence of CSR committee. 
Board size and the presence of CSR committee have a positive effect while the impact of board 
gender diversity and block ownership was found to be negative. The impact of block ownership 
and the presence of CSR committee is consistent with previous literature (Khan, Chand and Patel, 
2013b; Michelon and Parbonetti, 2012; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013; Reverte, 2009), however, the 
negative effect of female directors and the positive effect of larger board size are not common 
findings in other studies (see Barako and Brown, 2008; Frias-Aceituno, Rodriguez-Ariza and 
Garcia-Sanchez, 2013a). The finding showed that in contrast to the opinions that larger board size 
tends to be ineffective (Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2004), large boards are a customary practice 
amongst firms in these countries. The role of female directors in this context is also different. 
Female directors are often associated with a caring nature and are expected to pressure managers 
into engaging more with CSR practices (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). The negative effect of 
female directors found in this study, however, could be the result of the lack of board independence 
caused from the extremely low proportion of female directors on board (Amran, Periasamy and 
Zulkafli, 2014b). Moreover, opposite to the traditional conclusion that independent directors 
would motivate increased firm involvement in CSRD (see Barako and Brown, 2008; Htay et al., 
2012; Jizi et al., 2014), the percentage of independent directors has almost no effect, a cause of 
high block ownership (Chen and Nowland, 2010), as well as management’s limited CSR 
awareness, and knowledge in some of the countries (Binh, 2016; Chapple and Moon, 2005; 
Nguyen et al., 2015) 
The findings of this study, in general, have also provided some practical contributions. 
Identification of levels of CSRD across the six countries in Southeast Asia allows each country to 
compare the level of its firms’ CSRD with the others and learn from the experience of the countries 
with constructive practices. Moreover, the study also provides evidence of the diverse impact of 
some corporate governance practices in the regional context. The findings, therefore, allow 
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researchers, governments and other institutions to review the role of corporate governance in this 
context and open opportunities for further development. In terms of the institutional environment, 
the findings highlight the integral role of government in motivating firms to participate in CSRD. 
The findings also support the effectiveness of GRI reporting standard in guiding firms to improve 
their CSRD. Finally, results of this study encourage CSR-related associations to review their 
activities and play a constructive role in encouraging their members to take part in CSRD.  
1.9 Thesis Structure 
 
As presented at Figure 1.2, the chapter is divided into seven chapters. A brief content of each 
chapter is provided as follows: 
Chapter One begins with background information on the concepts of CSR and CSRD, followed 
by a brief discussion of relevant literature. Based on the review of previous literature, empirical 
and theoretical gaps are identified, from which motivations for conducting this research are 
presented. The chapter continues with the scope of this study, research aims, research questions 
and research objectives. A brief context of Southeast Asia and each of the six examined countries 
is also provided. The chapter concludes with a summary of the research findings and contributions 
as well as the presentation of the thesis’s structure.  
Chapter Two provides definitions of CSR reporting and CSRD. The scope and categories of 
CSRD (environmental disclosure, human resources disclosure, consumers and products disclosure 
and community involvement disclosure) form a detailed discussion. The chapter then presents 
empirical studies regarding determinants of CSRD, from which the gaps and limitations are 
identified. Additionally, the chapter provides essential information to develop CSRD instrument 
and locate this research within contemporary literature. 
Chapter Three focuses on the discussion of theoretical framework, a review of literature on the 
impact of corporate governance and institutional factors on CSRD and hypotheses development. 
The chapter starts with a session on theoretical framework in which relevant theories are identified 
and discussed in relation to CSR and CSRD studies then moves to justify the choice of multi-
theoretical framework, a combination of legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory, institutional theory 
and agency theory. Based on the discussion of theoretical framework, relevant internal 
determinants (corporate governance) and external determinants (institutional factors) are 
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identified, and relevant hypotheses are developed. The hypotheses development session, hence, is 
divided into two main sub-sections. The first sub-section focuses on the impact of corporate 
governance mechanisms on CSRD. The sub-section begins with a brief discussion on corporate 
governance definition, followed by an overview of corporate governance development and legal 
frameworks, together with comparisons of key practices across the six countries. The sub-section 
then provides a literature review on the relationship between corporate governance and CSRD. Six 
relevant corporate governance practices (board size, board independence, board gender diversity, 
CEO duality, block ownership and the presence of CSR committee) on CSRD are formed on the 
discussion of relevant literature and theories. In the second sub-section, the impact of institutional 
environment on CSRD is the main focus. The second sub-section starts with an overview of CSR 
and CSRD development across the six countries, followed by a discussion of the relationship 
between institutional environment and CSRD to highlight the need for studies looking at the role 
of institutional environment in shaping firms’ CSRD practice. Based on the Scott’s framework, 
six institutional factors, including legal origin, mandatory disclosure, uncertainty avoidance, 
masculinity, GRI standard and CSR-related associations, are identified to examine the effect of 
three institutional pillar, regulative, cultural-cognitive and normative on CSRD. Hypotheses on the 
effect of these institutional factors on CSRD are then developed based on the theoretical 
framework and previous studies.   
Chapter Four summarises the research methodology. The chapter begins with a discussion on 
research philosophy. Justification for using quantitative research method and content analysis data 
collection is provided. The chapter, then, continues with the discussion of research population, 
sampling type and an overview of the study’s subjects. Next, the measurements of the dependent, 
independent and control variables are presented with the support of previous literature. Finally, the 
types of data analysis techniques are mentioned based on the nature of each research question.  
Chapter Five is the first chapter of data analysis. The chapter provides descriptive statistics for 
all the dependent, independent and control variables. The statistics of the dependent variable, 
CSRDI are first presented and then discussed across three levels of analysis, country level, industry 
level and category level. Next, the descriptive statistics of the independent variables are divided 
into two main sub-sections for internal determinants (corporate governance variables) and external 
determinants (institutional variables), followed up by a discussion of these statistics across the six 
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countries based on previous literature and the study context. Finally, the descriptive statistics of 
all the control variables are addressed.  
Chapter Six (Part 1) aims to provide an answer for the research question regarding whether the 
levels of CSRD are different across the examined countries using the ANOVA data analysis 
technique. The chapter starts with testing ANOVA’s assumptions (absence of outliers, normality 
of sampling distribution of means, homoscedasticity and independence of errors). As all the 
assumptions are not seriously violated, ANOVA analysis and the Kruskal-Wallis test are 
performed with the conclusion that there is a significant difference between CSRD levels across 
the six countries. The presentation of post-hoc tests follows to identify the specific groups of 
countries with the significant difference. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the 
findings. 
Chapter Six (Part 2) presents the empirical findings regarding the impact of corporate governance 
practices on CSRD. The chapter starts with the assumptions testing for OLS regression model (1) 
which includes CSRDI (the dependent variable), corporate governance variables (the independent 
variables) and control variables. Upon the satisfaction of all the assumptions, the empirical results 
of the regression model are presented to examine the impact of each independent and control 
variables on CSRD. The section then continues with the use of alternative models to inspect the 
level of robustness and sensitivity of the results. The results from the original model and sensitivity 
analyses all confirm the significant impact of board size, board gender diversity, block ownership 
and the presence of CSR committee on CSRD. Finally, a review and discussion of the results in 
relation to previous studies will be provided at the end of the section.  
Chapter Six (Part 3) presents the empirical findings regarding the effect of institutional factors 
on CSRD. Firstly, similar with the previous section, OLS assumptions are examined, followed by 
the performance of OLS regression model to achieve the empirical results for both independent 
and control variables. The robustness and sensitivity of the results are then examined by the use of 
several alternative model. The results from the original model and sensitivity analyses provide 
consistent findings with the four significant independent variables, mandatory reporting, 
uncertainty avoidance, masculinity and GRI reporting standard. Finally, a discussion of empirical 
findings based on previous studies concludes the chapter.  
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Chapter Seven is the concluding chapter of the thesis. The chapter firstly re-addresses the research 
questions and discusses how the findings in this study answer each of these. The chapter then 
provides arguments for theoretical, empirical and practical contributions of the research. The 
limitations of the study are also addressed. The chapter concludes with recommendations for future 
research in the field of CSRD determinants.  
1.10 Chapter Summary  
Chapter One has provided background information about the concepts of CSR and CSRD. 
Relevant literature in the field of CSRD determinants was also discussed to identify empirical and 
theoretical gaps, from which motivations of conducting this study are based on. In the chapter, the 
scope of the study, research aims, objectives and questions were addressed. Moreover, the chapter 
presented a brief context information of Southeast Asia in general and each of the six examined 
countries. Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary of research findings and contributions as 
well as the organisation of the thesis.  
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Figure 2: Structure of the thesis 
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CHAPTER 2: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY DISCLOSURE 
 
2.1 Overview 
 
The main objectives of this chapter are to provide an overview of the current literature regarding 
determinants of CSRD and identify specific gaps that highlight the contributions of this study. The 
chapter starts by examining definitions including an attempt to differentiate between CSR 
reporting and CSRD, then followed by a review of previous literature on the scope and categories 
of CSRD. Consequently, an appropriate CSRD instrument is selected from a previous study. A 
detailed description of each category then follows to provide a defined understanding of included 
information for individual categories. The next section presents a review of previous studies 
regarding CSRD determinants. The chapter concludes with a discussion of relevant gaps in the 
literature and how this research fits in with contemporary literature.  
2.2 CSR reporting and CSRD 
 
The origin of corporate social and environmental reporting is largely associated with the dawn of 
the modern corporation (Buhr, 2007). Its notion was developed from the social theory view in 
which the corporation owe a duty to their respective society (Reynolds and Yuthas, 2008). The 
earliest trend of CSR reporting started with the use of annual reports to manage public opinion and 
satisfy stakeholders (Neu et al. 1998; Patten, 1992). The development of CSR reporting began 
with employee reporting, and then moved toward more diverse types such as social reporting, 
environment reporting, triple bottom line reporting and ideally sustainability reporting (Bhur, 
2007). CSR reporting began to receive increased attention in the early 1990s for numerous reasons, 
including greater public awareness, pressure from stakeholders, and social concerns over negative 
business conduct (Tschopp and Nastanski, 2014). With the growing importance of key 
stakeholders and the recognition of broader duties of accountability with non-financial 
expectations from stakeholders, the role of CSR reporting as a mechanism to address these duties 
has become integral (Gray, Owen and Adams, 1996). Aligned with the pertinence of CSR 
reporting, this phenomenon has become prominent as a research topic. Many academics, therefore, 
have attempted to define CSR reporting which results in various definitions evidenced in 
contemporary literature. Some examples of these definitions are presented as follows:  
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 “CSR reporting is a key tool for communication with stakeholders about an organisation’s 
CSR activities.” (Golob and Bartlett, 2007, p.1) 
“Voluntary disclosure of information, both qualitative and quantitative, made by 
organisations to inform or influence a range of audiences.” (Mathews, 1984, p.204) 
“Social and environmental disclosure can typically be thought of as comprising 
information relating to a corporation's activities, aspirations and public image with regard 
to environmental, community, employee and consumer issues.” (Gray et al., 2001, p.329) 
“Corporate social disclosure can be defined as the provision of financial and non-financial 
information relating to an organization’s interaction with its physical and social 
environment, as stated in annual report or separate social reports.”  
(Hackston and Milne, 1996, p.78).  
Through these definitions, CSR reporting is frequently agreed as a way through which 
organisations communicate information regarding their CSR activities with diverse stakeholders. 
Even though there is no commonly accepted definition for CSR reporting, the definition of Gray 
et al. (1987) has been extensively used to define CSR reporting: 
“The process of communicating the social and environmental effects of organisations’ 
economic actions to particular groups within society and to society at large” (Gray et al., 
1987, p.ix) 
Aligned with other definitions, CSR reporting is considered an extension of organisations’ 
accountability that goes beyond the traditional financial account for shareholders (Gray et al., 
1996) and becomes accountable for their social performance. Through these definitions, it is also 
noticeable that the concept of CSR reporting has been discussed using various labels. Previous 
literature recorded the interchangeable use of terminologies in CSR reporting studies, such as 
social and/or environmental disclosure (CSRD), sustainability reporting, sustainability disclosure, 
social accounting, stakeholder dialogue reporting, and social auditing (Gray, 2002; Parker, 1986). 
Without any clear differentiation, the interchangeable use of these terminologies cause confusion 
as these terms could be used to indicate different meanings. Therefore, in order to maintain 
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consistency and avoid confusion, for the purpose of this study, the term CSR disclosure (CSRD) 
is used to address corporations’ communication regarding environmental and social issues to 
stakeholders specifically in annual reports, while CSR reporting is the general term for reporting 
CSR information through wider forms and diverse channels, such as website, stand-alone reports, 
integrated reports, booklets, etc. (see Gray et al., 1996, Zeghal and Ahmed, 1990). Definitions of 
CSR reporting and CSRD, therefore, are developed for the purpose of this study as follows: 
“CSR reporting is defined as mechanism in which firms report social and environmental 
information, either mandatory or voluntary, regarding issues of environment, employees, 
consumers and products, and community activities to diverse range of stakeholders through 
different channels, such as annual reports, websites, stand-alone reports, booklets, etc.” 
“CSRD is the process of communicating firms’ social and environmental performance, 
either mandatory or voluntary, to diverse stakeholders regarding activities in areas of 
environment, employees, consumers and products and community, through the use of 
annual reports” 
Among these definitions, the two types of disclosure, mandatory disclosure and voluntary 
disclosure, have been taken into consideration. According to Mirfazli (2008), mandatory 
disclosure and voluntary disclosure can defined as follows: 
“Disclosure could be mandatory; it is a compulsory for an information disclosure 
conducted by company based on certain rule or standard. Disclosure could also be 
voluntary; it is information disclosure overweigh minimum requirement from the rules” 
(Mirfazli, 2008, p.278) 
Although the issues of mandatory and voluntary disclosure have rarely been mentioned when 
defining CSR reporting, some authors, such as Mathews (1984), gave more attention to voluntary 
disclosure with the emphasis on CSRD as a voluntary disclosure of information to inform and 
influence wide range of audiences. Throughout the past decade, however, mandatory disclosure 
has become a trend with a growing number of countries applying mandatory disclosure for CSR 
information, such as India, Argentina, Denmark, France, Indonesia, Malaysia, etc. (Malan, 2013). 
Requirements for mandatory CSRD can be released under the forms of national laws, regulations 
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or listing requirements. Therefore, aligned with the suggestion of Woodward (1997), both types of 
disclosure are included in the definitions.  
Despite the differentiation between CSR reporting and CSRD, this study focuses solely on CSRD 
which is the extent of CSR information disclosed in annual reports. The use of annual reports as 
the sole examined document type for this thesis is based on the following reasons. Firstly, annual 
reports have been used extensively as one of the key documents to examine corporation’s 
communication on social issues due to their accessibility, credibility and completeness (Kuasirikun 
and Sherer, 2004; Tilt, 1994). The nature of annual reports requires each company to have one 
annual report for each year studied. Therefore, the number of data for each company would be 
equal and consistent for the whole data set. In contrast, regarding non-annual report data, different 
companies would publish diverse types of documents. As a result, it is not possible to apply the 
same set of data for all companies as doing so would create bias in the sample, reduce the 
consistency of the results and not ensure the completeness of the data set (Gray, Kouhy and Lavers, 
1995a).  
Moreover, the practice of using the same set of data for all companies to examine the level of 
CSRD is particularly difficult in the case of this comparative study. With the sample of firms from 
across six countries, the level of document diversity across the sample would be high due to the 
differences in the national legal environments as well as regulations from different stock 
exchanges. As a result, annual reports alone would be a reasonable choice. In addition, annual 
reports are considered as the main source of information for diverse groups of stakeholders if they 
are interested in a company’s attitude on social and environmental issues, due to their widespread 
distribution (Campbell, Moore and Shrives, 2006; Deegan and Rankin, 1997). Finally, according 
to Naser et al. (2006), in developing countries, aside from annual reports, other means of corporate 
disclosure are not widely used and most of the CSRD information is more likely located within 
annual reports. Therefore, the use of other reporting channels for analysis might result practical 
difficulties (Naser et al., 2006). In the context of this study, most of the examined countries, except 
for Singapore, are classified as developing economies based on the classification of IMF (IMF, 
2017). As a result, the choice of annual reports as the sole documents to examine the level of CSRD 
is reasonable. Considering these arguments, this study only focuses on CSRD in annual reports 
rather than CSR reporting in general.  
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2.3 The Scope and Categories of CSRD 
 
Previous literature has attempted to classify CSRD into multiple categories, for instance some 
scholars use four categories (Anas et al., 2015; Branco and Rodrigues, 2008; Gray et al., 1995a; 
Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Jizi et al., 2014; Muttakin and Subramaniam, 2015; Ponnu and Maurice, 
2009; Said, Zainuddin and Haron, 2009), others, five (Ahmad et al., 2003; Esa and Ghazali, 2012; 
Hackston and Milne, 1996; Sobhani et al., 2009; Trotman and Bradley, 1981), and some with six 
or more (Chan et al., 2014; Gao et al., 2005; Guthrie and Parker, 1990; Ratanajongkol et al., 2006). 
No standard format of categories exists ensuing that depending on the requirements of each 
company and their stakeholders, the categories used by one company often differ from another 
(Mirfazli, 2008). Although different scholars classify CSRD categories differently, the primary 
areas for CSRD are consistently related to environment, energy, employees/human resources, 
consumers, products and community (see Chan et al., 2014; Gao et al., 2005; Gray et al., 1995a; 
Hackston and Milne, 1996). The energy category is occasionally included in environmental 
disclosure as a sub-category (see Anas et al., 2015; Branco and Rodrigues, 2008; Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2005; Jizi et al., 2016).  
Table 2 provides an overview of the scope and categories of CSRD that have been used in previous 
literature. CSRD checklists from 28 papers have been reviewed to identify the appropriate 
checklist used for this study. The review showed that aligned with the definition developed in this 
study, CSRD checklists of previous studies address the needs and expectations of four main 
stakeholders, including human resource (or the issue of workplace), environment and energy, 
consumers and products (or the issue of marketplace) and finally community (see Ahmad et al., 
2003; Anas et al., 2015; Branco and Rodrigues, 2008; Gray et al., 1995a; Jizi et al., 2014; Kilic et 
al., 2014; Muttakin and Subramaniam, 2015; Othman et al., 2011; Ponne and Maurice, 2009). 
Besides these main stakeholders, some other studies have attempted to incorporate alternative 
types of information in CSRD, such as value-added information (Esa and Ghazali, 2012; Khan et 
al., 2013a), general disclosure (Chan et al., 2014; Sobhani et al., 2009), fair business practices 
(Chan et al., 2014; Gao et al., 2005; Xiao et al., 2005), finance and investment (Lestari, 2013), or 
shareholder responsibility (Wang et al., 2013). Following previous CSRD studies conducted in the 
Southeast Asia region (Ahmad et al., 2003; Anas et al., 2015; Mirfazli, 2008; Othman et al., 2011; 
Ratanajongkol et al., 2006; Said et al., 2009) and ensuring the consistency between the developed 
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CSRD definition and the measurement of disclosure, the study only focuses on information 
disclosure that targets the four main stakeholders of CSRD, including environment, human 
resources, consumers and community. Aside from the differences in classifying disclosure 
categories, the numbers of disclosure items in previous studies are also diverse, ranging from 15 
items (Ahmad et al., 2010) to 70 items (Nurhayati et al., 2016). Some studies have attempted to 
classify and measure CSRD using more detail disclosure items than others. Such difference could 
be the result of each study’s nature. The studies that have used more detail CSRD checklists with 
very high number of disclosure items tend to focus on a specific country context (see Anas et al., 
2015; Gray et al., 1995a; Khan, 2010; Nurhayati et al., 2016) or industry context (see Jizi et al., 
2014; Kilic et al., 2016). The items in such studies, therefore, tend to be more specific. For 
instance, in the study of Kilic et al. (2016) examining the online CSRD in the banking industry of 
Turkey, the checklist included some specific items that are only applicable for the industry, such 
as ‘environmental investment policies’ or ‘environmental considerations in lending policies’. 
Similarly, in the checklist of Gray et al. (1995a), the items were divided into mandatory disclosure 
and voluntary disclosure, in which mandatory disclosure identified certain items that focused on 
the context of UK, for instance, charity donations, employment of disabled, employees 
consultation, and employee share ownership.  
After the review and careful consideration of different CSRD checklists in the contemporary 
literature, the CSRD checklist of Branco and Rodrigues (2008) is selected to be the guidance for 
measuring CSRD in this study due to several reasons. First of all, Branco and Rodrigues (2008)’s 
CSRD instrument includes the four disclosure categories, environmental disclosure (ED), human 
resources disclosure (HRD), product and consumer disclosure (PCD) and community involvement 
disclosure (CD), in which the ED also mentions information related to energy disclosure. These 
four categories with 30 disclosure items, therefore, cover all key aspects of CSRD that have been 
addressed in most CSRD studies (see Gao et al., 2005; Jizi et al., 2016; Sobhani et al., 2009), 
including studies conducted within the context of Southeast Asia (see Anas et al., 2015; Chapple 
and Moon, 2005; Mirfazli, 2008; Ratanajongkol et al., 2006). The checklist has also been used in 
a number of CSRD studies conducted in the context of the region (see Saleh et al., 2011; Hassan 
et al., 2012), which demonstrates the appropriateness of the checklist in measuring CSRD in the 
context of Southeast Asia. Secondly, the CSRD instrument was developed based on previous well-
established CSRD instruments, such as Adams et al., (1998); Gray et al., (1995b), Hackston and 
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Milne, (1996); Williams and Pei, (1999); and Purushothaman et al., (2000). Most of these 
instruments, as justified in Chapter 1, were developed based on the previous ones; therefore, the 
contemporary instrument of Branco and Rodrigues (2008) can be considered as an updated version 
of these well-established instruments. Additionally, the CSRD checklist have included a sufficient 
number of CSRD items which cover the relevant CSRD practices in detail, compared to some 
other studies in the field (see Ahmad et al., 2010; Esa and Ghazali, 2012; Khan et al., 2013a; 
Sobhani et al., 2009; Wang et al., 2013). Simultaneously, unlike a number of studies (see Jizi et 
al., 2014; Khan, 2010; Kilic et al., 2016; Nurhayati et al., 2016), the checklist has not provided 
detail information in relation to practices that are only relevant to a specific context or industry. 
This feature of the checklist has allowed it to be applicable to different study contexts and 
industries, which is important for this cross-national study. Finally, the 30 sub-categories provide 
general guidance for examining CSRD but at the same time allow the flexibility of adopting sub-
categories to the context of this study through the development of a detailed code book explaining 
each of the sub-categories (Appendix 2). This process will be explained further in Chapter 4. 
Therefore, with the above arguments, this CSRD instrument is considered appropriate for the 
study.  
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Table 2: A summary of previously used disclosure indexes 
Study Context Number of items Categories 
Gray et al. (1995a) UK 24 Mandatory disclosure (8 items), voluntary disclosure – human resource (9 items), 
environment (3 items), community (3 items), customer (1 item). 
Hackston and Milne 
(1996) 
New Zealand 20 Environment (3 items), energy, employee health and safety, employee other (9 items), 
products (3 items), community involvement, others (2 items).  
Trotman and Bradley 
(1981) 
Australia 34 Environment (10 items), energy (5 items), human resources (5 items), products (3 items), 
community involvement (5 items), other (6 items) 
Ahmad et al. (2003) Malaysia 24 Environment (9 items), energy, human resources (9 items), products and consumers (4 
items), community involvement.  
Branco and Rodrigues 
(2008) 
Portugal 30 Environment (11 items), human resource (9 items), products and consumers (5 items), 
community involvement (5 items) 
Jizi et al. (2014) US 31 Community involvement (6 items), environment (4 items), employees (13 items), products 
and services quality (8 items) 
Muttakin and 
Subramaniam (2015) 
India 17 Community involvement (3 items), environmental (5 items), employee (7 items), product 
and service (2 items) 
Ponnu and Maurice 
(2009) 
Kenya - Environment, community involvement, product and consumer, human resource.  
Said et al. (2009) Malaysia - Environment, human resource, energy, community involvement and products  
Esa and Ghazali 
(2012) 
Malaysia 21 Human resource (10 items), value-added information (1 item), environment (1 item), 
community involvement (3 items), product or service information (6 items) 
Sobhani et al. (2009) Bangladesh 30 Human resource (6 items), consumer/ product (6 items), community (6 items), environment 
(6 items), general (6 items) 
Chan et al. (2014) Australia 32 General (2 items), environment (7 items), energy (5 items), human resources (6 items), 
products (4 items), community (6 items), fair business practices (2 items).  
Gao et al. (2005) Hong Kong 36 Environment (8 items), energy (4 items), health and safety (6 items), human resources (7 
items), community involvement (4 items), fair business practices (7 items) 
Guthrie and Parker 
(1989) 
US - Environment, energy, human resources, products, community involvement, others 
Ratanajongkol et al. 
(2006) 
Thailand - Environment, energy, products, community, human resources, others. 
Mirfazli (2008) Indonesia 29 Labour (14 items), consumers (3 items), society (8 items), environment (4 items).  
Anas et al. (2015) Malaysia 17 Environment (4 items), community (5 items), workplace (4 items), marketplace (4 items) 
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Othman et al. (2011) Malaysia 40 Community (10 items), environment (10 items), workplace (10 items), marketplace (10 
items) 
Lestari (2013) Indonesia 38 Finance and investment (6 items), products and services (3 items), employees (10 items), 
society (11 items), environment (3 items), corporate governance (5 items) 
Xiao et al. (2005) Hong Kong and 
UK 
36 Environment (8 items), energy (4 items), health and safety (6 items), human resource (7 
items), community involvement (4 items), fair business practices (7 items) 
Ahmad et al. (2010) Bangladesh 15 Environmental (5 items), human resource (5 items), community involvement (5 items) 
Khan (2010) Bangladesh 59 Contribution to health sector (13 items), contribution to education sector (10 items), activities 
for natural disaster (5 items), other donations (8 items), employees (12 items), environment 
(5 items), products/ services (6 items) 
Khan et al. (2013a) Bangladesh 20 Community involvement (3 items), environmental (1 item), employee (9 items), product and 
service (6 items), value-added information (1 item) 
Wang et al. (2013) China 20 Shareholder (3 items), employee (5 items), customers and products (3 items), environment/ 
energy (4 items), community (3 items), others (2 items) 
Bhattacharyya (2014) Australia 35 Social disclosure indicators: employee (7 items), diversity, opportunity and human rights (3 
items), customers and communities (3 items), integrity and ethics (4 items) 
Environmental disclosure indicators: general (5 items), energy, water and materials (5 items), 
pollution and waste management (4 items), others (4 items) 
Kilic et al. (2014) Turkey 52 Environment (13 items), energy (9 items), human resource (12 items), products and 
customers (7 items), community involvement (11 items) 
Majeed et al. (2015) Pakistan 40 Contribution to health sector (6 items), contribution to education sector (8 items), activities 
for natural disaster (4 items), other donations (5 items), employees (8 items), environment 
(4 items), products/ services (5 items) 
Nurhayati et al. (2016) India 70 Labour practices and decent work (14 items), human rights (9 items), society (8 items), 
product responsibility (9 items), environment (30 items) 
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2.3.1 Environmental Disclosure (ED) 
 
Environmental disclosure (ED) refers to any disclosed information related to the impact of 
organisational process or operation on the natural environment (Campbell, 2004). Therefore, ED 
can be a strong indicator of corporate environmental commitment, and an organisations’ 
willingness to improve environmental performance (Perry and Sheng, 1999) in addition to 
enhancing reputation (Buzby and Falk, 1979). This type of disclosure in annual reports was 
initially a simple description of a firm’s environmental aspects (Harte and Owen, 1991) while 
negative effects, such as environmental damage or potential liability was rarely mentioned 
(Othman and Ameer, 2010).  
The sub-categories of ED have been developed over the last few decades by scholars (see Anas et 
al., 2015; Chan et al., 2014; Esa and Ghazali, 2012; Hackston and Milne, 1996; Jizi et al., 2014). 
There are multiple variations regarding what should be included in ED. For instance, the study of 
Anas et al. (2015) on CSRD of Malaysian listed companies has developed the sub-categories of 
ED based on CSR framework of Bursa Malaysia, the national stock exchange of Malaysia. Key 
issues, such as energy efficiency, emissions reduction, biofuels, and the need to protect flora and 
fauna, were addressed (Anas et al., 2015). Jizi et al.’s (2014) study, however, on CSRD in 
American banks defined sub-categories of ED differently, including environmental policies and 
concerns, systems for environmental management, environmental projects and energy saving 
performance. Another study of Chan et al. (2014) on CSRD of Australian firms proposed more 
detailed sub-categories for environmental disclosure with seven key issues, research and studies 
on environmental impact, disclosure of environmental incidents, non-compliance or fines, 
environmental performance and climate change strategies, pollution and gas emission controls, the 
use and recycling of waste materials, waste management, land reclamation and planting trees, and 
sustainability (the use of renewable energy, resources, recycled materials, etc.).  
Adopting the CSRD instrument of Branco and Rodrigues (2008), the ED category in this study 
includes the following eleven sub-categories: environmental policies and expression of 
environmental concerns, environmental management systems and audit, pollution from business 
conduct, pollution created from the use of company’s products, prevention or repair of 
environmental damage, natural resources conservation and recycling, sustainability awareness, 
59 
 
environmental aesthetics, energy conservation, products’ energy efficiency, and discussion of 
environmental laws and regulations, as indicated in Appendix 1. These 11 sub-categories address 
diverse topics of ED mentioned in previous CSRD studies (see Gao et al., 2005; Jizi et al., 2014; 
Sobhani et al., 2009). Moreover, the checklist can also be considered more exhaustive in 
comparison with majority of these studies due to the high number of ED items addressed.   
2.3.2 Human Resources Disclosure (HRD) 
 
Employees, as arguably the most valuable resource of an organisation, has meant that human 
resource disclosure has become increasingly important (Wickramasinghe and Fonseka, 2012). 
Companies rely on their human resources to improve efficiency and effectiveness to achieve 
competitive advantage (Nielsen, Bukh, Mouritsen, Rosenkrands and Gormsen, 2006; de Pablos, 
2003). Various terminology in relation to human resources have been used in the literature, such 
as ‘human capital’, ‘employees’, or ‘human assets’ (Absar, 2016; Khan and Khan, 2010; 
Wickramasinghe and Fonseka, 2012).  
The pressures for firms to disclose human resources information come from the emergence of 
better informed consumers and the need for policies to retain workforce (Khan and Khan, 2010). 
Human resources information could provide firms with considerable benefits such as highlighting 
more effective resources allocation, identification of gaps in skills and abilities (Guthrie, 2001), as 
well as assisting provision of more complete information for stockholders and potential investors 
(Flamholtz and Main, 1999; Royal, 2005). The concept of HRD has been researched under the 
broad concepts of CSRD (see Chan et al., 2014; Esa and Ghazali, 2012; Sobhani et al., 2009). 
According to the American Accounting Association (1973, p.169), HR Accounting, in which HRD 
is included, is defined as “the process of identifying and measuring data about human resources 
and communicating this information to interested parties”.  
Many studies have looked at the level of HRD as a category of CSRD (see Absar, 2014; Subbarao 
and Zeghal, 1997). Past CSRD studies have categorised HRD into several different sub-categories. 
For instance, in the study of Gao et al. (2005) regarding the level of CSRD of Hong Kong firms, 
HRD was examined under seven sub-categories, such as employee development programs, pay 
and benefits, employee loan, share ownership scheme, pension scheme, sport and recreation and 
other disclosure. On the other hand, nine sub-categories related to employee information were 
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identified in the study of Khan et al. (2013a) conducted in Bangladesh, with information about 
number of employees, employees’ relations, welfare, education, training and development, profit 
sharing, remuneration, health and safety, and child labour. There has been no standard measure of 
human resources information in annual reports. With the same justification for ED, sub-categories 
of HRD is adopted from the instrument of Branco and Rodrigues (2008). HRD is assessed through 
nine items, including issues related to health and safety, employment of minorities or women, HR 
profiles, employee remuneration, employee share ownership schemes, employee assistance/ 
benefits, employee training, employee morale and industrial relations (Appendix 1). The nine sub-
categories addressed all the key relevant issues related to HRD in CSRD studies (see Esa and 
Ghazali, 2012; Gao et al., 2005; Khan et al., 2013a).  
2.3.3 Products and Consumers Disclosure (PCD) 
 
Unlike the popular disclosure themes such as environmental disclosure or human resources 
disclosure, products and consumers disclosure (PCD) has only been discussed and examined 
together with other categories as a part of CSRD (see Anas et al., 2015; Branco and Rodgriez, 
2008; Sobhani et al., 2009). In some studies, only the product disclosure aspect is mentioned, 
without considering consumer related information disclosure (see Esa and Ghazali, 2012; Chan et 
al., 2014; Jizi et al., 2016; Muttakin and Subramaniam, 2015; Saleh, 2009). For instance, the 
studies of Muttakin and Subramaniam (2015) and Saleh (2009) examining the level of CSRD 
amongst Indian and Malaysian listed companies respectively addressed four main categories of 
CSRD, including community involvement, environmental, employee information, as well as 
product and service information. Product disclosure category often includes some key information, 
such as product development, product quality, product safety, and improved recycling ability of 
products (Muttakin and Subramaniam, 2015; Saleh, 2009; Trotman and Bradley, 1981). According 
to Pratten and Mashat (2009), previous studies suggested that firms tended to ignore their 
consumers.  
Despite the lack of attention, consumers are a sensitive stakeholder group to a company’s corporate 
social performance (Pivato, Misani and Tencati, 2008), and therefore should be addressed in firms’ 
communication. Some studies, such as Ahmad et al. (2003), Branco and Rodrigues (2008), have 
attempted to combine disclosure information about consumers to products disclosure categories 
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due to the relevance of information, constituting the category of PCD. Information regarding 
consumers in annual reports can be classified into the following sub-categories, consumer 
information (Ahmad et al., 2003), consumer safety practices disclosure, consumer satisfaction and 
complaints, and provision for disabled, aged, and difficult-to-reach consumers (Branco and 
Rodrigues, 2008). As this particular study is looking at the CSRD in cross-countries context, due 
to the differences in disclosure practices across the countries, it is important to have sub-categories 
that cover diverse aspects of CSRD. Consequently, rather than being restricted to products 
disclosure only, the use of the PCD category with the incorporation of consumer-related 
information is more appropriate. The PCD category of Branco and Rodrigues (2008) is applied 
with five sub-categories, product safety, product quality, consumer safety practices disclosure and 
provision for disadvantaged consumers (Appendix 1).  
2.3.4 Community-involvement Disclosure (CD) 
 
The vital role of corporate community involvement began as a topic of discussion from the mid-
20th century after the World War II (Yekini, Yekini, Adelopo and Andrikopoulos, 2015). 
According to Tallon (2010), corporate community involvement was one of key strategies for social 
and economic regeneration by many governments in response to the consequences of the war, such 
as homelessness, poverty and unemployment. Businesses, as a result, were encouraged to 
participate in community development to increase industrial and economic growth (Moon and 
Muthuri, 2006), resulting in the move from philanthropic activities to actual involvement in 
community development and social rebuilding (Bush, Grayson, Jordan and Nelson, 2008). 
Community involvement disclosure (CD) in annual reports can be defined as disclosure of 
corporations’ involvement in social initiatives of the communities where they operate (Moon and 
Muthuri, 2006). According to Patten (1995), CD includes: 
“disclosures related to community activities, health-related activities, donation of cash, 
products and employee services to education or arts or other community activity 
disclosure”. (Patten, 1995, p.280) 
Rather than emphasising any specific stakeholder group, the scope of CD demonstrates a wider 
range of concerns towards general interests of society (Campbell et al., 2006). Different from ED 
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and HRD, despite the importance of community as a broadly conceived stakeholder group 
(Clarkson, 1995), CD has received limited attention from previous studies (Soobaroyen and 
Mahadeo, 2016), resulting in a limited understanding of the motives, longitudinal or cross-
sectional behaviour of this category (Campbell et al., 2006). Most studies have only addressed CD 
as a part of CSRD (see Chan et al, 2014; Gao et al., 2005; Hackston and Milne, 1996). Even so, 
community themes have been consistently reported as one of the most disclosed categories across 
countries (Hackston and Milne, 1996; Holder-Webb, Cohen, Nath and Wood, 2009). According 
to Holder-Webb et al. (2009), the elevated level of community-related disclosure might reflect 
firms’ attempt to appear legitimate to the society.  
For the purpose of examining CD, diverse classifications of sub-categories have been developed 
in previous studies (Anas et al., 2015; Esa and Ghazali, 2012; Gao et al., 2005; Gray et al., 1995; 
Hackston and Milne, 1996; Sobhani et al., 2009). Despite the high variation of areas that should 
be put under CD, some key sub-categories, such as charitable donations, local development, 
sponsorship for education, community’s activities, sport activities, art and culture, have been 
consistently mentioned (Anas et al., 2015; Esa and Ghazali, 2012; Gao et al., 2005; Jizi et al., 
2016; Sobhani et al., 2009), emphasising their importance in measuring the category. As 
previously justified, with the use of CSRD instrument of Branco and Rodrigues (2008), the level 
of CD is examined under five sub-categories, charitable donations and activities, support for 
education, support for arts and culture, support for public health, and sponsoring sporting or 
recreational projects, which covers all the key sub-categories mentioned above (Appendix 1).  
2.4 Determinants of CSRD  
 
With the rising attention of CSR reporting in general and CSRD in particular throughout recent 
decades, and due to its voluntary nature, CSRD literature has extensively focused on the reasons 
why companies disclose CSR information (de Villiers and Alexander, 2014). As a result, research 
has attempted to investigate the nature, patterns (e.g. Buhr and Freedman, 2001) and determinants 
of CSRD (e.g. Chakroun and Matsoussi, 2012; Cowen, Ferreri and Parker, 1987; El-Halaby and 
Hussainey, 2015; Ghazali, 2007). Diverse number of determinants, such as firm size (see Esa and 
Ghazali, 2012; Mio and Venturelli, 2013; Rahman et al., 2011), profitability (see Anas et al., 2015; 
Cowen et al., 1987; El-Halaby and Hussainey, 2015), industry (see Chan et al., 2014; Naser and 
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Hassan, 2013; Parsa and Kouhy, 2008), media exposure (see Branco and Rodgriez, 2008), etc., 
have been considered in the literature. Adopting the classification of Fifka (2013), CSRD 
determinants can be divided into two main categories, external determinants and internal 
determinants. In order to have a more focused review of studies on determinants of CSRD in 
annual reports, a systematic literature review was conducted by using the University of 
Huddersfield Library’s search engine, Summon, and Google Scholar. The literature review covers 
only empirical studies in English language scholarly and peer reviewed journals from January, 
2005 to May, 2017. The choice of journal articles stems from the suggestion of Belal and Momin 
(2009) that this published source provides the most updated and authoritative information of the 
field. Furthermore, empirical studies would allow a more focused examination on factors and 
determinants influencing CSRD. Different combinations of key words, as presented in figure 3, 
were used to identify relevant studies. In order to emphasise the current trends and identify the 
gaps in the contemporary literature, following the systematic review technique of Fifka (2013), 
ables 3 and 4 provide a summary of these studies with information about authors, year of 
publication, examined countries, used theories, determinants (external/internal) and sample size. 
The studies were grouped based on their context. While table 3 presents only studies conducted in 
Southeast Asia, table 4 provides a summary of empirical studies in other contexts. Although there 
are different ways of categorising CSRD literature, such as chronologically (Mathews, 1997), the 
choice of categorising literature based on the study context would enable the ability to indicate and 
unearth studies conducted in Southeast Asia specifically with the main purpose of capturing 
significant trends, developments and gaps in the literature from the perspective of these countries.   
Internal determinants have been a strong focus within most reviewed studies. Only a handful of 
studies have examined the effect of external determinants, such as media exposure (e.g, Branco 
and Rodrigues, 2008; Tan et al., 2016), regulatory environment (e.g. Chakroun and Matsoussi, 
2012; Othman et al., 2011) or culture (e.g. Haniffa and Cooke, 2005), on CSRD. Among all the 
internal determinants, firm size, profitability, and industry are the most examined factors. The only 
determinant that is found to have consistent positive impact on CSRD is firm size (e.g. Rahman et 
al., 2011; Naser and Hassan, 2013). Findings are also consistent in concluding significant 
differences in CSRD across different industries (e.g. Amran and Devi, 2008; Gao et al., 2005). 
Results of other determinants, however, such as profitability (e.g Esa and Ghazali, 2012; Sharif 
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and Rashid, 2014), leverage (e.g Chan et al., 2014; Jizi et al., 2014), or government ownership 
(Haji, 2013; Naser and Hassan, 2013), remain diverse.  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Combinations of search key words 
 
Determinants 
Factors 
Effect 
Impact 
Social Reporting 
Social Disclosure 
CSR Reporting 
CSR Disclosure 
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Table 3: Studies of CSRD determinants in Southeast Asia 
Author/s Year Country/ies 
examined 
Theories used External 
determinants 
Internal determinants Sample size 
Haniffa and 
Cooke 
2005 Malaysia Legitimacy theory Culture (*) Non-executive directors (+) 
CEO duality (+) 
Foreign ownership (0) 
Size (+) 
Profitability (+) 
Gearing (0) 
Listing status (+) 
Industry (*) 
Annual reports of 139 
companies with two years 
observations, 1996 and 
2002 
Amran and Devi 2008 Malaysia Institutional theory - Government ownership (+) 
Dependence on government 
contract (+) 
Foreign ownership (0) 
Foreign business associate (0) 
Firm size (+) 
Profitability (0) 
Industry (+0) 
2002 and 2003 annual 
reports of 584 firms 
Othman, Thani 
and Ghani 
2009 Malaysia - - Firm Size (*) 
Profitability (*) 
Board Composition (*) 
Industry (0) 
Annual reports from 2004 
to 2006 of 56 listed 
companies 
Rahman et al. 2011 Malaysia - - Size (+) 
Age (0) 
Profitability (0) 
Leverage (0) 
Annual reports from 2005 
to 2006 of 44 listed 
government-linked 
companies 
Othman et al. 2011 Malaysia Institutional theory Regulatory 
environment (+) 
Government ownership (+) 
Percentage of family members (-) 
2007 annual reports of 117 
listed firms 
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Esa and Ghazali 2012 Malaysia - - Size (0) 
Board size (+) 
Profitability (0) 
Independent directors (0) 
Leverage (0) 
Annual reports of 27 
government-linked 
companies in two years, 
2005 and 2007 
Suttipun and 
Stanton 
2012 Thailand Legitimacy theory Country of 
origin (0) 
Firm size (+) 
Industry (0) 
Government ownership (0) 
Profitability (0) 
2007 annual reports of 75 
listed companies 
Lestari 2013 Indonesia Agency theory - Firm Size (+) 
Profitability (+) 
Firm Age (0) 
Independent directors (0) 
2010-2011 annual reports 
of 18 Syariah banks 
Anas et al. 2015 Malaysia Stakeholder theory 
and Legitimacy 
theory 
Award on CSR 
(+) 
Profitability (0) 
Size (0) 
Industry (0) 
2008 annual reports of 60 
listed companies 
Tan et al. 2016 Indonesia Stakeholder theory 
Legitimacy theory 
Media exposure 
(+) 
Firm size (+) 
Industry sensitivity (+) 
Annual reports of 53 listed 
firms 
Suteja et al. 2016 Indonesia - - Profitability (+) Annual reports from 2010 
to 2014 of 15 listed banks 
Notes: (0) indicates insignificant relationship; (-) and (+) indicate significantly negative and significantly positive repectively; (*) indicates 
significant relationship without clear direction.  
  
67 
 
Table 4: Summary of studies regarding determinants of CSRD in other countries 
Author/s Year Countries 
examined 
Theories used External 
determinants 
Internal determinants Sample size 
Gao et al. 2005 Hong Kong - - Size (+) 
Industry (+0-) 
154 annual reports from 
1993 to 1997 of 33 
listed companies 
Xiao, Gao and 
Cheung 
2005 Hong Kong 
and UK 
Accounting 
theory, 
legitimacy theory 
and stakeholder 
theory 
Social and economic 
development (*) 
- 334 annual reports of 69 
listed companies over 
the period of 1993-1997 
Naser, Al-
Hussani, Al-
Kwari and 
Nuseibeh  
2006 Qatar Multi-theoretical 
framework 
- Firm size (+) 
Leverage (+) 
Corporate growth (+) 
Governmental ownership (0) 
Individual share (0) 
Divident (0) 
Major shareholders (0) 
Annual reports of 21 
companies listed on 
Doha Stock Exchange 
Branco and 
Rodrigues 
2008 Portuguese  Legitimacy 
theory  
Resource based 
perspective 
Media exposure (+) International experience (0) 
Leverage (0) 
Profitability (0) 
Size (+) 
Environmental sensitivity (0) 
Consumer proximity (0) 
2003 annual reports of 
49 companies 
Prado-Lorenzo, 
Gallego-Alvarez 
and Garcia-
Sanchez 
2009 Spain Stakeholder 
theory 
- Financial institutions’ ownership 
(0) 
Dominant shareholder (0) 
Dispersed ownership (0) 
Firm size (*) 
Annual reports of 116 
non-financial firms. 
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Ahmad, Ahmed 
and Saha 
2010 Bangladesh Legitimacy 
theory 
- Firm size (+) 
Firm age (-) 
Profitability (-) 
ROE (+) 
2008 annual reports of 
20 banks listed on the 
Dhaka Stock Exchange 
Khan 2010 Bangladesh Legitimacy 
theory 
- Non-executive directors (+) 
Foreign directors (+) 
Women directors (0) 
Firm size (+) 
Profitability (+) 
Gearing (0) 
2007-2008 annual 
reports of 30 private 
commercial banks on 
the Dhaka Stock 
Exchange. 
Naser and 
Hassan 
2013 Abu-Dhabi - - Profitability (0) 
Leverage (0) 
Industry (0) 
Audit firm (0) 
Location of headquarter (0) 
Government ownership (0) 
Firm size (+) 
2011 annual reports of 
60 listed companies 
Khan et al. 2013a Bangladesh Legitimacy 
theory 
- Managerial ownership (-) 
Public ownership (+) 
Foreign ownership (+) 
Board independence (+) 
CEO duality (0) 
Audit committee (+) 
Annual reports from 
2005 to 2009 of 116 
companies, resulting the 
total 580 firm years 
observations 
Mio and 
Verturelli 
2013 Italy and 
UK 
- Common law (+) Size (0) 50 listed companies 
Wang, Song and 
Yao 
2013 China Legitimacy 
theory and 
political cost 
perspective 
- Firm size (+) 
Media exposure (+) 
Environmental sensitivity (+) 
Block ownership (+) 
Institutional shareholding (+) 
2008 and 2009 annual 
reports of 851 and 856 
listed firms respectively. 
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Bhattacharyya 2014 Australia Resource-based 
theory 
Institutional 
theory 
Legitimacy 
theory 
- Firm size (+) 
Profitability (-) 
Audit firm size (0) 
Industry (*) 
Firm age (0) 
2006-2007 annual 
reports of 47 listed 
companies 
Muttakin and 
Khan 
2014 Bangladesh Legitimacy 
theory 
- Firm size (+) 
Export orientation (+) 
Family ownership (-) 
Industry (*) 
Annual reports from 
2005 to 2009 of 135 
manufacturing 
companies listed on the 
Dhaka Stock Exchange, 
making up the total of 
580 year observations. 
Bukair and 
Rahman 
2015a 5 Gulf 
Cooperation 
Council 
Countries 
Legitimacy 
theory 
- Board size (0) 
CEO duality (0) 
Board composition (0) 
2008 annual reports of 
53 Islamic banks 
El-Halaby and 
Hussainey 
2015 25 countries - Accounting standards 
(+) 
Auditor type (+) 
Size (+) 
Age (0) 
Risk ratio (0) 
Leverage (0) 
Public ownership (0) 
Profitability (0) 
138 Islamic banks 
Kilic, Kuzey 
and Uyar 
2015 Turkey Legitimacy 
theory and 
stakeholder 
theory 
- Firm size (+) 
Board size (0) 
Board diversity (+) 
Ownership diffusion (+) 
Board independence (+) 
Annual reports of 25 
banks over the period of 
2008-2012 
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Majeed, Aziz 
and Saleem 
2015 Pakistan Legitimacy 
theory 
Social and 
political cost 
theory 
- Board size (+) 
Board independence (0) 
Foreign directors (0) 
Firm size (+) 
Female directors (-) 
Block ownership (+) 
Institutional ownership (+) 
Profitability (0) 
Annual reports from 
2007 to 2011 of 100 
listed companies on the 
Karachi Stock 
Exchange. 
Razak 2015 Saudi 
Arabia 
Legitimacy 
theory and 
stakeholder 
theory 
- Firm size (+) 
Profitability (+) 
Leverage (0) 
Consumer proximity (0) 
Environmental sensitivity (0) 
2013 annual reports of 
166 companies listed on 
the Tadawul Stock 
Exchange. 
Nurhayati, 
Taylor and 
Tower 
2016 India Legitimacy 
theory 
International awards 
(+) 
International brands 
(+) 
 Annual reports from 
2010 to 2012 of textile 
and apparel Indian 
firms, resulting the total 
observation of 285.  
Dyluch and 
Krasodomska 
2017 Poland Legitimacy 
theory 
- Firm size (+) 
Profitability (0) 
Board size (0) 
Female directors (0) 
Leverage (0) 
Industry environmental sensitivity 
(+) 
Internationalisation (+) 
Annual reports of 60 
listed companies 
Lu, Rozakm, 
Toppinen, 
D’Amato and 
Wen 
2017 China Stakeholder 
theory 
- Firm size (*) 
Profitability (0) 
Equity concentration (*) 
Leverage (0) 
209 annual reports 
published by 42 
companies for the 
period of 2011-2015 
Notes: (0) indicates insignificant relationship; (-) and (+) indicate significantly negative and significantly positive repectively; (*) indicates 
significant relationship without clear direction.  
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2.5 Empirical Research Gaps  
 
Firstly, regarding research contexts, previous review papers have concluded that the main attention 
of the current CSRD literature lies within the context of Anglo-Saxon and Western European 
countries (Fifka, 2013; Van der Laan Smith et al., 2005). Considering the differences in the market 
place and the impossibility of ‘one size fits all’ approach to the concept of CSR, an Asian 
perspective is needed to obtain advancements in social change and environmental sustainability 
(Fukukawa, 2009). With differences in national CSR contexts and challenges together with diverse 
CSR norms and practices of Asian business systems, further research in this context could provide 
a deeper understanding of the effect of such contextual factors on CSR practices on both firm and 
national levels (Chapple and Moon, 2005). Applying this suggestion to CSRD studies, based on 
the review (table 3 and table 4), there has been a growing number of studies regarding determinants 
of CSRD conducted in Asia in recent years (e.g. Lestari, 2013; Suteja et al., 2016; Suttipun and 
Staton, 2012). Specifically, in Southeast Asia (table 3), majority of the studies were conducted in 
the recent decade, however, the review of studies related to CSRD determinants has uncovered an 
imbalance in terms of research context. Seven out of eleven listed studies in table 3 were conducted 
in the context of Malaysia, three studies in the context of Indonesia, and only one study in Thailand. 
Other research contexts in Southeast Asia, such as Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam, have not 
received sufficient attention. Moreover, a single country study rather than a comparative approach 
has been a more dominant choice. Comparative studies in this area are increasingly necessary, 
considering that country of origin has been identified as one of the key factors influencing 
organisations’ CSRD (Van der Laan Smith et al., 2005). The significance of country of origin 
comes from pressures of diverse institutional groups, such as the government, industry 
associations, pressure groups or professional accounting (Neu et al., 1998). Therefore, a 
comparative study of CSRD in the six Southeast Asian countries not only provides insights on 
CSRD practice in the region, especially in the countries that have received less attention in the 
literature, but also allows us to examine whether institutional environment and economic 
development have any influence on CSRD.  
Another empirical gap was also found in terms of internal determinants. The review of CSRD 
studies (tables 3 and 4) demonstrates the extensive focus of current literature on the impact of 
corporate characteristics, such as firm size (see Anas et al., 2015; Esa and Ghazali, 2012; Rahman 
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et al., 2011), profitability (see Anas et al., 2015; El-Halaby and Hussainey, 2015), or industry (see 
Chan et al., 2014; Naser and Hassan, 2013). However, there has been a growing number of studies 
considering the role of corporate governance practices in defining the extent of CSRD (see Amran 
and Devi, 2008; Khan et al., 2013a; Kilic et al., 2015; Othman et al., 2011), signalling the 
importance of such practices as determinants of CSRD. Most studies observing the relationship 
between corporate governance and CSRD have been conducted in a single country context with 
the focus on some key practices, such as board size (e.g. Jizi et al., 2014), board independence 
(e.g. Esa and Ghazali, 2012; Khan et al., 2013), CEO duality (e.g. Haniffa and Cooke, 2005) and 
government ownership (e.g. Amran and Devi, 2008). In the context of Southeast Asian countries, 
the impact of CG on CSRD has only been examined intensively in the context of Malaysia (table 
3), very few studies have looked at this relationship in the context of other countries, such as 
Thailand or Indonesia. For instance, one of the oldest studies looking at CG practices as 
determinants of CSRD is the study of Haniffa and Cooke (2005) conducted in Malaysia, in which 
three CG practices, including non-executive directors, CEO duality and foreign ownership, were 
examined. However, only the effect of non-executive directors was significant.  
In a recent study of Haji (2013), more CG practices have been examined, including director 
ownership, government ownership, board size, board independence, board meeting and block 
ownership, in which director ownership was concluded to have a significantly negative impact of 
CSRD while government ownership and board size were found positively significant. The findings 
of board independence, board meeting and block ownership were insignificant. In the context of 
Indonesia, the only study found in the review that examined the impact of a CG factor on CSRD 
is the study of Lestari (2013). The study looked at the relationship between independent directors 
and CSRD concluded that the percentage of independent directors on board does not significantly 
influence CSRD. The impact of CG on CSRD, therefore, has not been sufficiently examined in the 
context of other Southeast Asian countries, other than Malaysia. As justified in Chapter 1, section 
1.2, corporate governance practices can be important determinants of CSRD as CSRD is the result 
of choices, motives and values of corporation’s managers (Khan et al., 2013a). Moreover, 
according to existing literature (Millar et al., 2005; Welford, 2007), CG practices in Southeast Asia 
share some common characteristics such as corruption, family dominance, and high concentrated 
ownership that could result in some differences in CG practices’ impact, compared with what have 
been known in the context of developed countries (Khan et al., 2013a). As a result, such impact 
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on CSRD is worthy of investigation. Therefore, with the purpose of responding to the lack of 
studies on the relationship between CG and CSRD in the context of the diverse Southeast Asia 
region, this study examines the impact of six CG practices, including board size, board 
independence, board gender diversity, CEO duality, block ownership and the presence of CSR 
committee, on the extent of CSRD in the context of the six Southeast Asian countries. The study, 
therefore, not only uncovers more of CG mechanisms in these countries, but also provides greater 
diversity of CG practices to allow better examination of the impact of such practices on CSRD.  
Additionally, according to the review, there have been few studies looking at the effect of external 
factors (e.g. Anas et al., 2015; El-Halaby and Hussainey, 2015; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Mio and 
Verturelli, 2013; Othman et al., 2011). Within these studies, only one or two external determinants 
were considered together with several internal determinants. For instance, in the study of Mio and 
Verturelli (2013) that examined CSRD in listed firms from Italy and UK, the effect of legal law 
origin (common/civil law system) on CSRD was considered with the result that firms from UK, 
as a common law country, disclosed higher CSR information than their counterparts from Italy 
following the civil law system. Different from the study of Mio and Verturelli (2013), Haniffa and 
Cooke (2005) examined the impact of culture and other internal determinants (such as non-
executive directors, CEO duality, foreign ownership, size, etc.) on CSRD, in which they found that 
the ethnic group (Malay or Chinese) that top managers belong to had a significant impact on the 
extent a company in Malaysia disclosed CSR information in annual reports. Furthermore, the study 
of Anas et al. (2015) looked at the role of external environment from a different aspect through 
defining the influence of CSR award on a firm’s CSRD practice; and concluded that achieving an 
award for good CSR practices motivated firms to have better CSRD practices.  
Generally, the review of CSRD studies on external determinants showed that external determinants 
have not received sufficient attention in literature, and that the role of external determinants on 
CSRD had been examined in a fragmented manner rather than from a broad base of aspects. These 
findings, therefore, are in conjunction with the review of Fifka (2013) who has argued that the lack 
of attention on external determinants in previous literature is due to the difficulty in quantifying 
these determinants. The role of external determinants, particularly institutional environment, 
cannot be overlooked as the concept of CSR and CSR practices (including CSRD) are strongly 
dependent on the national culture and institutions that corporations are bound (Campbell, 2007; 
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Lee, 2011; Marquis et al., 2007). According to Gunawan and Hermawan (2012), due to differences 
in institutional environments, every country has different way of communicating their CSR 
information to diverse stakeholders. Despite the importance of institutional factors in shaping 
CSRD practice, these factors have been taken for granted and considered as background 
conditions, which leads to insufficient attention and a narrow understanding of CSRD as a strategic 
behaviour. Therefore, to address this gap related to external determinants in the literature, the study 
also attempts to investigate the impact of institutional environment on CSRD from various aspects 
by identifying relevant institutional factors based on institutional theory and the Scott’s 
institutional framework (1995), as well as quantifying these factors to examine their impact on 
firms’ CSRD practice.  
In conclusion, responding to the mentioned empirical gaps, the research focuses on investigating 
the impact of corporate governance practices (as internal determinants) and institutional factors 
(as external determinants) on CSRD in the context of six Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. The study, therefore, provides better 
insights of CSRD practices in the main economies of Southeast Asia, allows the effect of corporate 
governance practices to be further examined in consideration of the region’s characteristics of 
family control and concentrated ownership, as well as identify the role of institutional environment 
in shaping the countries’ CSRD practice.  
2.6 Chapter Summary 
 
The chapter provided an overview of CSRD regarding its definition, scope and categories, 
followed by a detailed discussion about information provided in each category. The chapter also 
presented a review of studies about determinants of CSRD. Based on the review, gaps and 
limitations of the current literature were identified and connected to the rationales and 
contributions of this study. In the next chapter, the literature review continues with discussion 
about the impact of external and internal determinants of CSRD and the development of relevant 
hypotheses.  
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CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 Overview 
 
Chapter Three focuses on a review of literature surrounding the impact of corporate governance 
and institutional factors on CSRD, theoretical frameworks and hypotheses development. The 
chapter starts with a session on theoretical framework in which relevant theories are identified and 
discussed in relation to CSR and CSRD studies. The session reflects on how the theories overlap 
and can be integrated. The session then moves to discuss the choice of multi-theoretical 
framework, with the combination of legitimacy theory, institutional theory, stakeholder theory and 
agency theory, and provides the justification for such choice. With the foundation of the theoretical 
framework, the next session focuses on the hypotheses development. The hypotheses development 
session is divided into two main sub-section, for internal determinants (corporate governance 
mechanisms) and external determinants (institutional environment).  
The sub-section 3.3.1 for internal determinants begins with a discussion on the concept and 
definition of corporate governance. A detailed background, context, and comparisons of corporate 
governance practices across the six countries are then provided. The section continues with a 
literature review of the relationship between corporate governance and CSRD. With consideration 
of the context of each chosen Southeast Asian countries as well as previous literature, six corporate 
governance practices, including board independence, board diversity, board size, CEO duality, 
block ownership and the presence of CSR committee, are selected. Relevant hypotheses are then 
developed to test the impact of these mechanisms on CSRD.  
The second sub-section 3.3.2 focuses on the impact of diverse institutional factors on CSRD. The 
section begins with a discussion on the development of CSR and CSRD across the six countries, 
followed by a literature review on the relationship between institutional environment and CSRD 
as well as the need for research on the impact of institutional environment on CSRD using Scott’s 
institutional framework (1995). Scott’s institutional framework (1995) with its three pillars, 
regulative, cultural-cognitive and normative, is then used to identify relevant institutional factors 
in the environment that potentially influence the extent of CSRD. Six factors, including legal 
origin, mandatory disclosure, culture dimensions (uncertainty avoidance and masculinity), GRI 
standard and CSR-related associations, representing the three pillars, are identified with relevant 
developed hypotheses. Finally, a summary of the chapter is provided.  
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3.2 Theoretical framework 
3.2.1 Review of relevant theories  
 
Based on the literature review presented on table 3 and table 4 (Chapter 2, session 2.4), different 
theories have been used to examine the effect of several determinants on CSRD practice. For the 
purpose of identifying the appropriate theoretical framework, the section provides a summary of 
perspectives of several theories in social and environmental accounting research field and presents 
the justifications for the use of multi-theoretical framework as well as the focus on certain 
perspectives than the others. 
A number of studies in CSR as well as social and environmental accounting fields have attempted 
to review the key theoretical perspectives and their application in the research fields (see Chen and 
Roberts, 2010; Frynas and Yamahaki, 2016). For instance, in the paper of Chen and Roberts 
(2010), theoretical perspectives of relevant theories in the social and environmental accounting 
research, including legitimacy theory, institutional theory, resource dependence theory and 
stakeholder theory, were addressed with the notion that legitimacy theory is served as an 
overarching concept to examine the relationship and overlapping aspects between and among other 
theories. Different from the idea of Chen and Roberts (2010), a recent paper of Frynas and 
Yamahaki (2016) classified the theories based on external or internal drivers of CSR in which 
legitimacy theory, institutional theory, stakeholder theory and resource dependent theory were 
argued to be appropriate for studies examining external drivers while agency theory and resource 
based view were appropriate for studies looking at internal drivers. Following these review papers 
and the literature review presented in table 3 and table 4 (chapter 2, session 2.4), the widely adopted 
and key theories in the field of social and environmental accounting research (including CSRD), 
such as legitimacy theory, institutional theory, stakeholder theory and resource dependent theory, 
are discussed to provide an overview of these theories and examine which theories are appropriate 
for the purpose of this study. Apart from these key theories, agency theory is also considered due 
to its suitability in examining internal drivers, especially corporate governance which will be 
justified later in this section. 
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Legitimacy Theory 
As presented in the literature review, section 2.4, legitimacy theory is the most widely-used 
theories among studies examining CSRD determinants. According to Chen and Roberts (2010), 
legitimacy theory functions as an overarching concept that allows scholars to observe the 
relationships among other theories such as institutional theory, stakeholder theory and resource 
dependent theory. The theory introduces the concept of legitimacy, which underpins other 
theoretical perspectives (Michelon et al., 2016). Legitimacy is defined by Lindblom (1994, p.2) as 
‘a condition or status which exists when an entity’s value system is congruent with the value 
system of the larger social system of which the entity is part’. Legitimacy theory, hence, relies on 
the notion of ‘social contract’ in which organisations’ actions and activities are limited within 
society’s systems of norms, values, beliefs and definitions (Khan et al., 2013a). Corporations’ 
activities are considered appropriate and desirable when complying with these boundaries (Gray 
et al., 1995a). Individuals, groups and corporations in society, therefore, not only try to maximise 
their self-interests by competing for economic resources, but also seek social approval (Ntim and 
Soobroyen, 2013). Legitimacy theory, nevertheless, does not specifically address what should be 
done to align the actions with the value system of society in order to achieve legitimacy (Chen and 
Roberts, 2010).  
Legitimacy perspective is considered appropriate for examining the practice of CSRD as 
legitimacy is one of the motivations for management to adopt CSRD (Guthrie and Parker, 1989). 
In another word, CSRD practice has been referred to as a tool to establish or maintain legitimacy 
(Lindblom, 1994; Patten, 2005). CSRD has been undertaken by management to communicate with 
diverse stakeholders and convince them that the organisation has fulfilled its expectations (Khan, 
2010). Failure to comply with these institutional norms can create a ‘legitimacy gap’ (Sethi, 1979) 
and threaten a firm’s survival (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). When there is an existence of a 
‘legitimacy gap’, organisations seek to harmonise their values with society’s (O’Dwyer, 2002). 
Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) propose different strategies or modes that help organisations to 
enhance their legitimacy. These strategies have highlighted the role of information disclosure to 
gain, repair and maintain legitimacy (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Qu and Leung, 2006). According 
to Chan et al. (2014), to influence external parties, any remedial strategies implemented by the 
management must be accompanied by disclosure. This, therefore, emphasises the importance and 
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powerful role of CSRD in annual reports (Chan et al., 2014). As a result, legitimacy theory 
potentially provides a useful theoretical framework to evaluate the practice of CSRD.  
Institutional Theory 
The new institutional theory was developed in 1970s when scholars began to recognise that the 
social relationships in which organisations are embedded, has a stronger influence on organisations 
than objective tasks (Palmer, Biggart and Dick, 2013). Distinct from other organisations-
environments research focusing on resource environments of organisations, proponents of new 
institutional theory mainly concentrate on norms and mandates, such as laws, regulations, cultural 
pressures, social comparison processes or belief systems (Meyer and Rowan, 1991; Powell and 
DiMaggio, 1983). The theory, together with other lines of thoughts, emphasises the interdependent 
relationship between organisations and environments.  
Particularly, the field of new institutional economics concentrates on the interaction between 
institutions and firms (Hoskisson et al., 2000). The concept of institutions has been discussed 
widely by many scholars (Hoskinsson et al., 2000; North, 1990; Palmer et al., 2013). Palmer et al. 
(2013) perceived institution as a stable, resilient and hence relatively enduring way of organising 
human activities. In a simpler way, many other authors (Scott, 1995; North, 1990; Djelic, 2010) 
defined institutions as formal and informal rules, understandings, norms, and regulations that limit 
and enable behaviour. According to Scott (1995), institutions consist of regulative, normative and 
cultural-cognitive elements, together with activities and resources, provide stability and meaning 
to social life. Despite diverse definitions, all institutions present two main characteristics. 
Institutions are relatively permanent since it is impossible to imagine them ever being different or 
not existing at some point. Furthermore, institutions possess a taken-for-granted nature in that they 
are rarely questioned on appropriateness or efficiency (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). According to the 
theory, social structures in which organisations are embedded comprise of multiple institutions 
that significantly influence firms’ decision making (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012, Scott, 1995; Peng 
and Heath, 1996) by exerting their pressures and expectations through institutional constituents, 
such as the government, interest groups, public opinions or professions (Baughn, Bodie and 
McIntosh, 2007).  
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One of the central concepts of institutional theory is legitimacy. The theory reflects the institutional 
legitimacy view where evolving over time, the concepts of instutition and instituationalisation now 
concentrate on granting social acceptance than establishing social reality (Chen and Roberts, 
2010). The concept of legitimacy has been considered as the most fundamental attribute of the new 
institutional theory (Palmer et al., 2008). Despite the overlapping between legitimacy theory and 
institutional theory, unlike legitimacy theory which does not specify how firms could meet social 
expectation and receive social support, institutional theory concentrates more on the process of 
obtaining legitimacy and enhancing survival prospects through conforming with social institutions 
(Chen and Roberts, 2010; Michelon et al., 2016). As a result, institutionalists such as Weber (1978) 
and Parsons (1960) view legitimacy as the extent to which an organisation follows social laws, 
norms and values. With the development of new institutionalism in 1970s, early scholars, like 
Meyer and Rowan (1977), presented the legitimacy concept through institutional perspective by 
indicating that survival enhancing outcomes result not only from being efficient but by confirming 
to the institutional environment. Legitimacy is essential for companies to achieve social worthiness 
(Oliver, 1991), attract employees and consumers, and ensure a steady cash flow (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 2003). In contrast, legitimacy can also be defined by negative consequences. Failure to 
comply with institutional norms can lead to an organisations’ activities to be questioned 
(Deephouse and Suchman, 2008), creating a ‘legitimacy gap’ (Sethi, 1979) and threatens a firms’ 
survival (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Legitimacy, therefore, is considered as an intangible asset 
or operational resource that must be maintained in order to ensure support from society (Mahadeo 
et al., 2011b).  
Additionally, a significant advantage of institutional theory is that it considers CSR as a societial 
institution of its own accord and as a mode of governance that is interlinked within the wide scope 
of economic governance and societal systems (Brammer et al., 2012; Frynas and Yamahaki, 2016). 
As a result, from a comparative perspective, institutional theory provides explanations for the 
differences in CSR nature in consideration of firms’ local context (Matten and Moon, 2008; Jamali 
and Neville, 2011). Due to this advantage, the theory has been mentioned in the review paper of 
Fryas and Yamahaki (2016) as an appropriate theoretical perspective to examine external drivers 
of CSR practices. Specifically, a number of CSRD studies have used institutional theory to 
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examine the practice in the wider societal context such as Amran and Devi (2008); Othman et al. 
(2011); and Bhattacharyya (2014). 
Resource Dependent Theory 
Resource dependent theory, presenting the strategic legitimacy view in social and environmental 
accounting, emphasises on the will of an organisation to pursue strategies that maintain a supply 
of the resources that are integral to its survival (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). The theory was argued 
to be suitable for examining the relationships between organisations with different institutions and 
actors (Ingram and Simons, 1995; Julian, Ofori-Dankwa and Justis, 2008; Frynas and Yamahaki, 
2016). As a result, researchers adopting this theoretical perspective view legitimacy as any other 
resources that are vital for firms to survive and pursue their goals (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003).  
The theory, as a result, is different from legitimacy theory in the way that rather than stressing on 
the importance of avoiding any threat to an organisation’s legitimacy, the resource dependence 
theory focuses more on the impact of legitimacy as an essential resource for an organisation (Chen 
and Roberts, 2010). The resource dependent theory was first mentioned by Pfeffer and Salancik 
(1978) in which the scholars explored how specific external environments and constraints shape 
an organisation response. The book identified three central themes, the social context mattered, 
the ontological view of resource dependence theorists and the focus on power instead of economic 
efficiency (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). While the first theme focuses on analysing the pressures 
and constraints of environmental situations in which firms are located to enable greater 
understanding of organisations’ decisions and behaviours, the second and the third themes 
concentrate more on organisations’ strategic choices to obtain vital resources, either by internal 
changes, political actions, modifying the environment or building close relationships with other 
organisations with essential resources (Chen and Roberts, 2010). Based on the resource dependent 
theorists’ view, the condition of an environment is not solely to be accepted, but rather is is an 
outcome of interactions between multiple actors and organisations seeking their own interests 
(Chen and Roberts, 2010). The theory, hence, also presents a crucial difference from the 
institutional theory. While the institutional theory emphasises on institutionalised organisations in 
general, the resource dependent theory allows organisations to be critical, powerful and proactive 
entities to make strategic decisions (Frynas and Yamahaki, 2016; Chen and Roberts, 2010). Unlike 
the previously-mentioned theories, the resource dependence theory, as mentioned in the literature 
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review, has only been addressed in a few CSRD-determinants studies. In these studies, 
(Bhattacharyya, 2014; Branco and Rodrigues, 2008; Hasseldine, Salama and Toms, 2005), CSRD 
is perceived as a practice to help organisations enhance their reputation which in turn enables them 
to achieve certain economic benefits, such as improved financial outcomes, attracting better 
employees or increasing employees’ motivations and morale.  
Stakeholder Theory 
Another relevant theory in the field of social and environmental accounting is the widely adopted 
stakeholder theory. In line with the other theories, stakeholder theory also focuses on the 
relationship between organisations and their environment (Gray et al., 1995, 1996; Bhattacharyya, 
2014). The concept of stakeholder was defined by Freeman (1984) as any individual or group who 
can influence or be influenced by the achievement of firms’ objectives. The theory views corporate 
actions as responses of organisations to pressures from diverse stakeholders, as a result of power 
dependence or legitimacy claim (Frynas and Yamahaki, 2016). From this perspective, the value 
systems of stakeholder groups, rather than the society as a whole, determine whether the actions 
or objectives of organisations are legitimate. As a result, the theory overlaps with the legitimacy 
theory in this aspect. However, while the legitimacy theory only stresses on the importance of 
complying with society’s expectations in general, stakeholder theory has explicitly indicated that 
society consists of several stakeholders with different and conflicting expectations of firms (Chen 
and Roberts, 2010).  
Stakeholder theory has been a dominant theory in CSR literature as CSR activities surpass 
companies’ profit making purpose and influence more diverse groups of stakeholders (Anas et al., 
2015) which is aligned with the stakeholder perspective that a company’s objectives should go 
beyond its responsibility to shareholders and address the demands of several groups of 
stakeholders who are interested in the company (Lawrence and Weber, 2011; Tan et al., 2016). 
According to Clarkson (1995), it would be difficult for an organisation to survive without the 
support of its key stakeholders. As a result, with the dependence of corporations on stakeholders 
for resources, stakeholders achieve more power over corporations’ behaviour and their demands 
will be responded to if a firms’ success is dependant of the resource that group controls (Chan et 
al., 2014).  
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The stakeholder theory can be and has been used in a number of ways in the literature. According 
to Donaldson and Preson (1985), stakeholder theory can be applied on the basis of three aspects, 
descriptive/ empirical, instrumental and normative. In relation to CSR studies, the descriptive 
scope of stakeholder theory emphasises the views of people participating in the mission/ objectives 
forming process of an organisation and its actions with regard to different stakeholders. The 
approach, hence, provides interesting insights that firms are socially constructed and behave in 
congruence with shared perceptions (Brickson, 2007). This approach has been used together with 
the instrumental and normative stakeholder theory. Instrumental stakeholder theorists view CSR 
as a strategic tool that a corporation uses to achieve economic objectives while normative 
stakeholder theory focuses on the ethical aspects that connect business and society to promote 
moral obligations of organisations towards stakeholders (Brickson, 2007; Garriga and Mele, 
2004).  
Despite all of the arguments regarding the importance of all stakeholders and firms’ 
responsibilities to diverse stakeholder groups, due to the limited resources and bounded rationality, 
firms tend to give priority to certain stakeholders based on instrumental and/or normative 
considerations, such as managerial discretion, specific inclinations or their assessment of 
stakeholders in relation to power, urgency and legitimacy (Mitchell et al., 1997; Jamali, 2008). 
This understanding is particularly beneficial in examining CSRD practice in firms, as they tend to 
direct their attention and focus on disclosing information for specific stakeholder groups. 
Stakeholder theory, as a result, has been applied widely to explain firms’ motivations in involving 
in and disclosing CSR information (see Barako and Brown, 2008; Chan et al., 2014; Anas et al., 
2015; Tan et al., 2016; Janggu et al., 2007). The practice of CSRD is linked to the aspects of 
communication and compromise in stakeholder perspective. The willingness to communicate and 
compromise is emphasised in stakeholder theory as the essential solution to stakeholders’ approval 
and support (Freeman, 1984). Compromising, as the central concept of communication, provide a 
clear understanding of what organisations should give up to achieve stakeholder support, which 
explains the reasons why corporations voluntarily involve in certain social activities (Chen and 
Roberts, 2010).  
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Agency Theory  
The final theory addressed in this review section is the agency theory. Different from the above 
theories, agency theory is not perceived as one of the key theories in social and environmental 
accounting field, according to Chen and Roberts (2010). However, the theory has been used in a 
number of CSRD studies, mostly to explain the effect of a firm’s characteristics or internal 
practices such as corporate governance on CSRD (see Janggu, Joseph and Madi, 2007; Lestari, 
2013; Haji, 2013; Jizi et al., 2014). The theory was also mentioned in the recent paper of Frynas 
and Yamahaki (2016) as a useful theoretical perspective to examine internal drivers of CSR 
practices, including CSRD. As the main objectives of this study is to examine the impact of both 
external and internal determinants on CSRD, agency theory should also be considered. The theory 
focuses on the relationship between principals and agents, in which principals (shareholders) 
delegate decision-making authority to agents (managers) to perform business tasks (Mallin, 2013). 
The theory addresses the agency problem that arises when there are conflicts of interests between 
agents and principals or when the principals are unable to monitor effectively the conduct of agents 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1985). The agency problem can be overcome or reduced 
by the use of different CG mechanisms (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009). In relation to CSR, one of the 
earliest reference of agency theory in CSR studies is the work of Friedman (1962) in which CSR 
was argued to be a self-serving behaviour of agents to obtain social and environmental objectives, 
which reduces profit and ultimately damages the principals’ interests. This argument has been 
continuously utilised by recent studies to investigate the conflicts of interests between agents and 
principals in regards to the pursuit of environmental and social goals (Frynas and Yamahaki, 
2016). One of the major criticism of agency theory, especially in relation to CSR studies is the 
overly focus of the theory on the agents and principals relationship, which has overlooked other 
types of stakeholders (Freeman, 2010). The theory’s focus on monetary or wealth considerations 
limits its relevance to the scope of CSR (Cormier et al, 2005). Thus, according to Eisenhardt 
(1989), to overcome these criticisms, agency theory should be used with a combination of other 
complementary theories to capture greater complexity of organisations. 
3.2.2 Justification for the multi-theoretical framework 
Following the suggestion of Cormier et al. (2005) and Tagesson et al. (2009) that CSRD as a 
complex subject cannot be explained by a single theory, this study adopts the multi-theoretical 
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framework approach. According to Gray et al. (1995a), theories should be applied as 
complementary rather than competitive while explaining an empirical phenomenon. Despite 
sharing some similarities, the mentioned theories are fundamentally different. As a result, these 
alternative theories concentrate on distinct perspectives of the CSRD; and hence should not be 
perceived as competing perspectives, but as multiple ways of analysing and observing 
organisational decisions regarding to the disclosure of information to the public (Reverte, 2009). 
The use of multi-theoretical framework, therefore, would provide a more comprehensive 
explanation to the CSRD practice. 
Furthermore, the main objectives of this study are to identify the impact of external determinants 
(institutional factors) and internal determinants (corporate governance practices) on CSRD. As the 
study acknowledges the two major influences on firms’ CSRD practice in Southeast Asian 
countries, those related to the institutional context in which firms are embedded, and those related 
to companies’ internal governance, the adopted theoretical framework should incorporate both of 
these influences and allows the effect of both external and internal determinants to be elaborated. 
Following the suggestion of Haider (2010) that the choice of theories should be based on the factors 
that influence corporate decision to participate in CSRD, the study adopts four main theoretical 
perspectives, including institutional theory, legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory and agency 
theory. While the study does not pay major attention to the resource dependent theory, it is not to 
say that the theory does not have any contributing values in explaining CSRD. Since the resource 
dependence theory perceives the environment as an outcome of organisations interactions 
stemming from seeking their own interests, this perspective is more appropriate for studies 
investigating organisations’ strategic response to external constraints (Chen and Roberts, 2010). 
This study, however, only focus on how factors from external and internal environments put 
pressure on firms to adopt CSRD practice. As a result, in this consideration, the use of the other 
theories is more appropriate.  
For the purpose of examine the impact of institutional environment on CSRD, institutional 
perspective can be considered as the rational approach and a useful framework in examining how 
national contexts influencing CSR practice (Matten and Moon, 2008; Campbell, 2005) as the 
theory allows the motives of managers, shareholders and key stakeholders to be explored and 
compared within their respective contexts. Moreover, the theory brings inter-dependencies 
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between and interactions among stakeholders into the analysis, which is vital to understanding 
CSR, given its societal orientation (Matten and Moon, 2008). Particularly, the use of institutional 
theory to provide an argument for supporting transparency and disclosure practices has received 
increasing attention (Matten and Moon 2008; Brammer et al., 2012; Frias-Aceituno, Rodriguez-
Ariza and Garcia-Sanchez, 2013b). With differences in political, legal, social, economic and 
environmental conditions, every country has multiple ways to respond to these conditions and 
report its own CSR information to diverse stakeholders (Gunawan and Hermawan, 2012). 
Institutional theory, therefore, has been used in recent CSR reporting studies to explain motivations 
behind firms’ involvement in CSR reporting (De Grobois, 2016; Tudor-tiron and Dragu, 2014; 
Amran and Haniffa, 2011; Frias-Aceituno et al., 2013; Muttakin and Subramaniam, 2015). From 
this perspective, CSR reporting plays an important role in maintaining legitimacy and managing 
corporate reputation (Clarke and Gibson-Sweet, 1999).  
Despite the growing attention of institutional theory in CSR reporting studies, the use of this theory 
to explain firms’ CSRD in annual reports is limited to only a few studies, notably Amran and Devi 
(2008), Othman et al. (2011), and Pedersen, Neergaard, Pedersen and Gwozdz (2013). As most 
studies regarding determinants of CSRD in annual reports have predominantly focused on 
economic and internal variables, the use of other theories, such as agency theory, stakeholder 
theory, legitimacy theory are more appropriate to explain the relationships between these variables 
and CSRD. With the purpose of examining the role of institutional factors on CSRD, institutional 
theory is considered suitable for this study for the following reasons. Firstly, distinctive from other 
theories, institutional theory provides an insight that helps to explain the influence of institutional 
environments on organisational behaviours (Oliver, 1991), which reflect the aim of the study, to 
examine the impact of institutional factors on CSRD.  Secondly, as the study intends to investigate 
the role of institutional environment from diverse aspects, rather than just regulatory, institutional 
theory is a useful perspective as the theory focuses on not only formal rules, but also informal 
rules, norms and routines that influence organisations’ behaviour (Pedersen et al., 2013). Finally, 
the theory complements both stakeholder and legitimacy theories to provide an understanding of 
organisations’ response to social and institutional pressures. As well as their expectations to 
maintain legitimacy (Deegan and Unerman, 2006), its application to CSRD studies is relevant, 
considering CSRD is the method that organisations use to appear legitimate to the society (Ntim 
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and Soobaroyen, 2013) through communicating with stakeholders and convincing them that 
organisations have fulfilled their expectations (Khan, 2010). 
In terms of internal determinants, corporate governance practices, a combination of agency theory, 
stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory, as suggested by Khan et al. (2013) are adopted as the 
key theoretical perspectives to explain the effect of such practices on CSRD. While the relationship 
between corporate governance and CSRD is a trending topic in the literature, the impact of 
corporate governance attributes on financial and voluntary disclosure has had a longer tradition 
within the literature (see Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007; Eng and Mak, 
2003; Frias-Aceituno et al., 2013; Ho and Wong, 2001; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Empirical 
findings in the literature have proven constantly, over time and countries, that corporate voluntary 
disclosure is influenced by diverse corporate governance elements (see Cheng and Courtenay, 
2006; Eng and Mak, 2003; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Ho and Wong, 2001; Huafang and Jianguo, 
2007; Said et al., 2009). In the majority of these studies, agency theory has been widely used to 
explain the impact of corporate governance on information disclosure (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, 
Michelon and Parbonetti, 2012). The agency theoretical framework provides a strong framework 
that links disclosure practices to corporate governance (Barako et al., 2006). In order to ensure the 
accountability of managers, disclosure practice is necessary to reduce managers’ opportunistic 
behaviour and the intention to withhold information (Ho and Wong, 2001). Good and effective 
corporate governance systems play an important role in motivating managers to be more 
transparent, productive and put effort into fulfilling tasks from owners (Said et al., 2009). As a 
result, an effective corporate governance system is necessary to supervise and monitor managers’ 
actions and reduce information asymmetry. The use of agency theory, therefore, is considered 
appropriate for organisation behaviour topics that are related to information asymmetry.  
Although CSRD, as a form of disclosure, seems to be an excellent opportunity to apply agency 
theory (Barako et al., 2006), as explained in the previous section, the use of this theory on its own 
to explain the relationship between corporate governance and CSRD would not be appropriate due 
to its overly focus on the agents and principals relationship. Therefore, the theory is used in 
combination with legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory to enable discussion on firms’ 
motivations in adopting CSRD practice as well as disclosing information for specific stakeholder 
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groups. The two theories have also been used widely in the literature to examine the impact of 
corporate governance on CSRD.  
3.3 Hypotheses development 
3.3.1 Internal determinants – Corporate Governance practices 
The main aims of this session are to discuss the literature review on the relationship between 
corporate governance and CSRD as well as develop relevant hypotheses for the study. The session 
starts with a brief discussion on corporate governance definition, followed by an overview of 
corporate governance development and the legal frameworks of corporate governance across the 
six countries. Comparisons of some key corporate governance mechanisms are also presented. The 
session then continues with a summary of literature review on the relationship between corporate 
governance and CSRD. Based on the literature review and the study context, six important 
corporate governance mechanisms, including board size, board independence, board gender 
diversity, CEO duality, block ownership and the presence of CSR committee, are selected to 
examine the effect of corporate governance on CSRD in this study. Finally, relevant hypotheses 
are developed based on previous studies and the theoretical framework.  
3.3.1.1 Corporate Governance  
The 2008 global financial crisis and contemporary corporate scandals have developed an intensive 
interest in corporate governance (CG) research. The crisis was the result of a variety of weaknesses 
in regulatory and CG practices (Daniel, Cieslewicz and Pourjalali, 2012), therefore, the need to 
promote good CG practices globally has received great attention from regulators and academic 
scholars (Millar et al., 2005). With an increasing number of studies in the area, definitions of CG 
remain diverse. Over the past two decades, many definitions have been mentioned in scholarly 
literature as there is no commonly accepted definition (Balc, Ilies, Cioban and Cuza, 2013). CG as 
a discipline is relatively new. Definitions of CG tend to fall between narrow and broad views 
(Solomon, 2010). The narrow view approach to CG is limited to the relationship between a 
company and its shareholders (Solomon, 2010). The narrow view reflects the traditional finance 
paradigm that is expressed in agency theory. An example of such definition is that of Sir Adrian 
Cadbury mentioned in the earliest corporate governance report, in December 1992: 
“Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled. 
Boards of directors are responsible for the governance of their companies. The 
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shareholders’ role in governance is to appoint the directors and the auditors and to satisfy 
themselves that an appropriate governance structure is in place.” 
 (Cadbury report, 1992, p.15) 
The definition focuses on governance structures, practices and processes with the explanation that 
boards of directors in listed companies are responsible for the CG of such companies, while 
shareholders’ role is to appoint directors and auditors to ensure governance structures are in place. 
Adapted from agency theory, in this perspective, shareholder interest appears to be the core of CG. 
As a result, the definition concentrates on the development of CG as a response to agency problems 
that arise when the ownership is separated from the control. As directors (agents) manage firms on 
behalf of owners (principles), directors could abuse their power for their own interests, rather than 
owners’ interests (Mallin, 2016). Therefore, corporate governance was introduced to ensure that 
directors (agents) act upon the interests of companies’ owners (Rossouw, Watt and Malan, 2002). 
Some other examples of this perspective are presented as follows:  
“Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations 
assure themselves of getting a return on their investment”  
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p.737) 
“Corporate governance as the set of mechanisms – both institutional and market-based – 
that induce the self-interested controllers of a company (those that make decisions 
regarding how the company will be operated) to make decisions that maximize the value 
of the company to its owners (the suppliers of capital).”  
(Denis and Mcconnell, 2003; p.1-2) 
The two definitions above emphasise that the sole purpose of business is to make money for its 
owners. They argued that shareholders are more likely to lose their investment if companies run 
into trouble, while other stakeholders, such as employees, customers, or suppliers, are affected 
less. Shareholders, as providers of finance, therefore, bear the residual risks (Goergen, 2012). CG 
mechanisms, as a result, are established to help assure shareholders that managers will act 
according to shareholders’ interests. This perspective, as a result, is straightforward agency theory 
as it focuses on how shareholders ensure managers create revenue and pursue shareholder profits 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
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In contrast to the agency perspective, Goergen (2012) states that the legal status of shareholders 
does not justify corporations’ focus on their value maximisation. In line with this argument, Ireland 
(1999, p.56) addressed that rather than being the private property of shareholders, corporations 
should be seen as common property as they are “the product of the collective labour of many 
generations”. These perceptions align with the stakeholder approach, in which CG can be viewed 
as an amalgamation of relationships, not only between the company and its shareholders, but 
additionally with employees, customers, suppliers and others (Solomon, 2010). This approach has 
received growing attention in recent years and is considered as the broad approach to CG. Some 
examples of CG definitions inclusive of this stakeholder perspective are presented as follows: 
“Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s management, 
its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the 
structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining 
those objectives and monitoring performance are determined.” (OECD, 2004; p.11)  
Sir Adrian Cadbury has also adapted this approach in this recent definition mentioned in ‘Global 
Corporate Governance Forum’, World Bank 2000: 
“Corporate Governance is concerned with holding the balance between economic and 
social goals and between individual and communal goals. The corporate governance 
framework is there to encourage the efficient use of resources and equally to require 
accountability for the stewardship of those resources. The aim is to align as nearly as 
possible the interests of individuals, corporations, and society.” 
(Cadbury, 2000, p.vi) 
Such perspectives have meant that CG has become a broader, more lucid concept. The definition 
not only includes various stakeholders involved with companies, such as shareholders, managers, 
consumers, employees, and suppliers, but also outsider stakeholders (e.g. local, national and 
international societies) whose interests could be influenced by their activities (Tricker, 2012). This 
perspective poses many intriguing philosophical issues regarding the relationships between 
individuals, the state and enterprises (Tricker, 2012). 
Despite the differences in terms of perspectives, according to Solomon (2010), in general, the 
definitions of CG in the literature share several characteristics, with accountability being one. 
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While narrow approach definitions focus on accountability to shareholders, the broader 
perspective supports the extensive level of accountability, not only to shareholders but also other 
stakeholders. However, Solomon (2010, p.6) argued that “theoretical frameworks based 
exclusively on shareholder accountability are not necessarily inconsistent with theoretical 
frameworks which champion stakeholder accountability”. Arguably, companies can only satisfy 
shareholders’ interests by being accountable for other stakeholders as firms with stakeholder 
orientation, in a long term, are more successful and prosperous.   
There are different CG models reflecting these two main perspectives. Previous studies have 
indicated that CG models incorporate country and legal origin. While the shareholder model is 
common amongst Anglo-American countries, the stakeholder governance structure tends to be 
used in Europe and Asia (Mallin, 2016, p.22; Aguilera, 2005, p.S41; Kamal, 2010, p.206-207). 
The Anglo-American model exists in the US and the UK with maximisation of shareholders’ 
property as the main concern. The model is characterised by fragmented ownership and well-
developed financial markets (Kamal, 2010). The second model, the Continental Europe system, is 
commonly found in Japan and Continental European countries with Germany as a clear 
representative (Fannon, 2006). The system allows stakeholders to be members of a company’s 
board (a supervisor board) (Fannon, 2006) with the major goal of counteracting the abuse of 
executive power in shareholding models (Letza, Kirkbride, Sun and Smallman, 2008). Unlike the 
other perspective, the stakeholder corporate governance structure aims to maximise the business’s 
wider value (Letza et al., 2008). Besides allowing stakeholders more opportunity, this type of 
model also recognises and values major shareholders including banks as integral providers of 
capital (Kamal, 2010).  
Thus far, an overview of CG definitions, competing perspectives and several global models have 
been presented. In the next section, to have a developed understanding of CG in the six Southeast 
Asian countries, a detailed overview of CG development and CG legal framework in each of the 
countries will be discussed. Comparisons of numerous key CG characteristics will also be analysed 
in detail.  
3.3.1.2 Corporate Governance Development in Southeast Asian Countries  
CG practices amongst Southeast Asian countries share some common characteristics with other 
Asian markets. With distinct factors giving rise to CG in addition to structural characteristics of 
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developing countries, such as under-developed capital markets and government involvement, 
models of CG in these countries differs from developed economies (Rabelo and Vasconcelos, 
2002). The level of CG development and CG legal frameworks across the region also present some 
differences. For instance, based on the review of CG performance in the six countries conducted 
by Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2014) in 2013, the top three countries with high mean scores 
in relation to CG performance are Thailand (75.39), Malaysia (71.69) and Singapore (71.68). The 
lowest three are the Philippines (57.99), Indonesia (54.55) and finally Vietnam (33.87). The mean 
scores demonstrate disparities across the three groups, between the top three performers (Thailand, 
Malaysia and Singapore), the middle ones (Indonesia and Philippines) and the lowest one 
(Vietnam). The mean scores of the 2013 report presented an increase of 19% compared with its 
predecessor in 2012 (ADB, 2014), however, the ranking order is slightly distinct in the reports of 
Asian Corporate Governance Association (ACGA, 2016). The reports of ACGA rank the CG 
performance of eleven Asian countries, including five countries included in this study with 
Vietnam being the exception. In their 2014 report, Singapore ranked first, Thailand and Malaysia 
ranked fourth, and the Philippines and Indonesia ranked tenth. In 2016, the ranks of Thailand, 
Malaysia and Indonesia dropped to the positions of fifth, sixth and eleventh respectively. The 
differences between the two assessments, of ADB and ACGA, could be attributed to the 
differences in terms of methodology, sample size and collected data. While the assessment of ADB 
focuses on CG performance at company level, the CG ranking of ACGA was conducted based on 
the legal framework of the countries. Generally, however, the assessments present differences 
across the six countries regarding CG legal framework as well as CG performance. 
In order to garner an overview of CG in the region in general and in each of the countries in 
particular, the following sub-sections will present the legal framework of CG in each of the six 
countries with a detailed summary in table 5 and table 6. Table 6 highlights in detail key CG 
regulations relevant to the study. Comparisons of the legal framework and CG performance of 
these countries are also provided at the end of the section.  
Indonesia 
The development of CG in Indonesia arose from the 1998 financial crisis in East Asia, which had 
a huge impact on the country’s economic development. Harmful CG practices were deemed to be 
the main cause of the crisis. Issues such as transparency, board practices, disclosure and protection 
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of minority shareholders were badly implemented in many Public Listed Companies (PLCs). As a 
result, after the crisis, public and private sectors, including the Indonesia Capital Market and 
Financial Institution Supervisory Authority (BAPEPAM-LK), National Committee on 
Governance Policy, and the Bank of Indonesia, have all attempted to strengthen the CG framework 
in the country through the release of various regulations and guidelines.  The primary law covers 
diverse CG issues in Indonesia is the Limited Liability Company Law (No.40 of 2007). The Law 
addresses general regulations from the establishment, management and governance of a company 
and fiscal issues, to shareholders’ rights and meetings, and major actions. Aside law No.40, the 
CG of listed companies also follows the Capital Market Law No.8 of 1995 which provides general 
guidance, supervision and regulation of the Capital Market to protect the interests of investors and 
the public to ensure the Market is fair and efficient. Issues mentioned in the Capital Market Law 
include the protection of minorities, protection against market manipulation, fraud, insider trading, 
conflicts of interests and the governance of professional advisors. Moreover, regulations released 
by the Financial Services Authority (also called Otoritas Jasa Keuanga OJK) and listed 
requirements of the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) also contribute to the development of a CG 
legal framework for listed companies in Indonesia. Besides all of these regulations and rules, 
specific sectors, such as insurance, multi-finance and banking, have their own laws and regulations 
with detailed compliance requirements and guidance on good CG. Although each governmental 
agency has a duty to participate in implementing CG, the laws and regulations have not been fully 
implemented. For instance, in the case of the Company Law, there is lack of government regulation 
supplementing and guiding the processes and procedures. Moreover, in practice, the overlapping 
laws and regulations have led to confusion, uncertainties and ambiguities for firms when 
implementing good CG. Other non-statutory sources for CG include the Code on Good Corporate 
Governance issued by the National Committee for Governance (KNKG) and the Corporate 
Governance Manual issued by the Financial Services Authority (FSA).  The Indonesia Code on 
Good Corporate Governance is not legally-binding and is applied by companies on a voluntary 
basis.  
Malaysia 
Following the downturn of Malaysia’s economy in 1997, the High Level Committee on Corporate 
Governance was established in 1998. The Corporate Governance Code was reported by the 
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Committee in 2000 and adopted by the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange in 2002 in which all listed 
companies are required to follow the code on a ‘comply or explain’ basis. Since then, the Code 
has been revised three times, in 2007, 2012 and 2016 to improve CG practices. The new Code has 
adopted a revised approach with the focus on conduct and outcomes of CG practices to motivate 
progression. Besides changes in the Code, the Malaysian government has also attempted to 
improve the legal and regulatory framework through altering the Company Act 1965, revising 
legal frameworks for securities markets and listing requirements, as well as adding additional 
guidance on CG for government-linked companies (GLCs) and financial institutions.  
The key laws regulating the capital markets include the Capital Markets and Services Act 2007 
and the Securities Commission Act 1993. In addition to the Malaysia Stock Exchange (Bursa 
Malaysia), the supervision of the Securities Commission also plays a role of regulators through its 
listing requirements which cover a diverse set of CG requirements for listed companies. Moreover, 
there are also other governmental agencies, such as the Putrajaya Committee and the Bank Negara 
Malaysia, which are responsible for supervising CG practices and issuing guidance of CG for 
government-linked companies and financial institutions. In terms of auditing, the Malaysian 
Institute of Accountants, as the legally established professional institution, is responsible for 
auditing standards and practices as well as certifications. Authorities with enforcement power on 
CG in Malaysia include the Companies Commission, the Securities Commission, Bursa Malaysia, 
and Bank Negara Malaysia. Each of these agencies has concise areas of authority and precise 
enforcement frameworks (World Bank, 2012). In the case of overlap, these bodies often cooperate. 
Firms and conglomerates in the investment and financial sectors are under the jurisdiction of all 
four authorities.  
Philippines 
The key governmental agency that retains overall jurisdiction, control and supervision on domestic 
companies is the Philippines Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The SEC also oversees 
the activities of the Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE) to ensure it functions as a self-regulatory 
organisation in conjunction with SEC’s rules and the Securities Regulation Code. The PSE governs 
all listed companies. Aside from the SEC and the PSE, the Bangko Sentral ng Philipnas (BSP) and 
the Office of the Insurance Commission (IC) also play supporting roles. Each of these bodies is 
responsible for a distinct financial market sector and has the authority to issue its own circular 
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memoranda, implementing rules and regulations if there is no conflict with existing law. For 
example, while the BSP supervises and regulates companies in the financial and banking sectors, 
the IC is accountable for charitable trusts, mutual benefit associations, and insurance companies. 
The two important pieces of legislation under the control of SEC is the Securities Regulation Code 
and the Corporation Code of the Philippines, in which the Corporation Code (Batasang Pambansa 
68) is the main legal document that governs all stock and non-stock corporations from their 
establishment to dissolution, with regards to several key CG aspects such as board of directors, 
stockholders and records.  
As with many other countries, the Code of Corporate Governance plays a vital role in regulating 
companies’ CG practices in Philippines. Under the Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 2002, 
the Code of Corporate Governance and the Manual of Corporate Governance were issued with the 
main purpose of providing guidance for firms to formulate their governance rules and practices. 
The Code of Corporate Governance has been revised twice, firstly in 2009 (under the SEC 
memorandum Circular No. 6, Series of 2009) and recently in 2016. In response to the criticism of 
overregulation, the new code adopts a ‘comply or explain’ approach. With this approach, 
companies are not required to comply with the Code but they must identify the areas of compliance 
and non-compliance as well as explain the reasons for non-compliance. The Code allows 
company’s board greater flexibility. According to SEC’s rule, all the listed companies are required 
to submit the new Manual on Corporate Governance prior to the 1st of June 2017. Besides the SEC, 
PSE, BSP and IC as the key bodies, other institutions, such as the Institute of Corporate Directors 
(ICD) or the Institute of Certified Public Accountants, are also active in promoting good 
governance practices. For instance, with support from the SEC and the PSE, the ICD developed 
and institutionalised the Corporate Governance Scorecard for public listed companies. The 
scorecard was initially voluntary for listed companies, however, since 2009, according to the SEC 
Memorandum Circular No. 12, the scorecard has been mandatory and includes specific penalties 
classified under the Circular No.5, Series of 2009 for non-compliance.  
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Table 5: Summary of the CG’s legal frameworks in the six countries 
Country Corporate Governance Frameworks Key issues  
Indonesia The Limited Liability Company Law 
No.40 of 2007 
Key issues: Establishment of a new company, capital issues, management and 
governance of a company (annual report, profit and dividends, CSR, shareholders 
meetings, board of directors, board of commissioners, and cross shareholdings), the 
use of profit, liquidation, merge and acquisition, and expiry of company 
The Capital Market Law No.8 of 1995 Key issues: Governance of professional advisers and offerings, insider trading, 
minority protection, fraud and conflict-of-interest transactions, reporting and 
disclosing information. 
The Financial Services Authority 
regulations 
Includes regulations on reporting and CG for companies operating in banking, 
insurance and financial services.  
For example: The regulation on monthly report of non-bank financial services 
institutions and the Regulation 73/POJK.05/2016 on Good Corporate Governance 
for Insurance Companies (Regulation 73) 
The Code on Good Corporate 
Governance 
Main areas: Code of conduct, business ethics, shareholders, stakeholders, board of 
directors, board of commissioners, CG principles (transparency, accountability, 
responsibility, independence and fairness) and good CG practices.  
The Corporate Governance Manual  The manual provides general guidance for good CG practices mentioned as follows: 
board of commissioners, board of directors, board committees, auditing, 
shareholder rights, corporate secretary, general meeting of shareholders, and 
information disclosure.  
Listing requirements Includes general provisions for listing, procedure of listing and reporting 
obligations.  
Code of Conduct (IDX) (2011) Key areas: company’s relationships with shareholders and stakeholders, 
documentation and reporting, protection of data and information systems, insider 
trading, honesty, bribery, awards, and compliance to laws and regulations.  
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Malaysia The Code of Corporate Governance 
(2016) 
Include four principles regarding board leadership and effectiveness, financial and 
corporate reporting, managing risks and create value, and relationship with 
shareholders, on ‘comply or explain’ approach. 
The Company Act (2016) replaced the 
old Act (1965) effective from 31st, 
January, 2017 
Relevant CG issues regulated in the law include: substantial shareholdings, board 
of directors, financial statements and report, meetings and auditing.  
The Capital Markets and Services Act 
(2007) 
Regulates securities and derivatives markets, capital markets services, 
compensation fund, market misconduct and prohibited conduct, issues of securities, 
take over and mergers, provisions for listed corporations (CEO and directors’ 
respnsibilities, prohibited conduct of directors, information submission, auditor’s 
duties, false and misleading statements, whistle-blowing protection), disclosure 
information, and civil actions.  
The Securities Commission Act (1993) 
last amended in 2015 
Regulates the securities commission 
Bursa Malaysia’s listing requirements  Provides detail principles of CG regarding: board of directors, audit committee, 
external auditors, CG disclosure, and internal audit 
Philippines  The Corporation Code (Batas 
Pambansa Bilang 68) 
The Code governs the establishment and operation of both stock and non-stock 
corporations in Philippines, including some CG issues such as board of directors, 
meetings, stock and stockholders, corporate books and records.  
The Securities Regulation Code 
(Republic Act No. 8799) 
Governs the Securities and Exchange Commission, shareholders protection, fraud, 
manipulation and insider trading, responsibilities and oversight of self-regulatory 
organisations, acquisition and transfer of securities, settlement of transition, margin 
and credit.  
The Code of Corporate Governance 
(2016) 
Addresses principles of five CG areas: the board’s governance responsibilities, 
disclosure and transparency, internal control and risk management, relationship 
with shareholders, and duties to shareholders. 
PSE’s listing and disclosure rules  Mentions general requirement of listing securities, disclosed information, listing 
rules and requirements for specific industries, public ownership, etc.   
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Singapore The Companies Act (Chapter 50) Key regulated issues: constitution of companies, shares, debentures and charges, 
management and administration (includes regulations on directors and officers, 
meetings and proceedings), accounts and audit, winding up, regulations for specific 
type of companies (includes investment companies and foreign companies), and 
general provisions (enforcement, offences and miscellaneous).  
The Securities and Future Act of 2001 
(Chapter 289) 
Key regulated areas: establishment of markets, regulations of approved exchanges, 
regulations of recognised market operators, trade repositories, regulation of licensed 
foreign trade repositories, clearing facilities, holders of capital markets services 
licence and representatives, books, consumer assets and audit, conduct of business, 
disclosure of interests (including disclosure by directors and CEO, disclosure by 
substantial shareholders, and disclosure by corporation), securities industry council 
and take-over offers, supervision and investigation, prohibited conducts, attributed 
liability, offer of investment, appeals and miscellaneous.     
SGX’s listing requirements The rulebooks contain general and detail requirements for listing, such as 
shareholding spread and distribution, quantitative criteria, profit test, financial 
position and liquidity, directors and management, etc.  
The Code of Corporate Governance 
(2012) 
Key issues: Board matters (Board’s conduct of affairs, board composition and 
guidance, chairman and CEO, board membership, board performance, access to 
information), remuneration (remuneration policies, disclosure of remuneration), 
accountability and audit, shareholder rights and responsibilities, and disclosure of 
CG. 
Thailand  Public Limited Companies Act (1992) Regulates all the key aspects of companies, including formation, registration, share 
and shareholders, board of directors, meetings of shareholders, accounts and 
reports, inspections, liquidations, capitals, conversion to a company and penalties 
The Securities and Exchange Act 
(1992) 
Key regulated issues: supervision of securities and exchange, issuance of securities, 
public offering of securities, governance of public company (directors and 
executive, duty and responsibility of director and executive, and shareholder 
meetings), securities business, securities exchange, institutions related to securities 
business, unfair trading, acquisition of securities for business take overs, 
supervision and penalities.  
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SET’s regulations for listed companies Includes several rules, regulations and policies regarding listing equity securities, 
disclosure practice, minimum public ownership, best practices for directors, 
guidelines for audit committee, etc. 
Principles of good corporate 
governance for listed companies (2012) 
The principles and recommended best practices are presented under five main 
categories: the board’s responsibilities, rights and equitable treatment of 
shareholders, stakeholders’ role, disclosure and transparency. The Code does not 
include issues that have already been addressed in laws and regulations 
Vietnam  The Enterprise Law (2014) The Law regulates key aspects of companies from the establishment, management, 
reorganisation to dissolution, including some CG issues for listed companies, such 
as shares, rights and obligations of shareholders, dividends, organisational and 
managerial structure, general meeting of shareholders, board of directors, 
supervisory board, and information disclosure. 
The Law on Securities (2006) The law governs securities listing, public offering of securities, securities market 
services, provisions of securities, trading and investment.  
Relevant CG issues for public companies: compliance with CG principles, report of 
major shareholders, and information disclosure of public companies.  
Corporate Governance regulations 
(2012) (121/2012/TT-BTC) 
Key regulated aspects: shareholders’ rights and obligations, shareholders’ meetings, 
board of directors (qualifications, composition, rights, obligations, meetings, and 
remuneration), supervisory board (composition, rights, obligations, and 
remuneration), conflict of interest prevention, information report and disclosure, 
internal CG, board committees, supervisions and penalties.  
Disclosure Rule (2012) 52/2012/TT-
BTC 
Key regulated areas: obligations to disclose information, methods and forms of 
information disclosure, content of information, infrequent disclosure.   
HoSE’s listing requirements Includes rules about registration, supervision of listing requirement and penalties 
for violations of listing requirements on the HoSE. 
HNX’s listing requirements Include rules about registration, application, listing requirement, listing procedure, 
supervision and penalties (639/QD-SGDHN), information required to disclose 
(606/QD-SGDHN), and CG report (52/2012/TT-BTC) 
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Singapore 
Among the six countries, Singapore has been recognised by many assessment reports as one of the 
countries with best corporate governance practices in Asia (ADB, 2012, 2013; ACCA, 2014, 
2016). The Singapore CG framework includes the Companies Act (Chapter 50), the Securities and 
Future Act of 2001 (Chapter 289), the Singapore Exchange (SGX) Listing Rules and the Code of 
Corporate Governance (2012), with the SGX and the Monetary Authority of Singapore as the main 
regulative bodies. These CG rules and regulations cover many aspects of CG in listed companies, 
such as regulations on directors and officers, meetings, proceedings, disclosure, supervision, 
remuneration, accounting and auditing. In the past few years, these rules and regulations have 
adopted many alterations and amendments. For instance, the Companies Act, as the overarching 
legal framework for Singaporean companies, is reviewed frequently with approved changes made 
into law. The most recent amendment of the Companies Act is in 2017. The listing requirements 
and the Code of Corporate Governance were also amended in 2011 and 2012 respectively. All of 
these changes have reflected the government’s efforts in keeping up with the evolving business 
environment. Moreover, the combination between mandatory requirements and guidelines of best 
practice allows flexibility for firms while still meeting global best practices.  
Thailand  
According to ADB report (2013), Thailand is one of the leading countries in the region in terms 
of CG. The country has diverse CG regulations and guidelines with an elevated level of compliance 
in key areas. The main regulatory bodies overseeing CG in the country include the Department of 
Business Development, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand (SET), the Thai Institute of Directors, the Bank of Thailand, the State Enterprise Policy 
Office and the Federation of Accounting Professions. The key legislation that governs listed and 
other public firms is the Public Limited Companies Act (1992) which provided strong enforcement 
rules for the capital market as well as a supervisory framework. The secondary level of regulation 
consists of regulations issued by the SEC and listing requirements of SET, in which the SEC is 
considered the main regulator of capital markets. The Securities and Exchange Act (1992) issued 
to govern both the SEC and capital markets covers numerous issues regarding the SEC’s authority 
and the governance of listed companies. The SEC is also responsible for the SET’s activities. The 
SET issued the Regulations for Listed Companies, supporting notifications of key CG 
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requirements as well as the Principles of Good Corporate Governance for Listed companies (2006) 
which operate on a ‘comply or explain’ basis and has been updated in 2012. Besides these main 
regulatory bodies, companies operating in banking and financial industry are also regulated by the 
Bank of Thailand which released the Financial Institutions Business Act (2008) and other 
supporting regulation to govern banking CG. State owned enterprises (SOEs) are governed by the 
State Enterprise Policy Office (SEPO) which shares its responsibilities with relevant ministries. 
All of these statutory bodies have clear areas of authority. In the case of any overlap, whilst these 
bodies seek to cooperate, the lack of formal memorandum of understanding and the lack of joint 
inspections could be problematic. Aside from these statutory bodies, the Thai Institute of Directors 
founded in 1999, acts as the non-statutory body through providing training and conducting the 
Corporate Governance Report of Thai Listed Companies since 2000 to assess and rank all listed 
companies’ CG based on published information. In terms of accounting and auditing, the 
Federation of Accounting Professions, together with the SEC, oversee the auditing profession. The 
association is also accountable for accounting and auditing standards in addition to managing their 
transition to international standards.  
Vietnam 
The development of CG in Vietnam is late compared with the other five countries. The concept 
was first introduced in Vietnam under the form of formal legal framework through the Enterprise 
Law (2005), which provided details on principal laws and regulations for listed companies. The 
Law was revised in 2014 and has been effective since July 2015 signalling improvements in areas 
of board independence, conflict of interests and accountability. However, there is no national 
authority responsible for overseeing the implementation of the Enterprise Law as well as business 
registrations. These responsibilities are left with city or provincial departments of Planning and 
Investment under the coordination and advice of Ministry of Planning and Investment. Another 
law that regulates CG in the country is the Securities Law (2006) which was updated in 2010. The 
Securities Law governs the State Securities Commission (SSC) and capital markets. The SSC, as 
the principle regulator of the capital markets, supervises the two stock exchanges in Vietnam, the 
Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange (HoSE) and the Hanoi Stock Exchange (HNX). Under the Ministry 
of Finance, the SSC has issued and updated the Corporate Governance Regulations and the Model 
Charter for public companies in 2007 and 2012 respectively. All public companies with more than 
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100 shareholders are required to follow the new CG regulations. Consequently, unlike many other 
markets where the code of CG is on a ‘comply or explain’ basis, Vietnam takes a mandatory 
approach towards CG regulations, in which public listed companies need to comply with all 
provisions.  
Moreover, the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV), as the central bank, retains responsibility for 
regulating and licensing banks. The SBV issued the Credit Institutions Law in 2010 to replace the 
previous law (1997) and regulate banks’ governance. The compliance of banks with these CG 
requirements is overseen by the SBV’s Bank Supervisory Agency. Furthermore, in terms of 
accounting and auditing, the Ministry of Finance has issued various standards on accounting and 
auditing as well as the Law on Independent Audit (2011) to govern audit profession. The 
Vietnamese Association of Certified Public Accountants (VACPA) was also established to 
maintain and improve the capacity of professional standards. Since 2006, together with the rapid 
growth of the capital markets, the legal and regulatory framework on CG has been developed and 
improved significantly in Vietnam, however, previous assessments (ADB, 2012, 2013) indicate 
that the country still lags behind others in the region in relation to CG performance. 
3.3.1.3 Comparisons of key CG practices across the countries 
Based on the legal framework presented in table 5, company law, securities law, code of CG and 
listing requirements are all key instruments when regulating the CG of listed companies in these 
countries. Aside from these key regulations, companies operating in some specific industries, such 
as banking and finance, insurance or natural resources, are also required to follow additional 
regulations due to the nature of these industries. Despite similarities in constructing a legal 
framework, the extent of regulating CG is met using distinct approaches. While some countries, 
such as Indonesia and Vietnam, CG issues for listed companies are addressed in law, in the others, 
these issues are mainly mentioned in specific corporate governance codes or listing requirements 
(for example Singapore and Philippines). The approaches to CG codes are also different. While 
most of these countries follows the ‘comply or explain’ approach, Vietnam and Philippines, until 
recently, still had a mandatory approach towards CG. Comparisons of some specific CG practices 
in these countries, therefore, would provide a more in depth view of how CG practices differ in 
these countries. The table 6 provides the summary of key CG regulations in the six countries.  
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Firstly, in terms of board structure, while the unitary board structure is predominant in Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, the dual structure is widely adopted in Indonesia and 
Vietnam. In unitary boards, all executive and non-executive directors are comprised in a single 
board and are responsible for all aspects of a company’s activities (Mallin, 2016). A unitary board 
is also known as the Board of Directors. In contrast to a unitary board, the dual board system 
consists of two boards, a supervisory board and the executive board of management. The 
supervisory board is comprised only non-executive directors and the board of management is made 
up entirely of executive directors (Tricker, 2012). As a result, the functions of supervision and 
management are separated, with the supervisory board overseeing the direction of the business and 
the management board responsible for operating the business (Mallin, 2016). The management 
board is also called the Board of Directors while the supervisory board can come under different 
names. For instance, in Indonesia, supervisory board is known as the Board of Commissioners, 
while in Vietnam, the board is simply addressed as Supervisory Board.  
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Table 6: Key CG regulations in the six countries 
Country Source Key CG regulations 
Indonesia Law No.40  Board structure: two-tier board system 
 Board size: two or more Directors on board and one or more 
Commissioners. 
 Board Independence: at least one Independent Commissioners on board  
Code of CG  Board composition: composition of Board of Directors and Board of 
Commissioners should enable independent, effective, right and timely acts.  
 Board independence: Board of Commissioners should combine 
independent commissioners and affiliated commissioners. The number of 
independent commissioners shall ensure effective supervison mechanism.  
Decree No.Kep-00001/BEI/01-
2014  
 Minority shareholding for prospective listed companies should not be less 
than 300 million shares and must consist of: 
 At least 20% of the total issued and paid up capital if the total equity 
before the public offering is less than Rp500 billion; 
 At least 15% if the total equity before public offering more than 
Rp500 billion but less than Rp2 trillion; or 
 At least 10% if the total equity of public offering is more than Rp 2 
trillion.  
 Minority sharehoding for existing listed companies should be at least 50 
million shares and make up 7.5% of the company’s total issued and paid-
up capital. 
 Board independence: at least 30% of the board of commissioners are 
independent commissioners, in addition to one or more independent 
directors.  
Malaysia The Company Act (2016)  Board size: at least two directors 
Bursa’s listing requirements  Public ownership: the minimum public ownership is 25% unless the lower 
percentage is proven to be sufficient for a liquid market of such shares. 
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 Board independence: at least two individuals or one-third of the board, 
whichever is higher, need to be independent.  
Code of CG (2012)  CEO duality: Chairman and CEO positions should be held by separate 
individuals. 
 Board Independence: if the Chairman is not independent, the majority of 
the board must be made up of independent directors.  
Philippines Code of CG  Board diversity: a formal policy regarding boardroom diversity should be 
established and that female candidates should be ensured to be part of 
recruitment. Gender diversity policies should be explicitly disclosed in 
annual reports as well as targets and measurements of such policies.  
 Board independence: at least three or one-third of the board, whichever is 
higher, to be independent. If the Chairman is not independent, or Chairman 
and CEO positions are held by the same person, an independent director 
should be the lead director. 
PSE’s listing requirements  Board size: seven directors minimum.  
 Public float of listed companies should be 12% or higher. 
CG guidelines for listed 
companies  
 Board independence: at least 3 directors, or 30% of the board, whichever is 
higher, need to be independent directors. 
 The positions of Chairman and CEO should be held by different 
individuals. 
 The public float of listed companies should be at least 30%.  
Singapore Code of CG (2012)  Board independence: at least one-third of the board to be independent 
directors. The number of independent directors should made up half of the 
board if: (a) the positions of Chairman and CEO are held by the same 
person; (b) Chairman and CEO are immediate family members; (c) 
Chairman is part of the management team; or (d) Chairman is not 
independent.  
 Board diversity: diversity should be practiced by the board of directors in 
terms of gender, skills, experience and knowledge. 
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 CEO duality: the positions of Chairman and CEO should be held by 
separate individuals.  
Listing requirements  Public float: the minimum percentage is defined based on market 
capitalisation as follows:  
 25% for companies with market capitalisation of less than 300 S$ 
Million,  
 20% for companies with market capitalisation from 300 to no more 
than 400 S$ Million,  
 15% for companies with market capitalisation from 400 to no more 
than 1000 S$ Million, and  
 12% for companies with market capitalisation of more than 1000 S$ 
Million.  
 Board independence: a minimum of two non-executive independent 
directors.  
Thailand Public Limited Companies Act   Board size:  at least five directors on each board.   
SET’s listing requirements  Board independence: at least one-third of the board but no fewer than three 
directors.  
 Minority shareholding: Listed companies need to have at least 150 minority 
shareholders holding no less than 15% of the paid up capital.  
Principles of good CG (2012)  Board diversity: the board of directors should have an appropriate balance 
in terms of gender, experience and skills; as well as ensure the board’s 
diversity policy is disclosed on their website and in their annual reports.  
 Board size: the number of directors on each board should be more than five 
but less than twelve.  
 Board independence: half of the board should be made up of independent 
directors if the positions of Chairman and CEO are held by the same person; 
Chairman is not independent; Chairman and CEO are immediate family 
members; or Chairman is member of the management team. 
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 CEO duality: The positions of Chairman and CEO should be held by 
different people. 
 The Chairman should be independent.  
Vietnam The Enterprise Law (2014)  Board structure: two-tier board system. 
 Board size: the board of directors should have from three to eleven 
members. The supervisory board should have from three to five members.  
 CEO duality: the Chairman can also be the CEO unless: (a) the company 
has more than 50% state-ownership; or (b) the company’s principles and 
regulations of securities state otherwise.  
The CG regulations (2012) 
(121/2012/TT-BTC) 
 Board size: listed companies should have at least five but no more than 
eleven directors on each board.  
 Board independence: the composition of the board should ensure balance 
between executive members and independent members, in which at least 
one-third of the board should be independent.  
HoSE’s listing requirements  Minority shareholding: at least 20% of shares should be held by at least 
three hundred small shareholders, the only exception being privatised 
government-linked companies. 
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In terms of board size, the numbers of directors on these boards are regulated differently across 
the region. In Malaysia, listed companies are required to have the minimum number of two 
directors on board. Indonesia similarly regulates listed companies to have at least two directors 
and two commissioners on boards. In Vietnam, the number of directors per board ranges from 
three to eleven and the size of supervisory board is between three and five. For the countries 
adopting a unitary board system, Philippines and Thailand, the minimum number of directors per 
board as specified in the listing requirement and in law, are seven and five respectively. In the case 
of Singapore, there is no clear requirement for the number of directors in listed companies, 
however, according to the Companies Act (Chapter 50) every company must have at least one 
director who is an ordinary resident in Singapore. Moreover, the SGX’s listing requirement also 
regulates that listed companies should have at least two non-executive directors that are 
independent from all business activities and financial connections. Therefore, it could be implied 
that the number of directors per board for list companies in Singapore cannot be lower than two.  
Regarding board composition, the issues of board independence, diversity and CEO duality 
(whether the positions of Chairman and CEO are held by the same person) are addressed. Most of 
the countries require at least one-third of the board to be made up of independent directors 
(Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam), however, in some countries, the number of 
independent directors should not fall below two (Malaysia and Singapore) or three (Thailand and 
Philippines). In the case of Indonesia, this regulation states that only one or more commissioners 
are required to be independent. Among the six countries, Singapore and Thailand have relatively 
strict policies on board independence, as the codes of CG in these two countries mention that at 
least half of the board must be independent if the CEO and Chairman positions held by the same 
person, CEO and Chairman are immediate family, Chairman is part of the management team, or 
the Chairman is not independent. In terms of board diversity, the codes of corporate governance 
in most of the countries, except for Indonesia and Thailand, advise firms to have a diversity policy 
in skills, knowledge, experience and gender. In all countries, it is suggested in the codes that the 
positions of CEO and Chairman should be separated. In the case of Vietnam, according to the CG 
regulations, the two positions can be held by the same person unless the company has more than 
50% of state ownership or the company’s principles and regulations of securities state otherwise. 
Another key CG characteristic addressed in this section is ownership. Generally, companies are 
required to report information of large or substantial shareholders (shareholders that hold more 
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than 5% of the total shares). As mentioned previously, one of the CG characteristics of Southeast 
Asian countries is high level of concentrated ownership. The countries, therefore, have used 
diverse types of regulations, such as the percentage of public float or the percentage of shares held 
by minority shareholders, to address this issue. Among the six countries, Indonesia, Thailand and 
Vietnam have requirements on ownership of minority shareholders, while Malaysia, Philippines 
and Singapore regulate the public float. In terms of ownership held by minority shareholders, the 
requirement of Indonesia is lower than Thailand and Vietnam. In Indonesia, in order to maintain 
the listing status, companies must have at least 50 million shares and 7.5% of the company’s total 
issued and paid-up capital held by minority shareholders, while in Thailand, the number of 
minority shareholders should be at least 150 and hold at least 15% of the paid-up capital. In the 
case of Vietnam, the percentage is defined based on total shares, with at least 20% of total shares 
held by at least 300 non-large shareholders, except for privatised government-linked companies. 
However, although the requirement for continuing listed companies regarding minority 
shareholders is relatively low in Indonesia, the country has different requirements for prospective 
listed companies which are higher and more comparable with the other countries. Particularly, for 
prospective listed companies, minority shareholders should not hold less than 300 million shares 
which consist of, depending the size of a company’s total equity before public offering, at least 
20%, 15% or 10% of the total issued and paid-up capital. This regulation demonstrates the 
country’s intention to raise minority shareholders’ ownership.  
Distinct from the above countries, Malaysia, Philippines and Singapore only regulate the public 
float. Among the three countries, Malaysia has the strictest regulation with 25% of public 
ownership applied for all listed companies. In contrast, in the Philippines, the required percentage 
of the public float is only 12% or higher. Furthermore, Singapore does not have one fixed 
percentage of public float that is applied for all listed companies. The listing requirement on SGX 
regulates the public float based on market capitalisation. Depending on a company’s market 
capitalisation, the minimum public float must be 25%, 20%, 15% or 12% (table 6).  
The comparisons of some key CG regulations demonstrate the diversity in legal frameworks across 
the six countries. As a result, CG practices amongst Southeast Asian countries are expected to be 
diverse, which provides a good foundation for identifying its impact on CSRD. The section has 
provided a detailed background on CG legal frameworks in the six countries. In the next section, 
the literature on the relationship between CG and CSRD will be discussed.  
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3.3.1.4 Corporate Governance and CSRD 
Most previous studies have focused on the relationship between CG and voluntary disclosure 
(Akhtaruddin, Hossain, Hossain and Yao, 2009; Eng and Mak, 2003; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; 
Ho and Wong, 2001) or Corporate Financial Performance (CFP) (Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Core, 
Holthausen and Larcker, 1999; Filatotchev, Lien and Piesse, 2005). There is a limited but growing 
area of literature analysing the relationship between CG and CSR (Kolk and Pinkse, 2010; Harjoto 
and Jo, 2011), especially in regards to the role of CG implementation in improving corporate CSR 
engagement (Mahadeo and Soobaroyen, 2016). The scope of CG has been broadened in recent 
decades to response to the growing importance of CSR (Amran, Lee and Devi, 2014a). While 
developing regulatory frameworks to monitor firm activities is the responsibility of governments, 
it is board of directors that are accountable for sustainable business strategies and managers’ use 
of resources (OECD, 1999). Under the concept of CG, firms are motivated to demonstrate fairness, 
ethics, transparency and accountability and are expected to maintain high standards of governance. 
As firms should consider stakeholders’ interests when making decisions, their activities should 
focus on not only short term profit but also long-term sustainability benefits (Dyllick and Hockerts, 
2002). The idea being that business activities should be aligned with society’s legal, communal 
and ethical expectations is the realm of CSR. One of the key motives for firms to behave 
responsibly is to maximise long-term value (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Kolk and Pinkse, 2010) 
resulting from their dependence on stakeholders for resources (Jawahar and McLaughlin, 2001). 
Organisations that neglect stakeholders could lose their control over strategic direction and 
performance (Luo, 2005). CG can enable a foundation for solidifying responsibilities to both 
internal and external stakeholders, demonstrated through CG formulations and structures (Jamali, 
Safieddine and Rabbath, 2008). Companies with good CG usually consider the interests of diverse 
stakeholder groups and ensure their transparency, trustworthiness and accountability to all 
stakeholders (Dunlop, 1998). This is very important to ensure the mutual development of both 
firms and society (Huang, 2010). Previous research has supported these propositions with evidence 
that better governed firms tend to have a more socially responsible agenda and engage in more 
CSR activities compared with poorly governed ones (Cai, Jo and Pan, 2012; Jo and Harjoto, 2012; 
Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013).  
As organisations increasingly believe that their success is defined through the well-being of the 
community in which they operate, CSRD or the disclosure practices of CSR appears more 
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prominently in CG discussions (Sharif and Rashid, 2014). The key role of CG in defining CSRD 
practice comes from the power of board of directors in overseeing disclosure strategies and policies 
within company reports (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Companies with sound CG are more likely to 
convey to society that the company is well-managed and stakeholders’ interests are factors in 
decision making. CSRD could be used by effective boards of directors as a method to reduce 
information asymmetry between managers, shareholders as well as stakeholders and improve the 
control and supervisions of managers (Jizi et al., 2014; Jamali et al., 2008). As a result, if a firm’s 
purpose is to maintain the business’ sustainability through acknowledging societal concerns and 
creating positive relationships with stakeholders, firms with a more efficient board structure would 
be expected to promote CSRD diligently (Jizi et al., 2014). Therefore, CG mechanisms, such as 
ownership and board composition, could play an important role in defining CSRD. Furthermore, 
in recent years, the prominence of corporate accountability has contributed to the growing interests 
of CSR, not only to researchers, but also policy makers, regulators and stakeholders (Siregar and 
Bachtiar, 2010; Sufian and Zahan, 2013). Particularly, in the six countries the study examines, the 
codes and guidelines of CG in some countries, such as Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand, 
mention the responsibilities of companies to stakeholders. With the ‘comply or explain’ approach 
on these codes, the principle on responsibility to society, environment and stakeholders could be 
expected to pressure firms in engaging more in CSR and hence improve CSRD in annual reports 
(Siregar and Bachtiar, 2010).  
Despite the importance of CG in defining CSRD, little research has focused on the relationship 
between CG and CSRD, largely neglecting whether certain key characteristics of board of directors 
have an impact on CSRD (Jizi et al., 2014). In recent years, some studies have started to look at 
the relationship between CG quality and CSRD (see Chan et al., 2014) as well as the impact of 
diverse CG practices on CSRD (see Haji, 2013; Esa and Ghazali, 2012). Through analysing 222 
annual reports of listed companies in Australia, Chan et al. (2014) concluded that firms with better 
CSRD tend to have better CG ratings, bigger in size, and have a higher industry profile as well as 
leverage. Regarding ownership and board characteristics, Khan et al. (2013a) examined several 
corporate governance characteristics, including public ownership, foreign ownership, board 
independence, presence of audit committee, and CEO duality, in which public ownership, foreign 
ownership, board independence and presence of audit committee were found to have positive 
significant impacts on CSRD. Another study of Sufian and Zahan (2013) conducted in Bangladesh 
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concluded that ownership concentration has a positive impact on CSRD while other factors, such 
as the number of shareholders, board size and foreign ownership, are insignificant. In terms of 
board composition and diversity, the results of Barako amd Brown (2008) indicate that board 
presentation can improve corporate communication, providing evidence that a higher level of 
women and independent directors on a board improves CSRD. In these studies, different theories 
have been used to examine the relationship between CG and CSRD, such as stakeholder theory 
(see Barako and Brown, 2008; Suttipun and Stanton, 2012), agency theory (see Chakroun and 
Matoussi, 2012; Jizi et al., 2014), legitimacy theory (see Ghazali, 2007; Sharif and Rashid, 2014), 
and institutional theory (see Othman et al., 2011; Amran and Devi, 2008); in which legitimacy 
theory and stakeholder theory have been used more often than others. In this study, a multi-
theoretical framework with a combination of agency theory, stakeholder theory and legitimacy 
theory, is used to explain the impact of CG on CSRD.  
3.3.1.5 Hypotheses Development  
As CG systems comprise several attributes (Zahra and Pearce, 1989), following the suggestion of 
Khan et al. (2013a), CG characteristics, particularly ownership and board composition could be 
important determinants of CSRD. The unique corporate governance context of the Southeast Asia 
with characteristics such as concentrated ownership and family control (Millar et al., 2005), in 
addition to the existing literature where six CG practices, including board size, board 
independence, board gender diversity, CEO duality, block ownership and the presence of CSR 
committee are selected to examine the effect of CG on CSRD.  
Board Size 
In order to avoid agency problems associated with the lack of control over management, one of 
the responsibilities of the board of directors is to oversee whether the conduct of business is 
properly managed by executives (Mallin, 2013). The effectiveness of this supervisory role is 
influenced by board size (see Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Mak and Li, 2001; Nam and Nam, 2004). 
Board of directors as a decision-making group have been increasingly studied with focus on group 
dynamics and employee effectiveness (Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2004). Empirical findings of 
these studies show that the effect of board size on board performance can be both positive and 
negative. Larger boards are proven to be ineffective in communication, show poor decision making 
ability and have limited control due to various challenges in organising and coordinating large 
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groups of directors, compared to smaller boards (see Khanchel, 2007; Mak and Li, 2001; Van den 
Berghe and Levrau, 2004; Yoshikawa and Phan, 2003). The perspective is, however, different 
from the legitimacy aspect, in which larger boards are expected to have better diversity of 
knowledge, skills and experience to improve corporate reputation and image (Ntim and 
Soobaroyen, 2013). Moreover, in relation to CSR, larger boards with the presence of several 
stakeholders would have an elevated demand for CSR activities and provide higher managerial 
monitoring of the CEO (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013).   
Previous empirical evidence from the agency perspective suggested that board size influences the 
monitoring, controlling and disclosure mechanisms in firms (Bukair and Rahman, 2015b). The 
relationship between board size and CSRD has been examined in some studies (see Haji, 2013; 
Esa and Ghazali, 2012; Jizi et al., 2014; Sufian and Zahan, 2013) with most empirical findings 
supporting the positive effect of board size on CSRD. Companies with larger boards can be argued 
to have higher extent of CSRD as larger boards with diversity of experience and backgrounds are 
better in organising and initiating healthy discussions in which CSRD can be included (Esa and 
Ghazali, 2012). Moreover, firms with larger boards are also better in responding to social pressures 
and stakeholders’ demands with more effective executive decisions such as CSRD (Barakat, Perez 
and Ariza, 2015; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013).  As a result, with the supporting evidence of 
previous studies, firms with larger board size are expected to have higher level of CSRD.  
H1: Firms with larger board size have higher level of CSRD.   
Board Independence 
Board independence has been identified as one of the key determinants of voluntary disclosure 
(see Cheng and Courtenay, 2004; Eng and Mak, 2003). So far, the agency perspective has been 
widely adopted to examine the relationship between board independence and disclosure. Board 
independence is claimed to improve the monitoring mechanism and reduce the extent to which 
information is held back from stakeholders by management (see Bowrin, 2013; Fama and Jensen, 
1983). Independent directors, hence, are the check and balance mechanism to ensure that 
management acts on the best interests of not only its shareholders but also other stakeholders 
(Khan, 2010). Additionally, independent non-executive directors represent the interests of diverse 
stakeholder groups, both financial and non-financial, on the board (Haji, 2013). Through 
maintaining diverse perspective and representing different stakeholders, independent directors 
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contribute to the increase of management’s effectiveness. According to previous studies (Haniffa 
and Cooke, 2005; Khan, 2010; Kilic et al., 2015), the number of independent directors, as agents 
of the stakeholders on board to ensure firms behave in a responsible manner and in congruence 
with societal values, may influence firms’ attention to CSR and disclosure as well as motivate 
firms to engage in these practices.  
From the legitimacy perspective, the presence of independent directors on boards demonstrates a 
firms’ attention to legitimacy and external environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). Independent 
directors could pay more attention to broader stakeholder objectives (Mahadeo and Soobaroyen, 
2016) and put pressure on management to engage more in CSR practices (e.g. CSRD) in order to 
achieve legitimacy and improve organisational reputation (Khan et al., 2013a; Ntim and 
Soobaroyen, 2013). As independent directors are less aligned with management and more 
interested in maintaining reputational capital (Cheng and Courtenancy, 2006), they tend to less 
focus on financial performance and direct management to better transparency and long term 
sustainability, often through adopting CSRD practices (Ibrahim, Howard and Angelidis, 2003; Jizi 
et al., 2014).  
Numerous empirical studies have examined the relationship between independent directors and 
CSRD (see Chakroun and Matoussi, 2012; Jizi et al., 2014; Khan et al., 2013a). However, although 
previous arguments support the positive relationship between independent directors and CSRD, 
some studies have found no impact, or even negative effect of independent directors on CSRD 
(see Haji, 2013; Esa and Ghazali, 2012). For instance, in the study of Esa and Ghazali (2012) 
investigating CSRD of government-linked companies in the context of Malaysia, companies with 
higher proportion of independent directors on boards disclosed less CSR information in annual 
reports. A recent study of Haji (2013) also conducted in Malaysia did not find any significant 
impact of independent directors on CSRD. On the other hand, a few studies, such as Jizi et al. 
(2014) and Khan et al. (2013) concluded that boards with higher independent directors on boards 
have significantly higher level of CSRD. The differences in findings could be attributed to the 
study context as depending on the context of legal environment, independence, experience and 
expertise, the effectiveness of independent directors in encouraging higher level of CSRD can be 
different (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013).  
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Examining the relationship between independent directors and CSRD is particularly important in 
the context of Southeast Asia due to the high control ownership. Large shareholders often benefit 
firms but only when management is separated from ownership and when shareholders can 
effectively use CG mechanisms to counter misbehaviour (Nam and Nam, 2004). Therefore, a focus 
on board independence as the monitoring practice implemented by board of directors can 
successfully track activities on the behalf of its minority shareholders (Chen and Nowland, 2010; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983). This argument could also be applied to stakeholders in the broader 
perspective of CG. Good CG practices, such as high board independence, will be able to provide 
society information to ensure that the firm is well managed, top managers effectively supervise 
firm’s performance, and interests of stakeholders are considered (Michelon and Parbonetti, 2007). 
Therefore, the number of independent directors in the board is expected to have a positive 
association with CSRD.  
H2: Firms with higher percentage of independent directors on boards are expected to have higher 
extent of CSRD.  
Board Gender Diversity 
Board diversity has been considered as an integral element of CG literature in recent years (Khan, 
2010). Boards with greater diversity in gender, ethnicity and cultural background might present 
different perspectives that would not appear from directors with similar backgrounds (Carter, 
Simkins and Simpson, 2003). Specifically, gender diversity on board can improve board 
independence which in turn increases efficiency and financial performance by enhancing 
managerial monitoring and performance, attracting resources and enhancing legitimacy (Ntim and 
Soobaroyen, 2013). In terms of CSR, board diversity can improve the connection with stakeholders 
and pursue greater CSR orientation (Barako and Brown, 2008). As the extent to which firms 
involve in CSR activities is primarily the decision of executives, boards with gender diversity are 
expected to pressure managers to engage more in CSR practices (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013), 
including CSRD. Although only a limited number of studies have considered the impact of female 
directors on CSR reporting in general (see Barako and Brown, 2008; Frias-Aceituno et al., 2013) 
and CSRD in particular (see Barako and Brown, 2008; Khan, 2010), the empirical findings support 
the positive and significant effect of female representation at board level on corporate 
communication regarding CSR. From the agency perspective, for instance, Galbreath (2010) and 
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Kramer et al. (2006) proposed that with their relational abilities, female directors tend to engage 
more with several stakeholders and response to these interest groups’ needs, which leads to better 
corporate social responsiveness. Furthermore, as female members incorporate their perceived 
caring nature into the professional environment (Betz, O’Connell and Shepard, 1989), they apply 
different ethical frameworks and criteria compared to men (Harris, 1989), and express more 
interests as well as concerns in philanthropy (Ibrahim and Angelidis, 1994), they are expected to 
improve information transparency in terms of sustainability issues (Frias-Aceituno et al., 2013). 
As a result, higher percentage of female directors on board could have positive impact on CSRD 
(Khan, 2010). 
H3: Firms with more female directors presenting on board have higher level of CSRD 
CEO Duality 
CEO duality has been considered as one of factors influencing voluntary disclosure in general (see 
Ho and Wong, 2001; Huafang and Jiango, 2007) and CSRD in particular (see Haniffa and Cooke, 
2002; Jizi et al., 2014; Khan et al., 2013a). CEO duality happens in firms where one individual 
serves as both chairman and chief executive officer or managing director, resulting in a more 
managerially dominated structure (Ho and Wong, 2001). The agency theory suggests that 
combination of CEO and chairman positions could demonstrate leadership and governance issues 
(Said et al., 2009). CEO duality allows a person to have greater power. As a chairman has authority 
in setting board’s agenda and controlling information provided to other board members, CEOs 
with chairman power in hand can hide essential information easily from other directors, especially 
independent or non-executive directors (see Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Krishnan and Visvanathan, 
2009; Li, Pike and Haniffa, 2008) and allow them to manipulate board appointment in their favour 
(Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Moreover, CEO duality can limit board independence (Michelon and 
Parbonetti, 2012) as non-executive directors in this case are less likely to challenge and confront 
the managerial decisions from powerful CEOs (Jizi et al., 2014). Many studies have concluded 
that CEO duality results in weaker monitoring capabilities (Anderson, Gillan and Deli, 2003; 
Goyal and Park, 2002; Jensen 1993; Li et al., 2008) and is detrimental to the quality of disclosure 
(Forker, 1992). 
In relation to CSRD, from the legitimacy perspective, since the disclosure practice is part of a 
firm’s reputation management and legitimacy strategy, the awareness of chairmen on relevant 
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issues would also influence firms’ disclosure practice (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005). Additionally, 
according to the suggestion of agency theory, a managers’ own interests tend to influence the 
degree to which firms get involved in CSR activities and CSRD (Jizi et al., 2014). With the power 
of chairmen, these CEOs can make decision and use CSR for their personal interests and 
convictions without considering the interests of broader stakeholders (Jizi et al., 2014; Khan et al., 
2013a). This could lead to lower level of a firm’s involvement in environmental and social 
activities. Powerful CEOs might also be more reluctant in disclosing CSR information over the 
fear of improving the effectiveness of external control through informed shareholders, financial 
analysts, key stakeholders or the public (Jizi et al., 2014). On the other hand, the separation of 
Chairman and CEO roles is likely to enhance monitoring mechanism, especially in term of 
stakeholder responsiveness (Muttakin and Subramaniam, 2015). Considering the context of 
Southeast Asia, it is important to examine the impact of CEO duality on CSRD as CEO duality 
could still be a customary practice in the examined countries due to the level of family control 
(Millar et al., 2005). Empirical findings of the relationship between CEO duality and CSRD have 
been contested with significantly positive or insignificant results found in some studies (see 
Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Jizi et al., 2014). However, based on the arguments of agency theory 
and previous literature (see Jizi et al., 2014; Khan et al., 2013a), firms with CEO duality on board 
are expected to disclose less CSR information in annual reports.  
H4: Firms with CEO duality practice on board tend to have lower extent of CSRD.  
Block Ownership 
Corporate ownership, as one of the key factors shaping CG systems, is an important determinant 
for CSRD (Ghazali, 2007), in which high concentrated ownership is a particularly relevant practice 
in the context of Southeast Asia as many firms in the region developed from family business 
(Millar et al., 2005). The relationship between block ownership and CSRD has been examined in 
some previous studies (see Haji, 2013; Ghazali, 2007; Sufian and Zahan, 2013) with the central 
argument that companies with prominent levels of block ownership tend to disclose less CSR 
information in annual reports. Different theories, including legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory 
and agency theory, can be used to explain this relationship. From the legitimacy and stakeholder 
perspectives, in firms with more disperse shareholding structure, meaning the majority of a 
company’s shares are not held by a few large shareholders, the expectations and demands by 
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stakeholders increase (Keim, 1978); and the issue of public accountability becomes more 
important (Ghazali, 2007). The high level of public accountability makes it necessary for a 
company to get involved more in CSR practices, and therefore CSRD (Ghazali, 2007). In contrast, 
high percentage of block ownership, with less powerful outsiders, reduces the pressures for public 
accountability and from institutional environment to apply new practices such as CSR (Ntim and 
Soobaroyen, 2013). Moreover, practically, closely held firms have fewer incentives to invest in 
CSR and CSRD, as the cost of doing so could outgrow the benefits (Muttakin and Subramaniam, 
2015). These companies do not always see the necessity of considering other stakeholder groups. 
At the same time, large shareholders tend to focus more on financial performance rather than social 
accountability (Htay et al., 2012).  
From the agency perspective, the agency-principal conflicts are greater in widely held companies 
(Fama and Jense, 1983). According to Haji (2013), providing additional information in annual 
reports helps to reduce such conflicts. Extensive CSR information in annual reports could direct 
attention of shareholders and makes firms appear accountable (Haji, 2013), as some shareholders 
in dispersed ownership firms may be interested in its social performance (Brammer and Pavelin, 
2008). Moreover, firms with widely held ownership are more likely to use CSRD to improve their 
financial reporting and therefore reduce information asymmetries (Reverte, 2009). The arguments 
from several perspectives have all supported the negative relationship between block ownership 
and CSRD. Empirically, findings from previous studies have been relatively consistent with the 
conclusion that firms with higher level of block ownership tend to disclose less CSR information 
in annual reports (see Haji, 2013; Khan et al., 2013b).  As a result, the hypothesis is formed as 
follows:  
H5: Firms with higher percentage of block ownership disclose less CSR information in annual 
reports.  
CSR Committee 
The stakeholder theory indicates the role of governance structures (Donaldson and Preston, 1995), 
and the necessity for board of directors to consider stakeholders’ demands (Luoman and 
Goodstein, 1999). The study of Hung (2011), for example, used stakeholder perspective to stress 
on the directors’ role in setting direction for corporate social and environmental performance. The 
presence of effective CSR committee, hence, indicates a firm’s attention to its stakeholders at the 
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board level (Ullman, 1985). Even though the presence of CSR committee in a firm is no longer a 
rare practice, the literature on CSR committees is extremely limited. One of the rare studies 
examining this practice is the paper of Cowen et al. (1987) in which the impact of CSR committees 
on CSRD is examined together with other determinants, such as firm size and industry category. 
The scholars argued that even though the existence of CSR committees was not mentioned 
explicitly in the literature as a determinant of CSRD, its presence demonstrates a corporation’s 
concern for CSR; and therefore its findings may be seen significant enough to be published in 
annual reports (Cowen et al., 1987). Furthermore, from the legitimacy perspective, the 
establishment of a sub-committee dedicating to CSR matters expresses a firm’s concern to 
legitimise its social and environmental reputation, particularly towards important stakeholders (see 
Rankin, Windsor and Wahyuni, 2011). The presence of CSR committee displays an evidence on a 
firm’s proactive governance change to guide its long-term sustainability strategy. Consequently, 
the main aim of such committee is to motivate a firm to implement CSR-related policies and 
practices, including CSRD. Evidently, in a case study of Post, Preston and Sauter-Sachs (2002), 
besides its responsibilities of reviewing policies as well as operating, in line with company’s 
principles and commitment for CSR issues, the CSR committee is also involved in the disclosure 
process and policies of CSR information. Therefore, it is arguable that the presence of CSR 
committee would increase corporations’ tendency to disclose CSR information in annual reports.  
H6: Firms with the presence of CSR committee on board are more likely to disclose CSR 
information in annual reports.  
3.3.2 External determinants – Institutional Environment 
The main objective of this section is to identify relevant institutional factors that influence CSRD 
based on Scott’s institutional framework (1995). The section starts with an overview of CSR and 
CSRD development in Southeast Asia and the six examined countries. In the next sub-section, a 
literature review on the relationship between institutional environment and CSRD is provided, 
followed by an argument for using Scott’s framework as guidance to develop relevant and testable 
variables of institutional environment. Subsequently, the variables used to represent the impact of 
the institutional environment on CSRD through the three pillars, regulative, normative and 
cultural-cognitive. Following the arguments in the existing literature, relevant hypotheses are then 
developed for each of the variables.  
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3.3.2.1 CSR and CSRD Development in Southeast Asia Countries 
Southeast Asia 
Deeply influenced by culture and religion, the business community has a strong background of 
giving back to society in Southeast Asia. The classic philanthropy model, such as building 
hospitals, schools or cultural institutions has been rooted in some of these countries as a business 
necessity because of colonialism and war (Sharma, 2013). As a result, it is not unfamiliar that 
corporations contribute to nation building, in which constitutes CSR today. Many actors are 
integral to this process and further establishing a culture of CSR in the region.  One of the most 
integral actors in promoting CSR in Southeast Asian countries are their respective governments. 
According to the study of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC, 2005), the capability of the 
state and the economic development stage defines the CSR practices in business communities, 
however, differs substantially based on socio-political context and vary from country to country. 
While some governments, such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines, are more proactive in 
creating a regulative environment to ensure corporations consider its impact on the society and 
environment, other governments, such as Singapore, CSR is promoted through guidelines and 
principles alongside diverse public, private, industrial and NGO initiatives. For instance, Indonesia 
was the first country to mandate CSR for natural resources related business through the Article 74 
of the Limited Liability Corporation law No.40 published in 2007. Philippines in 2011 officially 
institutionalised CSR for both domestic and foreign corporations through the Corporate Social 
Responsibility Act. By contrast, in Singapore, although the government does not present any clear 
involvement in promoting CSR, the government directs its CSR agenda through quasi-government 
entities and the use of tripartite model which includes the key stakeholders, such as business, 
unions and the government.  
The role of government in CSR development, specifically in Southeast Asian countries, has 
increased in recent years with more countries considering mandatory CSR or some aspects of it. 
In terms of CSRD specifically, either through government laws or listing requirements on the stock 
exchanges, most countries considered in this study have some sort of mandatory disclosure (table 
7). The two countries with earliest mandatory disclosure requirements in the region were Indonesia 
and Malaysia. While the mandatory disclosure of CSR information in Indonesia was implemented 
through Law No.40/2007, article 66, the requirement for Malaysian listed companies to disclose 
CSR information in annual reports was addressed through the listing requirement of Bursa 
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Malaysia. In recent years, the other countries have also started mandating CSRD. Particularly, in 
their Corporate Social Responsibility Act (2011), the Philippines required all large tax payer 
corporations to submit a list of their CSR activities in their annual reports to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC). In the case of Thailand, from 2014, mandatory disclosure of CSR 
information on form 56-1, annual reports or standalone reports is applied for new firms listing. 
The latest country in the group with mandatory CSRD is Vietnam. In their recent Circular No. 
155/2015/TT-BTC, all listed companies are asked to disclose activities related to environment, 
employees, local community and society more broadly. Among the six countries, CSRD is still 
voluntary in Singapore, however, the country plans to officially require mandatory CSRD for listed 
companies on the ‘comply or explain’ basis from 2017 or 2018 (GRI, 2016a).  
In the Southeast Asia region, the presence of strong states has become important enablers for CSR 
development, as the governments significantly influence the economic identity of their countries. 
Many of the Southeast Asian countries, including Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam, still have high 
number of state-owned enterprises located in major sectors such as oil, mining, gas or energy. 
These enterprises, therefore, could play an important role in setting the benchmark towards 
sustainable practices (Herrera, Roman and Alarilla, 2011). Apart from government being the key 
enabler for CSR, the stock exchanges are also key institutions for CSR development in many of 
these countries. The stock exchange of Malaysia (Bursa Malaysia), for instance, has been actively 
promoting CSR through the launch of Business Sustainability programme, the environmental, 
social and corporate governance index, the CSR framework as well as the establishment of Institute 
of Corporate Responsibility Malaysia, to encourage listed firms to participate in CSR disclosure 
and reporting as well as integrating CSR into their strategies. These stock exchanges often play 
their role in promoting CSR through the release of CSR guidelines, frameworks or the launch of 
CSR awards.  
In addition to the roles of the governments and stock exchanges, NGOs, national and international 
standards, as well as private initiatives or industrial associations are important enablers of CSR 
practices in Southeast Asian countries. These entities have introduced various standards, codes 
and guidelines to facilitate business practices, providing a learning platform or extending the 
understanding of CSR. However, the case differs in each country, especially the influence of 
NGOs. While the presence of NGOs is strong in some countries such as the Philippines, it is not 
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significant in the others like Singapore. Regarding voluntary disclosure, CSR guidelines and 
frameworks, the presence of sustainability indexes, as well as the growing impact of international 
standards such as GRI and United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) have pressured and 
encouraged firms to become more involved in CSR reporting as well as CSRD.   
Despite the existence of necessary forces, the development of CSR in some countries has been 
neglected, with challenges on all sides. Although some countries have the necessary legislation 
framework for CSR development, the enforcement mechanisms are often too weak to ensure 
compliance. The prominent level of corruption in some countries also makes it difficult to carry 
out these regulations effectively. Moreover, very often businesses in the region still consider CSR 
as a cost, and together with the low CSR awareness and consumer activism, corporations do not 
have strong incentives to implement CSR (Sharma, 2013). Finally, as the majority of companies 
in the region are micro, small and medium enterprises, they do not have sufficient financial and 
technical capacity to incorporate CSR in their activities (Hieu, 2011).  
Indonesia 
The CSR movement in Indonesia began in late 1990s with the fall of the Suharto’s authoritarian 
New Order government, following the process of democratisation which allowed opportunities for 
NGO activists to attack local and foreign companies on environmental and societal issues, as well 
as demanding tighter regulation of companies’ activities. In response to this movement, companies 
started to portray themselves with closer ties to society and environment, and later realising the 
usefulness of CSR in this aspect (Rosser and Edwin, 2010). Business associations such as 
Indonesia Business Links (IBL) were also established to promote CSR in Indonesia through media, 
workshops, conferences, and the provision of corporate services. Subsequently, NGO activists 
have increasingly focused on the issue of CSR in Indonesia. An example of such NGO is Business 
Watch Indonesia (BWI) which has close ties to Oxfam. The BWI has actively produced numerous 
publications and has pursued media involvement on the issues of CSR since its establishment in 
2002. The activities of these organisations have helped to put the notion of CSR on public agenda 
and triggered the draft legislation that became mandatory law in 2007 (Rosser and Edwin, 2010). 
In 2007, Indonesia became the first country that gives CSR a mandatory nature with the adoption 
of Indonesia Corporate Law No.40 and the Investment Law No.25 (table 7). However, the 
implementing rule of this regulation has not been properly promulgated (Herrera et al., 2011). 
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Prior the Corporate Law No.40, Indonesia already had mandatory and customary norms regarding 
issues such as environment protection, work safety, consumer protection, labour rights, and limited 
welfare, however, the implementation of these regulations and norms has been undermined by the 
country’s weak law enforcement mechanisms. Moreover, as a result of the conflicting interests 
between economic growth and protection of stakeholders, in order to attract foreign investment, 
the country often offers preferential treatments such as tax deduction or less strict environmental 
standards for companies (Waagstein, 2011).  
The main CSR practitioners in Indonesia are often MNCs and large local corporations. Many of 
these firms are involved in philanthropy but there is lack of integration of these initiatives into 
business strategy (Herrera et al., 2011). The lack of knowledge and expertise to implement CSR 
is also a barrier to developing CSR at this country (Waagstein, 2011).  
Malaysia 
Although the evidence of CSR in Malaysia relates back to the 1980s, its development has only 
been significant in the past decade (Abdulrazak and Ahmad, 2014). Much of this development is 
largely attributed to the policies and initiatives of the government and its agencies (Sharma, 2013). 
The two important milestones for CSR development in Malaysia are the launch of the ‘Silver 
Book’ and the mandatory disclosure requirement of Bursa Malaysia. The launch of the Silver Book 
in 2005 provided CSR principles and guidelines for Government-linked companies to incorporate 
CSR in their business activities, while in 2006 Bursa Malays required all public listed companies 
to disclose their CSR information in annual reports (Yam, 2012). The Malaysian government is 
one of the earliest Southeast Asian countries to enact mandatory CSRD for public listed companies 
(The United Nations Children’s Fund [UNICEF], 2013). Together with the mandatory disclosure, 
Bursa Malaysia also introduced a CSR Framework to support public listed companies in disclosing 
and reporting CSR information. This initiative has played an important role in increasing the CSR 
awareness of companies in Malaysia (Rosnan and Aziz, 2012). Apart from these key regulations 
and frameworks, the government also incorporates several elements of CSR through legislation 
such as the Environmental Quality Act (1974), the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia Act 
(1999) (Lu and Castka, 2009) and the National Policy on the Environment (2002) (Zainal and 
Zainuddin, 2013). 
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Moreover, to motivate companies to participate in CSR activities, the Malaysian government also 
provides tax incentives, as well as several awards for companies conducting CSR. For instance, 
companies that donate to registered organisations including foundations, associations, or trusts can 
receive automatic tax exemptions. Firms can also request special tax exemptions for a certain 
charitable and community projects (Lu, 2013). In terms of awards, the country has several different 
awards to recognise the contribution of local business, such as the ACCA Malaysia Sustainability 
Reporting Award, the Prime Minister’s CSR Award, and the StarBiz-ICR Malaysia Corporate 
Responsibility Award (Zainal and Zainuddin, 2013). Furthermore, the emergence of NGOs such 
as the UN Global Compact, the Federation of Malaysia Consumers Association, and the Consumer 
Association of Penang also contributes to the increased awareness and development of CSR in 
Malaysia (Rosnan and Aziz, 2012). Despite all these efforts, however, CSR in Malaysia still trails 
behind in comparison to international practice (Abdulrazal and Ahmad, 2014). The main 
practitioners of CSR in Malaysia are several MNCs and large organisations (Lu, 2013), whilst 
these CSR practices still overly focus on philanthropy (UNICEF, 2013).   
Philippines 
Philippines differs with other Southeast Asian countries in terms of culture and norms, which is 
heavily influenced by the Western Catholicism. The presence of the Catholic Church was vital to 
the CSR concept and value’s development (Herrera et al., 2011). The concept and practice of CSR 
in Philippines has been rooted in the Filipino values of ‘bayanihan’ which is known as the 
‘cooperative spirit’ or the ‘spirit of volunteerism’, exist across kinship networks, church 
organisations and welfare agencies (Sharma, 2013). According to Roman and Herrera (2011), the 
development of CSR in Philippines can be classified into the five stages as follows. The first stage 
is the decade of donation (1960s) characterised by protest demonstrations as a result of social 
inequity and unrest. CSR in this stage was limited at companies’ donation by cash with fragmented 
and uncoordinated efforts. The second stage is the decade of organisation (1970s), representing 
the first step of establishing true CSR with the establishment of business associations and 
organisations. It sought to address the concerns of the poor and the reduced impact of philanthropy 
as a result of weak networks. This leads to the decade of involvement (1980s) in which many 
companies attempted to promote stable and peaceful business environment through assisting 
community relations, increasing community-related activities and services, as well as involving 
stakeholders in establishing CSR programmes. The fourth stage is the decade of institutionalisation 
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(1990s) signalled by the emergence of corporate citizen, the change of organisations’ 
understanding to contribute to the well-being of society beyond the community relation and the 
start of strategy formulation. And finally, the decade of engagement (early 21st century) has 
broadened the scope of CSR beyond the concerns of family and immediate communities to 
incorporate resources, skills, values and goals between business, sectors as well as social 
organisations (Roman and Herrera, 2011). Even though these stages of development suggest 
substantial improvement, CSR in the Philippines still focuses strongly on philanthropy and 
involvement in social development with only a few samples of integrated and embedded CSR 
(Sharma, 2013). 
Compared to other countries in the region, Philippines has strong presence of civil society due to 
the weakness of the state. Even though the country has diverse laws related to environment, 
consumer protection and corporate governance, which are sufficient in substance and form, the 
state does not have the ability to enforce these laws (Sharma, 2013). Examples of CSR-related 
laws in the Philippines include the Clean Air Act (1999), Ecological Solid Waste Management Act 
(2000), the Clean Water Act (2004), the Labour Code and Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, the 
Act of Prohibition of Discrimination against Women, and the Adopt-a-School Act. In 2011, the 
country officially regulated CSR through the release of the Corporate Social Responsibility Act 
(2011). Despite many regulations and the active advocate of civil society in the country, previous 
studies and reports have concluded the CSR practice in Philippines is not yet substantial (Chapple 
and Moon, 2005) and has only focused on the ‘front stage’ as a branding strategy and a crisis shield 
(Lorenzo-Molo, 2009). While strategic philanthropy is embedded, Filipino companies should 
consider other aspects of CSR, such as environment, human rights, sustainability and corporate 
governance (Sharma, 2013).  
Singapore 
Given the powerful economic status of Singapore, one would expect a high level of CSR that is 
comparable with Western countries. However, comparisons of CSR across different countries in 
both academically and anecdotally have proven that CSR falls short in Singapore (Sharma, 2013; 
Chapple and Moon, 2005). The reasons for this shortcoming can be explained by the government’s 
heavy investment in society which limits the need for CSR (Lee, Mak and Pang, 2012). However, 
the experience of Singapore cannot be generalised as many other countries with high tax bases and 
social support, such as the US and Japan, still have high level of CSR development. Moreover, 
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even though the awareness of CSR is high among Singapore’s business and executives, it does not 
lead to similar level of CSR involvement. According to Tan (2013), considering the lack of 
institutionalisation in socio economic and political aspects, as well as understanding and 
perceptions of CSR in Singapore, this performance gap is unsurprising. In the early years of 
industrialisation of 1960s, the Singapore government have realised the need for sustainable growth 
and development, which results diverse regulations and policies to create a good environment for 
business, attract foreign investment and raise people’s living standards. Even though the country 
has not had any formal regulation on CSR, a comprehensive set of regulations in three main areas, 
labour rights, environmental protection and corporate governance, have been put in place to protect 
different stakeholders. Consequently, companies are required to meet diverse codes of practices 
and legislations regarding corporate governance, environment health requirements, safety 
standards and pollution control (Thomas, 2011). Unsurprisingly, businesses in Singapore perceive 
CSR as a compliance issue rather than a way of doing business.  
The Singaporean approach to CSR development follows the hybrid model in which the 
government led the movement but the process has been conducted by a quasi-government 
organisation, the Singapore Compact for CSR with the presence of key stakeholders, employers, 
trade union and civil society. This cooperative partnership ensures the CSR movement to be neither 
over-regulated nor heavily-enforced (Sharma, 2013). Due to Singapore’s concentration on 
business-friendly environment, CSR is economic-driven and considered as a good marketing 
strategy, a way to enhance brand image and a means to avoid costs of non-compliance (Sharma, 
2013). With civil society being a weak driver, pressures to be involved in CSR often come from 
international partners and the need to maintain export competitiveness through complying with 
global standards.  
Thailand 
As Thailand was never colonised, the business and stakeholder relationship is strongly influenced 
by Buddhism and the teachings of dharma. As a result, companies in Thailand see philanthropy as 
a way to give back to society (Herrera et al., 2011). The rapid industrialisation in Thailand in early 
1990s resulted several social and environmental problems with the raise of industrial accidents as 
well as corporate scandals, such as wage discrimination, gender inequality, inadequate safety 
conditions and insufficient product quality guidelines. With the recognition of Thai 
industrialisation’s negative effects, the government introduced regulatory control, for example, the 
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Environmental Act (1992) and the Labour Protection Act (1998) (Sharma, 2013). When the 
southern part of Thailand suffered from a Tsunami in 2004, as evidence of environmental 
destruction, the Stock Exchange of Thailand formed the Corporate Social Responsibility Institute 
(CSRI) in 2007 with the assertiveness that businesses’ operations should be linked with 
environment, society and community (Srisuphaolarn, 2013). In the same month, the working draft 
of ISO 26000 was published and guidelines for new industrial standards for CSR were discussed. 
These are examples of public sector’s efforts to introduce and force CSR towards implementation 
(Srisuphaolarn, 2013). More recently, the government passed the Product Responsibility Law in 
2009 regarding the sales, manufacturer, and import of products that might cause injury.  
Furthermore, in response to the environmental disasters and industrial scandals in developing 
countries, a more holistic approach to conduct business in Thailand was adopted by multinational 
companies from late 1990s to the mid-2000s. As a result, Thai companies and supply chains put 
forward relevant policies, not only for workers, and the environment but also the community. Thai 
supply chain manufacturers also started to comply with various international certifications, 
including environmental management (ISO 14001), health product quality management (ISO 
9000), and safety at work (ISO 18000), to maintain their competitiveness.  
To motivate business involvement in CSR, in 2006, the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) 
announced its CSR awards to honour companies with exceptional contribution to society. The SET 
also gave funding to six organisations to work in different social projects, including education 
development, urban development, rural development, library development, music and sport. 
Besides, tax reductions are applied for companies that have energy saving technology or donate to 
charities. The development of CSR in Thailand has improved significantly after the Royal 
Foundations, as one of the largest and strongest development foundations in Thailand, listed CSR 
as the new frontier in their programme. Following the tradition that businesses provide funding to 
the Royal Foundations for their development agenda, this movement has motivated the business 
community as well as civil society to initiate and support CSR efforts (Sharma, 2013).  
Vietnam  
The concept of CSR first introduced in Vietnam through the process of outsourcing of international 
corporations under the forms of social standard requirements and Code of Conduct. Similar with 
other nations in the world, Vietnamese government committed to the ‘Sustainable development 
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and protecting the environment’ actions in its national strategy (O’Rourke, 1995). Since the 
implementation of open economy policies in 1986, the country has achieved impressive economic 
growth, however, at the same time, has experienced many social problems. As an effort to tackle 
these problems, besides the already established regulation regarding labour code enforcement and 
labour inspection, the government had issued new legislations, including the Environmental 
protection law and the Agenda 21 for sustainable development. Diverse punishments, such as 
monetary penalties, imprisonment or being suspended, are applied for violations (Hieu, 2011), 
however, the weak enforcement of such regulations is one of the key barriers of developing CSR 
in Vietnam. 
In addition to the government, the main advocator for CSR in the public sector is the Vietnam 
Chamber of Commerce and Industries (VCCI). With efforts to promote CSR in Vietnam, in 2005, 
VCCI together with the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and the Ministry of Industry 
organised the prize ‘CSR towards sustainable development’ to honour companies with best CSR 
practices in Leather and Textile Association (Long, 2015). Despite being a relatively weak actor 
in promoting CSR due to limited funding and high level of corruption in the country, the VCCI is 
an active supporter of many international initiatives. Particularly, the VCCI cooperated with the 
United Nations to launch the Global Compact Network Vietnam (GCNV) as the national centre of 
CSR in 2007. However, it seems that so far the network has neglected in its role as the facilitators 
of CSR in Vietnam (Hamm, 2012). Besides from VCCI and the GCNV, national and international 
NGOs also play important roles in the institutionalisation of CSR.  
Although similar with other countries in the region, the concept of CSR has been recognised in 
recent decades, the development of CSR is still at early stage with the main focus on charities and 
donations (Nguyen, 2013; Hieu, 2011). The concept and performance of CSR in local enterprises 
has been neglected and considered irrelevant given the impressive growth in recent years, despite 
the integration of labour rights and environmental protection laws (Nguyen and Truong, 2016). 
The slow development of CSR in Vietnam could be attributed to different reasons. Firstly, the lack 
of coherent public policy is one of the main issue in developing CSR in Vietnam. The development 
of such policy is restricted by weak law enforcement and corruption (Hamm, 2012). So far, the 
issue of CSR has not been addressed clearly within the government. Moreover, the code of conduct 
and standards used to evaluate CSR, such as SA8000, ISO 14000, GRI, etc., are not consistent 
with government regulations in international conventions, which limits the ties to companies’ rule 
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or export/import companies. Besides, local companies, especially SMEs, are still lack of resources 
and knowledge to apply CSR. The demand and incentives for firms to embrace CSR and disclose 
CSR information are also not strong (Hieu, 2011).  
The section has provided an overview of the CSR and CSRD development in the six Southeast 
Asian countries. The table 7 presents details factors influencing the mandatory and voluntary 
CSR/CSRD practices in these countries.  
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Table 7: Mandatory and voluntary CSR/ CSRD in the six countries 
Country Mandatory CSR/ CSRD Voluntary CSR/ CSRD 
Indonesia Mandatory CSR 
 Indonesia Limited Liability Corporation Law No.40 – Article 
74 (2007) and Government Regulation no.47/2012: All 
companies which operations are related to natural resources 
need to practice CSR with all spending being budgeted and 
calculated within the companies’ costs.  
 The Investment Law No.25 – Article 15: investors are 
required to meet corporate social obligations in addition to 
respecting the traditions and culture of the society.  
 Decree No.134/BL/2006 (2006) issued by Bapepam LK 
(Capital Market Executive Agency): all listed companies 
need to provide detailed activities and a cost for activities 
related to environment and society. 
 Environmental law (Law 23/1997): regulating the 
implementation of environmental management. 
 Labour Law: human rights and labour (Law 39/1999 and Law 
13/2003) 
 Human Rights Law (Law 39/1999): regulates basic 
human rights, economic rights, social rights, political 
rights and civil rights. Prevelant issues include 
freedom from forced labour, women rights, and 
protection for children from exploitation and 
dangerous work.  
 Labour Law (Law No.13/2003): regulates labour issues, 
including relevant subjects such as equal opportunities 
and treatment without discrimination, job/skills 
training, employment relations, industrial relations, 
protection, wages, and welfare.  
 Consumer protection law (Law 8/1999): provides details on 
rights and obligations of consumers and corporations.   
Voluntary CSR 
 Private Initiatives:  
 Indonesia Business Links promotes ethical business 
practices and capacity building for SMEs. 
 Business Watch Indonesia focuses on promoting 
accountable and democratic economic governance.  
 Global Compact Local Network: promotes, facilitates and 
implements the ten Global Compact principles in Indonesia.  
 KADIN (Indonesian Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry): focuses on all matters related to industry, services and 
trade. The organisation also promotes good CG.  
 Indonesian Employers Association (APINDO): aims to 
generate social welfare among the business community through 
cooperation with diverse stakeholders.   
 NGOs:  
 One example of NGOs in Indonesia is Public Interest 
Research and Advocacy Center (PIRAC). The organisation’s 
goals are to promote philanthropy and increase the capacity of 
Indonesian civil society organisations.  
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Mandatory CSRD 
 Law No. 40/2007, Article 66 requires limited liability 
companies to disclose information containing environmental 
and social responsibility programs within their annual 
reports. 
 Regulation No.KEP-431/BL/2012, 2012 concerning Annual 
Reporting for Publicly Listed Companies: CSR disclosure 
should contain labour practices, product responsibility, 
social empowerment, as well as policies and programs of 
environmental performance. Publicly listed companies can 
disclose this information through multiple methods, namely 
annual reports, separate sustainability reports or their CSR 
reports. 
 Government Regulation no.47/2012, 2012 regarding Social 
and Environmental Responsibility for Limited Liability 
Companies. This regulation addresses social and 
environmental responsibility as the obligation of companies 
with business activities in the area of natural resources; and 
the implementation of these responsibilities should be 
mentioned in their annual reports. 
 Regulation No.24/2012, 2012 by Ministry of Energy and 
Mineral Resources. The regulation introduces an annual 
report template which includes a section for environmental 
protection and community development. 
Voluntary CSRD 
 Private initiative: National Center for Sustainability Reporting 
(NCSR): develops and promotes sustainability reporting 
standards, knowledge and practices, in addition to CSR 
management. 
 GRI: in 2013, 46 organisations published GRI report in 2013, 
including 39 large organisations, 3 MNEs and 7 SMEs. In the 
start of 2017, the number has increased to 88 organisations 
(GRI, 2016b).  
 The Global Compact Network Indonesia was formed in 2006 to 
accelerate the advancement of human rights, competitive labour, 
sustainable environment and ethical business practices through 
promoting, facilitating and implementing the UN Global 
Compact. Until 2013, there were 57 participants, including 18 
companies and 13 SMEs participating. There has been a 
noticeable increase in those signing up with the Global 
Compact, 76 at the start of 2017, including 20 companies and 25 
SMEs (UNGC, n.d.).  
 The presence of the Sustainability Index on Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (GRI, 2016a) 
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Malaysia Mandatory CSR 
 Environmental Quality Act (1974) regarding the prevention, 
control of pollution, abatement and environmental 
enhancement. 
 The Human Right Commission of Malaysia Act (1999) 
promotes human rights, offers advice on formulating 
legislation and conducting investigations.  
 The National Policy on the environment (2002) outlines 
values and strategies to use natural resources sustainably. The 
policy also references the role of the private sector.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Voluntary CSR 
 Public Initiatives:  
 The Ministry of Energy, Green Technology and Water was 
created to manage the country’s energy, communications and 
resources in addition to facilitating and regulating related 
industries, thus ensuring high quality, safe services and 
efficiency.  
 The ‘Silver Book’ (2005) provided principles and guidelines 
for government-linked companies regarding their social 
obligations.  
 Tax incentives and exemption for charitable and community 
projects. 
 Private Initiatives:  
 Bursa Malaysia is a strong advocator of CSR through the 
launch of Business Sustainability programme and CSR 
Framework, which encourages listed companies to integrate 
CSR into their strategies as well as supporting them in disclosing 
and reporting relevant information.  
 Environmental, social and corporate governance index was 
launched by Bursa Malaysia in 2012 to attract more socially 
responsible environment funds to the country.  
 Industry Initiatives:  
 Institute of corporate responsibility Malaysia (2008) is a 
network of corporate institutions that concentrate on improving 
responsible business philosophy and practices.  
 CSR awards: the ACCA Malaysia Sustainability Reporting 
Award, the Prime Minister’s CSR Award, and the StarBiz-ICR 
Malaysia Corporate Responsibility Award, Ansted Social 
Responsibility International Award (ASRIA) 
 Examples of NGOs initiatives include the Malaysia Local 
Compact Network, the Federation of Malaysia Consumers 
Association and the Consumer Association of Penang.  
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Mandatory CSRD 
 The Securities Commission and Bursa Malaysia (the Stock 
Exchange of Malaysia) require all listed companies to 
disclose CSR in annual reports (2006) 
 
Voluntary CSRD 
 CSR Framework for voluntary reporting, 2006: a set of guidelines 
issued by Bursa Malaysia to support public listed companies in 
defining their CSR priorities, implementation and reporting.  
 GRI: in 2013, 28 organisations published GRI reports, including 
19 large organisations, 8 MNEs and 1 SME. At the start of 2017, 
the number has increased to 63 organisations (GRI, 2016b).  
 At the end of 2013, there were 26 participants in Global Compact, 
including 9 companies and 15 SMEs. At the start of 2017, the 
number increased to 41 participants, including 9 companies and 
25 SMEs (UNGC, n.d.). 
 The presence of a sustainability index: FTSE4Good Bursa 
Malaysia (GRI, 2016a) 
 
Philippines    Mandatory CSR: 
 Corporate Social Responsibility Act (2011): institutionalises 
CSR for domestic and international corporations. 
 Environmental laws include Clear Air Act (1999), Ecological 
Solid Waste Management Act (2000), and the Clean Water Act 
(2004).  
 The Labour Code: governing employment practices and labour 
relations. 
 Magna Carta for Disabled Persons (Act No.7277): providing 
rights and privileges of disabled citizens and their integration 
into society. The act also encourages the role of private sectors 
in supporting these groups’ welfare through the provison of 
programs appropriate to their needs.   
 The Act of Prohibition of Discrimination against Women 
(Republic Act No. 6725): prohibits discrimination against 
women related to employment terms and conditions.  
 The Adopt-a-School Act (Republic Act No. 8525): aims to 
generate partnership between business sector, private entities, 
NGOs, foundations and individuals to generate investment in 
public elementary and high schools.  
Voluntary CSR 
 Public initiatives: 
 Government Tax Incentives: mentioned in specific laws 
(Republic Act No. 7686 – The Dual Training System Act 
of 1994, Republic At No. 8525 (The Adopt-a-school Act 
of 1998), Republic Act 6791 (the Productivity Incentives 
Act of 1990), Tax Code of 1997 (Exception from Donor’s 
Tax sec. 101, NIRC, Claim for deduction from income).  
 Private initiatives: 
 The Philippine Business for Social Progress (PBSP) is the 
leading social development established by business leaders 
to carry out their corporate citizenship.  
 The Ramon V. del Rosario Center for Corporate 
Responsibility (RVR Center) promotes CSR through 
writing, research, education and training.   
 The League of Corporate Foundations (LCF) is a network 
of foundations and corporations with the purpose of 
promoting and enhancing CSR among its members and 
community.   
 Corporate Network for Disaster Response (CNDR) brings 
together multiple stakeholders such as business groups, 
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 The Consumer Act (Republic Act No. 7394): promotes 
consumer welfare, protects their interests and establishes 
conducting standards for businesses and industry.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
foundations, corporations and associations to rationalise 
and institutionalise disaster management in the business 
community.  
 Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PCCI) 
CSR Division’s ambition is to promote social 
accountability and labour compliances, increase 
productivity and competitiveness, as well as encourage 
corporations to comply with internally accepted principles. 
 NGO initiatives 
 Local Compact Chapter – Philippines Local Compact  
Philippine Business for the Environment (PBE): was founded in 
1992 to support Philippines industry in addressing 
environmental and social concerns and responsibilities.   
Mandatory CSRD 
 Corporate Social Responsibility Act, 2011: the regulation 
states that all large tax payer corporations need to disclose 
CSR related activities in annual reports submitted to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
 
 
 
Voluntary CSRD 
 GRI: in 2013, 23 organisations published GRI reports, including 
17 large organisations, 3 MNEs and 3 SMEs. At the start of 
2017, the number has increased to 33 organisations (GRI, 
2016b). 
 The Global Compact Network Philippines (GCNP) was 
established in 2016 with the purposes of strengthening 
responsible business initiatives and advancing Sustainability 
Development Goals (SDGs). At the time of writing there have 
been 20 participants, in which there are 6 large companies and 
7 SMEs. (UNGC, n.d.) 
Singapore Mandatory CSR 
 The Employment Act (CAP 91) is the main labour law which 
regulates terms and working conditions for all employees with 
some exceptions.  
 The Industrial Relations Act regulates the employer-employee 
relations, the prevention and settlement of trade disputes.  
 The Workmen’s Compensation Act regarding the 
compensation of workmen who have suffered injury or under-
employment.  
Voluntary CSR 
 Public initiatives: 
 Ministry of the Environment and Water Resources: 
encourages multiple sectors to meet sustainability targets, 
obtain long-term environmental sustainability and provide 
higher standards of public health.  
 National Tripartite Initiative (NTI) on CSR was 
established in 2004 to review and formulate strategies that 
will develop the CSR movement in Singapore further. The 
initiative takes a tripartite approach to include key 
stakeholders.  
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 Consumer protection (fair trading) act (Act 27 of 2003): 
promotes consumer rights and protects them against unfair 
practices.  
 Environmental protection and management act (Act 9 of 1999): 
regulates pollution control, provides protection and 
management of environment and resources.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 National Volunteers and Philanthropy Centre (NVPC) 
under the funding of the Ministry of Community 
Development, Youth and Sports (MCYS) promotes 
philanthropy and volunteerism through cooperation with 
citizens and the private sector.  
 Singapore Compact for CSR was established in 2005 by 
NIT with the National Trade Union Congress (NTUC) and 
the Singapore National Employers’ Federation (SNEF) as 
founding members. The network focuses on promoting 
collaboration between CSR stakeholders as well as the use 
of Global Compact principles in organisations.  
 Singapore Environment Achievement Award: the only 
local and most prestigious environmental award targeting 
environmental awareness and initiatives within 
organisations. 
 NGO and other initiatives/ organisations 
 Singapore Environment Council (1990) promotes greater 
public environmental responsibility awareness, coordinate 
environmental protection and promotion as well as assist 
organisations to meet these aims.  
 Examples of other NGOs: The Singapore Green Labelling 
Scheme and Energy Labelling Scheme, Project Eco-
Office, Centre for CSR, The Asia Pacific CSR group.  
 International Initiatives: 
 Singapore government through its agency, SPRING 
Singapore, strongly support and diligently follow the 
development of ISO 26000 to ensure corporations comply 
with the international standard.  
Mandatory CSRD 
 Energy Conservation Act, 2012: Large industries are expected 
to disclose energy usage and provide an energy management 
plan to the government. 
Voluntary CSRD 
 Guide to Sustainability Reporting for Listed Companies, 2011: 
a Policy Statement and Guide for Sustainability Reporting was 
adopted by the Singapore Exchange to assist listed companies in 
developing their sustainability reporting. 
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 GRI: in 2013, 29 organisations published GRI reports, including 
8 large organisations, 18 MNEs and 3 SMEs. At the start of 
2017, the number has increased to 62 organisations (GRI, 
2016b) 
 The Singapore Global Compact was established in 2005 as the 
national hub for Global Compact in Singapore. By the end of 
2013, there were 35 participants, including 16 companies and 
15 SMEs. At the start of 2017, the number has increased to 56 
participants, including 24 companies and 27 SMEs. (UNGC, 
n.d.). 
 
Thailand Mandatory CSR 
 The Environmental Act (1992): addresses issues related to 
land, water and pollution. 
 The Labour Protection Act (1998): provides protections for 
workers in reference to wages, working conditions, 
compensation and the use of women and child labour.   
 Product Liability Act (2009): focuses on the manufacture, 
import and sales of goods that are hazardous. 
 Consumer Protection Act (1979): provides protection to 
consumers in terms of sales and purchases of goods or 
services, advertising and labelling of goods.   
 Provisions on human rights under the Constitution of 
Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2540 (1997) (section 50, 51, 56, 
57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 79) also provides support for the 
development of CSR in Thailand.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Voluntary CSR 
 Private initiatives: 
 Social Responsibility Center (SR Center) was formed by 
the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) in 2007 and is 
responsible for providing sustainability guidelines for 
listed companies. 
 Kenan Institute Asia, the Thai-American institute, 
launched in 2001 to provide training programmes for 
corporate executives to advance their CSR programmes.  
 CSR Asia Center at AIT, a joint partnership between Asia 
Institute of Technology (AIT) and CSR Asia, promotes 
CSR in the Asia-Pacific region through its consultancy 
services, information, training and research on sustainable 
development practices.   
 The CSR working group established by Securities and 
Exchange Commission has been promoting and 
establishing CSR for Thai companies with government 
support.  
 SET CSR award (Stock Exchange of Thailand) was first 
introduced in 2006 to recognise listed companies that 
demonstrate exceptional contributions to society.  
 International certifications: ISO 26000, environmental 
management (ISO 14001), health product quality management 
(ISO 9000), and safety at work (ISO 18000) 
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 Public initiatives:  
 Royal Foundations: as the largest and strongest 
development organisation in Thailand, the foundation has 
recently adopted CSR in their agenda.   
 Thai labour Standard – Thai Corporate Social 
Responsibility was established by the Labour Standards 
Administration Committee and the Ministry of Labour to 
oversee labour management systems, rights and protection.  
 CSR promotion Centre was established by Ministry of 
Social Development and Human Security to promote CSR 
and formulate national CSR policy in the country.  
 
 NGO initiatives: 
Examples of NGOs actively working with business organisations: 
Population and Community Development Association (PDA), 
Kenan Institute Asia and the Social Venture Network Asia (SVN-
Asia) and Thai Business Council for Sustainable Development.  
Mandatory CSRD 
 Principles of good CG, 2002: listed companies need to 
demonstrate the fifteen principles of good CG in their annual 
reports. In 2013, the Stock Exchange and Commission (SEC) 
published a notification on compulsory disclosure of CSR 
policies and information on form 56-1, annual reports or in 
standalone reports. The regulation was effective in 2014 and 
applied to new firm listings. 
Voluntary CSRD 
 Guidance Document ‘Approach to Social Responsibility 
Implementation for Corporations’, 2012: issued by the Stock 
Exchange of Thailand (SET) supports companies on 
sustainability reporting and implementing CSR programs.  
 GRI: in 2013, 44 organisations published GRI reports, including 
42 large organisations, 2 MNEs and 0 SME. At the start of 2017, 
the number has increased to 177 organisations (GRI, 2016b).  
 The Global Compact Network Thailand (GCNP) was 
established in May 2016 with the aim of strengthening business 
initiatives and advancing SDGs through cooperating 
companies, academic institutions and civil society 
organisations. At the time of writing there have been 35 
participants, of which there are 25 companies and 5 SMEs 
(UNGC, n.d.) 
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Vietnam Mandatory CSR 
 The Labour Code (2012): regulates the employment 
relationship with diverse issues, including recruitment, labour 
discipline, labour dispute resolutions, working hours, and 
employment contracts.  
 Environmental protection law (55/2014/QH13): addresses 
regulations, policies, resolutions and resources related to 
environmental protection. The law also references the rights, 
obligations and responsibilities of corporations in protecting 
the environment.  
 Trade Union Law (12/2012/QH13): encompasses the rights of 
employees in establishing, participating and operating Trade 
Unions, the obligations of Trade Unions to their members, the 
responsibilities of government, as well as dispute settlement 
and violation handling.  
 The Consumer Rights Protection law (59/2010/QH12): 
regulates the rights and obligations of consumers, 
responsibilities of corporations providing goods and/or 
services to consumers, responsibilities of civil society to 
protect consumers’ rights, dispute settlement between 
consumers and enterprises, as well as responsibilities of the 
state in protecting consumers’ rights.  
 Products and Goods quality law (05/2007/QH12): specifies the 
rights and obligations of organisations or individuals 
producing, trading, conducting activities and management 
related to products and goods quality.  
Voluntary CSR 
 Public initiatives: 
 Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industries (VCCI) is 
the leading advocator in the public sector with diverse 
programmes aimed at increasing CSR awareness.  
 Prize ‘CSR towards sustainable development’ is 
introduced by VCCI and Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs and the Ministry of Industry to award companies 
with best CSR practices in Leather and Textile 
Associations. 
 The Vietnam General Confederation of Labour (VGCL) is 
the sole national trade union center of Vietnam with the 
key purpose of protecting labour rights.  
 
 
 NGO initiatives: 
 Global Compact Network Vietnam (2007) acts as the 
national hub of CSR. 
 National and international NGOs: some examples of 
national and international NGOs include United Nations 
Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO), Oxfam, 
and the Center for Development and Integration (CDI).  
 Industrial initiatives:  
 Trade associations play an integral role in developing CSR 
practices in Vietnam. These associations encourage their 
members to participate in national and global standards to 
maintain their competitiveness. Some examples of strong 
trade associations in Vietnam are the Vietnam Leather and 
Footwear Association, Garment and Textile Association 
and the Association of Electronic Industries of Vietnam.  
 Code of conduct and international standards, such as SA8000, 
ISO 14000, GRI, etc. 
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Mandatory CSRD 
 In 2015, the Ministry of Finance released the Circular No. 
155/2015/TT-BTC on Public Disclosure for listed 
companies, in which a guideline for disclosing information 
on securities markets was attached. According to the 
guideline, all listed companies, except those operating in 
finance, banking, securities and insurance sectors, are 
required to disclose any impact of their activities on the 
environment and society. This includes complying with 
regulations related to employees, water and energy 
consumption, management of raw materials, responsibility to 
local community and green capital market activities.  
Voluntary CSRD 
 GRI: In 2013, there were 6 organisations that published GRI 
reports, including 3 large companies, 1 MNE and 2 SMEs. At 
the start of 2017, the number has increased to 18 organisations 
(GRI, 2016b).  
 The Global Compact Network Vietnam (GCNV) was developed 
in 2007 to identify challenges and solutions for interactions 
between business, communities, environment, government and 
consumers with the purpose of advancing sustainable practices. 
Until the end of 2013, there were 17 participants, including 4 
companies and 6 SMEs. At the start of 2017, the number has 
increased to 34, including 7 companies and 18 SMEs (UNGC, 
n.d.). 
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3.3.2.2 Institutional Environment and CSRD 
As corporations are expected to align with institutional expectations to achieve social approval, it 
is obvious that institutions matter, especially given the development of new institutional theory in 
recent decades (Peng, Denis and Jiang, 2008). Although the study of institutional impact on 
organisations’ decision making has been relatively slow in the field of CSR (Aguilera, Rupp, 
Williams and Ganapathi, 2007; Campbell, 2007), recent studies have been diverting their attention 
to the effect of national institutions in shaping CSR behaviour (Jamali and Neville, 2011). 
According to Li et al. (2010), however, there is a need for more research regarding to the role of 
formal and informal institutions on the development of CSR. A study of institutions is necessary 
to identify circumstances in which firms respond to external pressures through adopting CSR 
policies (Doh, Howton and Siegel, 2010). Focusing on institutions indeed helps in understanding 
CSR, not only as a voluntary discourse but also as a requirement imposed by the corporate 
environment (Young and Marais, 2012). Peng (2002) suggested that institutions should be treated 
as independent variables to highlight the dynamic interaction between institutions, organisations 
and the outcome of such interaction, which is CSRD in this context. Unlike other aspects of CSR, 
the role of institutions in defining firms’ CSRD is still under-studied due to the limited number of 
studies on external determinants of CSRD as mentioned in Chapter 2, section 2.5. 
Adopting the Peng’s (2002) suggestion, this research attempts to investigate the impact of 
institutions as independent variables upon CSRD. In order to identify relevant institutions that 
present the effect of institutional environment on CSRD, Scott’s framework (1995) with the three 
pillars representing elements of institutions is used as guidance. The framework with the three 
contrasting, interdependent and mutually reinforcing institutional pillars, is considered useful in 
examining the forces and pressures from the institutional environment on firms (Kostova and Roth, 
2002). In addition to being symbolic, these institutional elements provide cognitive schema, 
normative guidance and rules that constrain and empower social behaviour (Scott, 2008). These 
elements differ in the type of institutional order that they support. These pillars, therefore, present 
different rationale for claiming legitimacy, whether through legally sanctioned (regulative), 
morally authorised (normative), or culturally supported (cultural-cognitive) (Scott, 2008). The 
three pillars have been utilised in other research fields, such as ownership and strategies (Xu, Pan 
and Beamish, 2004), management (de la Torre-Castro and Lindström, 2010) and Foreign Direct 
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Investment (FDI) (Kang and Jiang, 2012; Trevino, Thomas and Cullen, 2008). Nevertheless, based 
on the review of literature in chapter two, these pillars have not been widely applied in CSRD 
research to examine the impact of institutional environment on CSRD from different aspects.  
Although the arguments and indicators of each pillar are used to develop testable variables that 
represent the pillar, it is not to say that these variables only have characteristics of the pillar they 
represent, considering institutions could have characteristics of more than one pillar (see Scott, 
2005; Trevino et al., 2008). Similar with Kostova’s study (1997), in which the pillars were applied 
to develop a three-dimensional country institutional profile, the framework is used as a guideline 
to identify relevant institutions. In the study, six institutional factors were identified, including 
legal origin, mandatory disclosure, the adoption of Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), standard 
membership of CSR related associations, and two cultural dimensions (masculinity and 
uncertainty avoidance). The institutions were selected based not only on previous literature, but 
also their potential influence on firms’ CSRD through institutional processes associated with the 
institutional pillars (see Trevino et al., 2008).   
3.3.2.3 Hypotheses Development 
Regulative Pillar 
Regulative structures are mostly enforced by governments and states through the implementation 
of laws, rules and regulations, and are therefore, more formal, explicit, and legally sanctioned 
(Palmer et al., 2013). The regulative pillar reflects a rational actor model of behaviour, based on 
sanctions and conformity (Bruton, Ahlstrom and Li, 2010). Institutions with regulative elements 
are defined as rules of the game, hence, guiding behaviours through monitoring and enforcement 
(North, 1990). From the organisational perspective, regulative pillar encompasses institutions that 
put pressure on firms’ behaviour through laws, directives, and other mandatory regulations 
(Shnayder, van Rijnsoever and Hekkert, 2016). Institutional economists have paid more attention 
to regulatory elements than the softer normative and cultural-cognitive elements (Scott, 2005). 
Compared to the other elements, the regulative feature is more visible, fast moving, as well as 
easier to manipulate (Evans, 2004; Roland, 2004; Scott, 2008). Regulatory systems are generally 
superficial and less consequential than normative and cultural elements (Scott, 2008). As a result, 
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regulative systems’ effectiveness is more dependent on external controls such as surveillance and 
sanctioning, and therefore tend to evoke strategic responses (Scott, 2005).   
In the field of CSR, firms tend to behave more responsibly and more likely to report their behaviour 
when coercive and normative pressure, such as a significant and well-developed legal system to 
protect stakeholders’ interests, exist (Campbell, 2006). The coercive pressure from the regulative 
pillar is often reflected through the legal system (Barakat et al., 2015; Crawford and Williams, 
2010). There are two main secular legal traditions that have been identified by most scholars, 
common law and civil law (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2008). Although a country 
often adopts laws from a variety of legal traditions, generally a particular tradition dominates each 
country (La Porta et al., 2008). The two traditions present distinct characteristics that could 
potentially influence firms’ CSR and disclosure practices. Specifically, previous studies have 
observed that the civil law system is more stakeholder-oriented while the common law system 
tends to focus on protecting shareholders (Frias-Aceituno et al., 2013). As a result, countries 
following common law origin have more dispersed ownership, stronger law enforcement and 
better protection for shareholders. On the other hand, ownership structure in civil law origin 
countries is more concentrated, with greater involvement of banks and financial institutions 
(Grauel and Gotthardt, 2016). A number of studies have attempted to identify the impact of legal 
origin on CSR reporting (Adelopo, Moure, Preciado and Obalola, 2012; Adelopo, Moure and 
Obalola, 2013; Frias-Aceituno et al., 2013b). Although some scholars argued that firms from civil 
law countries, with stakeholder governance structure, are more likely to get involved in reporting 
CSR information (see Frias-Aceituno et al., 2013; Smith et al., 2005), other studies are more 
supportive towards the higher stakeholder demands for legitimacy management in common law 
countries due to their dispersed ownership structure (see Adelopo et al., 2012, 2013). In this study, 
following this perspective, the hypothesis is developed with the expectation that firms from 
common law societies would have more incentives to make CSR communications accessible and 
disclose more CSR information accordingly (Adelopo and Moure, 2010). In contrast, firms from 
civil law countries would have less stakeholder demand (Adelopo and Moure, 2010) as a result of 
their greater percentage of insider ownership (Hope, 2003) and therefore might not focus on 
disclosing CSR information. 
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Most studies examining the relationship between legal system and CSR reporting have used 
diverse means of communications, such as website, integrated reports or sustainability reports 
(Frias-Aceituno et al., 2013; Adelopo et al., 2012; Adelopo and Moure, 2010). None of the studies 
have examined the role of legal systems on CSRD in annual reports specifically, however, Waller 
and Lanis (2009) argue that, as country of origin influences the levels of CSRD, the institutional 
differences between companies, such as legal system, in relation to their country of headquarters 
cannot be ignored. In order to examine differences in CSRD, specific hypotheses related to such 
variables would have to be developed and further research is needed (Waller and Lanis, 2009). 
Following this suggestion, the study examines the impact of legal system on CSRD in annual 
reports. As CSRD is a form of CSR reporting, consistent with the previous arguments, firms from 
common law countries are expected to have higher level of CSRD than their counterparts from 
civil law countries.  
H7: Firms from countries with common law origin are expected to disclose more social and 
environmental information than their counterparts from civil law countries.  
In addition to legal systems, government regulations have been traditionally considered as a form 
of coercive power and regulatory pressure in which conformity is imposed on social actors (Scott, 
2008; Campbell, 2007, Kim, Amaeshi, Harris and Suh, 2013). Thus, the extent of these regulations 
have been used as indicators of the regulative element in the literature (Ruef and Scott, 1998; Scott, 
2008). In the light of several corporate scandals and the financial crisis, diverse groups of 
stakeholders are now expecting governments to be more active in sustainability reporting due to 
the high level of distrust toward companies’ self-regulation (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2014). 
Government involvement in legitimising social disclosure has, however, been controversial. Based 
on some scholars’ perspectives, mandatory disclosure is perceived as unnecessary, as companies 
have already voluntarily disclosed a high level of CSR information (Adams and Frost, 2007). 
Mandatory reporting would increase the costs of compliance and the potential of establishing a 
‘tick-a-box’ culture of compliance (Overland, 2007). Moreover, the increase of regulations and 
disclosure potentially gives firms little choice but to relocate themselves in other markets 
(Rodriguez and LeMaster, 2007).  
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Despite some criticism against the implementation of regulations, some scholars have provided 
support for mandatory regulations on sustainability reporting (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2014; 
Overland, 2007). According to the stakeholder theory, pressures from stakeholders are the main 
motivation for firms to disclose CSR information. Hence, firms that are required to report such 
information will have additional regulatory pressures than the others (Wang et al., 2017). Forcing 
firms to disclose more CSR information through regulation would also allow non-financial 
stakeholders to increase their demands and potentially enable transfer of wealth from shareholders 
to other stakeholder groups (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2017). Additionally, mandatory disclosure can 
act as a potential tool of public policy to govern business, force firms to interlise their social costs 
and induce organisational compliance through providing the public information about its social 
and environmental performance and reveal any problematic actions derived from norms and 
expectations (Mobus, 2005). As the regulation signals the commitment of government and 
regulators towards CSR issues and therefore enhances the importance of such issues in society, 
this type of regulatory commitment may produce an effective institutional justification to initiate 
changes and incorporate CSR issues into corporate business activities (Eccles, Ioannou and 
Serafeim, 2014). Moreover, in relation to CSRD practice itself, with the enforcement of 
regulations, mandatory disclosure can create a systematic effect at the society level and influence 
managerial practices to disclose more information on all firms in a country. Compulsory 
disclosure, furthermore, would allow objectivity in reporting, comparison among the companies, 
and assessment of the way non-financial risks such as environmental impact is addressed. Thus, 
raising greater awareness, as well as environmental and social consideration of corporations’ 
activities (Overland, 2007). As a result, regardless of all the potential negative outcomes of 
mandatory disclosure, the regulation could lead to a positive impact on organisations considering 
the interests of other stakeholders, behaving more responsibly and providing increased 
environmental and social information of their activities, even if it is only for the purpose of 
increasing profit.  
Many of the regulations and requirements for sustainability reporting relate to CSRD in annual 
reports (Malan, 2013). Specifically, several empirical studies have provided evidence for the 
positive influence of mandatory regulations on environmental disclosure (Criado-Jimenez, 
Fernandez-Chulian, Husillos-Carques and Larrinaga-Gonzalez, 2008; Frost, 2007; Burritt, 2002) 
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and CSRD (Othman et al., 2011; Pedersen et al., 2013). The study of Othman et al. (2011) 
examined the impact of the Malaysian government’s mandatory requirement that all publicly listed 
companies disclose social and environmental information, starting from the end of the 2007 
financial year. With the expectation that the regulation would increase the level of CSRD as a 
reaction to government’s demand, the regulation has successfully forced listed companies to 
increase the level of CSR information disclosed in annual reports. Moreover, the findings of 
Pedersen et al. (2013) indicate that there was an increase in the number of companies disclosing 
CSR in annual reports for the first time, in response to the new regulation. As a result, based on 
previous literature, it can be argued that coercive pressure of mandatory requirement for CSRD 
will inspire companies to disclose more CSR information in their annual reports.   
Hypothesis 8: Firms from countries with CSR mandatory disclosure have higher level of CSRD 
than firms from the other countries.  
Cultural-cognitive Pillar 
Different scholars, usually from differing perspectives, tend to favour one or another class of 
elements (Scott, 2005). The importance of the cultural-cognitive dimension is emphasised mostly 
by organisational sociologists and cultural anthropologists, such as Zucker (1977), DiMaggio and 
Powell (1991), and Scott (2005). The pillar is considered the main tool to differentiate neo-
institutionalism with sociology and organisational studies (Scott, 2013). Cultural-cognitive 
dimension emphasises the role of shared beliefs, social knowledge and taken-for granted 
assumptions by people in a country or culture that plays a powerful role in institutional processes 
(Scott, 2004). Anthropologists and sociologists perceive the shared conception constituting nature 
of social reality as the centrality of cultural cognitive elements (Scott, 2005). These concepts also 
create the frames through which meaning is made. Such shared conceptions and knowledge have 
an influence on the way a particular phenomenon is interpreted (Kostova and Roth, 2002).  
Institutions with the cultural-cognitive pillar encourage firms’ behaviour through social pressures 
and conformity that are based on share beliefs and taken-for-grated actions (Shnayder et al., 2016). 
The conformity in behaviour is justified by orthodoxy according to which the correctness and 
soundness underlying actions are perceived (Scott, 2013). For cultural cognitive theorists, actions 
are defined as appropriate only when they are perceived as ‘the way people do these things’ (Scott, 
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2013). As cultural conceptions are plural and nuanced, people interpret situations differently in 
terms of what is and what ought to be due to the differences in beliefs. That is the reason why 
people and companies working in unfamiliar cultural environments usually face unexpected 
behaviours originating from different conceptions (Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005; Orr and Scott, 
2008). In the area of business, at the transnational level, cultural processes contribute to the 
forming of organisational structure and processes (Drori, Meyer and Hwang, 2006). As also 
suggested in the stakeholder theory, a firm’s survival depends on its relationship with stakeholders. 
Stakeholders, hence, should be informed of a firm’s economic, social and environmental impact 
to decide whether they should continue providing resources or penalise firms for insufficient 
performance (Hess, 2008). Due to the cultural differences, stakeholders have different expectations 
of corporate performance, which gives rise to diverse values, norms and practices, such as CSR 
policies and behaviours (Garcia-Sanchez et al., 2013; Welford, 2005). 
The importance of culture in accounting studies has been reinforced by many scholars (Garcia-
Sanchez, Rodriguez-Ariza and Frias-Aceituno, 2013; Gray, 1988; Gray and Vint, 1995; Haniffa 
and Cooke, 2005; Zarzeski, 1996). General approach of these studies is to identify certain societal 
factors or cultural values that are related to accounting practices (Grimmelikhuijsen, Porumbescu, 
Hong and Im, 2013). The concept of national cultural systems influences the basic values of both 
individuals and corporations (Vitell, Joseph and Thomas, 2003), therefore affecting the decision-
making processes, organisational structure and behaviour, as well as the level of corporate 
transparency (Garcia-Sanchez et al., 2013). From the legitimacy perspective, firms will respond 
to the demands and needs of their ‘relevant publics’, otherwise their survival and legitimacy could 
be threatened. One of the key issues in this argument is that the ‘relevant publics’ or the society to 
which an organisation is embedded determines whether a firm’s action is legitimate (Newson and 
Deegan, 2002). With the cultural differences, expectations across societies are also different, 
which emphasises the role of culture in shaping firms’ legitimacy management strategy, including 
their approach to accounting practices. The use of cross-cultural research in accounting, as a result, 
could provide an explanation as to why there are differences in accounting techniques and practices 
across countries (Perera, 1989). According to Baydoun and Willett (1995), the effect of cultural 
values and cultural relevance is more significant in accounting disclosure than accounting 
measurement. Therefore, society-related determinants that impose differential pressures on firms 
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such as culture, are essential with regards to explaining social and environmental disclosure 
(Ullman, 1985; Van der Laan Smith et al., 2005). 
The effect of the cultural aspect of national context is often measured by the cultural dimensions 
developed by Hofstede (2001). National cultural dimensions present similarities and differences 
in cultures between countries across the world (Tsakumis, 2007). Despite the major criticism of 
Hofstede’s work being that it is no longer valid due to the convergence in societal practices 
(Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2013), it is not clear if the core cultural values are changing, as these 
values and differences have remained for centuries and are often relatively stable (Robbins and 
Stylianou, 2001). Due to the useful and well-established framework that Hosfstede’s work 
provides to compare between cultures, the cultural dimensions are used in this study to identify 
the effect of cultural-cognitive element on CSRD practice. Hofstede’s cultural dimensions have 
been used to examine the role of culture as a determinant of CSR reporting in general (Garcia-
Sanchez et al., 2013; Adelopo et al., 2013; Bowrin, 2013; Orij, 2010; Khlif, Hussainey and Achek, 
2015) and CSRD in particular (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002, 2005; Williams, 1999; van der Laan 
Smith et al., 2005). Among the four cultural dimensions, uncertainty avoidance and masculinity 
are relevant and appropriate for studies related to accounting disclosure practices (Williams, 1999; 
Bowrin, 2013) due to their link with the subcultural value of secrecy which is considered as the 
opposite of transparency (Gray, 1988).  A number of studies have used these two dimensions to 
examine the effect of culture on CSR reporting in general (Orij, 2010; Bowrin, 2013) and CSRD 
in particular (Williams, 1999). 
(i) Uncertainty Avoidance  
The first dimension, uncertainty avoidance (UA), relates to the extent in which people from a 
country feel threatened by uncertain situations in future and therefore creates beliefs or institutions 
that help to avoid these uncertainties (Hofstede, 2005). A small number of studies have 
investigated the impact of UA dimension in CSR reporting with competing perspectives (Adelopo 
et al., 2013; Garcia-Sanchez et al., 2013; Bowrin, 2013). While Adelopo et al. (2013) supported 
the positive relationship between uncertainty avoidance and CSR reporting with the argument that 
firms from high UA are more likely to report CSR information to reduce uncertainties following 
the society’s expectations, other studies provided evidence for the negative impact of the 
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dimension on CSR reporting (Bowrin, 2013). Most studies hypothesised the negative effect of UA 
on CSR reporting are based on Gray’s study (1988) that linked the dimension with the subcultural 
value of secrecy. Strong UA was argued to be aligned with a preference of secrecy, leading to a 
restriction in disclosure, thus retaining secuirty and avoiding competition as well as conflict (Gray, 
1988). As postulated by this perspective, corporate disclosure is reported to be low when UA 
increases (Zarzeski, 1996; Salter, 1998). Williams (1999) applied this perspective to examine the 
impact of the dimension on CSRD in particular and concluded that organisations in high UA 
societies tend to be reluctant in providing voluntary information, including CSRD, due to the fear 
of jeopardising the firm’s financial securities.  
Additionally, in response to uncertainties, countries with high score on this dimension are likely 
to use rules, standards and formality to structure life as they have less endurance of change and 
innovation (De Mooij and Hofstede, 2010). In contrast, lower uncertainty avoidance societies are 
more accepting of change, have less regulations and laws, as well as more flexible in their 
approaches. Consequently, stakeholders from these societies might have higher demands and 
expectations for CSR than high uncertainty avoidance societies as the approach to CSR in high 
uncertainty avoidance acountries are more forceful with the support of legislation to make sure 
firms behave more rigidly and consistently (Garcia-Sanchez et al., 2016). As a result, in response 
to higher demands for sustainability from stakeholders, companies in countries with lower 
uncertainty avoidance are expected to be more transparent to keep these interest groups informed 
with social and environmental activities. Aligned with the above arguments, the hypothesis is 
developed as follows:  
Hypothesis 9: Firms in countries with high score in uncertainty avoidance dimension are expected 
to have lower level of CSRD. 
(ii) Masculinity/ Femininity (MAS) 
The next cultural dimension considered in this study is masculinity. Countries with a higher score 
in this dimension represent societies that pay high value to competition, achievement and success 
while communities featuring feminine characteristics, indicated by a low score, appear to be more 
caring and conscious of the influence of their actions on society (Hofstede, 2005). Accordingly, in 
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a country with high level of masculinity, a firm may focus more on activities that bring economic 
success while sacrifying good environmental and social performance. Since these societies 
prioritise financial performance and surviving competition, stakeholders in a highly masciline 
society could be more acceptance towards unethical business behaviours (Kang, Lee and Yoo, 
2016). Evidently, previous literature also suggests less appreciation of cooperative strategies and 
lack of assistence behaviour from masculine societies (Steensma, Marino and Weaver, 2000; Tice 
and Baumeister, 1985) would lead to a negative social and environmental responsiveness. Firms 
from these societies, as a result, are less likely to engage in CSRD practice due to lower social 
demands for such activity (Williams, 1999). In contrast, as the interests of feminine societies 
reflect stronger stakeholder orientation, firms from these societies tend to be under greater pressure 
to engage in CSR practices (Gray, 1988) provide CSRD beyond purely financial information 
(Smith et al., 2005). Therefore, the negative relationship between masculinity dimension and 
CSRD is expected.  
Hypothesis 10: Firms from countries with femininity characteristics disclose more CSR 
information in annual reports, compared with firms from masculine countries.  
Normative Pillar 
The central conception of the normative pillar are rules that introduce a prescriptive, evaluative 
and obligatory dimension into social life. Based on theorists’ point of view, the normative 
dimension mainly concerns the influence of shared norms and values. These beliefs are not simply 
a predication for future action but also a normative expectation about how an actor should behave 
in a particular situation (Scott, 2013). Therefore, the main debate in normative research area is 
between the logic of appropriateness and the logic of instrumentality (Scott, 2013). Rather than 
choosing what is best for their own interests, with the normative effect, actors are confronted with 
the question ‘what is considered as appropriate?’, and it is this that influence their actions. Through 
the study of Kilduff (1993), the influence of normative elements, particularly shared norms, values 
and social networks, are proven to have an impact on actors’ behaviours. 
From an organisational perspective, normative elements not only play an important role in defining 
goals and objectives but also guide firms with appropriate ways to pursue them (Blake & Davis, 
1964). When an institution encourages an appropriate way to behave without any law or sanctions, 
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that institution affects organisations’ activities through normative processes (Trevino et al., 2008). 
The institutions that are encompassed in the normative pillar use moral or ethical criteria, such as 
external or industry standards, to influence organisations’ behaviour (Shnayder et al., 2016). 
Although normative elements are not supported by coercive pressures like regulatory dimension, 
they influence actors’ behaviour in a different way through the assistance of professional networks 
instead of changes in the state regulations, and hence constitute the system of soft laws (Scott, 
2013). The characteristics of self-regulation by soft law include ‘voluntary action (low level of 
obligation), imprecise rules and delegation of authority to non-state actors’ (Scherer and Palazzo, 
2011, p.912).  
Soft law (voluntary self-regulation) has recently replaced the use of hard law (formal rules and 
sanctions) as a result of a new set of global governance institutions created in response to the 
changing global landscape (Moon, Crane and Matten, 2011; Vigneau, Humphreys and Moon, 
2014). One of the most well-known self-regulation forms that go beyond state regulations is 
external or industry standards (Christmann and Taylor, 2006; Shnayder et al., 2016). The pressure 
to conform to such standards represents the effect of normative pressures. The construction of 
standards used to compare and assess structures or behaviours therefore reflects the concept of 
shared values in the normative pillar (Scott, 2013). Standards are developed and promoted by 
different associations and are enforced by self-policing or monitoring by external oversight units 
(Scott, 2013). According to Behnam and MacLean (2011), standards could be classified into three 
main categories, principle-based standards, certification-based standards and reporting standards. 
As the focus of this thesis is CSRD, only reporting standards are considered.  
Regarding reporting standards, several organisations have built up guidelines and designed formats 
that firms can adopt to improve their reporting practice, resulting in a variety of both international 
and national reporting standards for CSR. By engaging with these initiatives, firms expect to obtain 
expertise, increase credibility of efforts, as well as influence the shape of these guidelines (Selsky 
and Parker, 2005). One of the most applied reporting standards is Global Reporting Initiative 
(GRI). As this reporting standard is also widely used among Southeast Asian firms, the standard 
is selected to examine the normative effect on firms’ CSRD practice. The main purpose of GRI is 
to help organisations report their sustainability matters. From the stakeholder stance, the practice 
of sustainability reporting demonstrates a firm’s intention to communicate with diverse 
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stakeholder groups about its environmental and social performance, and furthermore, presents the 
public with a reliable source of information to effectively evaluate a firm (Prado-Lorenzo et al., 
2009).  Therefore, the GRI, as a supporting tool for firm’s sustainability reporting, is important to 
reduce information asymmetry among a firm, its shareholders and other stakeholders (Schadewitz 
and Niskala, 2010). The development of GRI has been recognised as a successful 
institutionalisation project (Brown, de Jong and Levy, 2009). GRI, as an international reporting 
standard, has been considered as a key normative body in CSR reporting (Barkemeyer, Preuss and 
Lee, 2015; Etzion & Ferraro, 2010; Levy, Brown and de Jong, 2010). The initiative has obtained 
wide reaching legitimacy not only corporate compliance but also from recognition of several 
multilateral and inter-governmental agencies and organisations (Levy et al., 2010). To date, 
seventy-eight percent of reporting companies worldwide have referred to the GRI standard as 
guidance for reporting their CSR activities with the purpose of enhancing the report’s credibility 
(KPMG, 2013). Several studies have indicated that the main motivations for organisations to adopt 
the initative is to achieve legitimacy through showing external stakeholders that the firm complies 
with social expectations and norms (Hedberg and von Malmborg, 2003; Nikolaeva and Bicho, 
2010). This argument is consistent with the predictions of stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory, 
and institutional theory that companies are willing to involve in CSRD to alter stakeholders’ 
perspectives of the firm’s social and environmental performance and achieve greater legitimacy 
(Holder-Webb et al., 2009; Clarkson et al., 2008; Nikolaeva and Bicho, 2010).  
Even though CSR standards in general, and GRI in particular, are expected to contribute to the 
increase of CSR reporting (Barkemeyer et al., 2015), some scholars have raised their concern over 
the effectiveness of such standards by arguing that organisations could use these standards as a 
shield against further scrutiny (Hess, 2008). The standards, therefore, could enable rather than 
prevent bad practices. So far, in the literature, empirical evidence regarding to the contribution of 
such standards is lacking (Perez-Batres, Miller and Pisani, 2010). Examining the effect of reporting 
standards like GRI, as a result, will not only reveal the normative pressure on firms but also help 
to identify the effectiveness of such standard. One of the rare empirical studies examining the 
effect of GRI as an institutional pressure is the study of Comyns (2016), in which the adoption of 
GRI resulted in better quality and more extensive greenhouse gas reporting.  
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GRI, as a reporting initiative, is unique in the sense that it does not have any requirement regarding 
the length of the report, and organisations are only required to follow the guideline and frameworks 
they have chosen (Othman and Ameer, 2009). There are several mediums in which such reporting 
could be done, including separate reports, sections in annual reports or online version on company 
websites (Sutantoputra, 2009). According to Alnajjar (2000), Clarkson, Overell and Chapple 
(2011), however, annual reports are traditionally used as the main medium for disclosing CSR 
information to stakeholders. GRI, furthermore, has been widely used to build the coding structure 
in annual reports (Alberici and Querci, 2016; Khan, Islam, Fatima and Ahmed, 2011), despite the 
lack of empirical studies regarding the effect of such initiative on CSRD in annual reports. As a 
result, for the purpose of examining the normative pressure of GRI on CSRD and identifying the 
role of such initiative on CSRD in annual reports, the impact of GRI on CSRD is tested in this 
study with the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 11: Firms that follow GRI reporting standard are more likely to report more CSR 
information in annual reports. 
Normative element also plays a role of guiding organisational actions and beliefs developed for 
professionalisation or social obligation (Hoffman, 1999). Organisations will comply with them in 
conformance to norms established by professional institutions or associations. According to 
Galaskiewicz (1991), corporations are more likely to act responsibly if there are normative 
institutions in place that support such behaviour. The role of business and professional associations 
have been mentioned as agents that provide normative environment that facilitate responsible 
behaviour from corporations (Campbell, 2007). Membership of such organisations increases 
members’ understanding of the virtues and benefits of corporate giving, as well as putting peer 
pressure on companies to behave more responsibly (Martin, 2002). Moreover, by interacting with 
their peers in trade or employer associations, firms tend to develop a long-term view of their 
interests rather than short term focus on profit (Streeck, 1997). As a result, business associations 
might have a significant effect in motivating corporations to engage in social responsibility 
(Galaskiewcz, 1991). Campbell (2007) proposed that corporations are more likely to behave 
responsibly when they are members of associations that promote CSR. Additionally, taking on the 
legitimacy stance, many of these CSR-related associations are working in collaboration with other 
stakeholder groups, such as governments, inter-governmental organisations and NGOs, and allows 
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them to contribute their opinions to a specific issue, thereby increasing the legitimacy of decision-
making process (Bostrom, 2006). Their programmes, as a result, are likely to be considered more 
legitimate by relevant actors (Fransen, 2012). Such advantage, hence, would motivate firms to 
actively participate in the programmes and report information about those activities to demonstrate 
their compliance with society’s expectations.  
Even though a few studies have articulated the role of business associations on CSR practices 
(Cammpbell, 2007; Martin, 2002; Galaskiewcz, 1991), the number of studies assessing the impact 
of such associations on CSRD is very limited. One study that has encompassed this relationship is 
that of Amran and Haniffa (2011) on CSRD in Malaysia. Their study examined the impact of 
association factor on CSRD in Malaysia through firms’ membership with the Business Council for 
Sustainable Development in Malaysia (BCSDM) – an association that promotes sustainable 
development among Malaysian business community with the argument that such membership 
might influence the level of CSRD (Amran and Haniffa, 2011). As a result, responding to the 
limited number of studies investigating the role of CSR-related associations in defining firms’ 
CSRD, this study intends to examine the impact of these associations, particularly those that are 
strong advocators of CSR and CSRD in the six countries, to present the effect of normative 
pressures on firms. The list of these associations is mentioned in the Appendix 3. 
Hypothesis 12: Firms that have membership with the associations promoting CSR have higher 
CSRD in annual reports compared to their counterparts.  
3.4 Chapter Summary 
Following the gaps that have been identified in Chapter 2, section 2.5 regarding the CSRD research 
field, this study attempts to examine the effect of both internal and external determinants on the 
extent to which firms disclose information about their CSR activities. The chapter begins with a 
discussion on relevant theories as well as justifications for using a multi-theoretical framework. 
The chapter focuses on the hypotheses development, which is divided into two main sub-sections. 
In the first sub-section, the impact of internal determinants is examined through corporate 
governance practices. Based on the theoretical framework, existing literature and the context of 
the study, six corporate governance practices, including board size, board independence, board 
gender diversity, CEO duality, block ownership and the presence of CSR committee, are used to 
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evaluate the effect of internal determinants on CSRD. Relevant hypotheses are then developed for 
each of the factors. In the second sub-section, the main focus is on the impact of institutional 
environment on CSRD. Based on the institutional theory, Scott’s institutional framework (1995) 
and previous studies, six institutional factors, representing the three pillars (regulative, cultural-
cognitive and normative) are identified to examine the role of institutional environment on defining 
firms’ CSRD practice. Similar with the first section, hypotheses are also developed for all 
institutional factors.  
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Overview 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the researcher’s methodological perspectives, provide 
justifications for the research strategy and research approach, and describe the process of data 
collection, amongst addressing the use of different statistical techniques for data analysis. Firstly, 
the chapter begins with a brief deliberation on numerous philosophical positions, through which 
the researcher expresses her position on reality and the nature of social research. Based on the 
philosophical perspectives, the use of a deductive approach and quantitative strategy is explained 
and subsequently justified. The use of content analysis as the data collection method is then 
discussed with a variety of arguments from the literature. Following the use of content analysis, 
the issues of reliability and validity are addressed together with the development of coding 
procedure, sampling type and variables’ measurements. Finally, the chapter concludes with the 
statistical techniques used for analysing data to answer the research questions.   
4.2 Research Philosophy 
 
Philosophy remains deeply connected with, and considered as foundational for social sciences 
(Hughes and Sharrock, 1997). Perceptions about nature and organisation of social research have 
often evolved from one’s philosophical conceptions, which is demonstrated through research 
approaches and methods (Hughes and Sharrock, 1997). The results of research could differ when 
conducted by different researchers due to competing starting points which originate from specific 
philosophical perceptions (Williams and May, 1996). Whether a researcher is conscious about 
philosophy or not, philosophical assumptions heavily underpin research activities, therefore, it is 
important to engage with the issues of philosophy in conducting research.  Research strategies are 
located within a broader framework of theoretical or philosophical perspectives which are referred 
to as research paradigms (Blaikie, 2007). These perspectives are formed and differentiated through 
two types of assumptions, assumptions about the nature of social reality (ontological perspective) 
and the way in which knowledge of reality can be achieved (epistemological perspective) (Blaikie, 
2007). Details of these two perspectives in addition to a discussion of the researcher’s positions 
are presented in the following sub-sections. 
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4.2.1 Ontological Perspective 
Ontology plays the vital role of conceptualising reality or truth by preliminary asking ‘what kinds 
of things really exist in the world?’ (Hughes and Sharrock, 1997, p.5). Questions of ontological 
perspectives focus on the nature of assumptions that underlie scientific theories. For instance, if 
one is to make a claim about the social and natural world, what presuppositions are built into an 
individual’s ideas regarding to their nature? (Williams and May, 1996). The primary concern about 
the nature of social ontology’s quest is whether social entities can and should be considered as 
objective entities that have independent realities to social actors or social constructions, developed 
and based on the perceptions and actions of social actors (Williams, 2003). As ontological 
assumptions are embedded in theoretical ideas that guide researchers in adopting research 
strategies and methods, the two ontological positions, realist and idealist, therefore, link to the two 
opposite and mutually exclusive theories (Blaikie, 2007). While realists perceive that natural and 
social phenomena are independent from human activities and observers, idealists refuse the 
independent existence of the external world from human thought (Blaikie, 2007). Even though 
idealist and realist positions demonstrate competing positions of the ontological perspective, there 
are a variety of other positions that exist between these two theoretical ideas.  
4.2.2 Epistemological Perspective 
Defined as the possibility of empirical knowledge, research philosophy relies upon epistemology 
(Hughes and Sharrock, 1997). The concept of epistemology contests any doubt and scepticism that 
humanity can never, with full confidence, claim to know anything about the external world 
(Hughes and Sharrock, 1997). Therefore, to provide assurances for our knowledge, researchers 
need to demonstrate that the system of knowledge is built upon a stable foundation defined by 
well-established and unchallengeable methods of acquiring knowledge. As a result, the choice of 
research methods or techniques helps demonstrates one’s epistemological position. It is important 
to address that no research method or technique is self-validating or could be used generically for 
research. Each research method is conducted under a number of assumptions. Hence, the 
effectiveness and appropriateness of each method depends on epistemological justifications and 
presuppositions (Hughes and Sharrock, 1997). Each subject matter is different, requiring different 
investigative practices. Consideration of the nature of reality and the role of theory can provide 
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foundation for developing methodology and methods. Methodology influences the choice of 
methods and also has an impact of the knowledge and results of the investigation (Howell, 2013).  
Epistemology is presented with three main positions, positivism, constructivism and subjectivism 
(Crotty, 1998). Firstly, positivism has been classified as the classical view of science and based on 
the thesis of naturalism (Blaikie, 2007). According to positivists, researchers are independent from 
external world, and truth can be found through a scientific procedure which is used to prove 
hypotheses through experiments (Howell, 2013). Knowledge must be based on what a researcher 
can perceive through his or her senses (Hughes and Sharrock, 1997). The only knowledge of reality 
that is acceptable is the knowledge derived from experience and observation. Anything that cannot 
be verified by experience is meaningless. The use of theory in positivism is to provide immutable 
laws that enable prediction (Howell, 2013). Post-positivism, however, is critical of this viewpoint, 
as it is impossible to identify laws in social science (Howell, 2013). Knowledge could only be 
known probabilistically. Post-positivism, also known as critical rationalism (Blaikie, 2007), relies 
on the idea of testing theories against reality, which links to the method of hypothesis, the 
hypothetico-deductive method or the method of falsificationism providing the foundation for 
deductive research strategy.  
On the opposing end of the epistemological perspective is subjectivism. Subjectivism is whereby 
social phenomena are created from perceptions and actions of social actors. As the interaction 
between actors is a continual process, social phenomena remain in a constant state of revision 
(Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2012). Rather than originating from the interaction between the 
subject and the object, meaning in subjectivism is imposed on the object by the subject. Hence, in 
this epistemological position, the object does not have an impact on the generation of meaning 
(Crotty, 1998). Until quite recently, positivism and subjectivism are considered as exhaustive and 
mutually exclusive epistemologies (Blaikie, 2007).  
Constructivism exists in the space between objectivism and subjectivism. According to 
constructivists, it is impossible for human beings to observe and make true discoveries about 
external world due to their fallibility (Blaikie, 2007). Therefore, there is no free theory knowledge 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2011). Constructivists perceive no objective truth (Crotty, 1998). Truth and 
meaning in constructivism originates from engagement with realities in the world, hence, there is 
no meaning without the mind. Meaning is constructed not discovered and individuals and groups 
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have multiple ways of constructing meaning, even with the same phenomenon (Crotty, 1998). 
Based on this perspective, knowledge and truth are collated within an individual’s mind, resulting 
in the conception of ‘multiple realities’ (Petit and Huault 2008). 
4.2.3 Discussion of Ontological and Epistemological Issues 
Indications of the researcher’s philosophical stance are highlighted briefly through the choice of 
the thesis topic as well as through the literature review. In this section, the ontological and 
epistemological issues are discussed together as these issues tend to emerge simultaneously 
(Crotty, 1998). If one intends to talk about the construction of meaning, they need to address the 
construction of meaningful reality (Crotty, 1998). Therefore, these two issues cannot be kept 
conceptually apart. The research adopts the realist ontology and post-positivism epistemology. 
Firstly, the researcher believes there is an external reality, independent from the researcher thereby 
presenting a realist ontology. The epistemological position is appropriate for the study as the study 
relies on information provided in annual reports to examine the extent of CSRD in the context of 
Southeast Asian countries, allowing the researcher to remain independent from the examined 
phenomenon. The post-positivism epistemology demonstrates through the nature of the research 
questions and the way in which the research has been conducted. According to Saunders et al. 
(2012), a positivist position is more desirable when the research problem is related to identifying 
and understanding factors influencing an outcome. As the key research questions of the study 
involve identifying relevant CSRD determinants and examining the impact of these determinants 
on CSRD, this epistemological position is appropriate. Moreover, regarding the way in which the 
research has been conducted, hypotheses were developed in Chapter 3 with the intention that these 
hypotheses will be statistically tested to examine the relationships. This method is directly linked 
to the post positivism idea of testing theories against reality. Moreover, the fact that the 
development of hypotheses was strongly based on previous literature and theories demonstrate the 
belief that observations are always made within a frame of reference, with certain expectations in 
mind, and that all observations are theory-dependent (Blaikie, 2007). These beliefs are core to the 
post-positivism epistemology. Therefore, the choice in research approach and research strategy 
presented in the next section is influenced by these philosophical positions.   
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4.3 Research Approach: Deductive 
Two key approaches of social science are deductive and inductive approaches. With the nature of 
adopting a positivist perspective and incorporating practices and norms of natural science, the main 
aim of a deductive approach is to test theory. Some scholars (Bryman and Bell, 2011; Gray, 2014) 
consider the deductive approach as the most common view related to the relationship between 
theory and research. According to this approach, with the understanding about a specific domain 
and theoretical considerations, hypotheses are built to identify the relationship between the 
variables (Gray, 2014). Based on the theory and built hypotheses, data is collected and analysed 
to confirm or reject these hypotheses (Bryan and Bell, 2011). Contrasting this position, the purpose 
of the inductive approach is to build on the existing stock of theory which implies theory is the 
outcome of inductive research (Bryman, 2016). This type of research, therefore, is qualitative with 
generalised inferences drawn from the findings. Despite their clear identification, deductive and 
inductive approaches are not always separate (Bryman, 2016). The choice of research strategy, 
design and methods should be based on the investigated research questions. This study is classified 
as an explanatory study with the aim to investigate the impact of external and internal determinants 
on CSRD, which is considered as the causal relationship between variables (Saunders et al., 2012). 
The study adopts deductive approach with quantitative strategy to identify the relationships 
between the variables that have been established in the literature review based on relevant theories.  
Following the deductive approach, the use of quantitative design is to test theories (Bryman, 2016) 
which reflects the researcher’s post-positivist position. The distinctive nature of quantitative 
research is the quantification of data collection and data analysis with the application of different 
statistical methods and techniques as powerful tools to provide precise summary of finding, in 
addition to increasing the quality of interpretation. Moreover, a quantitative approach is an 
appropriate strategy as the study does not focus on how things are but why things are the way they 
are, therefore demonstrating the researcher’s philosophy that social reality exists externally and 
independent from the researcher.  
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4.4 Data Collection: Content Analysis 
Content analysis is the method in which data is collected and analysed from documents that are 
communicated through a variety of means (Curtis and Curtis, 2011). The method is classified 
under unobtrusive research in which researchers conduct social behaviour studies without affecting 
it (Babbie, 2013). Content analysis method is closely associated with quantitative approach as the 
method is used to quantify content of analysed documents and text to a number of categories in a 
systematic and replicable manner (Bryman, 2016).  
According to Babbie (2013), the method of content analysis is particularly appropriate for studies 
related to communications. As a result, content analysis has been widely used in CSRD studies 
(see Haji, 2013; Tan et al., 2016; Alnajjar, 2000). In the CSRD research field, content analysis is 
the research technique that involves classifying the disclosed information into several categories 
of items that explain different aspects of CSR (Branco and Rodrigues, 2008). Such technique 
allows researchers to discover what corporations indicate through their reported information 
regarding their relationship with stakeholders, the impact of their business activities upon the 
environment, in addition to the level of openness regarding their business activities (Kuasirikun 
and Sherer, 2004). The content analysis method is also important in suggesting insights of actual 
and potential practices as well as contribution to the development of better disclosure practices 
(Kuasirikun and Sherer, 2004).  
Following the tradition of previous CSRD studies, content analysis is adopted as a data collection 
strategy in this particular research for the following reasons. Firstly, as the objectives of this study 
include identifying the extent of CSRD across six countries, the use of other data collection 
strategies, such as questionnaire or interview, cannot provide objective data. Moreover, content 
analysis is the best suited data collection strategy, considering the cross-countries context of this 
study. With the restrictions on time and funding of the PhD, it is impossible for the researcher to 
travel to these countries for data collection. As a result, difficulties in data accessibility have made 
the use of content analysis an appropriate and suitable data collection strategy (see Holsti, 1969).  
One of the important areas that researchers should pay attention to while conducting a content 
analysis study is the type of document (Unerman, 2000). As argued in the chapter 2, section 2.2, 
annual reports were chosen to examine the level of CSRD to ensure the completeness and 
consistency of the whole data set. Additionally, as most of the examined countries have their own 
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native language, the choice of other un-official documents would pose certain difficulties and 
challenges in analysing the data due to the unavailability of English versions for these documents. 
As a result, annual reports were selected on the basis of English language since most of the large 
listed companies in the six countries have English version of their annual reports. CSR information 
is checked thoroughly in all sections of, and for each of the annual reports to ensure no disclosed 
information is missed.   
4.5 Population, Sampling Type and Sample Size  
4.5.1 Population 
As justified in Chapter 1, this study examines the extent of CSRD in the six main economies of 
Southeast Asia, including Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines and Vietnam. 
Listed companies are the subjects of this study. Due to the high level of publicity and public 
pressure, it is important for these companies to practice CSRD to demonstrate their consideration 
of different stakeholder groups. Moreover, listed companies are also more likely to responds to 
external pressures. As a result, using listed companies as subjects of the study provides a great 
opportunity to identify the influence of external environment on firms’ CSRD. Finally, under 
different laws, regulations and listing requirements, listed companies are obligated to disclose 
information regarding their CG practices and in some cases, CSR activities. Therefore, the choice 
of listed companies would reduce the missing data rate as well as ensure availability and 
completeness of the data set.  
With the exception of Vietnam, the other five countries have only one national stock exchange. 
Vietnam has two stock exchange markets with Ho Chi Minh City stock exchange (HoSE) as the 
primary and largest market based on market capitalisation, and Ha Noi stock exchange (HNX) as 
the secondary market. The six countries with seven stock exchange markets, Bursa Malaysia, 
Hanoi stock exchange (HNX), Ho Chi Minh City stock exchange (HoSE), Indonesia stock 
exchange (IDX), The Philippines stock exchange (PSE), the stock exchange of Thailand (SET) 
and Singapore Exchange (SGX), are all part of the ASEAN Exchanges collaboration. A brief 
introduction of each stock exchange is introduced as follows.  
Firstly, the capital market of Indonesia has been established long before the country’s 
independence in 1912 during the Dutch colonial era (IDX, 2010). The market grew gradually since 
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the establishment, however, for various reasons, including the two world wars and power transition 
for the Dutch government, the stock exchange was inactive until 1977 when the government 
reactivated it again (IDX, 2010). Ever since, the market has grown rapidly with the support from 
the government (ASEAN Exchanges, 2012). Before 1989, Indonesia had two stock exchange 
markets, the Jakarta stock exchange and the Surabaya stock exchange. Since 2007, the two stock 
exchanges have merged into one national stock exchange, the Indonesia stock exchange (IDX) 
(ASEAN Exchanges, 2012). At the end of 2013, the total market capitalisation of IDX is 4,219.02 
trillion rupiah (approximately $317,398.56 millions) with 483 listed companies. 
The next stock exchange to be mentioned is the national stock exchange and future exchange of 
Malaysia which is managed under an exchange holding company, Bursa Malaysia Berhad 
(ASEAN Exchanges, 2012). Bursa Malaysia is one of the largest stock exchanges in ASEAN with 
more than 900 companies listed on either the main market (for large capitalisation companies) or 
the ACE market (emerging companies of all size) (Bursa Malaysia, 2017). At the end of 2013, the 
stock market had 911 public listed companies with the total market capitalisation of 462,285 USD 
millions and over 130,000 USD millions total value of share trading (Bursa Malaysia, 2013). The 
stock market’s benchmark index is the FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI which comprises the thirty 
largest companies listed on the main board based on full market capitalisation.  
The Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE) is the oldest stock exchange in Asia and has been active 
since 1927 from the establishment of the Manila Stock Exchange. Prior to PSE, the country had 
two former stock exchanges, the Manila Stock Exchange established in 1927, and the Makati Stock 
Exchange (MkSE) established in 1963. The two stock exchanges were unified to become the 
current PSE in 1992 after nearly 30 years of separate trading (PSE, 2012). The PSE is the next 
stock exchange after Bursa Malaysia, SGX and SET, in terms of dividend yield (Bursa Malaysia, 
2013). At the end of 2013, the stock exchange achieved a market capitalisation of $256,502.81 
million with 257 companies listed (PSE, 2013). The main index of PSE is the PSEi which 
comprises of the thirty largest listed companies based on market capitalisation (PSE). The selection 
of thirty companies is based on a specific criteria of public float, liquidity and market 
capitalisation. 
Among the six countries, Singapore is the only advanced economy based on the classification of 
IMF (2017). The stock exchange of Singapore (SGX) was formed in 1999 as a holding company 
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by the emerge of two financial institutions, the Stock Exchange of Singapore (SES) and the 
Singapore International Monetary Exchange Limited (Simex) (Shaw, 2002). The SGX is Asia’s 
most international and influential multi-asset exchange with approximately 40% of listed 
companies originating from outside Singapore. SGX is also the largest securities market in 
Southeast Asia in terms of market capitalisation (SGX, 2013). In 2013, the total number of listed 
companies on SGX exceeded 770, with the total capitalisation of $1 trillion and the total trading 
value of $363 billion (SGX, 2013).  
The development of a modernised Thai capital market began with the establishment of Bangkok 
Stock Exchange in July 1962. The Bangkok stock exchange was owned by a limited company, 
however, it performed poorly in terms of turnover due to the lack of government support and 
limited understanding of equity market, which finally led to its operations ceased in early 1970s. 
After the first stock exchange fails, the Thai government increased its involvement in legislating 
and creating a capital market. With a basic legislative framework, the Securities Exchange of 
Thailand started trading in 1975. In 1991, the name was changed to the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand (SET) (SET, n.d.). Together with Bursa Malaysia and SGX, the stock exchange of 
Thailand (SET) is among the top three stock exchanges in Southeast Asia (Bursa Malaysia, 2013). 
In the end of 2013, more than 600 firms are listed on SET.  
Vietnam is the final country considered in this study. According to FTSE’s classification (2015), 
Vietnam is the least developed country out of the six, holding the position of frontier economy. 
Even though Vietnamese stock exchange markets were initiated much later than other countries in 
the region, they have grown substantially (Vo, 2010). The first and primary stock exchange in 
Vietnam is Ho Chi Minh stock exchange (HoSE) which was established in 2000 with four listed 
companies (Vo, 2010).  In 2013, the total market capitalisation of HoSE is 842,105 billion VND 
with 303 listed companies (HoSE, 2013). In addition to HoSE, the second stock exchange market 
of Vietnam is Hanoi Stock Exchange (HNX). HNX was established in 2005 and is considered as 
the secondary stock exchange market in Vietnam. Even though HoSE is a much larger stock 
exchange market in terms of market capitalisation, HNX has higher number of listed companies 
with 394 companies (ASEAN Exchanges, 2012). Both stock exchanges are operated as state-
owned single member limited liability companies.  
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4.5.2 Sampling Type 
After careful consideration, purposive sampling is identified as an appropriate sampling type for 
this study for the following reasons. Firstly, according to Punch (2005), if the research purpose is 
to identify relationships between variables or compare between groups, the use of deliberate or 
purposive sampling might be more suitable to increase the chance of relationships being observed, 
especially in the case of less developed countries with limited resources and insufficient technical 
infrastructure (Bulmer and Warwick, 1993). In purposive sampling, only the units that contribute 
to the answers of research questions are chosen (Krippendorff, 2013). This suggestion is 
particularly applicable for the current research. The study aims to compare the levels of CSRD 
across the six examined countries as well as investigate the impact of CG and institutional factors 
on CSRD. In Vietnam and the Philippines, however, the concept of CSR has not been substantial, 
therefore, CSRD is unlikely to be customary practice among small and medium companies. The 
use of purposive sampling with a focus on large listed companies, as a result, would allow 
sufficient amount of data collected from each country, avoid high level of missing data, and ensure 
the completeness of the data set since largest listed companies have high levels of publicity and 
public pressure. Practicing CSRD, hence, is integral to their survival and also demonstrates their 
consideration towards various stakeholder groups.  
Moreover, empirical findings of previous studies have been relatively conclusive, indicating that 
larger firms tend to have higher and better CSRD (see Rahman et al., 2011; Hamid, 2004; Ghazali, 
2007). Large listed companies, hence, have been the subject in some previous CSRD studies (see 
Brammer and Pavelin, 2004; Ghazali, 2007; Saleh, Zulkifli and Muhamad, 2010) and allows for 
comparison with previous findings and studies. Another reason for focussing solely on large listed 
companies is the language barrier. Without the use of large listed companies, it would have been 
difficult to collect data for this comparative study as all the six countries have their own national 
language, even though English is classified as the second language in some of them (Singapore 
and Malaysia). While large listed companies tend to have an additional English version for their 
reports, it is not guaranteed for small and medium companies. As a result, following the objective 
of achieving the greatest amount of information on the research phenomenon, purposive sampling 
with large listed companies is used as they are active actors in the studied problem (Flyvbjerg, 
2006).  
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4.5.3 Sample Size 
As mentioned previously, for this study, purposive sampling of large listed companies is used to 
ensure the availability and accessibility of data sources. The selection of listed companies from the 
six chosen countries was adapted from the methodology of FTSE ASEAN all-stars index. The 
ASEAN all-stars index includes 180 leading companies from the ASEAN region. The index 
comprises 30 companies chosen from each of the six countries in the ASEAN Exchange 
collaboration, including Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam. The 
purpose of the index is to reflect the breadth and depth of the ASEAN economy with companies 
selected from these countries’ respective stock exchanges. The chosen companies at the national 
level are the largest and have the most liquid stocks on their national stock exchanges. Aside size 
and liquidity as the criteria of the index, the diversity in terms of operating industries is also one 
of the main characteristics of these companies (ASEAN Exchanges, 2012). 
Modelled on the FTSE ASEAN all-stars index, data of the top 30 largest companies based on 
market capitalisation from each of the following stock exchanges, Bursa Malaysia, SGX, SET, 
IDX, PSE and HoSE, was collected. In the case of Vietnam, the top 30 listed companies are 
selected from HoSE rather than HNX, as HoSE is the primary stock exchange market in Vietnam. 
Moreover, companies listed on HoSE tend to be larger in terms of market capitalisation. Therefore, 
the chosen firms would be more comparable with the ones from the other countries; and the 
findings would reflect the CSRD practice of large firms in Vietnam better. The sample of 30 largest 
companies from the six stock exchanges made up a total sampling size of 180 companies. Due to 
several reasons as mentioned in the table 8, the final sampling of this study includes 171 
observations. 
The sampling choice, however, does contain limitations. Although the sample size is comparable 
or bigger than numerous CSRD studies (see Hamid, 2004; Ghazali, 2007; Mirfazli, 2008; Suttipun 
and Stanton, 2012; Tan et al., 2016), compared with the total population, the sample size is not 
large enough to ensure generalisability. Moreover, only one year of data is collected (2013), rather 
than spread across multiple years. Despite the acknowledgement that a bigger sample size with 
cross-year observations would increase the generalisability and allow comparing the extent of 
CSRD across time, the sample size of 171 firms is more appropriate for this study as bigger sample 
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size would have been unmanageable considering the limited timeframe of a PhD, the labour-
intensive data collection process and the difficulty of collecting data across the region.  
Table 8: Sample size specification 
Country Sample specification 
Indonesia  Intended sample size: 30 
 Number of companies that do not have separate 2013 
annual report from parent companies: 0 
 Number of companies with missing/ unavailable 2013 
annual report: 0 
 Final sample size: 30 
Malaysia  Intended sample size: 30 
 Number of companies that do not have separate 2013 
annual report from parent companies: 0 
 Number of companies with missing/ unavailable 2013 
annual report: 1 
 Final sample size: 29 
Philippines  Intended sample size: 30 
 Number of companies that do not have separate 2013 
annual report from parent companies: 1 
 Number of companies with missing/ unavailable 2013 
annual report: 2 
 Final sample size: 27 
Singapore  Intended sample size: 30 
 Number of companies that do not have separate 2013 
annual report from parent companies: 3 
 Number of companies with missing/ unavailable 2013 
annual report: 1 
 Final sample size: 26 
Thailand  Intended sample size: 30 
 Number of companies that do not have separate 2013 
annual report from parent companies: 0 
 Number of companies with missing/ unavailable 2013 
annual report: 0 
 Final sample size: 30 
Vietnam  Intended sample size: 30 
 Number of companies that do not have separate 2013 
annual report from parent companies: 0 
 Number of companies with missing/ unavailable 2013 
annual report: 1 
 Final sample size: 29 
Total  Final sample size: 171 
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4.6 Variables and Measurements 
4.6.1 The Dependent Variable - Corporate Social Responsibility Index (CSRDI) 
4.6.1.1 Scoring Scheme and Measurement  
Previous literature indicates that the extent of CSRD can be measured through various methods, 
either through weighted or non-weighted techniques (see Arshad et al., 2012; Naser, Al-Khatib 
and Karbhari, 2002; Gao et al., 2005). Non-weighted index is the simplest way in which the extent 
of CSRD is measured by counting the number of CSR-related instances or items that are disclosed 
in annual reports (see Gao et al., 2005; Janggu et al., 2007; Menassa, 2010). This form of 
measurement, however, was criticised for not considering the extent of information disclosure 
(Branco and Rodrigues, 2008) which indicates the significance and weight of each disclosed item 
(Zeghal and Ahmed, 1990). Therefore, to address this problem, weighted index with the use of 
word count (see Gao et al., 2005; Menassa, 2010), sentence count (see Amran and Devi, 2008; 
Janggu et al., 2007), or page count (see Lynn, 1992; Thompson and Zakaria, 2004) have been 
applied to measure the extent of CSRD in some previous studies.  
Appropriate units of measurement are also debated in the literature. For instance, while scholars, 
such as Gray et al., (1995a) and Milne and Adler (1999), support the use of page count with the 
argument that page count reflects the total space given for a specific topic; and therefore, indicates 
its importance, this type of measurement was criticised by Lavers (1993). The author argued that 
the use of page count tends to be subjective due to the differences in front size, graphics and 
margins (Hamid, 2004). Regarding the use of word count, in contrast to the justification that the 
volume of disclosure can be examined in greater detail with the use of word count, some studies 
claimed that individual words do not provide any meaning without its context (El-Bannany, 2007; 
Milne and Adler, 1999).  
Similarly, the use of sentences as units of measurement can also be problematic as it ignores the 
fact that two different writers can convey the same message with different numbers of sentences 
using differing grammatical styles of (Unerman, 2000). Therefore, previous literature on this issue 
has shown that different measurements can have their own strengths and weaknesses. As a result, 
the use of an appropriate unit of measurement should be based on the context of study. In this 
study, the use of non-weighted index is considered more suitable as the use of weighted index 
(word count, sentence count or page count) could create subjectivity and bias during the analysis 
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process as the format and presentation of each annual report can be very different from another, 
considering the cross-national context. Moreover, previous literature shows that the choice of 
weighted or un-weighted index would not result any significant difference in findings (Chow and 
Wong-Boren, 1987; Firth, 1980; Hossain and Hammami, 2009). Finally, as the simplest type of 
measurement, the use of non-weighted index can be easily replicated in future studies.  
As discussed in chapter 2, section 2.2, information on CSRD is collected based on a checklist of 
items adapted from the study of Branco and Rodrigues (2008). The checklist classifies CSR 
information into four main categories: environmental disclosure (ED), human resources disclosure 
(HRD), products and consumers disclosure (PCD) and finally community involvement disclosure 
(CD). The total number of items on the checklist is 30, with 11 items in ED, 9 items in HRD, 5 
items in PCD, and 5 items in CD. With the use of non-weighted index, a company is awarded 1 if 
an item in the checklist is disclosed and 0 if it is missing. The CSRDI is calculated by the ratio of 
actual scores awarded to the maximum score that a firm could achieve. In most of the cases, the 
maximum score is 30 as there is 30 items on the checklist. However, in order to avoid penalising 
firms for not disclosing the items unrelated to their business, certain items are excluded for firms 
from the industries of healthcare services, banking and financial services, hotels, leisure and 
entertainment. The excluded items are presented as follows: 
 Healthcare services: items such as pollution from business conduct, pollution created 
from the use of company’s products, prevention or repair of environmental damage, 
environment aesthetics, energy efficiency of products, discussion of specific 
environmental laws and regulations, product safety, and disclosing of consumer safety 
practices are excluded, making the maximum number of items for this industry is 22. 
 Banks and financial services: pollution created from the use of company’s products, 
prevention or repair of environmental damage, environmental aesthetics, energy 
efficiency of products, discussion of specific environmental laws and regulations and 
product safety are excluded. The maximum number of items for this industry is 24 
 Hotels, leisure and entertainment: pollution arised from the use of company’s products, 
prevention or repair of environmental damage, environmental aesthetics, and energy 
efficiency of products and discussion of specific environmental laws and regulations are 
excluded, making the maximum number of items is 25.  
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 Software and computer services: pollution created from the use of company’s products, 
prevention or repair of environmental damage, environmental aesthetics, energy 
efficiency of products, discussion of specific environmental laws and regulations, product 
safety, and disclosing of consumer safety practices are excluded, resulting with a 
maximum number of 23 items.   
4.6.1.2 Reliability and Validity of the Construction Index 
(i) Reliability  
Reliability refers to the question of whether a measurement is stable (Bryman, 2016) and able to 
provide the same results in separate occasions (Howell, 2013). This concept is important for a 
content analysis study to address the issue of reliability of not only the instruments but also the 
data collected using those instruments to ensure inferences drawing from the data are replicable 
and valid (Milne and Adler, 1999). In order to ensure the reliability of the construction index and 
the results of content analysis, following the suggestion of Krippendorff (2013), three elements of 
reliability, stability, reproducibility and accuracy, are examined in this study. However, as the 
accuracy element which is preferred to as the issue of determining coding performance against an 
expert built predetermined standard or from previous studies (Krippendorff, 2013) can be related 
to the validity of the construction index, only two elements, stability and reproducibility, are 
discussed in this sub-section.  
The first element, stability, also known as intra-coder reliability, is mentioned as the degree to 
which the process of content analysis remains unchanged and produces the same results over time. 
Assessing stability requires the involvement of test and retest procedure in which a sample of the 
data should be coded again by the same coder after a period of time. High correlation from the test 
and retest procedure is a sign of stability in measurement. In this study, to examine the stability of 
the construction index, a sample of 30 companies is re-analysed after three-months. The results 
between the two times of coding were relatively similar without any major difference. As a result, 
the intra-coder reliability can be assured.   
Regarding the reproducibility of measurement, the main aim of this reliability type is to measure 
the extent to which the coding results are the same when there are multiple coders (Milne and 
Adler, 1999). In this study, a second coder is used to ensure the reproducibility of measurement. 
169 
 
The second coder is a postgraduate researcher who has previous experience in content analysis 
and a competent understanding of CSR concept but not involved in any other aspect of this study 
rather than re-coding a small sample. This requirement helps to ensure the independence of coder 
to allow freedom of judgement without the influence of the researcher. A process of training was 
applied prior the coding assignment as it allows coders to familiarise themselves with definitions, 
coding rules and scheme (Kolbe and Burnett, 1991). The second coder was explicitly explained 
the categories, meaning of each item and when an item is considered disclosed. After fully 
understanding the process, the second coder was asked to analyse one document to test whether 
he perceived the coding procedure correctly. At the end of the training, the second coder was 
provided a code book with detail description of each item (Appendix 2) and asked to choose a 
sample of 30 companies with 5 randomly chosen companies from each country. When the coding 
is finished, the two coders met and discussed any difficulties raised from the coding process and 
further develop description for some vague terms in the items. When comparing the results of two 
coders’ analysis did not show any major difference. Therefore, inter-coder reliability can be 
guaranteed.  
Furthermore, in order to assess internal consistency of the construction index, the Cronbach’s alpha 
test is employed. Internal consistency measures the extent to which the items in the checklist 
measure the same construct and hence are internally consistent (Bryman and Cramer, 2005). Some 
previous disclosure studies (see Botosan, 1997; Khan et al., 2013a; Aribi and Gao, 2010) have 
used the Cronbach’s coefficient alpha to examine the degree that correlation amongst categories 
of the disclosure index are reduced as a result of random error. According to previous literature 
(Field, 2013, p.709; Gul and Leung, 2004, p.360), the alpha value above 0.70 is considered 
acceptable. In this study, the coefficient alpha value of four disclosure categories in the CSRD 
index is 0.715, which exceeds the cut-off point and higher than some previous studies of Gul and 
Leung (2004), Khan et al. (2013a) and Aribi and Gao (2010). Therefore, the statistics indicate that 
the disclosure items in the index captures the same construct. Table 9 presents the result of the 
Cronbach’s test.  
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Table 9: Reliability test of the CSRDI 
Cronbach’s Alpha Value No. of items 
0.715 4 
 
(ii) Validity  
According to Matthes and Kohring (2008), validity’s indicator is the extent to which the measuring 
instrument measures the concept it is supposed to measure. Validity plays an important role in 
ensuring inferences drawn from the coding procedure are supported by empirical evidence and 
theoretical rationale (Rourke and Anderson, 2004). In this study, different procedures have been 
adapted to ensure the validity of the construction index. Firstly, as mentioned in the previous 
chapters, the index was adapted from the study of Branco and Rodrigues (2008) which was 
developed based on well-recognised CSRD instruments. Therefore, the appropriateness and 
validity of the index could be ensured. Moreover, according to Rourke and Anderson (2004), a 
valid protocol does not either miss out behaviours that should be included or include behaviours 
that should be ignored. The CSRDI includes 30 items classified into four main categories, ED, 
HRD, PCD and CD. Compared with other indexes in some previous CSRD studies (see Anas et 
al., 2015; Esa and Ghazali, 2012; Sobhani et al., 2009), the index adapted in this study is more 
exhaustive with most mentioned items included and diverse aspects of CSR covered. After a trial 
analysis, however, the researcher recognised that the items mentioned in the checklist are too 
general and may cause confusion and/or inconsistency during the coding process. As a result, a 
detailed coding guideline with detailed descriptions for each item was developed based on previous 
studies that Branco and Rodrigues (2008) adapted, including Gray et al. (1995a); Hackston and 
Milne (1996); and Williams and Pei (1999) (Appendix 2). Besides, the coding guideline is also 
modified after the trial analysis as to include some relevant points. The coding guideline, then, is 
discussed with the two supervisors for further alterations. Furthermore, the instruction index has 
also been tested through the presentation and submission in various national and international 
conferences. Therefore, the validity of the construction index can be well-assured.  
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4.6.2 Independent Variables 
4.6.2.1 Internal Determinants 
As discussed in Chapter 3, section 3.2, CG practices are used to examine the impact of internal 
determinants on CSRD. Based on the context of study and previous studies on the relationship 
between CG and CSRD, six CG practices, representing board structure, board composition, board 
diversity and ownership are chosen to examine the effect of CG on CSRD.  
The CG variables in this study are measured as follows. In terms of board composition, board 
independence was computed based on the percentage of independent directors on a board (Cheng 
and Courtenay, 2006’ Khan, 2010; Michelon and Parbonetti, 2012). Board gender diversity based 
on gender was measured by the percentage of female directors on a board (Barako and Brown, 
2008; Frias-Aceituno et al., 2013). Regarding board structure, CEO duality and the presence of 
CSR committee were measured by dummy variables (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Jizi et al., 2014; 
Cowen et al., 1987). Finally, block ownership was computed based on the percentage of ordinary 
shares held by large shareholders who have more than 5% of ownership (Halme and Huse, 1997).  
4.6.2.2 External Determinants  
As mentioned in Chapter 2, section 3.3, diverse institutional factors, representing the three pillars 
in the institutional environment, regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive, are selected to 
identify the impact of external determinants on CSRD. Following previous studies (see Adelopo 
et al., 2012; Amran and Haniffa, 2011; Comyns, 2016; Williams, 1999), all the six variables, legal 
origin, mandatory disclosure, uncertainty avoidance cultural dimension, masculinity cultural 
dimension, the adoption of the GRI standard and membership of CSR-related associations are all 
measured by dummies variables. The table 10 provides more detail of the measurements for each 
variable.  
4.6.3 Control Variables 
In this study, several variables are controlled to mitigate potential problems associated with 
omitted variables (Wooldridge, 2013). The control variables include firm size, leverage, 
profitability, firm age, audit firm size and industry affiliation. The choice of these variables is 
based on theoretical predictions, and existing literature. The theoretical and empirical argument 
for choosing each of the control variables is discussed in the following sub-sections: 
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4.6.3.1 Firm Size 
 
The relationship between firm size and CSRD has been relatively consistent with empirical 
findings supporting the positive impact of firm size on CSRD (see Haji, 2013; Gao et al., 2005; 
Trotman and Bradley, 1981). With diverse geographical and product markets, large firms are 
highly visible and have increasingly diverse stakeholder groups (Brammer and Pavelin, 2004). As 
a result, such firms are under greater pressures to exhibit CSR (Cowen et al., 1987). Moreover, 
large corporations with broader business activities will have greater impact on society (Cowen et 
al., 1987). Therefore, from the legitimacy perspective, large firms tend to disclose higher CSR 
information in annual reports to demonstrate their corporate citizenship, therefore legitimising 
their existence and in many cases enhancing reputation (Branco and Rodrigues, 2008; Hamid, 
2004; Ghazali, 2007). Following previous studies (see Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Ntim and 
Soobaroyen, 2013), firm size, in this study, is measured by using a natural log of total assets. As 
the countries have different currencies, all of the company’s figures were converted into a common 
currency, in this case the United States dollar, before applying the measurement.  
4.6.3.2 Leverage 
 
High leverage levels have been argued to have a negative relationship with CSRD (see Jizi et al., 
2014; Siregar and Bachtiar, 2010). High leverage levels tend to lead to high monitoring costs. As 
a result, managers might seek to reduce costs associated with CSR and CSRD (Esa and Ghazali, 
2012; Jizi et al., 2014). The study of Purushothaman et al. (2000) also supported the negative 
relationship between leverage and CSRD with the argument that due to the close relationship with 
their creditors, firms with an elevated level of leverage might use other means to disclose CSR 
information. This view, however, differs from the perspective of voluntary disclosure and agency 
theory in which highly leveraged firms were claimed to use voluntary information disclosure to 
reduce agency costs and therefore capital cost (see Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Reverte, 2009; El-
Halaby and Hussainey, 2015). This argument could also be applicable for CSRD as a form of 
voluntary disclosure. With these conflicting perspectives, empirical findings regarding the impact 
of leverage on CSRD have been inconclusive. While some studies found positively or negatively 
significant impact of leverage on CSRD (see Chan et al., 2014; Khan et al., 2013a), findings in 
other studies were insignificant (see Esa and Ghazali, 2012; Naser and Hassan, 2013; Siregar and 
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Bachtiar, 2010). Following previous studies (Branco and Rodrigues, 2008; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 
2013), leverage was computed based on the percentage of total debt to total assets.  
4.6.3.3 Profitability 
 
In previous CSRD studies (see Amran and Devi, 2008; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005), profitability is 
expected to have a positive association with CSRD. Managers from highly profitable firms are 
stated to have more freedom and flexibility to engage in CSR activities and CSRD (Amran and 
Devi, 2008; Siregar and Bachtiar, 2010). Moreover, from a legitimacy perspective, profitable firms 
tend to disclose more CSR information to demonstrate their contribution to society and therefore 
legitimise their existence (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005). Taking an alternative approach, however, 
the relationship between profitability and CSRD can be negative as additional costs associated 
with CSRD could reduce a firm’s profit (Esa and Ghazali, 2012). Previous studies show 
inconclusive empirical finding on the relationship between profitability and CSRD. While some 
studies concluded the significantly positive impact of profitability on CSRD (see Hossain et al., 
2006; Sharif and Rashid, 2014; Suteja et al., 2016), insignificant results were found in other studies 
(see Anas et al., 2015; El-Halaby and Hessainey, 2015; Naser and Hassan, 2013). Profitability, in 
this study, is measured by the ratio of net income to total assets (Branco and Rodrigues, 2008). 
4.6.3.4 Firm Age 
 
According to Hamid (2004), legitimacy theory predicts that firm age corresponds with its 
reputation in society and subsequently its CSRD development. Previous studies have argued that 
longer-established firms tend to have a higher extent of CSRD (see El-Halaby and Hussainey, 
2015; Hamid, 2004; Parsa and Kouhy, 2008). Longer-established corporations have received 
increased benefits from society and as this relationship matures, these firms also develop a greater 
sense of social responsibility, which could lead to higher level of CSRD. Moreover, Parsa and 
Kouhy (2008) claimed that younger firms may feel more pressure and hence reluctant to disclose 
information as it could threaten their competitive position. In contrast, firms that are better 
established in the market are less likely to be threatened and their competitive position, therefore, 
is also less likely to be influenced by CSRD. Although several arguments in the literature have 
provided support for the positive relationship between firm age and CSRD, empirical findings 
from some studies have concluded insignificant impact of firm age on CSRD (see Rahman et al., 
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2011; Hamid, 2004; Parsa and Kouhy, 2008). Modelled on previous studies (Hamid, 2004; 
Rahman, 2011), firm age is measured by the number of years from a company’s establishment to 
the year of 2013. 
4.6.3.5 Audit Firm Size 
 
The quality, size and status of auditing firms have been considered as an essential factor in the 
corporate sector as it demonstrates corporations’ willingness to be audited by stricter standards 
and therefore higher quality of information disclosures (Ntim et al., 2017). The relationship 
between audit firm size and voluntary disclosure has long been established in the literature (see 
Barros, Boubaker and Hamrouni, 2013; Dunn and Mayhew, 2004), however, there are a limited 
number of studies examining the impact of audit firm size on CSRD (see El-Halaby and Hussainey, 
2015; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Most studies provided arguments to support the positive 
relationship between audit firm size and voluntary disclosure, including CSRD (see Dunn and 
Mayhew, 2004; El-Halaby and Hussainey, 2015; Huang and Kung, 2010). According to the study 
of Huang and Kung (2010) which looks at the audit firm size as one of environmental disclosure’s 
drivers, the monitoring strength of auditing firms affects both quality and quantity and information 
disclosure. Previous research suggested that well-established auditing firms, such as the Big Four 
auditing firms (Deloitte, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst & Young, and KPMG), provide higher 
assurance quality (Teoh and Wong, 1993) as they have more expertise and experience (Wallace, 
Naser and Mora, 1994), as well as reputations to maintain (DeAngelo, 1981). Therefore, the Big 
Four auditing firms are more likely to demand corporations to disclose more information so to 
maintain their reputation and avoid expensive litigation (Huang and Kung, 2010). Applying this 
argument to CSRD, following the suggestion of Bewley and Li (2000), as well-established auditing 
firms are expected to be better at assessing the impact of firms’ operation on environment and 
society, they tend to require more CSRD. Moreover, from the institutional perspective, the Big 
Four auditing firms can put normative pressure on their clients and affect CSRD (Tagesson et al., 
2012). In this study, a dummy variable is used to measure audit firm size with the value of 1 if a 
firm was audited by one of the Big Four auditing companies, and 0 otherwise (see El-Halaby and 
Hussainey, 2015; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013).  
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4.6.3.6 Industry Affiliation 
 
Industries have been considered as one of the key determinants of CSRD (see Chan et al., 2014; 
Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Mirfazli, 2008; Rizk et al., 2008). Therefore, the impact of industry 
affiliation on CSRD has been considered in numerous studies (e.g. Branco and Rodrigues, 2008; 
Gray et al., 2001; Mahadeo et al., 2011). From the institutional perspective, organisations 
generally model themselves on businesses that have been deemed or perceived to be successful 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). As a result, industry affiliation could play an important role in 
defining a firm’s CSRD practices (see Hackston and Milne, 1996; Patten, 1991). The relationship 
between industry affiliation and CSRD could also be explained by legitimacy theory in which 
companies with high public visibility or greater impact on the environment were found to provide 
more CSRD than their counterparts (see Adams et al., 1998; Clarke and Gibson-Sweet, 1999; Gao 
et al., 2005). In this study, in order to examine the impact of industry affiliation on CSRD, 
following previous studies (see Branco and Rodrigues, 2008; Wang, Song and Yao, 2013), the two 
proxies, environmental sensitivity and consumer proximity, are used. Theoretical and empirical 
arguments for these two variables are provided as follows.  
(i) Environmental sensitivity 
Previous studies have argued that firms from industries in which their manufacturing process has 
a negative impact on the environment tend to disclose more CSR information than counterparts 
from other industries (see Gao et al., 2005; Harte and Owen, 1991; Patten, 1991; Reverte, 2009) 
because firms from these industries are exposed to higher risks of criticism for CSR matters 
(Reverte, 2009). In contrast, industries with lower environmental impact would receive less 
stakeholder pressure and therefore more likely to display a lower level of disclosure (Reverte, 
2009). Empirical findings in a number of CSRD studies have provided evidence for the negative 
relationship between industry’s environmental sensitivity level and CSRD (see Gao et al., 2005; 
Patten, 1991; Reverte, 2009). Industrial sectors, such as oil and gas, basic materials (mining, 
forestry and paper, industrial metals and chemicals), industrials (construction and materials), and 
utilities (electricity, gas and water distribution), are classified as exhibiting high environmental 
sensitivity based on previous literature (e.g. Branco and Rodrigues, 2008; Patten, 1991; Reverte, 
2009). Other sectors are considered less environmentally sensitive. A dummy variable with 
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one/zero value is used to designate firms from these industries: one if a company operates in more 
sensitive industry and 0 if it is from less sensitive industries.  
(ii) Consumer proximity 
Similar with companies from industries with high environmental sensitivity, companies with high 
public visibility tend to disclose more CSR information than the others, due to the public pressure 
and attention they receive (Clarke and Gibson-Sweet, 1999; Wang et al., 2013). With increased 
visibility, companies might use CSRD as a technique to avoid pressures and criticisms from 
external parties (Patten, 1991). One of the characteristics that define a company’s level of public 
visibility is consumer proximity or consumer visibility (Roberts, 1992). According to Cowen et al. 
(1987), consumer-oriented firms are expected to demonstrate higher levels of CSR to improve 
sales and enhance corporate reputation. According to Branco and Rodrigues (2008), a company 
has higher public visibility when it operates in the industries that are closer to the general public. 
Empirical results of previous studies remain mixed with both significant and insignificant findings 
(see Lu and Abeysekera, 2014; Wang et al., 2013). In this study, consistent with previous literature 
(Lu and Abeysekera, 2014; Wang et al., 2013), consumer proximity is measured by dummy 
variables with the value of 1 if a company operates in industries with a high profile, and 0 if a 
company is from a low-profile industry. High-profile industries, following the classification of 
Branco and Rodrigues (2008), are consumer goods (personal and household goods), retailers, 
telecommunication services and banks. All other industries are classified as low-profile.  
The measurement and data source of all the variables considered in this study are presented in 
table 10. It is important to note that as the six countries have their own currency, all of the 
company’s financial figures were converted into a common currency, the US dollar, before 
applying the measurements.  
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Table 10: Measurement and data source of all the variables 
Variables Measurement Data source 
Dependent Variable 
CSRDI CSRD checklist includes 30 items. For each disclosed item, a value of 1 
is awarded and 0 otherwise. The CSRDI is calculated by the ratio of the 
number of disclosed items to the maximum number of relevant items a 
company may disclose.  
Annual reports 
Independent Variables – CG mechanisms 
BS The total number of inside and outside executive on board.  
In the case of two-tier boards, board size is calculated by the total 
number of both Board of Directors and Supervisory Board 
Annual reports 
IND Ratio of independent directors on board.  Annual reports 
FED Ratio of female directors on board. Annual reports 
DUAL 1 if the Chairman and CEO position are held by the same person, and 0 
otherwise 
Annual reports 
BLOC The percentage of ordinary shares held by large shareholders who have 
more than 5% ownership 
Annual reports and 
information on the 
stock exchanges  
COMT 1 if a company has CSR committee on board and 0 otherwise Annual reports 
Independent Variables – Institutional variables 
LEG 1 if a company from a country with common law origin and 0 if a 
company from a country with civil law origin 
Literature (Hope, 
2003; Kouwenberg et 
al., 2014; CIA, n.d.) 
MD 1 if a company from country with CSRD requirement in annual reports 
and 0 otherwise 
CSR legal framework 
(Chapter 3, section 
3.3.2.1) 
UA 1 if a company from country with high uncertainty avoidance (the 
country score is equal or higher than the mean score of 50) and 0 if a 
company from country with law uncertainty avoidance (the country 
score is lower than the mean score of 50) 
Hofstede (2005) 
MAS 1 if a company from country with high masculinity (the country score 
is equal or higher than the mean score of 50) and 0 if a company from 
country with low masculinity (the country score is lower than the mean 
score of 50) 
Hofstede (2005) 
GRI 1 if a company follows GRI reporting standard and 0 otherwise  GRI’s website and 
annual reports 
CSRA 1 if a company is member of the associations promoting CSR at 
national level (Appendix 3), and 0 otherwise 
The associations’ 
websites  
Control Variables 
FSIZE Natural log of total assets Annual reports  
LEV Ratio of total debt to total assets Annual reports 
PROF Ratio of net income to total assets  Annual reports  
AGE The number of years from establishing to 2013 Annual reports and 
companies’ websites 
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Continuation table 10 
Variable Measurement Data source 
BIG4 1 if a company was audited by one of the Big 4 auditing firms 
(including Deloitte, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst & Young, and 
KPMG), and 0 otherwise 
Annual reports 
ES 1 if a company operates in high sensitive industry and 0 otherwise Annual reports 
CP 1 if a company operates in highly visible industry to consumers, and 0 
otherwise  
Annual reports  
 
Notes: CSRDI denotes CSRD index; BS denotes board size; IND denotes board independence; FED denotes board gender diversity; 
DUAL denotes CEO duality; COMT denotes CSR committee; BLOC denotes block ownership; LEG denotes legal origin; MD 
denotes mandatory disclosure; UA denotes uncertainty avoidance dimension; MAS denotes masculinity dimension; GRI denotes 
the adoption of GRI standard; CSRA denotes the membership of CSR-related associations; FSIZE denotes firm size; LEV denotes 
leverage; PROF denotes profitability; AGE denotes firm age; BIG4 denotes audit firm size; CP denotes consumer proximity; ES 
denotes environmental sensitivity. 
4.7 Data Analysis  
In this section, the choice of statistical techniques used in the study is presented and justified based 
on the nature of the research questions, the type of data and previous literature. All of the research 
questions therefore are reviewed as follows:  
Research question 1: To what extent do companies in each of the six countries disclose their CSR 
information in annual reports and what type of category is the most disclosed? 
Research question 2: What are the differences, if any, among the levels of CSRD across the six 
countries? 
Both research questions focus on the extent of CSRD in firms across the six Southeast Asian 
countries. The answers for the research question 1 are based entirely on the descriptive statistics 
about the extent of CSRD in each of the countries as well as the disclosure levels across the four 
categories (ED, HRD, PCD and CD). For the research question 2, as the main purpose of this 
question is to identify whether there are any significant differences among the levels of CSRD 
across the countries. ANOVA, one of the statistical models in analysis of variance is used. This 
technique is selected because it allows differences in means across several groups on a metric 
variables, in this case is CSRD, to be examined (Hair et al., 2003). As a result, ANOVA has been 
used in comparative studies in CSRD area (see Adams et al., 1998; de Villiers and van Staden, 
2010; Saida, 2009; Xiao, Gao, Heravi and Cheung, 2005). The equal numbers of observations in 
each country provide a good condition to apply ANOVA analysis. Other assumptions of ANOVA 
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will be examined more detail in Chapter 6. There are two variables used for ANOVA analysis, 
country of origin as categorical independent variable and CSRDI as the dependent variable. The 
independent variable was recorded to groups based on the country of origin. One-way ANOVA 
will identify whether there are significant differences in the mean scores of the dependent variable, 
CSRDI. Post-hoc tests are followed to identify where the differences lie. The test will help to 
answer the question whether there are differences between the levels of CSRD among the six 
countries in Southeast Asia region.  
Research questions 3: What are the important CG determinants of CSRD; and to what extent do 
these CG practices influence the level of CSRD in the six countries? 
The first part of the research question 3 has been answered in the literature review chapter 3, 
section 3.3.1 in which relevant CG factors were identified based on the context of study, existing 
literature and theoretical framework. The second part of the research question seeks to examine 
the relationship between these CG practices and CSRD. In order to identify the relationship 
between diverse CG mechanisms and CSRD, multiple regression is considered an appropriate 
technique as one of the major uses for multiple regression is causal analysis which aims to 
determine whether an independent variable influences the dependent variable as well as calculating 
the extent of that effect (Allison, 1999). When applying this to the research question, the impact 
of individual CG practice on CSRD can be identified to test the established hypotheses.  
Furthremore, multiple regression, particularly the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method, has been 
intensively used in the literature to examine the impact of diverse factors on CSRD (see Anas et 
al., 2015; El-Halaby and Hussainey, 2015; Farook and Lanis, 2007; Hoang, Abeysekera and Ma, 
2016; Khan et al., 2013a; Lone et al., 2016). Therefore, following the existing literature, this study 
uses the OLS method in which the dependent variable (CSRDI) is regressed on the independent 
variables (CG practices) and the control variables. The regression model (1) is presented as 
follows: 
(1)  CSRDIi = β0 + β1 BSi + β2 INDi + β3 FEDi + β4 DUALi + β5 BLOCi  
+ β6 COMTi + ∑ βi CONTSi + εi  
Notes: CSRDI denotes the CSRD index; BS denotes board size; IND denotes the percentage of independent directors; 
FED denotes the percentage of female directors on board; DUAL denotes CEO duality practices; BLOC denotes the 
percentage of block owner; CONTS denotes control variables for firm size (FSIZE), leverage (LEV), profitability 
(PROF), firm age (AGE), audit firm size (BIG4), environmental sensitivity (ES) and consumer proximity (CP). 
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Research question 4: What are important institutional determinants of CSRD; and to what extent 
do these institutional factors influence the level of CSRD in the examined countries? 
The structure of this research question is alike with the previous one. The first part of the research 
question has been answered in section 3.3.2 of chapter 3 in which relevant institutional factors 
were identified based on previous literature, institutional theory and the Scott’s institutional 
framework (1995). In the second half of this research question, similar with the previous one, the 
main purpose of this part is to examine the effect of various independent variables (institutional 
factors) on the dependent variable (CSRD). With the same argument, the OLS method is the most 
appropriate statistical technique. Consequently, in order to identify the relationship between the 
institutional factors and CSRD, the regression model (2) is established as follows, in which CSRDI 
is regressed on the independent variables (institutional variables) and the control variables: 
(2) CSRDIi = β0 + β1 LEGi + β2 MDi + β3 UAi + β4 MASi + β5 GRIi  
+ β6 CSRAi + ∑ βi CONTSi+ εi  
Notes: CSRDI denotes the CSRD index; LEG denotes legal origin; MD denotes mandatory disclosure; UA denotes 
uncertainty avoidance; MAS denotes masculinity; GRI denotes GRI standard; CSRA denotes CSR-related 
associations; CONTS denotes control variables for firm size (FSIZE) ), leverage (LEV), profitability (PROF), firm 
age (AGE), audit firm size (BIG4), environmental sensitivity (ES) and consumer proximity (CP). 
4.8 Chapter Summary  
 
Through this chapter, the researcher’s methodological perspectives have been discussed and has 
led to the choice of a quantitative approach as research strategy and content analysis as the data 
collection method. The selection of research approach and data collection method has been clearly 
justified based on the philosophical perception and the nature of the research questions. 
Furthermore, the detailed development of coding instruments and coding procedure provides a 
sturdy foundation for the reliability and validity of the chosen data collection process. 
Additionally, the measurements of all the independent and control variables are presented. The 
chapter concludes with a series of different statistical techniques used for data in relation to the 
research questions. The details of data analysis and the use of these techniques will be addressed 
in the following chapters.   
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CHAPTER 5: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
5.1 Overview 
The main purpose of Chapter Five is to provide a summary of descriptive statistics on the 
dependent variable (CSRDI), the independent variables (CG variables and institutional variables) 
and the control variables. The chapter therefore is divided into three main sub-sections 
corresponding to the three types of variables. In the first sub-section 5.5.1, the descriptive statistics 
of the dependent variables, CSRDI, will be presented based on three levels, country level, industry 
level and category level. In each of the levels, the statistics will be discussed in relation to previous 
studies as well as the study context. The next sub-section 5.5.2 summarises the descriptive statistics 
of all the independent variables. The sub-section is divided into smaller sections in which the 
statistics of internal determinants (CG variables) and external determinants (institutional factors) 
are presented and discussed separately. Finally, the descriptive statistics of all the control variables 
in the study is mentioned in the sub-section 5.5.3. The chapter then concludes with a short 
summary.  
5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
5.2.1 The Dependent Variable - CSRDI 
The descriptive statistics of CSRDI will be examined across the three levels, country level, 
industry level, and categories level. The figure 3 demonstrates the levels of analysis. The statistical 
results of CSRDI across the six countries are presented in Panel A of the table 11. In total, there 
are 166 out of 171 companies (97.076%) demonstrating CSRD with at least one item being 
disclosed. This percentage is higher compared to some previous studies conducted in Southeast 
Asia region (see Chapple and Moon, 2005; Gunawan and Hermawan, 2012). The high percentage 
of companies disclosing this information signifies the increasing awareness of CSR in Southeast 
Asian countries. Despite the high percentage of firms reporting CSR information, the quantity of 
information is low. Regarding CSRDI, the average disclosure level is 0.440 (44%), which is less 
than half of the items that companies should disclose. The average number of items disclosed in 
the sample is 12.54 with the maximum value of 24 and the minimum of 0. Although the average 
disclosure index is not high, it has been an improvement when compared with previous CSRD 
studies using similar measurements in the context of Southeast Asia (see Haji, 2013; Siregar and 
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Bachtiar, 2010). The low level of CSRD in the six Southeast Asian countries corresponds to the 
context of CSR development in these countries. As discussed in Chapter Three, section 3.3.2, 
despite the presence of necessary legislation framework for CSR development, with the weak 
enforcement mechanisms, the prominent level of corruption, it is difficult for these regulations to 
be carried out effectively. Additionally, businesses in the region still perceive CSR as a cost, and 
together with the low awareness as well as limited consumer activism, the incentives for 
corporations to engage in CSR is not strong. Aligned with the lack of participation in CSR from 
businesses, it is not surprising that CSRD level is low in these countries. CSRD levels across the 
six countries indicate that Thailand (0.554) has the highest mean value of CSRDI, followed by 
Indonesia (0.552), Malaysia (0.459), Singapore (0.427), Philippines (0.326) and lastly Vietnam 
(0.302). In comparison with Chapple and Moon’s (2005) research, in which five out of the six 
countries in this study, except for Vietnam, were examined, Thailand had the highest ranking in 
terms of CSRD, followed by Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines and Indonesia. Within this study, 
the position of Indonesia in the ranking has altered significantly from position found in Chapple 
and Moon’s research (2005) and now sits in second position. Aside from the case of Indonesia, the 
rankings of other countries indicate minor change. Details about the extent of CSRD in each of the 
countries will be discussed in the following sub-sections.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Analysis levels of CSRD 
 
Indonesia 
Industry level 
CSRDI Country level Category level 
Philippines 
Malaysia 
Singapore 
Thailand 
Vietnam 
EDI 
PCDI 
HRDI 
CDI 
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Table 11: CSRDI statistics across the six countries 
 All Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam 
Panel A: CSR Disclosure Index (CSRDI) 
Mean 0.440 0.552 0.459 0.326 0.427 0.554 0.302 
Median 0.467 0.575 0.500 0.267 0.433 0.592 0.267 
STD 0.204 0.162 0.155 0.208 0.167 0.192 0.194 
Minimum 0.000 0.267 0.167 0.033 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 0.917 0.875 0.750 0.800 0.700 0.917 0.792 
% of disclosing companies 97.1 100 100 100 92.3 96.7 93.1 
Panel B: Environmental Disclosure Index (EDI) 
Mean 0.392 0.448 0.433 0.323 0.415 0.514 0.213 
Median 0.364 0.455 0.455 0.273 0.454 0.591 0.090 
STD 0.267 0.232 0.240 0.266 0.216 0.262 0.288 
Minimum 0.000 0.091 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 1.167 1.000 1.000 0.909 1.000 1.167 1.000 
% of disclosing companies 86 100 93.1 85.2 92.3 90 55.2 
Panel C: HR Disclosure Index (HRDI) 
Mean 0.498 0.659 0.475 0.288 0.530 0.622 0.391 
Median 0.556 0.722 0.444 0.222 0.556 0.667 0.333 
STD 0.273 0.228 0.210 0.304 0.258 0.210 0.253 
Minimum 0.000 0.222 0.111 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 1.000 1.000 0.889 0.889 1.000 0.889 0.889 
% of disclosing companies 91.2 100 100 70.4 92.3 93.3 89.7 
Panel D: Products and Consumers Disclosure Index (PCDI) 
Mean 0.286 0.370 0.284 0.187 0.165 0.527 0.153 
Median 0.200 0.400 0.250 0.200 0.000 0.600 0.000 
STD 0.263 0.265 0.197 0.222 0.227 0.253 0.196 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 1.000 1.000 0.750 0.800 0.800 1.000 0.600 
% of disclosing companies 66.7 80 82.8 51.9 46.2 90 44.8 
Panel E: Community-involvement Disclosure Index (CDI) 
Mean 0.581 0.760 0.648 0.548 0.538 0.553 0.428 
Median 0.600 0.800 0.800 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.400 
STD 0.280 0.177 0.254 0.246 0.245 0.363 0.255 
Minimum 0.000 0.400 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.800 
% of disclosing companies 91.8 100 96.6 96.3 92.3 83.3 82.3 
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5.2.1.1 Country level 
(i) Indonesia 
Indonesia has the second highest average value of CSRDI (0.552) after Thailand. The descriptive 
finding of CSRDI in this study also shows a significant improvement on a previous study of Siregar 
and Bachtiar (2010) conducted on 2003 annual reports of 87 companies, with the mean CSRDI 
value of 0.137. The result of CSRDI in this study is also found comparable with the findings of 
Tan et al. (2016). In their study, the minimum and maximum values of CSRDI, based on the 
examination of CSRD in 2012/2013 annual reports of 53 listed companies, were 0.139 and 0.709 
respectively. These values are slightly higher (0.267 and 0.875 respectively) in this study, 
however, could be explained by the choice of large companies as subjects of the study. The high 
level of CSRD recorded in this study could also be the result of the sample choice, as according to 
Herrera et al. (2011), large corporations are the main CSR practitioners in Indonesia.  
Among the sub-indices, the highest disclosure index is CDI (0.760), followed by HRDI (0.659), 
EDI (0.448), and finally, PCDI (0.370) (table 11). This finding supports the result of Djajadikenta 
and Trireksani’s (2012) investigation into the 2008 annual reports of listed Indonesian firms, that 
CD is the most disclosed category, followed by HRD. In addition, the study of Gunawan and 
Hermawan (2013) concluded that HRD and CD are the most disclosed themes in Indonesia. The 
finding also provides evidence for the claims made in contemporary studies that Indonesian 
companies pay more attention to human welfare, including both employees and community 
(Djajadikerta and Trireksani, 2012; Gunawan et al., 2009) with the purpose of gaining societal 
recognition, in addition to most firms involvement in philanthropy rather than integrating CSR 
initiatives into business strategy (Herrera et al., 2011). Furthermore, the high level of CD in 
Indonesia could be attributed to the attention of firms in community-related activities. Due to the 
high degree of poverty in Indonesia, CSR activities under the form of community involvement is 
considered an effective and convenient way to help poor people and at the same time appear 
legitimate to society (Nugroho, Tanaya, Widiyanti and Permana, 2010). Specifically, based on the 
table 12, in Indonesia, the sub-categories of CD, such as ‘support for education’, ‘charitable 
donations and activities’, and ‘support for public health’ are among the most highly disclosed 
items. Indonesian firms particularly pay extensive attention to education with all of the firms 
disclosing activities in the ‘support for education’ sub-section. The strong focus on education 
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found in this study is aligned with the study of Famiola and Adiwoso (2016) in which subsidiaries 
of MNCs in Indonesia were reported to be actively engaged and interested in educating community 
as a result of Indonesian context. In Indonesia, majority of people in rural areas are living in 
poverty with limited access to education, knowledge and information, therefore, such education-
related programmes would be beneficial to community well-being (Famiola and Adiwoso, 2016). 
Other highly disclosed items include ‘prevention or repair of environmental damage’, ‘employee 
training’, and ‘employee profiles’. These findings are relatively consistent with the common 
implemented CSR activities reported in a previous study of Sugino et al. (2015).  
(i)  Malaysia 
The CSRDI in Malaysia is the third-highest (0.459), after Thailand and Indonesia. The statistic 
shows that on average, Malaysian companies disclose less than half of the CSRD checklist. The 
finding reflects the conclusion of previous studies (Said et al., 2009) that Malaysia has a generally 
low disclosure index, however, compared with findings from the study of Haji (2013), CSRD 
practice in Malaysian firms also demonstrate some improvements. Particularly, in his study, Haji 
(2013) implemented similar content analysis method to examine the level of CSRD in 2006 and 
2009 annual reports of 85 companies. The mean values of CSRDI (18.06% in 2006 and 31.71% in 
2009) between the two years showed significant improvement in only three years. With the mean 
value of 0.459 (or 45.9%) found in this study, it could be concluded that the extent of CSRD in 
Malaysian firms have been consistently increasing.  The differences in findings between this study 
and the study of Haji (2013) could also be explained by changes in institutional environment 
related to CSR development in Malaysia after 2006. Particularly, from 2006, the stock exchange 
of Malaysia, Bursa Malaysia, started to impose mandatory CSRD on all listed firms and released 
the CSR Framework for voluntary reporting. Furthermore, diverse tax incentives and exemption 
as well as different CSR awards could possibly contribute to the development of CSR and CSRD 
in Malaysia. 
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Table 12: Descriptive statistics of CSRD sub-categories  
Disclosure categories and sub-categories % of companies disclosed 
Indonesia 
(N=30) 
Malaysia 
(N=29) 
Philippines 
(N=27) 
Singapore 
(N=26) 
Thailand 
(N=30) 
Vietnam 
(N=29) 
Total 
(N=171) 
Environment Disclosure        
Environmental policies or expression of environmental 
concerns  
83.3 79.3 40.7 84.6 80 37.9 67.8 
Environmental management systems and audit 56.7 34.5 29.6 38.5 53.3 24.1 39.8 
Pollution from business conduct 6.7 24.1 18.5 26.9 20 6.9 17 
Pollution created from the use of company’s products 0 0 3.7 0 0 0 0.6 
Prevention or repair of environmental damage  93.3 86.2 66.7 73.1 90 37.9 74.6 
Natural resources conservation and recycling 73.3 72.4 59.3 84.6 83.3 31 67.3 
Sustainability issues 20 24.1 18.5 23.1 40 6.9 22.2 
Environmental aesthetics 23.3 31.0 25.9 7.7 33.3 20.7 24.0 
Energy conservation  50 55.2 40.7 69.2 83.3 24.1 53.8 
Energy efficiency of products 10 0.0 11.1 3.8 10.0 3.4 6.4 
Discussion of environmental laws and regulations 23.3 3.4 7.4 3.8 6.7 6.9 8.8 
Human Resources Disclosure         
Employee Health and Safety 83.3 79.3 44.4 73.1 86.7 41.4 68.4 
Employment of minorities or women 53.3 48.3 22.2 42.3 53.3 31 48 
Employee profile 90 31 29.6 30.8 60 44.8 48.5 
Employment remuneration 53.3 20.7 22.2 53.8 83.3 51.7 48 
Employee share ownership schemes 33.3 37.9 29.6 57.7 23.3 10.3 31.6 
Employee assistance/ benefits 83.3 93.1 29.6 84.6 86.7 55.2 72.5 
Employee training 96.7 89.7 40.7 84.6 86.7 69 78.4 
Employee morale 30 17.2 14.8 11.5 53.3 20.7 25.1 
Industrial relations 66.7 17.2 22.2 34.6 30 24.1 32.7 
 
Products and Consumer Disclosure 
       
Product safety 36.7 20.7 29.6 7.7 33.3 13.8 24 
Product quality 53.3 51.7 25.9 15.4 80 34.5 44.4 
Consumer safety practices 23.3 13.8 7.4 19.2 60 0 21.1 
Consumer complaints/satisfaction 60 41.4 22.2 23.1 70 17.2 39.8 
Provision for disabled, aged, and difficult-to-reach 
consumers 
3.3 10.3 7.4 11.5 3.3 6.9 7 
 
Community involvement Disclosure 
       
Charitable donations and activities 93.3 93.1 88.9 92.3 63.3 79.3 84.8 
Support for education 100 93.1 85.2 88.5 86.7 62.1 86 
Support for the arts and culture 70 48.3 29.6 46.2 53.3 24.1 45.6 
Support for public health 93.3 34.5 59.3 23.1 46.7 37.9 49.7 
Sponsoring sporting or recreational projects 23.3 55.2 11.1 19.2 26.7 10.3 24.6 
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Across the four categories, CD (0.648) is the theme with the highest disclosure value, following by 
HRD (0.475), ED (0.433) and PCD (0.284). In terms of average percentage of companies disclosed, 
more firms disclosed HR information than community information. This result contradicts findings 
with some studies in the literature. For instance, rather than CD, the product disclosure theme was 
reported to be one of the most disclosed themes, together with HRD (Hamid, 2004; Said et al., 2009; 
Thompson and Zakaria, 2004). The result is, however, consistent with the conclusion in the 
UNICEF’s report (2013) that CSR practices in Malaysia is still overly focus on philanthropy. 
Particularly, in this study, the sub-categories ‘charitable donations and activities’ and ‘support for 
education’ are the two items with the highest percentage of disclosing companies (Table 12). The 
concentration of Malaysian firms on community-involvement activities in general and donations in 
particular could be the result of the government’s tax incentive and exemption schemes in which 
Malaysian companies can receive tax exemptions for certain charitable and community projects as 
well as donations towards registered organisations, including foundations, associations or trusts (Lu, 
2013). Moreover, the attention of Malaysian firms on CD category can be explained by the 
introduction of diverse government’s policies and programmes, such as ‘Caring society policy’, 
‘Vision 2020’ (Zain and Janggu, 2006) and most recently the National Mission based on the Nineth 
Malaysian Plan (2006-2010), that demonstrate the government’s belief in reducing poverty and 
generating more balanced benefits of growth for all Malaysian people (Rahman et al., 2011). As a 
result, by disclosing more information in CD-related subcategories, firms can establish an image of 
good corporate citizen that follow the government policies and response to the need of wider public 
(Rahman et al., 2011). Other popular disclosed items among firms are ‘Employee 
assistance/benefits’ and ‘Employee training’ of HRD. The findings, therefore, corresponds to the 
conclusion of Hamayoun, Rahman, Johansson and Malmstron (2012) that employees’ training and 
community-related activities, such as donations or sponsor to charitable bodies, are popular topics 
in CSR reporting in Malaysia.  
Additionally, the result also demonstrates limited attention to ED. For instance, in some ED sub-
categories, such as ‘pollution arising from the use of company’s products’ and ‘energy efficiency of 
products’, there were no companies that disclosed these items in their annual reports. The finding, 
therefore, is aligned with multiple studies in the literature stating that ED has always been one of 
the least disclosed themes amongst Malaysian firms (Hamid, 2004; Gunawan and Hermawan, 2013; 
Ahmad and Haraf, 2013; Said et al., 2009; Saleh et al., 2010; Sumiani, Haslinda and Lehman, 2007; 
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Thompson and Zakaria, 2004). The low level of ED is likely a result of disclosure being voluntary 
(Malan, 2013). Even though disclosure practices in Malaysia is reasonably low, the percentage of 
companies disclosing any form of social information is encouraging. All 29 companies in the 
Malaysian sample (100%) disclosed at least one CSRD item. It is a significant improvement from 
the studies of Said et al. (2009) and Thompson and Zakaria (2004), where the number of companies 
is much lower, 81.3% and 90% respectively. However, the difference could also be the result of 
sampling choice.  
(ii) Philippines 
Philippines has significantly lower CSRDI (0.326) compared most countries investigated in this 
study. The extent of CSRD in Philippines is only higher than Vietnam. This result is consistent with 
the previous study of Chapple and Moon (2005) in which the Philippines was ranked after Thailand, 
Malaysia and Singapore in terms of disclosure. Despite having diverse laws and regulations related 
to CSR and CSRD, the level of CSR and CSRD engagement in Philippines is still low due to the 
inability of the state to enforce these laws (Sharma, 2013). Therefore, it is unsurprising that the CSR 
practices in Philippines are still at a minimal level. The finding, hence, is aligned with previous 
studies (see Chapple and Moon, 2005; Lorenzo-Molo, 2009) that CSR is not yet substantial in 
Philippines and has only focused on the ‘front stage’ as a branding strategy and a crisis shield.  
The main concern of CSR in the Philippines has been clearly reflected through the disclosure indexes 
between the categories. Among all the four categories, CD (0.548) is the most popular theme, 
following by ED (0.323), HRD (0.288) and finally PCD (0.187). In terms of the number of 
companies disclosing information, CD (96.296%) has the highest rate, following by ED (85.185%), 
HRD (70.370%) and PCD (51.852%). This finding is, therefore, consistent with the arguments that 
strategic philanthropy is embedded in practices of Filipino firms while other aspects of CSR have 
been neglected (Sharma, 2013). According to Rebolledo and Nugid-Anden (2003), CSR practice in 
the country retains a focus on philanthropy, more specifically education. This observation is further 
confirmed in this study with ‘charitable donations and activities’ and ‘support for education’ being 
the two most frequently disclosed items among Filipino firms. The overly focus of Filipino firms on 
community-involment activities could also be a result of the government’s tax incentives 
demonstrated through diverse laws and regutions, such as the Adopt-a-School Act, the Exception 
for Donor’s tax, etc., as mentioned in Chapter Three, table 7.  
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(iii) Singapore 
Contrary to expectation formed based on Singapore being the singular developed economy in the 
sample, the country has relatively low level of CSRD, with most companies disclosing less than half 
of the items (Mean=0.427). The percentage of companies disclosing some sort of CSR information, 
however, is still high with 92.308 %. Although Singapore was expected to demonstrate high levels 
of CSRD, the low CSRDI among Singaporean firms is understandable, considering the country’s 
CSR development context discussed in Chapter 3. According to previous studies and reports (see 
Chapple and Moon, 2005; Sharma, 2013), CSR development in Singapore has proven to fall short 
compared to countries in the same level of economic development. The reasons for this shortcoming 
could be attributed to the heavy investment of the government to society that reduces the necessities 
and motivations for corporations to get involved (Lee et al., 2012; Ramasamy and Ting, 2004), or 
indeed the comprehensive set of regulations in areas such as labour rights, environment protection 
and consumer protection that has made CSR become a compliance issue rather than a model of doing 
business in Singapore (Tan, 2013; Thomas, 2010). Even though the level of disclosure is not high 
in Singapore, the number of companies disclosing CSRD (92.308%) has dramatically improved, 
especially considering only 38% of companies disclosed CSRD in the study of Chapple and Moon 
(2005). 
Between the categories, similar with some of the other countries, CD (0.538) has the highest 
disclosure index, followed by HRD (0.530), ED (0.415) and PCD (0.165), in which the PCD 
category has a significantly lower disclosure index compared with other categories. The statistics 
are, therefore, consistent with the conclusions of previous studies (see Chapple and Moon, 2005; 
Tsang, 1998), that HRD and CD are the two categories with highest coverage in Singapore firms. 
As with some of other countries in this study, HR is one of the popular themes. Due to the limited 
human resources in the country, the Singaporean government pays more attention to improving 
support for its people (Gunawan and Hermawan, 2013). In order to attract investment into the 
country, the Singaporean government has focused on nurturing its workforce through promoting 
better working environments (Purushothaman et al., 2000). As a result, aligned with the 
government’s orientation, corporations disclose HR information to demonstrate their effort in 
development and satisfaction of the workforce (Andrew et al., 1989). Consequently, among all the 
sub-categories of HRD in this study, ‘employee assistance/benefits’ and ‘employee training’ are the 
ones with the highest number of disclosing companies. The other widely disclosed items among 
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Singaporean firms are ‘charitable donations and activities’, ‘support for education’, ‘environmental 
policies or expression of environmental concerns’, ‘employee training’ and ‘employee assistance 
and benefits’.  
(iv) Thailand 
The findings of this study show that among the six Southeast Asian countries, Thailand has the 
highest CSRDI (0.554), which mean on average the firms disclosed more than half of the items in 
the checklist. The finding supports the previous result of Chapple and Moon (2005) in which 
Thailand was one of the countries with high disclosure rates. According to the study of 
Ratanajongkol et al. (2006), after the economic crisis in 1997, corporate governance practices have 
been promoted amongst Thai companies. By the end of 1997, all listed companies in Thailand were 
required to have an audit committee. Diverse topics in governance and non-financial disclosure was 
also addressed through a variety of newspaper articles, talk shows and conferences by Institute of 
Internal Auditors of Thailand to raise awareness of good practices (Ratanajongkol et al., 2006). The 
study concluded that the practice of social disclosure in Thailand has steadily increased, as a method 
of achieving legitimacy of Thai companies. One of the key motivations for Thai firms publishing 
more CSR information are the Principles of good corporate governance 2002, in which listed 
companies are required to demonstrate the fifteen principles of good corporate governance in their 
annual reports (Malan, 2013). Several factors, such as the foundation of CSR Institute in 2007, the 
release of new Product Responsibility Law in 2009, the introduction of several CSR awards, and the 
involvement of the Royal Foundation, as mentioned in Chapter 3, section 3.3.2.1, have contributed 
to the continued development of CSRD in Thailand. The percentage of companies disclosed some 
form of CSR information is also high (96.667%) compared to a previous study of Ratanajongkol et 
al. (2006), in which the percentage of firms disclosed at least 1 item of CSRD is 75%.  
In relation to other countries in the region, there are less differences between the sub-indices of 
CSRD. Among the four indexes, HRDI is highest disclosure index (0.622), following by CDI 
(0.553), PCDI (0.527) and finally EDI (0.514). The result is relatively consistent with the current 
findings that HRD and CD are the two dominant themes in Thai firms’ CSRD (Gunawan and 
Hermawan, 2013; Kuasirikun and Sherer, 2004; Ratanajoingkol et al., 2006), while ‘environment’ 
and ‘products’ themes have decreased over the years (Ratanajoingkol et al., 2006). According to 
Kuasirikun and Sherer (2004), Thai firms are particularly concerned about improving employee 
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capabilities through training together with the intention to promote employee well-being and their 
mutual interest. This observation also reflects in this study with the three sub-categories ‘employee 
health and safety’, ‘employee training’ and ‘employee assistance/benefits’ being among the most 
frequently disclosed items. Regarding to the percentage of companies disclosing each of the 
categories, even though CD has the second highest disclosure, the percentage of companies reporting 
information related to community activities (83.333%) is lower than the other categories, showing 
that even though companies disclosed more community-supporting information, addressing the 
interests of other stakeholders, such as environment, employees and consumers, is more important 
to Thai firms than community interests. Additionally, compared with the other countries, the PCDI 
of Thailand is much higher, which possibly corresponds to the release of the Product Responsibility 
Law in 2009. Some other most frequently disclosed CSRD items among Thai firms include 
‘prevention or repair of environmental damage’, ‘natural resources conservation and recycling’, 
‘energy conservation in operations’ and ‘support for education’. The popularity of these items in 
CSRD among Thai firms could be the result of Thai government’s tax reduction policy in which 
firms with energy saving technology or having donation to charities can receive tax reductions.  
(v) Vietnam 
Vietnam has the lowest CSRDI (0.302) among the six countries. The level of CSRD in Vietnam is 
very low, with only 30% of the items disclosed on average. This finding supports the conclusion of 
Binh (2016) and Nguyen et al. (2015), that CSRD is not popular amongst Vietnamese firms. Most 
companies pay more attention to reporting financial information and complying with mandatory 
requirements in Vietnamese accounting (Nguyen et al., 2015). Moreover, similar with the case of 
Philippines, the development of CSR-related in Vietnam is limited due to the weak law enforcement 
and corruption (Hamm, 2012). Despite these restrictions, however, with regards to the number of 
companies disclosing CSR information, the number is rather encouraging. Even though the level of 
disclosure remains low, more than 90% of the companies in this sample report some form of CSR 
information. The companies with higher CSRD might have used CSR to achieve financial benefits 
within the global context, as exporters are required to conform with environmental and social 
standards thus allowing them to export their products to developed countries (Nguyen et al., 2015). 
Similar with some other countries, CD and HRD have the highest disclosure indexes with the 
average values of 0.428 and 0.391 respectively. In contrast, PCD is the theme with the lowest index 
(0.153). The low PCDI could be related to the awareness of CSR among consumers in Vietnam. In 
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Vietnam, there is lack of national standards and requirements to protect consumers (Hieu, 2011). 
Consumers either do not have, or have limited knowledge about CSR, therefore, they do not realise 
the importance and benefits of CSR (Hieu, 2011). When purchasing, most consumers still pay more 
attention to price than elements of CSR. With low awareness amongst consumers and even investors, 
Vietnamese companies are not willing to disclose their CSR activities (Hieu, 2011), which also 
explains why consumers are not the key stakeholders for CSRD among Vietnamese firms. Although 
the percentage of companies disclosing at least one item of CSRD in Vietnam is very high (93.1%), 
majority of companies only focus on HRD and CD with the percentages of 89.7% and 82.8% 
respectively, which demonstrating higher attention of Vietnamese firms on employees and 
community than other stakeholders. The two most disclosed sub-categories among Vietnamese 
firms are ‘charitable donations and activities’, and ‘employee training’.  
5.2.1.2 Industry level 
The classification of industry sectors is based on the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) 
developed and maintained by FTSE. Apart from the industries listed in the ICB, conglomerates are 
added to the list to present the group of companies involved in several industries. The sample 
includes a diverse range of companies from various industries, with a high number of companies 
from industrial, financial, conglomerate and consumer goods sectors. The table 13 of disclosure 
classified according to industries is presented in ascending order of CSRDI, with basic materials at 
the top and conglomerates at the bottom. 
The group of companies operating in basic materials, oil and gas industries features one of the 
highest disclosures in CSR with the CD as the most popular theme, followed by HRD, ED and 
finally PCD. Even though the result is slightly different from a recent study of Dong and Burritt 
(2010) stating that companies in extractive sectors pay more attention to human resources and 
environment, and less to community and consumers. Despite this, however, both results highlighted 
the dominance of HRD. According to Rizk et al. (2008), HR information is essential to firms 
operating in industries where health and safety practices are considerable concerns. Therefore, the 
high level of HRD in these industries is reasonable, as the majority of companies in this group are 
from oil and gas exploration and production, chemicals or mining sectors. The difference between 
this study and Rizk et al.’s study (2008) is the ED. Although ED in this study is not the highest 
score, the level of ED is still significantly higher than in other industries. In relation with other 
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industries, firms from basic materials, oil and gas industries published more information about their 
environmental performance. The high ED from these firms is due to the nature of their business 
operating in a sensitive area from a social aspect (Adam et al., 1998). Companies in this group are 
likely to provide more disclosure to mitigate their effect on environment and society (Branco and 
Rodgues, 2008). Among the four categories, CD has the highest disclosure score between the 
categories, which is supported by Perez and Sanchez (2009). According to these authors, the visible 
effect of these industries on communities is the reason for high results in social performance.  
Asides basic materials, oil and gas industries, the health care industry makes for a surprising result 
with the second highest level of CSRD. This finding might be the result of the way CSRDI was 
calculated to avoid penalising companies and the low number of health-care firms in the sample. 
Although the result is surprising, the categories’ scores are expected. In the health-care industry, 
PCD has the highest disclosure, following by HRD. The ED and CD have the same level of 
disclosure and are the lowest ones. Companies from health-care industry have a significantly higher 
PCD compared to other industries. Due to the nature of health-care business, with major decisions 
related to consumers’ well-being, health-care firms disclosed a lot of information to assure their 
consumers that they have high quality services and safety practices. Besides PCD, this industry also 
has the highest HRD. Like consumers, employees are important to health care firms. Human 
resources are the most important out of the three principles of health-care inputs (Kabene, Orchard, 
Howard, Soriano and Leduc, 2006), where nearly all countries are challenged by issues related to 
human resources (Bartlett, 2001). Consequently, supporting the development and welfare of human 
resources would bring certain benefits for companies, such as improving organizational 
commitment, or increasing staffs’ motivation (see Bartlett, 2001; Mathauer and Imhoff, 2006). 
The services group in this sample includes financial, telecommunications, technology, and consumer 
services industries. The common characteristic in disclosure practices of these industries is the 
dominance of CD and HRD. The finding receives support from previous studies (Akinpelu et al., 
2013; Ratanajongkol et al., 2006), with the explanation that these companies are highly visible to 
final consumers and hence more likely to report community-involvement activities (Clarke and 
Sweet, 1999). ED is the one of the lowest themes in this group due to the industries’ relatively 
limited impact on the environment (Hamid, 2004), as well as low pressure from society (Akinpelu, 
Ogunbi, Olaniran and Ogunseye, 2013). Similar with ED, PCD is not high for services industries as 
the industries have no tangible products (Akinpelu et al., 2003). 
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Table 13: CSRD across industries 
ICB SECTOR NUMBER OF 
COMPANIES 
CSRDI ED HRD PCD CD 
Basic materials 10 0.577 0.555 0.589 0.400 0.780 
Health care 3 0.533 0.467 0.593 0.667 0.467 
Oil and gas 7 0.519 0.519 0.524 0.286 0.743 
Financials 31 0.503 0.462 0.584 0.282 0.581 
Telecommunications 11 0.473 0.397 0.566 0.455 0.491 
Technology 1 0.467 0.364 0.556 0.400 0.600 
Consumer services 15 0.424 0.346 0.489 0.307 0.640 
Industrials 44 0.423 0.390 0.482 0.232 0.582 
Utilities 10 0.413 0.345 0.556 0.220 0.500 
Consumer goods 18 0.413 0.359 0.426 0.344 0.578 
Conglomerates 21 0.303 0.247 0.339 0.171 0.495 
 
The final group with low disclosure level includes industrial, utilities, consumer goods, and finally 
conglomerates. The low disclosure indexes of industrial and utilities may be due to the fact that these 
industries are not visible to final consumers, and are not as environmentally sensitive compared with 
the oil and gas industry. Therefore, companies from these sectors are less pressured to disclose CSR 
information. Surprisingly, however, the consumer goods industry has a really low disclosure index, 
considering their visibility to consumers. The finding, therefore, is different from the expectation 
that consumer-orientation companies tend to demonstrate CSR to the community for the purposes 
of maintaining image and increasing sales (Cowen et al., 1987). However, this result can be aligned 
with the study of Suttipun and Stanton (2012) in which the agricultural and food industry group was 
concluded to have the least disclosure, as the majority of firms in the consumer goods industry in 
the sample are in the food and beverage sector. The low level of disclosure in the consumer goods 
industry could be explained by the low awareness of CSR in the researched countries (see Binh, 
2016; Chapple and Moon, 2005; Nguyen et al., 2015; Ramasamy and Ting, 2004), which in turn 
reduce external pressure on firms to engage in CSR activities and disclose CSR ifnromation. Finally, 
the group of companies with lowest CSRD is conglomerates. There have been very few studies 
related to disclosure from conglomerates, therefore, this finding might enable or indicate an area for 
further research. With the nature of conglomerates as corporate groups, that is the combination of 
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two or more firms operating in different industries, conglomerates as a group may be less visible to 
final consumers than their subsidiaries. Furthermore, the case could be made that CSRD practice is 
delivered more effectively at the subsidiary level due to the differences between the operating 
industries. Table 13 presents the disclosure levels of companies across different industries. 
5.2.1.3 Category Level  
According to the descriptive results (table 11), among the four categories, CD and HRD have the 
highest percentage of companies disclosed with 91.813% and 91.228% respectively, followed by 
ED (85.965%), and PCD (66.667%) as the least disclosed theme. The results are relatively consistent 
with scholarly literature. Particularly Hackston and Milne’s (1996) view that human resources, 
environment and community themes are the most commonly disclosed categories across countries. 
In addition, in line with the study of Holder-Webb et al. (2009), community relations have the 
highest frequency. The high percentage of companies disclosing community-related activities is 
likely linked with the purpose of maintaining legitimacy with the society (Holder-Webb et al., 2009). 
The CD category also has the highest disclosure index value among the four categories. The finding 
is consistent with some previous studies (see Anas et al., 2015; Gray et al., 1995a; Jizi et al., 2014). 
Particularly, in the study of Anas et al. (2015) conducted in Malaysia, they concluded that 
community-involvement category is the category with highest level of disclosure and highest 
number of companies disclosing. The high disclosure in community involvement supports the 
argument of institutional theory that the main purpose for companies involving in CSR and CSRD 
is building or maintaining legitimacy. According to Holder-Webb et al. (2007), firms not only 
disclose community-involvement activities but also emphasise this information. Moreover, the high 
involvement in CD could be the result of tax deduction for charitable and community projects such 
as practised in Malaysia and Philippines. The two sub-categories, ‘support for education’ and 
‘charitable donations and activities’ are the most commonly disclosed items of the checklist as well 
as in the CD category. As a result, these findings, once again, confirm the argument of Sharma 
(2013) that the classic philanthropy model has been widely practiced in these countries. 
After CD, HRD has the second-highest disclosure index with the mean value of 0.498. HRD has 
consistently been one of the most focused elements in CSRD, if not the highest disclosure rate in 
some studies (Belal, 2001; Saleh et al., 2010). There are several reasons why companies disclose 
more information about human resources. According to Holder-Webb et al. (2009), by disclosing 
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information about employee health and safety practices, companies not only ensure the support from 
labour providers but also demonstrate their values to consumers. Moreover, labour policies and 
practices can bring economic advantage to the companies through the increase in employee 
performance (Mirfazli, 2008). The focus of human resource information in CSRD can also be 
attributed to the countries’ policies relating to employee welfare and the existence of a unionised 
labour force (Belal and Momin, 2009). As expected from previous studies (see Hewaidy, 2016; 
Olsson, 2001; Subbarao and Zeghal, 1997), ‘employee training’, ‘employee assistance/benefits’ and 
‘employee health and safety’ are the sub-categories disclosed by most of the companies in regards 
to HRD. Among the other items, ‘employee share purchase schemes’, ‘employee morale’, and 
‘industrial relations’ have the lowest number of disclosing companies.  
The mean value of EDI is relatively low (0.392) compared with CDI and HRDI. The lower level of 
ED has been reported in previous studies (Ahmad and Haraf, 2013; Sumiani et al., 2007; Thompson 
and Zakaria, 2004). Particularly, in two studies that examined the extent of environmental disclosure 
in Malaysian companies (Ahmad and Haraf, 2013; Sumiani et al., 2007), the results concluded that 
the ED is very low. According to Thompson and Zakaria (2004), only 16% out of 257 companies 
demonstrated some level of ED. Even though EDI is not as low in this study, the lower disclosure 
level compared to the other two categories (CDI and HRDI) is likely linked to the context of the 
chosen countries. Moreover, the level of ED is said to be subject to legitimacy threats on the 
companies or industrial sectors (de Villiers and van Staden, 2006), therefore, the reason for low EDI 
might also be related to the high number of companies from the banking and financial sectors (31 
companies). There is evidence within the literature which indicates that banks disclose more 
community activities rather than environmental information, as they provide services with minimal 
immediate environmental effects, therefore receiving less pressure from society to disclose 
environmental information (Akinpelu et al., 2013). Among the eleven sub-categories, the items with 
highest disclosure frequency are ‘prevention or repair of environmental damage’, ‘environmental 
policies or expression for environmental concerns’, and ‘natural resources conservation and 
recycling’, while the least disclosed items are ‘pollution arising from the use of company’s products’ 
and ‘energy efficiency of products’.  
The PCD theme received the least disclosure. Among the 171 companies in the sample, only 
66.667% of these mentioned information related to PCD. The average disclosure index in this theme 
is also relatively low (0.286) compared with other themes. The finding of PCD being the least 
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disclosed theme contradicts the result from Kilic’s study (2016) examining the level of CSRD in 
Turkey’s banking industry. The difference in results between the two studies can be attributed to the 
differences in sampling choice and study context. Firstly, as AlNaimi, Hossain and Momin (2012) 
mentioned in their study, different industries may have alternative focuses on disclosure. The 
majority of the companies in this study’s sample operate in the industrial or financial sector (table 
13). Notably, the nature of industrial sector is not highly visible to final consumers and the financial 
sector does not have tangible products. Consequently, with the high number of firms from these two 
sectors, it is not surprising that the level of PCD is low in this study. Furthermore, linked to the 
context of the study, Sharma (2013) argued that Southeast Asian countries have low CSR awareness 
and limited consumer activitism. Since one of the reasons that firms disclose CSR information is to 
respond to external pressures, such low awareness and consumer acitivism potentially reduces the 
pressure of consumers on firms and hence decreases firms’ motivations to disclose information in 
the PCD category.  The result of this study is aligned with previous studies conducted in Southeast 
Asian context, such as Anas et al. (2015), Darus et al. (2014), and Ratanajongkol et al. (2006), which 
provides support for this argument. Among the sub-categories of PCD, ‘product quality’ and 
‘consumer complaints and satisfaction’ are the most frequently reported items.  
5.2.2 Independent Variables 
5.2.2.1 Corporate Governance variables 
Table 14 presents descriptive statistics of corporate governance variables. The statistics demonstrate 
high variability regarding corporate governance (CG) practices in firms across the six countries. 
According to Ntim (2016), a large amount of variability indicates a sufficiently selected sample, 
which reduces the possibility of any serious bias. Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for board 
size. The average size is relatively large in these countries, with the mean score of 11 members on 
board. The values of board size range from a minimum value of 5 to a maximum of 19. Across the 
six countries, the two countries with the largest board size are Indonesia and Thailand. The average 
board size in these two countries exceeds 13 members. This descriptive finding is consistent with 
the conclusion that Thai firms tend to have larger boards in the corporate governance assessment of 
World Bank (2013). The large board size of Thai firms could be a result of its regulation (the Public 
Limited Companies Act), in which companies are required to have at least 5 directors on board. This 
requirement is higher than some of the other countries (i.e. Malaysia or Singapore). In the case of 
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Indonesia, the high number of board members could be attributed to the two-tier board system of 
firms. Firms from Singapore, Philippines and Vietnam are recorded to have relatively similar board 
size with the mean values of 10.385, 10.208 and 10.118 respectively. Malaysian firms have a 
comparatively smaller board size on average (mean score of 9.379). Large board size is expected in 
this study, considering the subjects of this study are the largest firms, and tend to symbolise complex 
organisational structures.  
The next CG practice considered is board independence, which is presented through the percentage 
of independent directors (IND) per board. With the mean score of 38.293, it is concluded that 
amongst the six countries, on average, more than one-third of the board is made up by independent 
directors. There is, however, a high variability of board independence practices across the firms, 
with a minimum value of 7.143% and a maximum value of 90.910%. The descriptive statistics 
demonstrate the diversity of this practice across the six countries. Particularly, on average, firms 
from Singapore are recorded as having more than half their boards made up of independent directors 
(Mean = 64.346%), while firms from Indonesia and Vietnam have a much lower percentage of 
independent directors, with less than 20% (mean scores are 19.95 and 17.94 respectively). Between 
these two extremes are firms from the Philippines (29.350% on average) with less than one-third of 
the board, as well as firms from Thailand and Malaysia with more than 40% of the board (44.943% 
and 48.750% respectively). The descriptive findings are relatively consistent with expectations 
based on the CG framework in these countries. As discussed in Chapter Three, section 3.3.1, the 
regulations about board independence varies across the countries. With the strict policies on board 
independence, it is unsurprising that firms from Singapore and Thailand have higher average of 
board independence than the others. The finding is aligned with the review from previous reports 
that Singapore has one of the best CG practices in Asia and most Singaporean Public listed 
companies have at least 50% of independent directors on board (KPMG, 2016). In contrast, the low 
presence of independent directors on boards in Vietnam, Philippines and Indonesia are also 
supported by the previous assessment of CG in these countries (IFC, 2012; IFC, 2014; SEC, 2015). 
The case of low board independence in Indonesia is expected as the country’s regulation (Law 
No.20) only requires at least one Commissioner to be independent. In the context of the Philippines, 
according to dela Rama, Volonte and Zaby (2014), it is difficult to introduce independent directors 
due to elevated levels of family control. And finally with the situation in Vietnam where the concept 
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of independent directors is still new (IFC, 2012), a sufficient level of board independence has not 
yet been widely implemented among firms.  
In terms of gender diversity, based on the mean score of 11.728%, the presence of women on boards 
is very low across the region. The minimum value of 0.000 implies that some boards comprise only 
male directors.  The finding indicates the low gender diversity on boards in Southeast Asia. Among 
the six countries, firms from Vietnam have the highest percentage of females per board (23.071%), 
much higher than the other countries. The prominent level of female presence in Vietnamese 
companies in comparison to others in the region has been discussed in previous literature. For 
instance, according to Nguyen et al. (2015), the high presence of female directors in Vietnamese 
firms is a result of a more gender-diverse institutional context. As a socialist country, gender equality 
is one of the central goals for socio-economic development strategies (Knodel, Loi, Jayakody and 
Huy, 2005) and the country has actively promoted gender equality in society. As a result, according 
to the World Bank’s report (2012), compared to other East Asian countries, Vietnam has done very 
well in achieving key gender equality indicators. In contrast to Vietnam, other countries within the 
region still have a very low percentage of female directors, especially Singapore (Mean=7.581%) 
and Indonesia (Mean=7.108%).  
Panel D presents the descriptive statistics for the presence of CEO duality on board. The statistics 
show that 14.6% (25 firms) of the total sample were recorded to have the same person working as 
both CEO and Chairman. This includes 2 firms from Thailand (6.7%), 4 from Singapore (15.4%), 6 
from Malaysia (20.7%), 9 from the Philippines (33.3%) and 4 from Vietnam (13.8%). There was no 
firm in Indonesia that has CEO duality on board. Among all of the six countries, Philippines has the 
highest number of firms with CEO duality, which is aligned with the observation of dela Rama et 
al. (2014) that CEO duality is not an unusual practice in the Philippines due to large family control. 
While the CG codes in all of the countries suggest the two positions should not be held by the same 
person, with the ‘comply or explain’ practice, CEO duality on board still exists in some firms.  
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Table 14: Descriptive statistics of corporate governance variables 
Variables All  Thailand Singapore Malaysia Indonesia Philippines Vietnam 
Panel A: Board size   
Mean 11.327 13.533 10.385 9.379 13.633 10.185 10.517 
Median 11.000 14.500 10.000 9.000 13.000 10.000 10.000 
Std. dev. 2.976 2.560 1.941 2.211 2.698 2.573 2.798 
Min 5.000 7.000 5.000 6.000 9.000 7.000 5.000 
Max 19.000 18.000 14.000 14.000 19.000 15.000 16.000 
Panel B: Board Independence (%) 
Mean 38.293 44.943 64.346 48.750 19.899 29.065 17.368 
Median 35.290 40.835 64.105 44.440 18.465 27.270 12.500 
Std. dev. 19.803 11.579 14.736 13.424 5.691 8.478 11.112 
Min 7.143 33.330 38.460 25.000 10.000 13.330 7.143 
Max 90.910 73.330 90.910 87.500 42.860 50.000 50.000 
Panel C: Board Gender Diversity (%) 
Mean 11.728 9.655 7.581 14.852 6.871 9.862 21.230 
Median 10.000 8.330 7.415 14.290 6.460 10.000 20.000 
Std. dev. 11.985 8.271 8.362 12.089 7.171 10.244 17.005 
Min 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Max 50.000 28.570 25.000 42.860 22.220 28.570 56.250 
Panel D: CEO Duality  
Mean 0.146 0.067 0.154 0.207 0.000 0.333 0.138 
Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
STD 0.354 0.253 0.368 0.412 0.000 0.480 0.350 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Panel E: Existence of CSR Committee  
Mean 0.163 0.333 0.308 0.138 0.067 0.148 0.000 
Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
STD 0.371 0.479 0.471 0.351 0.254 0.362 0.000 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 
Panel F: Percentage of block ownership (%) 
Mean 64.435 57.207 71.314 59.660 59.620 86.207 54.438 
Median 64.550 61.690 75.670 59.290 59.960 91.163 54.580 
Std. dev. 19.337 16.189 15.166 15.554 13.263 14.046 22.720 
Min 9.580 18.710 24.680 13.200 17.880 49.540 9.580 
Max 99.960 97.880 87.190 78.770 85.000 99.960 97.360 
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In term of the presence of CSR committee on board, the statistics from panel E show that in the total 
sample, 16.3% of firms (28 firms) have CSR committee on board. More specifically, in Thailand, 
33.3% of companies recorded to have CSR committee. This percentage is 30.8% in Singapore, 
13.8% in Malaysia, 6.7% in Indonesia, 14.8% in Philippines and 0% in Vietnam. Nearly half of 
these firms come from Thailand. The finding, therefore, indicates the high level of attention to CSR 
issues at the board level in Thai firms.  However, in general, the percentage of 14.6% also mean that 
the presence of CSR committee at board level is not a common practice in these six Southeast Asian 
countries. The finding could be explained by the context of the six countries. Although, as presented 
in Chapter Three (Table 7), majority of the countries have some existing regulations to support the 
development of CSR, there is no requirement for companies to establish a committee to take care of 
these issues at the board level. Similarly, in terms of CG regulations and laws, the responsibilities 
of firms to stakeholders is only mentioned in some of the countries’ CG code (i.e. Thailand, 
Indonesia, Malaysia) without indicating any specific suggestion on CG structure, such as the 
establishment of CSR committee to reflect these responsibilities.  
Consistent with expectations, block ownership is one of the key CG issues in Southeast Asia, with 
a very high average of 64.435%. However, the minimum value of 9.58% and the maximum value 
of 99.960% imply diverse block ownership practices across the firms in the sample. On average, 
firms from these countries have more than 50% of block ownership. Among the six countries, 
Philippines has the highest ownership concentration with the mean score of 86.491%, followed by 
Singapore (71.314%), Malaysia (59.660%), Indonesia (59.620%), Thailand (64.435%), and finally 
Vietnam (54.438%). Based on the statistics, the three countries with regulations related to the 
percentage of share held by minority shareholders (Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam) have lower 
level of block ownership than the countries with only regulations related to public float (Malaysia, 
Philippines and Singapore). Furthermore, in each of these two groups, countries with stricter 
regulation consistently have lower percentage of block ownership. For instance, among the three 
countries, Malaysia, Philippines and Singapore, Philippines only requires listed companies to have 
at least 12% of public float while this percentage is 25% in Malaysia. Singapore is in the middle 
ground between the two countries with different percentage of public float (12%, 15%, 20% or 25%) 
depending on a company’s market capitalisation. These differences could be the reason towards why 
Philippines have very high block ownership percentage. Moreover, the prominence of block 
ownership in this country can also be explained by the family ownership tradition where half of the 
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corporate section, in terms of market capitalisation, was controlled by the ten largest companies 
(Claessens, Djankov and Lang, 1999).  
5.2.2.2 Institutional variables 
Different from the internal determinants (CG variables), all of the external determinants 
(institutional factors) are measured with dummy variables. The statistics relevant to these variables 
are presented in table 15. Firstly, in terms of legal origin, as suggested in the literature review, this 
study considers the effect of the two main legal traditions, common law and civil law (La Porta et 
al., 2008). Based on previous studies (see Kouwenberg et al., 2014; Hope, 2003), among the six 
Southeast Asian countries, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore follow the common law origin, while 
the legal systems of Indonesia, Philippines and Vietnam are influenced by the civil law tradition. As 
a result, the total number of firms amongst countries following the common law system is 85 (the 
total number of firms from Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore) and the total number of firms in 
countries following the civil law tradition is 86 (the total number of firms from Indonesia, 
Philippines and Vietnam). 
The next variable under the regulative pillar is mandatory disclosure, which considers whether a 
country has mandatory requirement regarding CSRD and how this requirement influences firms’ 
CSRD. According to table 7 in Chapter Three, until 2013, there were only three countries requiring 
mandatory disclosure of CSR information in annual reports, those were Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Philippines. Therefore, the number of firms in countries that have a mandatory disclosure 
requirement is the total number of firms from these countries, therefore 86 firms (50.3%). The 
number of firms from countries without mandatory disclosure is 85 (49.7%).  
In terms of the cultural-dimension pillar, there are two dimensions chosen for examination in this 
study, uncertainty avoidance and masculinity. The countries are classified into two groups, low and 
high score in each of these dimensions. The decision to classify each country to low or high groups 
is based on the mean of 50 index score (Adelopo et al., 2013) in Hofstede’s study (2005). The scores 
of each country are presented in the table 16. According to these scores, only Thailand has an 
elevated level of uncertainty avoidance, while the remaining countries are low in this dimension. 
Hence, the number of firms from countries with high uncertainty avoidance is 30 (17.5%) and the 
number of firms from countries with low uncertainty avoidance is 141 (82.5%). Regarding the 
masculinity dimension, Malaysia and the Philippines are classified as countries with high 
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masculinity while others have a low level, making the record of 115 (67.3%) firms from countries 
with low masculinity and 56 (32.7%) firms from countries with high masculinity. 
Table 15: Distribution of cases in institutional variables 
Pillar Variables Number of cases 
Regulative Pillar Legal system From civil law countries: 86 (50.3%) 
From common law countries: 85 (49.7%) 
Mandatory disclosure From countries with mandatory disclosure 
requirement: 86 (50.3%) 
From countries without mandatory disclosure 
requirement: 85 (49.7%) 
Cultural-
Cognitive Pillar 
Uncertainty avoidance From countries with low uncertainty avoidance: 
141 (82.5%) 
From countries with high uncertainty avoidance: 
30 (17.5%) 
Masculinity/ Femininity From countries with low masculinity: 115 
(67.3%) 
From countries with high masculinity: 56 (32.7%) 
Normative Pillar Adoption of GRI Standard Not following GRI: 107 (62.6%) 
Following GRI: 64 (37.4%) 
Membership of CSR-related 
associations 
Being member of one of the examined 
associations: 39 (22.8%) 
Not being member in any of the examined 
associations: 132 (77.2%) 
 
The next two variables representing the normative effect are GRI reporting standard and CSR-
related associations. With the GRI variable, firms are classified into two groups, firms that follow 
the GRI standard and firms that do not follow the standard. The information was gathered from the 
GRI’s website and annual reports. Based on the list of participating organisations, 64 (37.4%) 
companies followed the standard, 17 of which were Thai, 13 Singaporean, 12 Malaysian, 12 
Indonesian, 8 Filipino and 2 Vietnamese.  
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Table 16: Hofstede’s scores (2005) of uncertainty avoidance and masculinity  
 
 
 
 
 
In terms of CSR-related associations, firms are divided under two categories, firms that are members 
of the examined associations and firms that are not. As previously mentioned, in each country, one 
association is chosen based on specific criteria as follows: 
 The association must be well-established before 2013. 
 One of the key aims of the association is to promoting CSR/ sustainability development.  
 The association must be key/ main advocator of CSR at national level (established under 
government or global organisations partnership) in the examined country. 
 The association must involve business as one of the key stakeholders. 
 The association must be the largest of its kind in the country based on the number of 
members. 
Following the list of associations (Appendix 3), membership lists of these associations are checked 
to identify which firms in the sample are members. The statistics showed that 39 firms (22.8%) were 
members of these associations, including 2 firms from Indonesia, 7 from Malaysia, 8 from 
Philippines, 10 from Singapore, 12 from Thailand and 0 firms from Vietnam.   
5.2.3 Control Variables  
The table 17 presents the descriptive statistics of all the control variables, including firm size 
(FSIZE), leverage (LEV), profitability (PROF) and firm age (AGE). The descriptive statistics of 
FSIZE is presented in Panel A. The average value of FSIZE in the sample is 22.206 which represents 
the total assets of $4.405 billion approximately. The FSIZE values are ranging from 18.430 to 
26.490. The mean values of FSIZE across the six countries are relatively equal with the highest 
value of 23.369 from Singapore, and the lowest one of 20.572 from Vietnam. The average values of 
FSIZE variable across the six countries, therefore, are relatively similar, which provides a good 
Countries Masculinity Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
Thailand 34 64 
Singapore 48 8 
Malaysia 50 36 
Indonesia 46 48 
Philippines 64 44 
Vietnam 40 30 
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condition to compare the level of disclosure across the countries. The panel B presents the 
descriptive statistics of leverage (LEV). The LEV variable has a wider range value from 5.12% to 
126.61% with the mean value of 55.889%. The wide range of values in the sample demonstrate 
different leverage levels across the companies. Among the six countries, Thai firms have the highest 
level of leverage with the mean score of 64.056%. Apart from the case of Thailand, the mean values 
of LEV in the other countries are not majorly different from each other. The highest value of LEV 
is 126.610%. The only case with this extreme value is case number 106 from Indonesia.  
Regarding the PROF variable, the percentages of profitability is ranging from 0.100% to 60.060% 
in the whole sample. Comparisons across the six countries showed that the mean score of PROF is 
highest in Indonesia (11.332%), followed by Singapore (8.863%), Thailand (8.714%), Vietnam 
(6.657%), Philippines (6.472%), and finally Malaysia (6.245%). The last metric control variable is 
AGE. With the year of 2013 as the base line, the average value of AGE is 39.053 years with a 
relatively large range from 2 years to 179 years. Philippines (Mean=55.259), Malaysia (Mean = 
48.069) and Indonesia (Mean = 45.067) are the three countries with more established firms in the 
sample. The firm age of Vietnamese companies is significantly younger than the other countries 
(Mean=19.517).  
Three categorical variables, audit firm size (BIG4), consumer proximity (CP), and environmental 
sensitivity (ES), are considered as control variables in this study. Regarding the BIG4 variable, 
majority of firms (73.684%) have been audited by Big Four auditing firms. The percentage is highest 
in Singapore where all the firms are reported to use Big Four’s service. Different from the other 
countries, Philippines is the only country where majority of firms (88.889%) have not been audited 
by Big Four companies. The finding, however, is consistent with some previous studies (see Ghoul 
et al., 2016; Gul et al., 2013) in which Philippines repeatedly had the lowest percentage of firms 
audited by Big Four companies. The percentage of 11.111 found in this study is relatively similar 
with the percentage of 10.400% reported in the study of Gul et al. (2013). In terms of consumer 
proximity, the numbers of firms operating in low profile sectors and high profile sectors are 
relatively equal with 50.292% and 49.708% respectively. Among 171 firms in the sample, more 
than half of the firms (59.064%) conduct business in sectors with less environmental sensitivity.  
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Table 17: Descriptive statistics of control variables  
Variables All  Thailand Singapore Malaysia Indonesia Philippines Vietnam 
Panel A: Firm size  (FSIZE) 
Mean 22.206 22.196 23.369 23.018 21.783 22.448 20.572 
Median 22.260 21.990 23.310 22.710 21.425 22.440 20.050 
STD 1.638 1.440 1.424 1.365 1.416 1.069 1.543 
Min 18.420 19.200 20.980 19.850 19.300 20.490 18.420 
Max 26.490 24.570 26.490 25.860 24.820 24.350 24.030 
Panel B: Leverage (LEV) % 
Mean 55.889 64.642 53.730 55.082 52.653 57.515 53.480 
Median 54.090 62.455 47.570 55.630 46.220 55.000 54.650 
STD 23.506 20.244 21.398 27.542 26.705 18.907 24.871 
Min 5.120 25.260 18.590 5.120 13.640 12.310 11.560 
Max 126.610 67.700 91.700 93.010 126.610 91.150 91.360 
Panel C: Profitability (PROF) % 
Mean 8.113 8.714 6.245 8.863 11.332 6.471 6.657 
Median 5.240 6.035 5.165 5.810 9.135 5.200 4.720 
STD 8.937 10.717 5.297 12.816 9.654 4.694 6.492 
Min 0.100 0.100 0.880 0.960 1.690 1.330 0.390 
Max 60.060 47.180 20.040 60.060 40.180 16.810 28.560 
Panel D: Firm age (AGE) 
Mean 39.053 36.400 33.192 48.069 45.067 52.259 19.517 
Median 29.000 29.000 23.000 39.000 41.000 37.000 19.000 
STD 30.892 25.336 28.645 29.851 29.760 45.363 10.786 
Min 2.000 2.000 2.000 6.000 4.000 7.000 4.000 
Max 179.000 107.000 114.000 107.000 154.000 179.000 51.000 
Panel E: Audit firm size (BIG4) 
Mean 0.737 0.833 1.000 0.897 0.767 0.111 0.793 
Median 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
STD 0.442 0.379 1.000 0.310 0.430 0.320 0.412 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Panel F: Consumer Proximity (CP) 
Mean 0.497 0.567 0.385 0.586 0.400 0.704 0.345 
Median 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
STD 0.501 0.504 0.496 0.501 0.498 0.465 0.483 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Panel G: Environmental Sensitivity (ES) 
Mean 0.409 0.433 0.307 0.276 0.433 0.593 0.414 
Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
STD 0.493 0.504 0.470 0.455 0.504 0.501 0.501 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
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5.3 Chapter Summary 
 
Chapter Five presented descriptive statistics of the dependent variable, CSRDI, as well as all the 
independent variables (CG and institutional variables) and control variables addressed in the study. 
The levels of CSRD were presented according to disclosure categories, all six countries, in addition 
to distinct industries. The findings of these statistics were discussed incorporating relevant literature 
and the study context. The chapter, therefore, has provided a good overview of CSRD, CG practices 
and differences in institutional environments across the six countries. In the next chapter, statistical 
techniques will be used to analyse the data, obtain the empirical results and test the relevant 
hypotheses to provide answers for the key research questions.   
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CHAPTER 6: EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
6.1 Overview 
 
Following the descriptive statistics, this chapter focuses on answering the three empirical questions: 
 What are the differences, if any, among the levels of CSRD across the six Southeast Asian 
countries? 
 To what extent do corporate governance practices influence the level of CSRD in the six 
countries? 
 To what extent do the institutional factors influence the level of CSRD in the six countries? 
To answer these three research questions, as justified in Chapter 4, section 4.7, different statistical 
techniques will be used to analysis the data. The chapter, therefore, is divided into three main 
sections: comparisons of CSRD across the countries (section 6.1), the impact of CG on CSRD 
(section 6.2), and the impact of institutional factors on CSRD (section 6.3). In the first section (6.1), 
in order to identify any differences in the extent of CSRD across the six countries, ANOVA analysis 
with post-hoc tests are used. Prior to running the ANOVA analysis, the data is examined based on 
the assumptions of the statistical technique to ensure there is no violation. If the assumptions are not 
fully satisfied, the non-parametric of ANOVA, the Kruskal-Wallis test, is applied as an additional 
analysis technique to examine whether the violation influences the result. In the case of a significant 
result, post-hoc tests are used to identify the pairs of comparison that cause the differences. At the 
end of the section, a brief summary of the result will be provided.  
In the following section (6.2), the OLS regression method is used to identify the impact of CG 
practices on CSRD. All the OLS assumptions are carefully checked prior to the running of the OLS 
model. The empirical findings of the model are then presented in the next sub-section. Following up 
these results, diverse sensitivity analyses are conducted to examine the robustness and consistency 
of the findings. Finally, a discussion of the findings based on previous studies, theoretical 
framework, and the study’s context as well as a brief summary of this section are provided at the 
end.  
The third section (6.3) has a similar structure with the previous one as the OLS method is also used 
to answer the third research question: the impact of institutional factors on CSRD. Firstly, OLS 
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assumptions will be examined, followed by the performance of OLS regression model (2) to achieve 
the empirical results for both independent and control variables. The robustness and sensitivity of 
the results are then examined by the use of several alternative models. Finally, a discussion of 
findings will be provided and the chapter ends with a summary of these findings.  
6.2 Comparisons of CSRD between the countries  
 
The previous chapter presented the descriptive statistics of CSRDI. These statistics demonstrate 
multiple differences in the level of CSRD across the six countries, however, in order to answer 
research question 2 and to conclude whether these differences are significant, as justified in Chapter 
4, section 4.7, the ANOVA data analysis technique is used. Prior to the test, the assumptions of 
ANOVA are examined to ensure the data is appropriate for the technique. If all assumptions are 
satisfied, the statistical test is then run to examine whether the differences are significant. The non-
parametric analysis, the Kruskal-Wallis test is also used as a back-up analysis method to ensure the 
consistency of the result. In the case of significant result, post-hoc tests are conducted to identify the 
pairs of comparisons that are significantly different. Finally, a detailed discussion of the findings 
based on existing literature is provided at the end of the section.  
6.2.1 Assumptions Testing  
 
According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2001), there are four assumptions that need to be addressed 
when using ANOVA analysis, normality of sampling distribution of means, independence of errors, 
homogeneity of variance, and the absence of outliers. In this study, the absence of outliers will be 
examined first as this assumption provides the foundation for the others. In order to identify outliers 
in each group of countries, the z-score technique is use for the dependent variable CSRDI (Miles 
and Shevlin, 2001). The z-score is calculated by the ratio of the difference between the score of the 
reliant case and the mean score to the standard deviation of that group.  For identifying possible 
outliers, the following table 18 provides the maximum and minimum values of the dependent 
variables for all six groups. Based on the minimum and maximum values, z-scores are calculated. 
According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2001), observations with absolute values greater than 3.3 are 
potential outliers. According to the results from the following table, there are no outliers for CSRDI 
from any of the countries examined.  
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Table 18: The result of outlier identification for CSRDI variable across the countries 
Country of 
listed 
market 
Mean N Std. 
Deviation 
Minimum Z 
score 
Maximum Z score 
CSRDI 
Thailand 0.554 30 0.192 0.000 -2.887 0.917 1.893 
Singapore 0.427 26 0.167 0.000 -2.554 0.700 1.630 
Malaysia 0.459 29 0.155 0.167 -1.887 0.750 1.876 
Indonesia 0.552 30 0.162 0.267 -1.763 0.875 1.990 
Philippines 0.326 27 0.208 0.033 -1.410 0.800 2.281 
Vietnam 0.302 29 0.194 0.000 -1.559 0.792 2.523 
 
6.2.1.2 Normality of Sampling Distribution of Means 
 
The careful examination of this assumption is essential as non-normality distribution could result in 
other assumptions being violated (Field, 2013). The test of normality will be conducted on the 
dependent variable across different levels of the independent variable. To identify whether the data 
set satisfies this assumption, both graphical analysis of normality and statistical testing of normality 
are applied. In terms of statistical testing, z values of kurtosis and skewness as well as the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test are used, while the normality probability plots are applied for visual 
inspection. The distribution is normal when kurtosis and skewness values are close to zero. 
Departures from zero signal non-normal distribution. In order to know whether these values are large 
enough to be worried about violation of normality, z-values of kurtosis and skewness values are 
calculated based on the following formula: 
Zskewness = 
𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠
√
6
𝑁
    Zkurtosis = 
𝑘𝑢𝑟𝑡𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑠
√
24
𝑁
 
With the error level of .05, if either z value exceeds the critical value of ±1.96, the distribution is 
concluded to be non-normal at that value (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). Table 19 presents the 
statistical tests for normality across the six groups divided based on country of origin. The results 
showed that the distribution of CSRDI in the groups of Singapore and Thailand might have violated 
the normality assumption. Visual inspection of normality probability plots (for brevity sake not 
presented here) also illustrate departures from normal distribution in these two groups. Following 
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the results of the tests, different transformation techniques are used based on the values of skewness 
and kurtosis. The CSRDI variable was transformed in multiple ways and re-tested across the six 
countries to examine the improvement of normal distribution. Despite the use of different 
transformations, the normal distribution of variables did not improve, however, according to 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2001), if the sample sizes of groups are relatively equal and two-tailed tests 
are applied with no outliers, ANOVA is robust with 20 degrees of freedom for error. Even though 
the total sample size of this study is not large, the degree of freedom (df = 171-6 = 165) is 
significantly larger than 20. The sample sizes of groups are relatively equal with the ratio of the 
largest to the smallest being 1.154. Furthermore, as examined in the previous section, there are no 
potential outliers in all dependent variables, hence, if the two-tailed tests are used, the analysis is 
robust to any violation of this assumption. The ANOVA analysis, therefore, will be carried out 
despite the violations. However, a nonparametric test will be followed and results between the tests 
will be compared to minimise the impact of assumption violation on the results’ interpretations.  
Table 19: Normality tests for CSRDI across the six countries 
Country Skewness Kurtosis Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test (Sig.) 
Statistic Z value Statistic Z value  
Indonesia -0.269 -0.602 -0.713 -0.797 0.090* 
Malaysia -0.182 -0.400 -0.641 -0.705 0.080* 
Philippines 0.828 1.756 -0.298 -0.316 0.084* 
Singapore -1.122 -2.336 2.086 2.171 0.068* 
Thailand -1.291 -2.887 2.365 2.644 0.001*** 
Vietnam 0.655 1.440 0.426 0.468 0.200 
*** and *: significant at 0.01 and 0.10 levels 
6.2.1.3 Homoscedasticity 
 
The purpose of ANOVA analysis is to test whether population means are different across the levels 
of independent variable. Nevertheless, one of the assumptions in ANOVA model is population 
variances across the levels is equal. Hence, in order to examine this assumption, the variance of the 
metric variable (CSRDI) is compared across different levels of the independent variable, country of 
origin. For this purpose, the Levene test was used. If the result of Levene test is not significant, the 
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assumption is met. In contrast, if significance is found in the test, it means the variances of the groups 
are not equal and the assumption has been violated (Pallant, 2001). Table 20 contains the results of 
the Levene test. As the result of Levene test is non- significant at .05 level, the variances across the 
groups are equal and assumption is not violated. 
Table 20: The Levene test’s result of CSRDI across the countries 
CSRDI Levene test’s result 
Levene Statistic Sig. 
Based on Mean 0.844 0.520 
Based on Median 0.636 0.672 
Based on Median and with adjusted df 0.636 0.672 
Based on trimmed mean 0.791 0.557 
Based on Mean 0.844 0.520 
 
6.2.1.4 Independence of errors/ observations 
This assumption means that all the subjects should be allocated randomly to the groups; and if the 
subjects are not randomly allocated, this assumption could be violated. In this study, the subjects 
were not allocated randomly as the observations were divided into six groups in response to the six 
countries. Therefore, it is possible that the data has violated the assumption. However, according to 
Roberts and Russo (1999), ANOVA is robust under most circumstances and small violations of 
assumptions are unlikely to have a great effect on the significance. Especially in the cases that a p 
value is less than 0.01 or higher than 0.1, it is very unlikely that incorrect statistical inference will 
be drawn. As a result, based on the p value of ANOVA analysis, the effect of such violation could 
be examined. Furthermore, due to the potential violations of some assumptions, a non-parametric 
equivalent of ANOVA, the Kruskal-Wallance One-way Analysis of Variance by Ranks will also be 
used as an additional analysis to ensure the consistency of the result.  
6.2.2 Empirical Analysis 
The ANOVA analysis with post-hoc tests is conducted to identify whether there is any significant 
difference between the levels of CSRD among the six countries. As previously mentioned, the size 
of the six groups is reasonably similar with the ratio of largest to the smallest of 1.154 (Stevens, 
2002), which provides a good condition to conduct ANOVA analysis. Table 21 provides the main 
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result for this analysis, which answers the question whether there is a significant difference between 
the countries’ CSRDI. The ANOVA analysis results a very small significance value of 0.000, 
signaling significant differences between the indexes at .01 level. The p-value less than 0.01 also 
implied that violation of assumptions are highly unlikely to have a great effect on the analysis. 
Moreover, according to Stevens (2002), one of the factors influencing the power of a test is the effect 
size. The effect size represents the total variance of the dependent variable that can be predicted by 
the independent variable (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). In ANOVA analysis, eta squared is used to 
measure the effect size. The eta squared is calculated by the ratio of sum of squares between-groups 
to the total sum of squares. In this analysis, the eta squared is 0.238 which is a very large effect, 
according to Cohen’s (2003) definition of large effect of 0.14. Based on the ANOVA results and the 
effect size, it can be concluded that country of origin has a big impact on the CSRDI and there are 
significant difference between the levels of CSRDI among the countries.   
Table 21: ANOVA analysis’s result 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
***: Significant at .01 level 
 
As argued, although the violation of normality assumption would not significantly influence the 
interpretation of the results, it is important to run non-parametric technique to check if the result is 
robust against such violation. The non-parametric alternative of ANOVA is the Kruskal-Wallis test 
that allows the comparison of scores on a metric variable for three or more groups (Pallant, 2001). 
The table 22 shows the results of Kruskal-Wallis test. Consistent with the ANOVA analysis, results 
of Kruskal-Wallis test is also significant at .01 level, confirming the significant differences between 
CSRDI across the six country groups; and meaning that some minor violations of the assumptions 
did not seriously influence the empirical result.  
 
CSRDI Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Between Groups 1.681 5 .336 10.317 .000*** 
Within Groups 5.376 165 .033   
Total 7.057 170    
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Table 22: The Kruskal-Wallis test’s result 
Variable Country of origin N Mean Rank 
CSRDI Thailand 30 115.68 
Singapore 26 82.33 
Malaysia 29 89.64 
Indonesia 30 113.58 
Philippines 27 57.87 
Vietnam 29 52.60 
Total 171  
Notes: Chi-Square value: 42.394 (Sig.=0.000) 
 
As the ANOVA analysis does not identify which group is different from another (Field, 2013), the 
two post-hoc tests, the Turkey’s Honestly Significant Different test (HSD) and the Scheffe test, are 
applied to identify specific groups causing the significant difference. The results of both post-hoc 
tests (for brevity sake not presented here) indicated significant differences for four comparisons, 
Thailand – Philippines, Thailand – Vietnam, Indonesia – Philippines, and Indonesia – Vietnam. 
In conclusion, for the purpose of examining the impact of country of origin on CSRDI, a one-way 
between-groups analysis of variance ANOVA was conducted. The data is divided into six groups 
according to the six countries. The findings showed the statistically significant difference at the 
p<.01 level in CSRDI for the six groups with the eta squared value of 0.238, demonstrating the role 
of country of origin in defining CSRDI. Both of the post-hoc tests identified the significant 
differences in the four comparisons as mentioned above. The mean score of Thailand (M=0.554, 
SD=0.192) is significantly different from Philippines (M=0.326, SD=0.208). The level of CSRD of 
Thailand (M=0.554, SD=0.192) is also different from Vietnam. Similarly, the CSRDI of Indonesia 
(M=0.552, SD=0.162) is also significantly higher than that of Philippines (M=0.326, SD=0.208) and 
Vietnam (M=0.302, SD=0.194). 
The significant findings of the statistical tests, together with the large effect size, emphasises the 
role of country of origin in defining the extent of CSRD. The result supports previous literature 
arguing that country of origin is an important determinant of level and type of CSR disclosure and 
reporting (Craig and Diga, 1998; Meek, Roberts and Gray, 1995; Newson and Deegan, 2002; Van 
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der Laan Smith et al., 2005). Surprisingly, different from expectation, the extent of CSRD in 
Singaporean firms is ranked behind Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia. The result indicates that 
economic development might not be an indication for the level of CSRD in annual reports and 
suggests that the differences in CSRD across the countries could be attributed to other institutional 
factors, rather than economic factors. The finding, therefore, corresponds to the argument that the 
capability of the state and the economic development stage defines the CSR practices (including 
CSRD) in business communities, however, differs substantially based on socio-political context and 
vary from country to country (APEC, 2005). With the consideration of each country’s institutional 
context, the findings regarding the levels of CSRDI were thoroughly discussed in Chapter Five, 
section 5.5.1.1 and are not presented again here to avoid repetition. Further analysis of the role of 
institutional factors in determining level of CSRD in these countries will be discussed in section 6.3 
where the impact of six developed institutional factors on CSRD will be examined. 
6.2.3 Section Summary 
 
Section 6.2 presents the process of ANOVA analysis with the purpose of identifying whether the 
levels of CSRD among the six countries are significantly different. The results of both parametric 
ANOVA analysis and non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test showed that there is significant difference 
between the levels of CSRD across the six countries. Post-hoc tests, then, were conducted to identify 
comparisons with significant difference. The results of post-hoc tests concluded significant 
differences between the two countries with highest level of CSRD, Thailand and Indonesia, with the 
lowest CSRD group, Philippines and Vietnam. Among the six countries, Thailand has the highest 
CSRDI, following by Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines and finally Vietnam. The 
findings, therefore, highlighted the role of country as an important determinant of CSRD and 
indicated that other factors rather than economics could provide an explanation to the differences in 
CSRD practice across countries. As a result, in the next two sections, the impact of other factors, 
CG mechanisms and institutional factors, on CSRD will be examined.  
6.3 The impact of Corporate Governance practices on CSRD 
The main focus of this section is to respond to the third research question of the influence of CG on 
CSRD. In this study, a variety of CG mechanisms are considered. As justified in the methodology 
chapter (Chapter 4), for the purpose of identifying the impact of CG variables on CSRD, Ordinary 
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Least Squares (OLS) multivariate regression technique is used to test the hypotheses. The chapter 
starts off with OLS assumptions testing. Then the empirical results of the regression model (1) will 
be presented to examine the impact of each independent and control variables on CSRD. The section 
then continues with the use of alternative models to inspect the level of robustness and sensitivity of 
the results. Finally, a review and discussion of the results in relation to previous studies will be 
provided at the end of the section.  
6.3.1 OLS Assumptions Testing 
As the OLS multivariate regression technique is used to examine the effect of CG variables on 
CSRDI, the OLS assumptions of multicollinearity, normality, linearity, homoscedasticity and 
independence of the residuals as well as outlier identification, are carefully examined to ensure no 
violation can seriously influence the model’s results.  
One of the assumptions for linear OLS regression model is that there is no perfect multicollinearity 
(Gujarati and Porter, 2010). Multicollinearity exists when two or more predictors have high 
correlations in the regression model. High collinearity could increase the standard errors of the 
coefficients, making them less trustworthy, limit the size of R and make it difficult to assess the 
importance of an individual predictor (Field, 2013). Although the case of perfect multicollinearity 
is rare, in most situations, some degree of multicollinearity is unavoidable due to the nature of 
economic data (Gujarati and Porter, 2010; Seddighi, Lawler and Katos, 2000). In order to identify 
the relationships among the variables in the regression model (1), Pearson’s parametric correlation, 
Spearman’s non-parametric correlation, tolerance and variance inflation factor (VIF) are used 
(Studenmund, 2014). 
Table 23 presents the correlation coefficients among all the variables considered in the regression 
model (1). As the direction and magnitude of both correlation matrices are relatively similar, non-
normality of some variables would not cause any major violation to the OLS assumptions (Ntim and 
Soobaroyen, 2013, p.478). Moreover, there is no correlation coefficient with a value above 0.80 or 
0.90, which indicates serious multicollinearity is not a problem in this model (Field, 2013). In terms 
of correlations with the dependent variables (CSRDI), there are eight variables found to have 
significant correlation (significant level less than 0.05) with CSRDI, including board size (BS), 
female directors (FED), CEO duality (DUAL), CSR committee (CSRC), block ownership (BLOC), 
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leverage (LEV), and audit firm size (BIG4). Among these variables, the four variables, BS, BLOC, 
COMT and BIG4 are significant at .01 level, while the others are significant at .05 level. 
Moreover, to identify whether the multicollinearity between the predictors is at the acceptable level, 
tolerance and variance inflation factor (VIF) statistics are used. The VIF values indicates how strong 
a linear relationship between a predictor and other variables is. The most common cut-off threshold 
is 0.10 for a tolerance values, which corresponds to value above 10 in VIF (Field, 2009; Gujarati, 
2015). However, some scholars impose stricter requirements with the argument that researchers 
should be concerned about multicollinearity if VIF values are above 2.5 (Allison, 1999) or above 4 
(Miles and Shevlin, 2011). Table 24 presents the tolerance and VIF values of the predictors in the 
regression model (1). According to the statistics, the highest VIF value recorded is 2.605 (tolerance 
= 0.384) in the case of FSIZE, as expected, because the variable have relatively high and significant 
correlations with some other variables such as LEV, PROF, AGE and CP. The VIF values of the 
other variables are all below 2. Therefore, at this stage, multicollinearity should not be a concern as 
the highest VIF value is only marginal of the strictest criterion of Allison (1999).  
The next assumption to examine is the normality assumption. The normality assumption of OLS 
requires the error term to be normally distributed (Gujarati and Porter, 2010; Studenmund, 2014). 
Although the assumption does not stress that all the metric variables should have normal distribution, 
examining the distribution of these variables will provide the foundation for identifying appropriate 
transformation in the case of violation. Therefore, the normality test is conducted for both metric 
variables and the variate of the model by using both graphic and statistical tests. In terms of graphical 
analysis, the normal probability plots (for brevity sake not presented here) showed there are five 
variables that appear to have normal distribution, including firm size (FSIZE), block ownership 
(BLOC), independent directors (IND), board size (BS) and leverage (LEV).  
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Table 23:  Correlation coefficients of all the variables of regression model (1) 
 
VARIABLES CSRDI BS IND FED DUAL COMT BLOC FSIZE LEV PROF AGE BIG4 CP ES 
 CSRDI  .375*** .003 -.169** -.183** .269*** -.329*** .106 .173** -.043 .141 .254*** .067 -.035 
BS .362***  -.256*** -.047 -.214*** .009 -.154* .139 .271*** -.120 .102 .189** .181** -.111 
IND .034 -.241***  -.085 .039 .214*** .051 .340*** -.038 -.134 -.062 .151 -.069 -.032 
FED -.191** -.049 -.134  -.082 -.158 .032 -.008 .068 -.056 -.068 .073 .099 -.035 
DUAL -.181** -.214*** .008 -.070  -.010 .070 .084 -.161** -.107 .097 -.206* -.032 .025 
COMT .266*** -.014 .173** -.135 -.010  -.062 -.013 .113 .014 -.031 .057 .018 .057 
BLOC -.290*** -.132 .008 .021 .090 -.052  .009 -.087 .049 -.082 -.245*** .041 .098 
FSIZE .155 .156 .350*** -.009 .059 -.016 .022  .424*** -.669*** .300*** .127 .227*** -.164** 
LEV .179** .287*** -.075 .076 -.175** .085 -.125 .442***  -.545*** .277*** .004 .444*** -.182** 
PROF -.043 -.078 -.117 .043 -.107 .049 .036 -.537*** -.238***  -.156 -.018 -.101 .039 
AGE .098 .083 -.033 -.070 .083 .001 -.023 .308*** .240*** -.002  -.047 .143 -.147 
BIG4 .269*** .193** .181** .093 -.206** .057 -.249*** .141* .040 .024 -.010  .065 -.248*** 
CP .058 .185** -.101 .080 -.032 .018 .055 .259*** .459*** .062 .123 .065  -.320*** 
ES -.040 -.112 -.019 -.021 .025 .057 .092 -.161* -.211*** -.107 -.086 -.248*** -.320***  
Notes: The bottom left half provides Pearson’s parametric correlation coefficients, whereas the upper right half contains Spearman’s non-parametric correlation coefficients. CSRDI 
denotes CSRD index; BS denotes board size; IND denotes board independence; FED denotes board gender diversity; DUAL denotes CEO duality; COMT denotes CSR committee; 
BLOC denotes block ownership; FSIZE denotes firm size; LEV denotes leverage; PROF denotes profitability; AGE denotes firm age; BIG4 denotes audit firm size; CP denotes 
consumer proximity; ES denotes environmental sensitivity.  ***, ** and * indicate significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels. 
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  Table 24: Tolerance and VIF values of all the predictors in the model (1) 
Variable Tolerance  VIF 
BS 0.758 1.319 
IND 0.634 1.577 
FED 0.910 1.099 
DUAL 0.845 1.184 
COMT 0.909 1.100 
BLOC 0.879 1.137 
FSIZE 0.384 2.605 
LEV 0.546 1.830 
PROF 0.577 1.734 
AGE 0.805 1.242 
BIG4 0.762 1.313 
CP 0.666 1.501 
ES 0.801 1.249 
Notes: CSRDI denotes CSRD index; BS denotes board size; IND denotes board independence; FED denotes board 
gender diversity; DUAL denotes CEO duality; COMT denotes CSR committee; BLOC denotes block ownership; 
FSIZE denotes firm size; LEV denotes leverage; PROF denotes profitability; AGE denotes firm age; BIG4 
denotes audit firm size; CP denotes consumer proximity; ES denotes environmental sensitivity 
Even though it is useful to see the shape of the normal probability plots, the graphical analysis 
might pose some difficulties towards the conclusion of variables’ normality distribution (Hair, 
2010). Therefore, similar with the previous section 6.2.1.2, the evaluation of normality will 
also be examined through the two components of normality, skewness and kurtosis. Based on 
the z values from the table 25, out of 8 metric variables, five variables, BS, IND, BLOC, FSIZE 
and LEV have normal distribution, leaving the other three variables (FED, PROF and AGE) 
suffering from non-normal distribution in both measurements. Before deciding to transform 
the non-normal variables, the normality of the error term of the variate should be tested. 
According to Allison (1999, p.130), the only variable that is required to have normal 
distribution in multiple regression is the disturbance term. Therefore, if the error term of the 
variate has normal distribution, transformation of these variables is not necessary. Moreover, 
as explained earlier, since the two correlation matrices are relatively similar, the impact of non-
normality in these variables should not cause serious violation to the assumption.  
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In order to test whether the errors of prediction are distributed normally throughout predicted 
dependent variables’ values (Miles and Shevlin, 2001), a visual examination of normal 
probability plot of the residuals is used (for brevity sake not presented here). Even though there 
are some slight departures, the values fall along with diagonal with no substantial or systematic 
departures, which shows that the model has met the normality assumption. As a result, even 
though the normality test for all metric variables showed that some variables suffer from non-
normal distribution and the result of the normality test for the variate does not show any 
violation of normality. Therefore, the non-normal distributed variables should not present any 
serious problem of the course of data analysis.  
Table 25: Normality tests of metric variables in regression model (1) 
Variable SHAPE DESCRIPTORS Description of the 
distribution Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic z value Statistic z value 
The Dependent variable 
CSRDI -0.282 -1.424 -0.487 -1.230 Normal distribution 
Corporate Governance (metric) variables 
BS 0.291 1.469 -0.493 -1.245 Normal distribution 
IND 0.565 2.853 -0.401 -1.012 Normal distribution 
with positive skewness 
FED 1.113 5.620 1.166 2.944 Peaked distribution with 
positive skewness 
BLOC -0.374 -1.889 0.118 0.298 Normal distribution 
Control (metric) variables 
FSIZE 0.038 0.192 -0.106 -0.267 Normal distribution 
LEV 0.182 0.919 -0.664 -1.677 Normal distribution  
PROF 2.838 14.331 10.077 25.443 Peaked distribution with 
positive skewness 
AGE 1.732 8.746 3.662 9.246 Peaked distribution with 
positive skewness 
Notes: CSRDI denotes CSRD index; BS denotes board size; IND denotes board independence; FED denotes board 
gender diversity; DUAL denotes CEO duality; COMT denotes CSR committee; BLOC denotes block ownership; 
FSIZE denotes firm size; LEV denotes leverage; PROF denotes profitability; AGE denotes firm age; BIG4 
denotes audit firm size; CP denotes consumer proximity; ES denotes environmental sensitivity 
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For the purpose of examining the homoscedasticity and linearity assumptions, a number of 
statistical tests, including Cook’s Distances, Leverage values and Studentised Residuals, are 
conducted to ensure no outlier could cause non-linearity and heteroscedasticity. The Cook’s 
Distances range from 0.000 to 0.132 with the mean score of 0.008. The computed Leverage 
values range from 0.023 to 0.275 with a mean of 0.085. No value that exceeds one in these two 
measurements indicates non-existence of serious outliers (Elmagrhi, 2016, p.195). The 
Studentised Residuals values are from -3.066 to 2.596 with the mean score of -0.002. Although 
there is one observation with the Studentised Residual value above three, the very small mean 
score of -0.002 implies this is not a severe outlier. Furthermore, the visual inspection of the   
scatterplot (for brevity sake not presented here) does not reveal any obvious pattern of 
nonlinear relationship. Additionally, the patterns slightly demonstrate the diamond shape 
which is expected in the case of percentages used in some of the variables as variation more 
focuses on the middle than the tails. However, in general, the patterns are relatively similar 
with null plot, which indicates the homoscedasticity assumption has been met (Hair, 2010, 
p.184). Moreover, the linearity assumption is also checked for all metric variables presented in 
the regression model (1) by plotting each of the metric variables against the dependent variable. 
All of the scatterplots (for brevity sake not presented here) do not show any obvious curve, 
therefore, the relationships between the metric independent variables and the dependent 
variable do not violate linearity assumption.    
The final assumption to be considered is the independence of the residuals. Following previous 
studies (Mahadeo, Hanuman and Soobaroyen, 2011a, p.552; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013, 
p.129), this assumption is examined by using the Durbin-Watson test. Statistics of the test vary 
from 0 to 4 with the value of 2 as uncorrelation between residuals (Seddighi et al., 2000; 
Wooldridge, 2013). If the value is closer to 2, it is less likely that autocorrelation is serious. In 
the case of regression model (1), the value is 1.949 (table 27), meaning autocorrelation is not a 
serious problem in the model.  
In conclusion, different statistical and graphical tests, including Cook’s Distance, Leverage 
values, Studentised Residuals, skewness, kurtosis, normality probability plots, scatterplots, 
correlation matrices, VIF, tolerance values and Durbin-Watson test, were conducted to 
examine whether the regression model (1) satisfies all the OLS assumptions. The results of 
these tests and visual inspections showed that the OLS assumptions are not seriously violated, 
therefore OLS can be used as an appropriate statistical technique to examine the relationship 
between CG variables and CSRD.  
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6.3.2 Empirical Results: CG variables and CSRD 
 
As previously discussed in Chapter 5, the main objective of the regression model (1) is to 
examine the impact of six CG mechanisms, board size, board independence, board gender 
diversity, CEO duality, block ownership and the presence of CSR committee, on CSRD. The 
regression model includes the dependent variable, all six independent variables and control 
variables. The regression model (1) is presented as follows: 
(1) CSRDI = β0 + β1 BS + β2 IND + β3 FED + β4 DUAL + β5 BLOC + β6 COMT +  
∑ βi CONTSi + εi 
 (Notes: CSRDI denotes CSRD index; BS denotes board size; IND denotes board independence; FED denotes 
board gender diversity; DUAL denotes CEO duality; BLOC denotes block ownership; COMT denotes the 
presence of CSR committee; CONTS denotes control variables; including firm size (FSIZE), leverage (LEV), 
profitability (PROF), firm age (AGE), audit firm size (BIG4), consumer proximity (CP), and environmental 
sensitivity (ES)) 
Table 26 presents the empirical results of the regression model (1). Overall, all the variables 
explained 32.3% of the dependent variable’s variance. The adjusted R2 is 26% with the 
standard error value of 0.167. Based on the table, five variables were found significant, 
including four independent variables (BS, FED, BLOC and COMT) and a control variable 
(BIG4). The results, therefore, confirmed that board size, the presence of CSR committee and 
audit firm size have positive and significant impact on CSRD, while the relationship between 
block ownership and CSRD is significantly negative, as expected in the hypotheses. Different 
from the expectation, board gender diversity (FED) is significantly and negatively associated 
with CSRD. This unexpected result will be explained further in the discussion section. The 
impact of the other independent variables, board independence and CEO duality is 
insignificant. As a result, the hypotheses for these two variables cannot be confirmed. Among 
all of the control variables, only audit firm size (BIG4) is positively and significantly related 
to the CSRD. The coefficients of the other control variables are insignificant.  
Finally, in order to examine the contribution of CG variables to the explanation of CSRDI’s 
variance, a regression model (3) with only control variables is run. The statistic of R2 in this 
model is then compared with the results of the model (1) to identify the contribution of CG 
variables. 
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(3) CSRDI = β0 + β1 BIG4 + β2 FSIZE + β3 LEV + β4 PROF + β5 AGE + β6 CP + β7 ES 
+ εi 
(Notes: CSRDI denotes CSRD index; BIG4 denotes audit firm size; FSIZE denotes firm size; LEV denotes 
leverage; PROF denotes profitability; AGE denotes firm age; CP denotes consumer proximity; ES denotes 
environmental sensitivity) 
Table 26: Empirical results of the regression model (1) 
Variables Coefficient 
estimate 
Sig. Collinearity statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) -0.055 0.846   
Corporate Governance variables 
BS 0.017 0.002*** 0.758 1.319 
IND 0.000 0.695 0.634 1.577 
FED -0.003 0.026** 0.910 1.099 
DUAL -0.050 0.230 0.845 1.184 
BLOC -0.002 0.008*** 0.879 1.137 
COMT 0.115 0.002*** 0.909 1.100 
Control variables 
FZISE 0.018 0.200 0.384 2.605 
LEV 7.198E-5 0.926 0.546 1.830 
PROF 0.001 0.586 0.577 1.734 
AGE 0.000 0.722 0.805 1.242 
BIG4 0.070 0.059* 0.762 1.313 
CP -0.006 0.854 0.666 1.501 
ES 0.023 0.452 0.801 1.249 
Notes: BS denotes board size; IND denotes board independence; FED denotes board gender diversity; DUAL denotes CEO 
duality; COMT denotes CSR committee; BLOC denotes block ownership; FSIZE denotes firm size; LEV denotes leverage; 
PROF denotes profitability; AGE denotes firm age; BIG4 denotes audit firm size; CP denotes consumer proximity; ES denotes 
environmental sensitivity. ***, ** and * indicates significance at 0.01; 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively.  
Prior to the interpretation of the model (3)’s results, diverse visual and statistical tests are 
conducted to ensure all of the OLS assumptions are satisfied. Similar with the previous section, 
the Cook’s Distance, Leverage values and the Studentised Residuals are used to identify 
outliers. The Cook’s Distance values range from 0.000 to 0.089. The Leverage values are from 
0.011 to 0.233. As a result, all of the Cook’s Distance and Leverage values do not exceed one. 
Moreover, the Studentised Residuals range from -2.846 to 2.237 with no value above three. 
Therefore, it could be concluded that no obvious outlier is found in the model (3) that might 
cause non-linearity and heteroscedasticity. Furthermore, the visual inspection of the Scatterplot 
and the P-P Plot suggest there is no obvious outlier and the distribution does not show any 
obvious curve and with random patterns. As a result, the assumptions of linearity and 
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homoscedasticity are not violated. In the normal probability plot, all the values fall along the 
diagnosis line without any serious departure, indicating the normality assumption was also 
satisfied. Finally, with the Durbin-Watson statistics of 1.778, the autocorrelation assumption is 
not seriously violated. Additionally, as all the VIF values are below 2, multicollinearity is also 
not an issue. The model’s results, therefore, can be used to compare with the previous 
regression model. Table 27 presents the comparison of summary regression diagnostics 
between the two models.  
Table 27: Comparisons between the original model (1) and the model (3)  
Regression diagnostics Model (1) Model (3) 
R2 0.323 0.160 
Adjusted R2 0.260 0.124 
F-value 5.099 4.386 
F-value significance 0.000 0.000 
Standard error 0.167 0.191 
Durbin-Watson statistics 1.949 1.778 
 
Comparing the R2 statistics between the regression model (1) (with all the variables) and the 
regression model (3) (with only control variables) shows that the presence of CG variables 
have increased the R2 value from 0.160 to 0.323, which means the CG variables contribute 
approximately 16.3% to the explanation of CSRDI’s variance. With CG variables as predictors 
together with the control variables, the standard error of estimation has also reduced from 0.191 
to 0.167.  
In conclusion, the results of the regression models emphasise the role of CG practices in 
defining firms’ CSRD practice. Together, all six CG variables explained nearly 20% of the 
CSRDI’s variance. Among all the internal determinants (CG practices), four variables are 
found to have significant impact on the level of CSRD across the six Southeast Asian countries, 
including BS, FED, BLOC and COMT, in which BS and COMT have positive coefficients 
while FED and BLOC have a negative effect on CSRDI. As a result, the findings confirm 
hypotheses 1, 5 and 6. Although board gender diversity was reported to have a significant 
impact on CSRDI, hypothesis 3 cannot be confirmed as the sign of the relationship is different 
from the expectation. Table 28 summarises the results of regression model (1).  
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Table 28: Summary of results of corporate governance variables 
Independent 
variables 
Hypothesis Predicted 
sign 
Sign of 
coefficient 
P-value Hypothesis 
confirm 
CG variables      
BS 
IND 
FED 
DUAL 
BLOC  
COMT 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
+ 
+ 
+ 
- 
- 
+ 
+ 
+ 
- 
- 
- 
+ 
0.001*** 
0.988 
0.030** 
0.359 
0.006*** 
0.003*** 
Confirm 
Not confirm 
Not confirm 
Not confirm 
Confirm 
Confirm 
Notes: BS denotes board size; IND denotes board independence; FED denotes board gender diversity; DUAL 
denotes CEO duality; COMT denotes the presence of CSR committee; BLOC denotes block ownership. *** and ** 
indicate significant levels at .01 and .05 respectively 
6.3.3 Sensitivity Analysis  
In this section, several tests are used to check the robustness of the results reported in section 
6.3.2, including the use of alternative model with transformed variables to examine the impact 
of non-normal distributed variables on the model and the use of weighted CSRDI and CSRD 
sub-indices. 
Firstly, as presented in table 25, some of the variables have non-normal distribution. Although 
these variables were argued to not seriously influence the normal distribution of the regression 
model’s variate, an alternative model with transformed variables is run to examine the impact 
of these non-normal distributed variables on the regression’s results. The three variables with 
non-normal distribution are board gender diversity (FED), profitability (PROF) and firm age 
(AGE). Different kinds of transformation, including inverse, square root, logarithm, squared or 
cubed, as suggested by Hair (2010, p.78), were applied and the most appropriate transformed 
variables are chosen. Particularly, square root transformation is applied for FED variable, and 
the logarithm transformation is employed for both PROF and AGE variables, to reduce non-
normality. The results of the regression model (1.1) with transformed variables are presented 
in table 29 and compared with the results of the original model (1). Observable, the results of 
both models are almost identical in terms of coefficients’ signs and significant levels. The only 
differences between these two models are the coefficient values of the original variables and 
the transformed variables, which is expected. As a result, it could be concluded that the 
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regression results are consistent and the variables with non-normal distribution do not have any 
major impact on the model (1).  
As mentioned in previous chapters, the CSRD checklist employed in this study consists of 30 
items divided into four sub-categories, environmental disclosure (ED), HR disclosure (HRD), 
product and consumer disclosure (PCD) and finally community-involvement disclosure (CD). 
As the number of items in each sub-category is not equal (ED has 11 items, HRD has 9 items, 
PCD and CD have 5 items), the results of regression model (1) could be sensitive to the weight 
of each sub-index. As a result, following a previous study of Elmagrhi (2016, p.174) in order 
to examine whether the relationships between the sub-indices and the independent variables 
are the same with the main results, the regression model (1) is re-estimated with the sub-indices, 
EDI, HRDI, PCDI, and CDI as dependent variables. The results of these models are presented 
in table 30. The results of the four sub-indices model are similar with those reported in Table 
26, except for some small sensitivities such as a negative coefficient on IND in model (1.4) 
and some inconsistent signs in control variables. The results of these models, therefore, provide 
evidence that the results are fairly robust to the use of different sub-indices.  
Moreover, as justified in Chapter Four, the CSRDI is equal weighted. However, since the 
number of items in the sub-indices are substantially different from each other, different weights 
could be assigned to each sub-index (for instance EDI 36%, HRDI 30%, PCDI 17% and CDI 
17%). As a result, following previous disclosure studies (Elmagrhi, 2016, p.176; Al-Bassam, 
Ntim, Opong and Downs, 2015, p.28), an alternative weighted index W-CSRDI was 
constructed by giving each of the sub-index an equal weight of 25% to ensure the relationship 
between the CG variables and CSRDI is not sensitive to the weight of the four sub-indices. The 
regression model (1), hence, is re-examined with the W-CSRDI replaced the equal-weighted 
CSRDI as the dependent variable. The findings of the new model (1.6) is reported in Table 30. 
The coefficients’ values, directions, and the significant levels of the CG variables are almost 
the same with the original model, apart from a very minor sensitivity of IND where the 
coefficient changed from 0.000 to -0.001 with the same insignificant level. With this evidence, 
the findings of the main model (1) could be concluded to be fairly robust with different 
weighting technique of the sub-indices.  
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Table 29: Comparisons of results between the original model (1) and the model with 
transformed variables (1.1) 
Independent Variable 
(Model) 
Main OLS Model  Model with transformed 
variables  
(1) (1.1) 
Corporate Governance Variables 
BS 0.017 (.002)*** 0.018 (.001)*** 
IND 0.000 (.695) 0.000 (.907) 
FED -0.003 (.026)**  
FED (SR) - -0.013 (.055)* 
DUAL -0.050 (.230) -.0.054 (.200) 
BLOC -0.002 (.008)*** -0.002 (.006)*** 
COMT 0.115 (.002)*** 0.114 (.002)*** 
Control variables 
FSIZE 0.018 (.200) 0.017 (.233) 
LEV 7.198E-5 (.926) 0.000 (.903) 
PROF 0.001 (.586) - 
PROF (Log) - 0.029 (.535) 
AGE 0.000 (.722) - 
AGE (Log) - 0.040 (.372) 
BIG4 0.070 (.059)* 0.068 (.069)* 
CP -0.006 (.854) -0.005 (.878) 
ES 0.023 (.452) 0.023 (.455) 
Constant -0.055 (.846) -0.114 (.705) 
Durbin-W. Stat 1.949 1.971 
F-value 5.099*** 5.105*** 
Adj. R2 26% 26% 
Notes: BS denotes board size; IND denotes board independence; FED denotes board gender diversity; FED (SR) denotes 
square root transformation of FED; DUAL denotes CEO duality; COMT denotes CSR committee; BLOC denotes block 
ownership; FSIZE denotes firm size; LEV denotes leverage; PROF denotes profitability; PROF (log) denotes logarithm 
transformation of PROF; AGE denotes firm age; AGE (Log) denotes logarithm transformation of AGE; BIG4 denotes audit 
firm size; CP denotes consumer proximity; ES denotes environmental sensitivity. P-values are in brackets. ***, ** and * indicates 
significance at 0.01; 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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Table 30:  Summary of results based on CSRD sub-indices and weighted CSRDI 
Notes: BS denotes board size; IND denotes board independence; FED denotes board gender diversity; DUAL denotes CEO duality; COMT denotes CSR committee; BLOC 
denotes block ownership; FSIZE denotes firm size; LEV denotes leverage; PROF denotes profitability; AGE denotes firm age; BIG4 denotes audit firm size; CP denotes 
consumer proximity; ES denotes environmental sensitivity. P-values are in brackets. ***, ** and * indicates significance at 0.01; 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. 
 
 
Independent variable 
(Model) 
EDI HRDI PCDI CDI W-CSRDI 
(1.2) (1.3) (1.4) (1.5) (1.6) 
Corporate Governance variables: 
BS 0.016 (.030)** 0.016 (.031)** 0.026 (.001)*** 0.013 (.121) 0.018 (.001)*** 
IND 0.001 (.425) 0.000 (.684) 0.000 (.893) -0.004 (.006)*** -0.001 (.478) 
FED -0.002 (.169) -0.004 (.025)** -0.002 (.328) -0.003 (.136) -0.003 (.028)** 
DUAL -0.028 (.633) -0.078 (.169) -0.052 (.368) -0.018 (.779) -0.044 (.281) 
COMT 0.178 (.001)*** 0.089 (.081)* 0.148 (.005)*** 0.028 (.625) 0.111 (.003)*** 
BLOC -0.003 (.013)** -0.002 (.061)* -0.002 (.087)* -0.001 (.334) -0.002 (.012)** 
Control variables: 
FSIZE 0.041 (.039)** -0.024 (.216) -0.007 (.698) 0.063 (.004)*** 0.018 (.183) 
LEV -0.001 (.340) 0.002 (.026)** 0.001 (.523) -0.003 (.012)** 0.000 (.736) 
PROF 0.003 (.271) 0.000 (.978) 0.003 (.257) -0.002 (.437) 0.001 (.616) 
AGE 0.000 (.805) 0.001 (.309) 0.000 (.567) 0.000 (.933) 0.000 (.784) 
BIG4 0.033 (.533) 0.181 (.001)*** -0.011 (.825) 0.019 (.745) 0.055 (.132) 
CP 0.020 (.682) -0.034 (.455) 0.046 (.318) -0.034 (.516) -0.001 (.988) 
ES 0.064 (.147) 0.016 (.703) -0.020 (.642) 0.019 (.691) 0.020 (.515) 
Constant -0.598 (.142) 0.716 (.068)* 0.237 (.550) -0.528 (.234) -0.043 (.877) 
Durbin-W. Stat 1.788 1.842 1.886 2.112 2.041 
F-value 3.544*** 5.028*** 3.577 *** 2.428 *** 4.626*** 
Adj. R2 17.9% 25.6% 18.1% 10.9% 23.7% 
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Table 31: Non-linearity test  
Independent Variable (Model) Main OLS Model  Non-linear model  
(1) (1.7) 
Corporate Governance Variables 
BS 0.017 (.002)*** 0028 (.394) 
BS2 - 0.000 (.733) 
IND 0.000 (.695) 0.000 (.690) 
FED -0.003 (.026)** -0.003 (.033)** 
DUAL -0.050 (.230) -.0.047 (.263) 
BLOC -0.002 (.008)*** 0.000 (.938) 
BLOC2 - -1.452E-5 (.604) 
COMT 0.115 (.002)*** 0.113 (.003)*** 
Control variables 
FSIZE 0.018 (.200) 0.018 (.208) 
LEV 7.198E-5 (.926) 6.274E-5 (.936) 
PROF 0.001 (.586) 0.001 (.643) 
AGE 0.000 (.722) 0.000 (.764) 
BIG4 0.070 (.059)* 0.064 (.105) 
CP -0.006 (.854) -0.004 (.916) 
ES 0.023 (.452) 0.022 (.491) 
Constant -0.055 (.846) -0.151 (.666) 
Durbin-W. Stat 1.949 1.963 
F-value 5.099*** 4.389*** 
Adj. R2 26% 25.1% 
Notes: BS denotes board size; BS2 denotes the squared transformation of BS; IND denotes board independence; FED denotes 
board gender diversity; DUAL denotes CEO duality; BLOC denotes block ownership; BLOC2 denotes the squared 
transformation of BLOC; COMT denotes CSR committee; FSIZE denotes firm size; LEV denotes leverage; PROF denotes 
profitability; AGE denotes firm age; BIG4 denotes audit firm size; CP denotes consumer proximity; ES denotes environmental 
sensitivity. P-values are in brackets. ***, ** and * indicates significance at 0.01; 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. 
Furthermore, based on some previous studies (Elghuweel, 2015; Elmagrhi, 2016, Ntim, Lindop 
and Thomas, 2013), the impact of some CG mechanisms, such as board size and block 
ownership on corporate voluntary disclosure can be non-linear. As a result, in order to examine 
whether these two variables, board size and block ownership, have non-linear relationship with 
CSRD, the regression model (1) is re-estimated by including squared transformation of board 
size (BS) and block ownership (BLOC). Table 31 presents the results of the regression model 
(1.7) examining the non-linear association between these two CG mechanisms and CSRDI. 
The empirical results from the regression model (1.7) indicate that, different from some 
previous studies (i.e. Connelly, Limpaphayom and Nagarajan, 2012; Elmagrhi, 2016; Ntim et 
al., 2013), the two CG mechanisms, board size and block ownership, do not have non-linear 
relationship with CSRD in this study as the coefficient of both BS2 and BLOC2 in the model 
(1.7) are insignificant. Overall, other empirical findings remain the same compared with the 
original model (1). With the result of non-linear test, it can be concluded that there is no 
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presence of non-linear relationship between the two CG mechanisms, board size and block 
ownership with CSRD in the model (1).  
In this section, firstly different alternative models have been used to examine the robustness of 
the regression model (1)’s findings. As the directions and significant levels of the CG variables 
were fairly consistent across the six alternative models, the findings of the original model (1) 
can be considered relatively robust with the presence of non-normal distributed variables, 
across the sub-indices and with a different weighting technique of CSRDI. Moreover, the result 
of non-linearity test also showed that there is no presence of non-linear relationship between 
some of the CG mechanisms and CSRD in this study.  As a result, the empirical finding of the 
original model (1) could be used for further discussion in which conclusion of the impact of 
CG variables on CSRD and connection to previous literature will be made.  
6.3.4 Additional Test 
 
In order to further examine the impact of CG mechanisms on CSRD in different country 
contexts, country dummy variables are incorporated into the model (1) as follows: 
(1.8) CSRDI = β0 + β1 BS + β2 IND + β3 FED + β4 DUAL + β5 BLOC + β6 COMT + β7 
C1 + β8 C2 + β9 C3 + β10 C4 + β11 C5 + ∑ βi CONTSi + εi 
 (Notes: CSRDI denotes CSRD index; BS denotes board size; IND denotes board independence; FED denotes 
board gender diversity; DUAL denotes CEO duality; BLOC denotes block ownership; COMT denotes the 
presence of CSR committee; C1 denotes firms from Thailand; C2 denotes firms from Singapore; C3 denotes firms 
from Malaysia; C4 denotes firms from Indonesia; C5 denotes firms from Philippines; CONTS denotes control 
variables; including firm size (FSIZE), leverage (LEV), profitability (PROF), firm age (AGE), audit firm size 
(BIG4), consumer proximity (CP), and environmental sensitivity (ES)) 
The regression model (1.8) includes the same variables with the regression model (1) with the 
addition of five country dummy variables representing Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, 
Indonesia and Philippines. Vietnam is not represented as a dummy variable in the model and 
hence acts as the intercept factor for the comparison with the indices of the remaining five 
countries. If any of the coefficients on the dummy variables for each of the countries is 
significant, a conclusion can be drawn that the level of CSRD in the corresponding country is 
different significantly from the intercept country, in this case is Vietnam. Such result will again 
indicate that the variations of CSRD levels are significantly influenced by country-level factors. 
Table 32 presents the findings of the regression model (1.8). 
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Table 32: Findings of the regression  model (1.8) with country dummy variables 
Independent Variable 
(Model) 
Main OLS Model  Additional model  
(1) (1.8) 
Corporate Governance Variables 
BS 0.017 (.002)*** 0.011 (.073)* 
IND 0.000 (.695) 0.000 (.701) 
FED -0.003 (.026)** -0.002 (.207) 
DUAL -0.050 (.230) -0.037 (.374) 
BLOC -0.002 (.008)*** -0.002 (.015)** 
COMT 0.115 (.002)*** 0.113 (.003)*** 
Country dummy variables   
C1 - 0.113 (.125) 
C2 - 0.037 (.697) 
C3 - 0.117 (.121) 
C4 - 0.178 (.009)*** 
C5 - 0.151 (.086)* 
Control variables 
FSIZE 0.018 (.200) 0.008 (.608) 
LEV 7.198E-5 (.926) 0.001 (.437) 
PROF 0.001 (.586) 0.000 (.866) 
AGE 0.000 (.722) 0.000 (.731) 
BIG4 0.070 (.059)* 0.115 (.016)** 
CP -0.006 (.854) -0.014 (.689) 
ES 0.023 (.452) 0.014 (.653) 
Constant -0.055 (.846) 0.055 (.859) 
Durbin-W. Stat 1.949 1.986 
F-value 5.099*** 4.465*** 
Adj. R2 26% 29.1% 
Notes: BS denotes board size; IND denotes board independence; FED denotes board gender diversity; DUAL denotes CEO 
duality; COMT denotes CSR committee; BLOC denotes block ownership; C1 denotes firms from Thailand; C2 denotes firms 
from Singapore; C3 denotes firms from Malaysia; C4 denotes firms from Indonesia; C5 denotes firms from Philippines; FSIZE 
denotes firm size; LEV denotes leverage; PROF denotes profitability; AGE denotes firm age; BIG4 denotes audit firm size; 
CP denotes consumer proximity; ES denotes environmental sensitivity. ***, ** and * indicates significance at 0.01; 0.05 and 
0.10 level, respectively.  
With the addition of five dummies, the adjusted R2 has increased from 26% in model (1) to 
29.1% in model (1.8). Table 32 demonstrates similarity in the results between the two models. 
Overall, the empirical findings of CG variables and control variables remained the same. The 
only difference could be detected in the result of model (1.8) is that the FED variable, 
representing the number of female directors on board, is no longer significant. The finding 
indicates that when the country-level factors is considered, board gender diversity does not 
significantly influence the level of CSRD in the context of Southeast Asian countries. The 
finding, therefore, suggests that the relationship between board gender diversity and the extent 
of CSRD in Southeast Asia context is not straightforward; and other country-level factors 
should be considered. In term of country dummy variables, the findings present some 
significant results. Particularly, all of the dummies’ coefficients are positive, which means the 
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levels of CSRD of the five countries, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and 
Philippines, are higher than the level of CSRD in Vietnam. In another word, compared with 
these five countries, Vietnam has the lowest level of CSRD. This result is consistent with the 
descriptive statistics mention in section 5.2.1. However, surprisingly, among the five 
coefficients, only the coefficients of C4 and C5, representing firms from Indonesia and 
Philippines, are significant. Such findings imply that the level of CSRD in these countries are 
significantly higher than the level of CSRD in the intercept country, Vietnam. The findings 
also indicate that the variations of CSRD are affected by country-level factors. Compared with 
the findings of ANOVA analysis in section 6.2, the significant finding of C5 (Philippines) and 
the non-significant finding of C1 (Thailand) is rather unexpected. According to the result of 
ANOVA analysis, there are significant differences between the two countries with highest level 
of disclosure, Thailand and Indonesia, and the two lowest ones, Philippines and Vietnam. As a 
result, one would expect that firms from Thailand and Indonesia would have a significantly 
higher disclosure than firms from the intercept country, Vietnam, which means the coefficients 
of C1 and C4 were expected to be significant, while the coefficient of C5 (Philippines) would 
not be significant. However, the findings in model (1.8) show the opposite in the cases of C1 
and C5. This unexpected results could be explained by the presence of other variables, CG and 
control variables, in the model. When other variables in the model remain constant, only the 
levels of CSRD of firms from Indonesia and Philippines are significantly higher than the extent 
of disclosure in Vietnamese firms. These findings, hence, could open opportunities for future 
research to investigate further the relationship between these factors using interaction variables. 
In conclusion, the inclusion of country dummy variables has indicated that the variation of 
CSRD levels across the six Southeast Asian countries is influenced by nation-level factors. 
Following this result, the associations between some specific country-level factors and CSRD 
will be further examined in the later section 6.4. Prior the further investigation on the role of 
country and institutional factors, the empirical findings on the relationship between CG 
mechanisms and CSRD will be discussed in detail based on previous literature in the following 
sub-section.  
6.3.5 Discussion 
 
The results of both original model (1) and different alternative models presented in the previous 
section showed consistent result. The result being that among all CG variables, board size, 
board gender diversity, the presence CSR committee and block ownership are important 
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predictors of CSRDI. The findings, therefore, are discussed in detail as follows, in relation to 
previous literature.  
Firstly, the positive coefficient of board size emphasises its significantly positive impact on 
CSRD, which is consistent with the expectation from hypothesis 1. In the context of the six 
Southeast Asian countries, with the average board size of 11 found in this study, large boards 
appear to be a customary practice among big corporations and firms with a larger board size 
tend to engage more in CSRD practices. This contrasts with some arguments in the literature 
that larger boards can be ineffective due to the increase in communication problems and 
difficulties in coordinating the board and controlling management (Van den Berghe and 
Levrau, 2004). The finding, however, is consistent with some previous studies (Esa and 
Ghazali, 2012; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Post, Rahman and Rubow, 2011). Larger boards 
were stated to be more effective in responding to social pressures and stakeholders demands 
(Barakat et al., 2015; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). Additionally, with a variety of ideas and 
experience, larger boards could initiate healthy discussions around CSRD (Esa and Ghazali, 
2012) and lead to higher involvement, as proven through the empirical finding.  
Different from the expectation built in hypothesis 2 and findings of some previous studies 
(Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Eng and Mak, 2003; Jizi et al., 2014; Petra, 2005), the impact of 
board independence measured through the percentage of independent directors on CSRD 
cannot be detected in this study. With the coefficient 0.000 (sig. = 0.695), the percentage of 
independent directors, in this case, have almost no effect on CSRD. The limited impact of 
independent directors in encouraging firm involvement in CSRD can be explained based on 
the context of the six examined countries. As discussed in Chapter 3, firms from Asia in general 
and in the six countries in particular are more likely to be owned by large families and have 
high block ownership. As the family groups would have some involvement in choosing 
independent directors, these directors, in this case, are not truly independent (Chen and 
Nowland, 2010). This argument is in conjunction with the observation of Mahadeo and 
Soobaroyen (2016, p.744) that “the lack of independence or ambiguities as to the role of an 
independent director is considered to be a significant problem in emerging economies”, which 
in turn demonstrates the board’s inability of supervising management effectively. Furthermore, 
despite the common practice of at least one-third of the board to be independent, the average 
board independence percentage of some countries (i.e. Indonesia, Vietnam and Philippines) 
still fall below this requirement. With the low number of independent directors on board, it 
would be difficult to control management and make changes such as engaging more in CSR 
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and CSRD. Additionally, according to Sundarasen, Je-Yen and Rajangam (2016), without the 
right experience and knowledge, independent directors are insufficient in managing a firm. 
This argument can be applied to explain the limited role of independent directors in the context 
of Southeast Asian countries in relation to CSRD. Particularly, among the six examined 
countries, in some countries like the Philippines and Vietnam, CSR remains a relatively new 
concept. CSR awareness and knowledge, therefore, is still very limited (Binh, 2016; Chapple 
and Moon, 2005; Nguyen et al., 2015). As a result, independent directors might not be able to 
recognise the importance of CSRD and convince the board to adopt and develop the practice 
in their annual reports. Furthermore, in the case of Vietnam for instance, the definition of non-
executive directors and independent directors has only very recently been mentioned in law 
and regulation (IFC, 2012). As a result, without supportive guidance, it is understandable that 
the role of independent directors in motivating firms to participate in CSRD could be hindered.  
With the negative coefficient, surprisingly, board gender diversity has a negative impact on 
CSRD. The finding differs from the expectation developed in Hypothesis 3. Even though most 
previous studies have supported a positive relationship between the number of female directors 
on a board and disclosure (Adams and Ferreira, 2004; Carter et al., 2003; Khan, 2010), 
according to Kramer, Konrad, Erkut and Hooper (2006), only one or two female directors on 
the board is insufficient to make changes. The social pressure from the majority opinions could 
reduce the competency of minorities (Brewer and Kramer, 1985) and pressure them to conform 
(Nemeth, 1986). Although the majority of CG codes in these countries mention board diversity 
in term of gender as a good CG practice (Chapter Three, table 6), this practice has not been 
commonly implemented in the context of the six countries. In this study, the average percentage 
of female directors on board is only 11.73%. With the low representation, female directors in 
these countries do not have enough power to make changes within corporate decision making. 
The significant negative impact of female directors on CSRD could be explained by the 
argument of Amran et al. (2014b) in which the low proportion of gender diversity might reduce 
the level of independence of the board. Moreover, this empirical finding confirms the 
observation of Mahadeo, Soobaroyen and Hanuman (2012) that the positive impact of female 
directors on board is not consistent in empirical studies as women participation on board is 
purely considered as a legitimacy effect to stakeholders.  
In terms of CEO duality, based on the empirical finding, CEO duality has a negative and 
insignificant impact on CSRD. Although the coefficient sign is aligned with expectation, the 
result was insignificant which implies that CEO duality, in this study, does not influence the 
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level of CSRD in annual reports. Hypothesis 4, as a result, is rejected. The finding does not 
provide empirical support for previous studies (i.e. Chakroun and Matoussi, 2012; Jizi et al., 
2014) that firms with CEO duality practice on board tend to disclose less CSR information in 
annual reports. The finding, however, is consistent with the study of Khan et al. (2013a) in 
which the impact of CG practices on CSRD was examined in the context of Bangladesh, an 
emerging economy. Following the argument from Khan et al. (2013a), the insignificant effect 
of CEO duality on CSRD in this particular study could be explained by the context of the six 
countries. The descriptive statistics in Chapter Five, section 5.5.2.1, showed that CEO duality 
is not a common CG practice in these countries. Only 14.6% of firms in the sample practice 
CEO duality on board with the highest percentage of 33.3% in Philippines. However, the 
separation of CEO and Chairman positions, in this situation, does not mean Chairman is 
independent. With the tradition of family control and high level of block ownership, these two 
positions could be given to the two members of the same family or majority shareholders. As 
a result, even though the two positions are held by different persons, it might have little impact 
on firms’ practices; and role duality, in this case, may have limited meaning. Therefore, it is 
understandable that CEO duality does not have any significant impact on CSRD in this context.  
The percentage of block ownership was found to have a significant and negative impact on 
CSRD. The finding, therefore, confirms hypothesis 5 and concludes that firms with a higher 
percentage of block ownership tend to disclose less CSR information in their annual reports. 
With more than 5% of ownership in a firm, block shareholders often have representatives on 
board and are subsequently more interested in firms’ financial performance rather than social 
information. As a result, board of directors have less motivation to disclose CSR information 
(Htay et al., 2012). Moreover, the finding also supports arguments of the relationship between 
block ownership and CSRD from legitimacy and agency perspectives. Particularly, from the 
legitimacy aspect, firms with high level of block ownership receive less pressure for public 
accountability and therefore have less motivations to practice CSRD (see Ghazali, 2007; Ntim 
and Soobaroyen, 2013). From the agency perspective, with a greater extent of agency-principal 
conflicts (Fama and Jense, 1983), firms with widely held ownership are more likely to use 
CSRD to improve their financial reporting and reduce information asymmetries than firms with 
high block ownership (Reverte, 2009). The result, therefore, supports the findings of previous 
studies in the literature (Adelopo, 2011; Htay et al., 2012; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2012).  
The next significant variable is the presence of a CSR committee. The sign of coefficient 
demonstrates positive impact of CSR committees on CSRD. Although the presence of a CSR 
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committee has not been widely practiced in the six Southeast Asian countries, the result 
confirms the hypothesis 6 that firms with a CSR committee at board level report more CSR 
information in their annual report. It is not a surprise that CSR committees play an important 
role in determining the level of CSRD. Evidence from previous studies (Ullman, 1985; Rankin 
et al., 2011) show that the existence of a CSR committee indicates firms’ attention to 
stakeholders and CSR issues at board level as well as its concern to legitimise social and 
environmental reputation. The obvious involvement of the committee in the reporting process, 
therefore, would increase the corporations’ tendency to disclose social information (Michelon 
and Parbonetti, 2012; Ullman, 1985).  
Regarding the effect of control variables on CSRD, different from the expectation that larger 
firms have tendency to disclose more CSR information in annual reports to demonstrate their 
corporate citizenship, response to external pressures, legitimise their existence and enhance 
reputation (see Branco and Rodrigues, 2008; Ghazali, 2007, Hamid, 2004), the effect of firm 
size on CSRD was positive and insignificant in this study. The finding, however, is aligned 
with some other studies (see Anas et al., 2015; Esa and Ghazali, 2012). The non-significant 
result of firm size on CSRD could be attributed to the fact that the sample size of this study 
comprises 30 largest firms from each of the countries. Based on the descriptive statistics in 
Chapter 5, section 5.5.4, the size of firms collected from these countries are relatively 
consistent, which might have hindered the possibility to detect firm size effect on CSRD.   
Both control variables related to financial performance, leverage and profitability, were found 
to have positive and insignificant relationship with CSRD. These findings are consistent with 
many previous studies in the literature (see Esa and Ghazali, 2012; Naser and Hassan, 2013; 
Rahman et al., 2011; Siregar and Bachtiar, 2010). The insignificant results of these two 
economic measurements could be explained by the observation of Williams (1999) that firms 
disclose CSR information as a response to social pressures rather than economic pressures. 
Furthermore, the insignificant impact of profitability on CSRD could be due to the fact that 
firms, despite being profitable, still perceive investment in CSR as a cost without any tangible 
benefits (Siregar and Bachtiar, 2010).   
Similar with the mentioned control variables, the effect of firm age on CSRD in this study was 
insignificant. With the coefficient of 0.000, it can be concluded that firm age does not have any 
impact on CSRD. The finding, therefore, is opposite with the expectation that longer-
established firms have greater sense of social responsibility which reflects in higher level of 
disclosure. The result, however, is aligned with some previous studies concluding that there is 
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no significant relationship between firm age and CSRD (see El-Halaby and Hussainey, 2015; 
Parsa and Kouhy, 2008; Rahman et al., 2011). The finding implies the levels of CSRD between 
long-established companies and new companies are not different. The impact of firm age on 
CSRD might be hindered in this study due to the study context. Since CSR is a new concept in 
some of the examined countries, with limited CSR awareness, longer-established firms do not 
necessarily develop better sense of social responsibility which leads to more disclosure as 
argued. Therefore, their CSRD practice might not be much different from the practice of new 
firms. The impact of firm age on CSRD hence cannot be detected.  
Audit firm size is the only control variable that was confirmed to have significant impact on 
CSRD. With the positive coefficient, following previous studies (see Barros et al., 2013; Huang 
and Kung, 2010), the empirical finding supports the positive relationship between audit firm 
size and CSRD. Based on the arguments of previous studies, large audit firms are more likely 
to be concerned for their reputation and avoid the risk of losing it by associating themselves 
with firms that disclose more information (Alsaeed, 2006; DeAngelo, 1981). Furthermore, 
companies’ decision of audit firm is claimed to be linked with the choice to disclose more or 
less information (Craswell and Taylor, 1992). The choice of employing audit specialists comes 
along with the intention to provide high disclosure quality (Dunn and Mayhew, 2004). As a 
result, aligned with these arguments, the empirical finding of this study confirms that firms 
audited by one of the Big Four auditing companies tend to disclose more CSR information in 
their annual reports as these auditing companies are expected to be better at assessing the firms’ 
impact on environment and society; and hence tend to require more CSRD (Bewley and Li, 
2000).   
Finally, the two variables representing the impact of industry affiliation on CSRD, consumer 
proximity and environmental sensitivity, were concluded to be insignificant based on the 
empirical results. Therefore, different from the expectation that industry affiliation could play 
an important role in defining a firm’s CSRD practice, this study found no significant difference 
in the level of CSRD between firms from high-profile industries and low-profile industries, or 
between firms operating in industries with high environmental impact and their counterparts 
from industries with low impact. Majority of the arguments supporting the effect of industry 
affiliation on CSRD is based on different levels of external pressures faced by these industries 
(see Clarke and Gibson-Sweet, 1999; Reverte, 2009; Wang et al., 2013). Firms from high 
profile industries or industries with high environmental impact were expected to disclose more 
CSR information in annual reports to response to stakeholder pressures and avoid criticism 
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from external parties (see Patten, 1991; Reverte, 2009). However, the insignificant findings of 
both industry affiliation’s indicators in this study could be explained by the fact that external 
pressures on firms to engage in CSR activities are low in these countries’ context. Previous 
studies (i.e. Hieu, 2011; Ramasamy and Ting, 2004) recorded relatively low awareness of CSR 
among stakeholders in some of the six countries. The low awareness of stakeholders, therefore, 
could reduce the pressures faced by companies operating in high profile or environmentally 
sensitive industries, which possibly leads to indifferences in their CSRD practice compared 
with their counterparts from other industries.  
6.3.6 Section Summary 
This section has provided the empirical results to answer the research question regarding the 
impact of CG mechanisms on CSRD. The empirical findings indicated that board size, board 
gender diversity, block ownership and the presence of CSR committee have significant impact 
on CSRD. Particularly, aligned with the expectations, board size, and the presence of CSR 
committee were significantly and positively associated with CSRD, while block ownership had 
significantly negative relationship with CSRD. Although board gender diversity was found to 
have significant result, the relationship sign was opposite to the expectation. The results of the 
other CG mechanisms, board independence and CEO duality were insignificant. Comparison 
with the model (3) consisting only control variables showed that CG mechanisms, in this study, 
explained a significant part (16.3%) of the CSRDI. The followed-up sensitivity analyses 
provided evidence that the empirical findings are robust with the existence of non-normal 
distributed variables as well as the use of different sub-indices and weighted index. At the end 
of the section, the empirical results were discussed in relation to previous literature and the 
study context.  
6.4 The Impact of Institutional Factors on CSRDI 
 
Following the previous section on the effect of CG practices on CSRD, the main purpose of 
this section is to identify the impact of the six institutional factors developed in the literature 
review on CSRD. Similar with the analysis procedure in the previous section, OLS assumptions 
will be examined first, followed by the empirical results of the model (2) and sensitivity 
analyses. The section finishes with a discussion of the empirical findings in relation to previous 
literature and a summary of the section. The OLS regression model is presented as follows: 
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(2) CSRDI = β0 + β1 LEG + β2 MD + β3 UA + β4 MAS + β5 GRI + β6 CSRA  
+ ∑ βi CONTSi + εi 
Notes: CSRDI denotes CSRD index; LEG denotes legal origin; MD denotes mandatory disclosure; UA denotes 
uncertainty avoidance dimension; MAS denotes masculinity dimension; GRI denotes the adoption of GRI 
standard; CSRA denotes the membership of CSR-related associations; CONTS denotes control variables, 
including firm size (FSIZE); leverage (LEV), profitability (PROF), firm age (AGE), audit firm size (BIG4), 
consumer proximity (CP), and environmental sensitivity (ES). 
6.4.1 OLS Assumptions Testing 
 
Firstly, in order to identify influential outliers that may cause non-linearity and 
heteroscedasticity, similar with the regression model (1), various measurements, including 
Cook’s Distance, Leverage Value and Studentised Residuals, are used. The Cook’s Distance 
values range from 0.000 to 0.100 with the mean of 0.007; while the Leverage values range 
from 0.035 to 0.267 with the mean score of 0.078. In both of these measurement, there is no 
observation with value exceed one. In the case of Studentised Residuals, with the minimum 
value of -3.081 and the maximum value of 2.741, there is only one observation with residual 
marginally exceed the value of three. However, as the mean score is very small (-0.001), 
following the argument of Ntim (2009), the observation is not a severe outlier. Therefore, 
outliers should not be an issue in this model.  
As all the metric variables in the regression model (2) have been examined in the previous 
section. To avoid repetition, the assumptions of normality, homoscedasticity, linearity, and 
independence of the residuals, will only be examined on the model’s variate. Visual and 
statistical examination using normal probability plot of the residuals, the scatterplot of 
standardised residuals (for brevity sake not presented here) and Durbin-Watson test (table 36, 
page 225) does not show any serious violation of these assumptions. Regarding 
multicollinearity, similar with the previous section, Pearson’s parametric correlation, 
Spearman’s non-parametric correlation, Tolerance value and VIF value are used to examine 
the correlations between the variables. Table 33 presents the coefficients of both Pearson’s and 
Spearman’s correlation matrices. As the two correlation matrices are similar in terms of 
direction and magnitude, non-normal distribution of some variables in the sample would not 
seriously violate the OLS’s assumptions. The correlation matrices also show that there are eight 
variables that have significant correlations with CSRDI, including LEG, UA, MAS, GRI, 
FSIZE, LEV, AGE and BIG4, in which GRI, UA and BIG4 are the three variables with highest 
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coefficients. Furthermore, it is important to pay attention to some relatively high correlations 
with value above 0.40 such as correlations between GRI and CSRA, UA and LEG, UA and 
MD, PROF and FSIZE. Among all the independent and control variables, the variable FSIZE 
have significant correlations with ten other variables in the model; and some of these 
correlation coefficients are higher than 0.40. Despite the high level of correlations between 
some of the predictors, there is no correlation with value above 0.800 or 0.900 which indicates 
the presence of severe multicollinearity (Field, 2013, p.325). Moreover, all of the tolerance and 
VIF values reported in the table 34 are at the acceptable level. Therefore, multicollinearity is 
not a problem in this regression model. 
In conclusion, the examination showed that all of the OLS assumptions were not seriously 
violated in the regression model (2) and no obvious outlier was identified. The OLS model, 
therefore, can be used as an appropriate statistical technique to examine the impact of the 
institutional factors on CSRD.   
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Table 33: Correlations between the variables in the regression model (2) 
 
VARIABLES CSRDI LEG MD UA MAS GRI CSRA FSIZE LEV PROF AGE BIG4 CP ES 
 CSRDI  .206*** .054 .260*** -.159** .406*** .105 .187** .199*** -.014 .185** .293*** .051 -.031 
LEG .202***  -.313*** .454*** .038 .235*** .265*** .374*** .083 -.081 .051 .411*** .053 -.142* 
MD .063 -.313***  -.454*** .692*** .011 -.066 .113 -.051 .125 .352*** -.329*** .112 .045 
UA .243*** .454*** -.454***  -.314*** .156** .179** -.015 .161** -.014 .011 .151* .093 .018 
MAS -.147 .038 .692*** -.314***  -.014 .073 .237*** .032 -.040 .249*** -.368*** .197** .029 
GRI .390*** .235*** .011 .156** -.014  .472*** .247*** .169** -.026 .144* .135 .094 .067 
CSRA .104 .265*** -.066 .179** .073 .472***  .258*** .179** -.040 .149* .022 .195** .100 
FSIZE .223*** .382*** .130* -.012 .234*** .251*** .254***  .407*** -.573*** .345*** .164** .254*** -.145* 
LEV .197*** .069 -.045 .152** .006 .148* .172** .427***  -.502*** .259*** -.004 .390*** -.133 
PROF -.007 -.013 .098 .030 -.032 .067 .051 -.465*** -.226***  -.109 .003 -.072 .021 
AGE .137* .019 .298*** -.024 .246*** .113 .132* .344*** .234*** .019  -.029 .164** -.164** 
BIG4 .306*** .411*** -.329*** .151* -.368*** .135* .022 .181** .022 .045 .010  .071 -.233*** 
CP .050 .053 .112 .093 .197** .094 .195** .285*** .403*** .069 .137* .071  -.306*** 
ES -.032 -.142* .045 .018 .029* .067 .100 -.142* -.168** -.113 -.096 -.233*** -.306***  
Notes: The bottom left half provides Pearson’s parametric correlation coefficients, whereas the upper right half contains Spearman’s non-parametric correlation coefficients. 
CSRDI denotes CSRD index; LEG denotes legal origin; MD denotes mandatory disclosure; UA denotes uncertainty avoidance dimension; MAS denotes masculinity dimension; 
GRI denotes the adoption of GRI standard; CSRA denotes the membership of CSR-related associations; FSIZE denotes firm size; LEV denotes leverage; BIG4 denotes audit firm 
size; CP denotes consumer proximity; ES denotes environmental sensitivity; PROF denotes profitability; AGE denotes firm age. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 0.01 and 
0.05 level, respectively.  
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Table 34: Tolerance and VIF statistics of all the predictors in the regression model (2) 
Variable Tolerance  VIF 
LEG 0.352 2.839 
MD 0.326 3.067 
UA 0.548 1.826 
MAS 0.324 3.086 
RS 0.703 1.423 
CSRA 0.667 1.500 
FSIZE 0.343 2.917 
LEV 0.649 1.542 
BIG4 0.585 1.708 
CP 0.630 1.587 
ES 0.775 1.290 
PROF 0.548 1.824 
AGE 0.740 1.352 
Notes: CSRDI denotes CSRD index; LEG denotes legal origin; MD denotes mandatory disclosure; UA denotes 
uncertainty avoidance dimension; MAS denotes masculinity dimension; GRI denotes the adoption of GRI 
standard; CSRA denotes the membership of CSR-related associations; FSIZE denotes firm size; LEV denotes 
leverage; BIG4 denotes audit firm size; CP denotes consumer proximity; ES denotes environmental sensitivity; 
PROF denotes profitability; AGE denotes firm age.  
6.4.2 Empirical Results: Institutional Factors and CSRD 
Following the hypotheses established in the literature review (Chapter Three, section 3.3) about 
the effect of diverse institutional factors on CSRD, the regression model (2) includes the 
dependent variable (CSRDI), the independent variables (institutional variables) and control 
variables (firm age, firm size, leverage, profitability, audit firm size, consumer proximity and 
environmental sensitivity). Table 35 presents a summary of the empirical results. With the R2 
value of 0.376, all the variables in the model explain 37.6% of the variance of the CSRDI. The 
adjusted R2 value of 0.324 which is smaller than the R2 value indicates no overfitting in the 
model. The standard error value of the model is 0.167.   
In terms of independent variables, four variables are found to be statistically significant, 
including mandatory disclosure (MD), uncertainty avoidance (UA), masculinity (MAS), and 
the adaption of GRI standard (GRI). Consistent with expectations, mandatory disclosure and 
the adaption of GRI standard have positive and significant impact on CSRD, while masculinity 
cultural dimension is significantly and negatively associated with CSRD. Although the result 
of uncertainty avoidance dimension is significant, the coefficient sign is not as expected. The 
unexpected coefficient sign for this variable will be discussed further in the discussion section 
below. The results of the other independent variables, legal system (LEG) and CSR-related 
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associations (CSRA) were found to be insignificant. In terms of coefficient signs, apart from 
the unexpected sign of UA, CSRA also have the coefficient sign opposite with the expectation. 
Aligned with the hypothesis 12, firms that are members of CSR-related associations tend to 
have better awareness about CSR and disclose more CSR information in annual reports. 
However, based on the coefficient sign, CSRA has negative relationship with CSRD. As the 
bivariate correlation between CSRA and CSRD was positive (table 33), the changed sign in 
the regression model could be a result of multicollinearity or the mediating effect of other 
variables in the model. Nevertheless, the coefficient of CSRA is not significant; hence, the 
relationship between CSRA and CSRD is inconclusive in this study. Furthermore, the 
coefficient values show that among the significant independent variables, mandatory disclosure 
is the strongest predictor of CSRD, following by the two cultural dimension variables 
(uncertainty avoidance and masculinity) and finally the adaption of GRI reporting standard. In 
terms of the control variables, similar with the regression model (1), only audit firm size (BIG4) 
is found to be significant, which confirms that firms audited by the four big auditing companies 
tend to disclose higher level of CSR information in their annual reports.  
Table 35: Empirical results of the regression model (2)  
Variables Coefficient 
estimate 
Sig. Collinearity statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 0.076 0.785   
Independent Variables 
LEG 
 
0.041 
 
0.342 
 
0.352 
 
2.839 
MD 0.210 0.000** 0.326 3.067 
UA 0.133 0.005** 0.548 1.826 
MAS -0.145 0.003** 0.324 3.086 
GRI 0.126 0.000** 0.703 1.423 
CSRA -0.037 0.335 0.667 1.500 
Control Variables     
FSIZE 0.004 0.765 0.343 2.917 
LEV 0.001 0.076 0.649 1.542 
BIG4 0.109 0.005** 0.585 1.708 
CP -0.024 0.454 0.630 1.587 
ES 0.005 0.874 0.775 1.290 
PROF -0.001 0.569 0.548 1.824 
AGE 0.000 0.901 0.740 1.352 
Notes: CSRDI denotes CSRD index; LEG denotes legal origin; MD denotes mandatory disclosure; UA denotes uncertainty 
avoidance dimension; MAS denotes masculinity dimension; GRI denotes the adoption of GRI standard; CSRA denotes the 
membership of CSR-related associations; FSIZE denotes firm size; LEV denotes leverage; BIG4 denotes audit firm size; CP 
denotes consumer proximity; ES denotes environmental sensitivity; PROF denotes profitability; AGE denotes firm age. ** 
and * indicate significance at 0.01 and 0.05 level, respectively.  
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Furthermore, in order to identify the contribution of all the institutional variables to explaining 
the dependent variable’s variance, comparisons will be made between the regression model (2) 
and regression model (3) with only control variables. Based on table 36, compared with the 
regression model (3), the presence of institutional variables has increased the value of R2 from 
0.160 to 0.376 and explained 21.6% of CSRDI’s variance. In relation to the previous result 
from section 6.2.2 in which the CG variables explained in total 17.6% of the CSRDI’s variance, 
it could be concluded that institutional variables, in this study, explained greater part of 
CSRDI’s variance than CG variables. 
Table 36: Comparisons between the model (2) and the model (3)  
Regression diagnostics  Model (2) Model (3) 
R2 0.376 0.160 
Adjusted R2 0.324 0.124 
F-value 7.181 4.386 
F-value significance 0.000 0.000 
Standard error 0.167 0.191 
Durbin-Watson statistics 2.257 1.778 
 
In conclusion, the institutional variables together have contributed more than 20% to the 
explanation of the dependent’s variance. The regression’s results confirmed that mandatory 
disclosure (MD), uncertainty avoidance (UA), masculinity (MAS) and the adoption of GRI 
standard (GRI) are important predictors of CSRD. The findings, therefore, confirm hypotheses 
8, 10 and 11. Table 37 provides a summary of the results. In the next section, diverse alternative 
models will be used to examine the robustness and the sensitivity of the regression’s results.  
Table 37: Summary of the results of institutional factors 
Independent 
variables 
Hypothesis Predicted 
sign 
Sign of 
coefficient 
P-value Hypothesis 
confirm 
LEG 
MD 
UA 
MAS 
GRI  
CSRA 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
+ 
+ 
- 
- 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
- 
+ 
- 
0.342 
0.000*** 
0.005*** 
0.003*** 
0.000*** 
0.335 
Not Confirm 
Confirm 
Not Confirm 
Confirm 
Confirm 
Not Confirm 
Notes: LEG denotes legal origin; MD denotes mandatory disclosure; UA denotes uncertainty avoidance; MAS 
denotes masculinity; GRI denotes the adoption of GRI standard; CSRA denotes CSR-related associations. *** 
indicates significance at 0.01 level.  
245 
 
6.4.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
In this section, similar with the previous regression model (1), a number of sensitivity analyses 
are applied to ensure the main findings were not influenced by the non-normal distribution of 
some variables, and are robust to alternative CSRD proxies. First of all, as discussed in the 
previous model (1), some of the control variables are suffered from non-normal distribution. 
As a result, in order to ensure such violation does not influence the regression model’s findings, 
the regression model (2) is re-estimated with transformed variables. Among all the variables 
considered in the regression model (2), two control variables, profitability (PROF) and firm 
age (AGE) were not distributed normally. The logarithm transformation was applied to reduce 
these variables’ non-normality. Therefore, in the regression model with transformed variables 
(2.1), while all of the other variables in the regression model (2) are kept the same, PROF and 
AGE variables are replaced by their transformed version, PROF (log) and AGE (log). The 
findings of the regression model (2.1) are presented in the table 38 and compared with the 
original findings of the regression model (2). In both models’ findings, the signs and significant 
levels of all the independent variables are the same. The magnitudes of the coefficients do not 
demonstrate substantial changes. In term of the control variables, except for the cases of two 
transformed variables, the results for the other control variables are relatively the same. Despite 
the coefficient signs of PROF and AGE changed from positive to negative in the transformed 
versions, the results remain insignificant. The slight changes in coefficient values of these two 
variables are expected due to the transformation. However, both variables have the same 
significance level in both models. Moreover, the original model (2) and the model with 
transformed variables (2.1) are relatively similar in terms of adjusted R2 and F-value. 
Specifically, the adjusted R2 in the original model is 32.4% while the value is 32.3% in model 
(2.1). The F values in the models (2) and (2.1) are 7.181 and 7.162 respectively. Therefore, 
with these slight differences, it could be concluded that the non-normality of some variables in 
the original model (2) does not seriously influence the findings.  
Additionally, as discussed in the section 6.3.3, the current employed CSRDI includes 30 items 
that are divided into the four sub-indices, environmental disclosure (ED), HR disclosure 
(HRD), product and consumer disclosure (PCD) and community-involvement disclosure (CD). 
However, as these sub-indices consist different number of items which suggests that the 
regression’s findings could be sensitive to the weight of each sub-index. As a result, similar 
with the previous section, in order to examine the effect of the independent variables on each 
of the sub-indices, four alternative models were conducted by re-estimating the regression 
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model (2) with each of the sub-indices, EDI, HRDI, PCDI and CDI, replaced the CSRDI as the 
dependent variable. The results of these four models is presented in the Table 39. The results 
of the four sub-indices models are generally consistent with the original model (2), except for 
some minor sensitivities. The only sensitivity found in the independent variables is a negative 
coefficient on GRI in the model (2.5). Other sensitivities are recorded on the control variables, 
including a negative coefficient on FSIZE and PROF in model (2.3), a negative coefficient on 
FSIZE and ES in model (2.4), and a negative coefficient on LEV and PROF in the model (2.5). 
As majority of these minor sensitivities are found on the control variables, rather than the 
independent variables. It can be concluded that the findings of the regression model (2) are 
moderately robust with the use of different sub-indices.  
Table 38: Comparison of results between the original model (2) and the model with 
transformed variables (2.1) 
Independent Variable (Model) Main OLS Model  Model with transformed 
variables  
(2) (2.1) 
Institutional Variables 
LEG 0.041 (.342) 0.030 (.493) 
MD 0.210 (.000)*** 0.199 (.000)*** 
UA 0.133 (.005)*** 0.138 (.004)*** 
MAS -0.145 (.003)*** -0.137 (.005)*** 
GRI 0.126 (.000)*** 0.123 (.000)*** 
CSRA -0.037 (.335) -0.040 (.284) 
Control variables 
FSIZE 0.004 (.765) 0.012 (.369) 
LEV 0.001 (.076)* 0.001 (.062)* 
PROF -0.001 (.569) - 
PROF (Log) - 0.017 (.706) 
AGE 0.000 (.901) - 
AGE (Log) - -0.010 (.813) 
BIG4 0.109 (.005)*** 0.108 (.006)*** 
CP -0.024 (.454) -0.032 (.327) 
ES 0.005 (.874) 0.007 (.817) 
Constant 0.076 (.785) -0.101 (.728) 
Durbin-W. Stat 2.257 2.253 
F-value 7.181*** 7.162*** 
Adj. R2 32.4%  32.3% 
Notes: LEG denotes legal origin; MD denotes mandatory disclosure; UA denotes uncertainty avoidance 
dimension; MAS denotes masculinity dimension; GRI denotes the adoption of GRI standard; CSRA denotes the 
membership of CSR-related associations; FSIZE denotes firm size; LEV denotes leverage; PROF denotes 
profitability; PROF (log) denotes logarithm transformation of PROF; AGE denotes firm age; AGE (Log) denotes 
logarithm of AGE; BIG4 denotes audit firm size; CP denotes consumer proximity; ES denotes environmental 
sensitivity. P-values are in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively.  
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Furthermore, whilst similar with the previous model (1), as the CSRDI used in this model 
consists 30 items divided into four sub-indices, the numbers of items in each of the sub-indices 
are unequal. As a result, it could be argued that each of the sub-indices is weighted differently, 
for instance, ED (36%), HRD (30%), PCD (17%), and finally CD (17%). Therefore, in order 
to ensure that the relationship between CG variables and CSRDI is not sensitive to the 
weighting of the sub-indices. An alternative model is constructed with the weighted CSRDI 
(labelled as W-CSRDI) to replace the current unweighted CSRDI. The W-CSRDI, as 
mentioned in section 6.3.3 is calculated by giving each of the four sub-indices equal weight of 
25%. The results of this alternative model is presented in table 39. The results from the 
alternative model (2.6) do not show any significant different from the findings of model (2). 
The coefficient sign and significant levels of all the independent variables are the same with 
what were presented in table 35. Specifically, MD, UA and GRI are positively and significantly 
associated with CSRDI while MAS has significantly negative coefficient. The impact of LEG 
and CSRA are insignificant with a positive and a negative coefficient respectively. In term of 
control variables, the only difference found is a negative coefficient on PROF. Both models 
also have relatively similar adjusted R2 and F values. Particularly, the adjusted R2 in the 
alternative model (2.6) is 31.2% while this percentage was 32.4% in the original model (2). 
The F values of the two model (2) and (2.6) are 7.181 and 6.862 respectively. As a result, with 
the relatively consistent results, the findings from the original model (2) can be argued to be 
robust with the use of different weighting of the sub-indices.  
In conclusion, the results of sensitivity analyses with the use of seven alternative models 
showed that the findings obtained from the original model (2) is not sensitive and robust to the 
presence of non-normal distributed variables and the use of different alternative indices. In the 
next sub-section, an additional test is conducted to examine further the effect of both CG 
mechanisms and institutional factors on CSRD. 
248 
 
Table 39: Summary of results based on CSRD sub-indices and weighted CSRDI 
Independent variable 
(Model) 
EDI HRDI PCDI CDI W-CSRDI 
(2.2) (2.3) (2.4) (2.5) (2.6) 
Institutional variables 
LEG 0.028 (.654) 0.103 (.079)* 0.031 (.587) 0.019 (.769) 0.045 (.290) 
MD 0.139 (.033)** 0.243 (.000)*** 0.208 (.000)*** 0.332 (.000)*** 0.231 (.000)*** 
UA 0.150 (.027)** 0.053 (.398) 0.317 (.000)*** 0.065 (.359) 0.146 (0.002)*** 
MAS -0.055 (.424) -0.258 (0.000)*** -0.108 (.086)* -0.195 (.008)*** -0.154 (0.001)*** 
GRI 0.182 (.000)*** 0.150 (0.001)*** 0.141 (0.001)*** -0.027 (.575) 0.111 (0.000)*** 
CSRA -0.039 (.477) -0.044 (.384) -0.088 (0.075)* 0.015 (.796) -0.039 (.295) 
Control variables: 
FSIZE 0.023 (.230) -0.031 (.091)* -0.015 (.399) 0.037 (.075)* 0.004 (.785) 
LEV 0.000 (.862) 0.003 (.000)*** 0.002 (.078)* -0.001 (.202) 0.001 (.169) 
PROF 0.000 (.918) -0.002 (.496) 0.001 (.677) -0.005 (.105) -0.001 (.492) 
AGE 0.000 (.956) 0.001 (.300) 0.000 (.443) 0.000 (.869) 0.000 (.986) 
BIG4 0.102 (.067)* 0.164 (.002)*** 0.034 (.496) 0.075 (.204) 0.094 (.015)** 
CP -0.032 (.486) -0.024 (.587) 0.023 (.581) -0.033 (.509) -0.016 (.607) 
ES 0.030 (.477) 0.010 (.794) -0.054 (.163) 0.022 (.626) 0.002 (.940) 
Constant -0.355 (.375) 0.723 (.055)* 0.347 (.338) -0.282 (.506) 0.108 (.692) 
Durbin-W. Stat 2.063 2.131 2.112 2.232 2.327 
F-value 4.323*** 7.345*** 6.450*** 3.682*** 6.862*** 
Adj. R2 20.5% 32.9% 29.7% 17.2% 31.2% 
Notes: LEG denotes legal origin; MD denotes mandatory disclosure; UA denotes uncertainty avoidance dimension; MAS denotes masculinity dimension; 
GRI denotes the adoption of GRI standard; CSRA denotes the membership of CSR-related associations; FSIZE denotes firm size; LEV denotes leverage; 
PROF denotes profitability; AGE denotes firm age; BIG4 denotes audit firm size; CP denotes consumer proximity; ES denotes environmental sensitivity. 
P-values are in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively.  
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6.4.4 Additonal Test 
 
In this sub-section, an additional regression model is conducted to incorporate significant CG 
mechanisms, including board size (BS), board gender diversity (FED), block ownership 
(BLOC) and the presence of CSR committee (COMT), in the country-level model (2). The 
regression model (2.1) is presented as follows: 
(2.7) CSRDI = β0 + β1 LEG + β2 MD + β3 UA + β4 MAS + β5 GRI + β6 CSRA + β7 BS 
+ β8 FED + β9 BLOC + β10 COMT + ∑ βi CONTSi + εi 
Notes: CSRDI denotes CSRD index; LEG denotes legal origin; MD denotes mandatory disclosure; UA denotes 
uncertainty avoidance dimension; MAS denotes masculinity dimension; GRI denotes the adoption of GRI 
standard; CSRA denotes the membership of CSR-related associations; BS denotes board size; FED denotes board 
gender diversity; BLOC denotes block ownership; COMT denotes the presence of CSR committee; CONTS 
denotes control variables, including firm size (FSIZE); leverage (LEV), profitability (PROF), firm age (AGE), 
audit firm size (BIG4), consumer proximity (CP), and environmental sensitivity (ES). 
Table 40 provides a summary of the model (2.7)’s findings, in comparison with the original 
results of the model (2). The coefficients’ signs of all the variables remained the same, except 
for a small change. The coefficient of PROF has been altered from -0.001 to 0.000. In term of 
the significant level, the five variables, MD, GRI, BS, BLOC and COMT, are still significant 
in the findings of model (2.7). However, the other variables, including the two cultural 
dimensions, UA and MAS, and the percentage of female directors on board (FED) are no longer 
found to be significant in model (2.7). The results indicate that culture does not significantly 
influence the level of CSRD when important CG mechanisms are considered. Furthermore, 
consistent with the additional test conducted in section 6.4.4, the relationship between board 
gender diversity and CSRD is not significant with the presence of country-level factors. The 
finding suggests that the relationship between culture and the extent of CSRD is not direct in 
the context of these Southeast Asian countries and other factors, such as CG mechanisms, need 
to be considered. The finding, therefore, open an opportunity for further investigation on this 
relationship in future studies. The next sub-section provides a detail discussion on the effect of 
institutional factors on CSRD based on previous literature.  
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Table 40: Comparison of findings between model (2) and model (2.7) 
Independent Variable 
(Model) 
Main OLS Model  Model with CG mechanisms  
(2) (2.7) 
Institutional Variables 
LEG 0.041 (.342) 0.018 (.693) 
MD 0.210 (.000)*** 0.144 (.005)*** 
UA 0.133 (.005)*** 0.079 (.124) 
MAS -0.145 (.003)*** -0.056 (.311) 
GRI 0.126 (.000)*** 0.096 (.004)*** 
CSRA -0.037 (.335) -0.030 (.421) 
Corporate Governance Variables 
BS - 0.013 (.038)** 
FED - -0.002 (.194) 
BLOC - -0.002 (.031)** 
COMT - 0.093 (.014)** 
Control variables 
FSIZE 0.004 (.765) 0.009 (.511) 
LEV 0.001 (.076)* 0.001 (.356) 
PROF -0.001 (.569) 0.000 (.926) 
AGE 0.000 (.901) 0.000 (.774) 
BIG4 0.109 (.005)*** 0.105 (.010)*** 
CP -0.024 (.454) -0.026 (.416) 
ES 0.005 (.874) 0.011 (.720) 
Constant 0.076 (.785) -0.007 (.980) 
Durbin-W. Stat 2.257 2.146 
F-value 7.181*** 6.371*** 
Adj. R2 32.4%  36% 
Notes: CSRDI denotes CSRD index; LEG denotes legal origin; MD denotes mandatory disclosure; UA denotes uncertainty 
avoidance dimension; MAS denotes masculinity dimension; GRI denotes the adoption of GRI standard; CSRA denotes the 
membership of CSR-related associations; BS denotes board size; FED denotes board gender diversity; BLOC denotes block 
ownership; COMT denotes the presence of CSR committee; FSIZE denotes firm size; LEV denotes leverage; BIG4 denotes 
audit firm size; CP denotes consumer proximity; ES denotes environmental sensitivity; PROF denotes profitability; AGE 
denotes firm age. ** and * indicate significance at 0.01 and 0.05 level, respectively.  
 
6.4.5 Discussion 
The regression model (2) was conducted to examine the effect of six institutional factors 
representing the three pillars, regulative pillar (legal origin and mandatory disclosure), cultural-
cognitive pillar (uncertainty avoidance and masculinity), and normative pillar (the adoption of 
GRI standard and membership of CSR-related associations) on CSRDI. The empirical findings 
have concluded that mandatory disclosure, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity and the adoption 
of GRI standard have significant impact on CSRD, while the impact of the other variables, 
including legal origin and membership of CSR-related associations, are inconclusive. In terms 
of control variables, only audit firm size was found to have positive and significant relationship 
with CSRD. Since the results for control variables in this model is similar with the previous 
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model (1); and their impact of CSRD has been discussed in the previous discussion. This 
discussion section will only discuss the relationship between institutional factors and CSRD. 
In the first pillar of the Scott’s institutional framework (1995), coercive pillar, the two 
variables, legal origin and mandatory disclosure are chosen to present the impact of this pillar 
on CSRD practice. Based on the empirical findings, only mandatory disclosure has a significant 
impact on CSRD, while the influence of legal origin is not significant. Mandatory disclosure, 
among all the institutional factors, is the strongest indicator of CSRD. Therefore, with a 
positive coefficient, the finding emphasises the impact of the regulative pillar through 
mandatory regulations that place pressure on firm’s behaviour to disclose more CSR 
information. The result, hence, confirms hypothesis 8 and supports the findings of previous 
studies (Barbu, Dumontier, Feleaga and Feleaga, 2014; Criado-Jimenez et al., 2008; Frost, 
2007; Othman et al., 2011) that firms from countries with mandatory disclosure regulation tend 
to disclose more CSR information. The finding is aligned with the conclusion of Othman et al. 
(2011) that the regulation would increase the level of CSRD in annual reports as a reaction to 
government’s demand. As a form of formal regulation and one of the regulative pillar’s key 
indicators, mandatory disclosure is proven to be effective in creating a systematic effect on 
management to disclose more information (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2014) and successfully 
forces firms to consider interests of stakeholders and behave more responsibly (Overland, 
2007).  
Different from the case of mandatory disclosure, the impact of regulative pillar through legal 
origin is not significant. Therefore, it could be concluded that not all institutional factors that 
have regulative elements influence CSRD. The impact of the regulative pillar on CSRD 
depends on the institutions themselves. The insignificant finding is distinct with the expectation 
that firms from common law origin would disclose more CSR information to demonstrate 
greater stakeholder responsibility and manage legitimacy demand (Adelopo et al., 2012). The 
unclear impact of legal origin on CSRD could also be explained by the context of study. 
Although according to La Porta et al. (2008), legal origin can be classified into two main 
traditions, common law and civil law, this classification is not always straightforward. Despite 
following one main legal tradition, countries often adopt law from other legal systems. For 
example, according to the legal system report in The World Factbook (CIA, 2017a), Indonesia 
has a civil law system based on the Roman-Dutch model, however, Indonesia’s legal system is 
also influenced by customary law. Similarly, despite being classified under the common law 
system, Malaysia also adopts laws from other traditions, such as Islamic law and customary 
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law (CIA, 2017b). The trend of adopting laws from different traditions in these nations might 
have hindered the effect of legal origin on CSRD. Although the finding, provided a vastly 
different view, compared to some previous studies that support the impact of legal origin on 
CSRD (Adelopo et al., 2012, 2013; Frias-Aceituno et al., 2013), the insignificant relationship 
between legal origin and CSRD is consistent with the result of Orij (2010)  
Regarding the cultural-cognitive pillar, both the variables representing this pillar, uncertainty 
avoidance and masculinity dimensions were found to have a significant impact on CSRD. 
Compared to other institutional factors, the impact of these two cultural dimensions is only 
lower than mandatory disclosure of regulative pillar. With the significant findings of these two 
cultural dimensions, the role of institutions with cultural-cognitive pillar in encouraging firms’ 
CSRD behaviour through social pressures and conformity based on share beliefs and taken-
for-granted actions (Shnayder et al., 2016) has been confirmed. Among the two cultural 
dimensions, uncertainty avoidance dimension’s impact on CSRD is different from the 
expectation that since the dimension is linked with the subcultural value of secrecy (Gray, 
1988), firms from countries with high uncertainty avoidance would disclose less CSR 
information (Williams, 1999). The finding in this study indicates positive and significant 
relationship between uncertainty avoidance and CSRD. Although this finding opposes 
conclusions of previous studies (Bowrin, 2013; Williams, 1999), it is consistent with the 
argument of Adelopo et al. (2013) that firms from high uncertainty avoidance societies would 
disclose more CSR information to follow the society’s expectations and reduce uncertainties. 
Moreover, as these societies are characterised by being rule-oriented (Hofstede, 2001), the 
regulative pressure from institutional environment would encourage CSRD across companies. 
In contrast, in societies with low uncertainty avoidance index, firms can be flexible in their 
way of approaching CSR issues as these societies are more relaxed in terms of exploring 
possibilities (Adepolo et al., 2013). 
Regarding the masculinity dimension, the significant and negative coefficient demonstrate a 
negative relationship between masculinity dimension and CSRD practice, which is consistent 
with the expectation from hypothesis 10. The finding supports the literature suggesting that 
corporations from highly masculine countries have weaker social orientation which in turn 
leads to the lower level of CSRD (Orij, 2010). Masculine societies have less appreciation of 
cooperative strategies and helping behaviour (Steensma et al., 2000; Tice & Baumeister, 1985), 
which could lead to a negative social and environmental responsiveness. In conclusion, both 
cultural dimensions examined in this study are found to be statistically significant in relation 
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to their impact on CSRD. These findings, therefore, emphasise the impact of institutions with 
cultural-cognitive pillar on CSRD. The impact of such institutional factors on CSRD is the 
second largest after mandatory disclosure of regulative pillar.    
In terms of the normative pillar, the institutional factors representing the impact of this pillar 
on CSRD are the adoption of GRI standard and the membership of CSR-related associations. 
Similar with the case of regulative pillar, only one factor, the adoption of GRI standard was 
found to have a positive and significant impact on CSRD. Based on the coefficient’s value, the 
effect of GRI adoption on CSRD is the smallest one, out of the four significant institutional 
factors. The result, therefore, implies that the institutional factors with normative pillar seem 
to have lesser impact on CSRD, compared with the other institutions representing regulative 
and cultural-cognitive pillars. However, it is also important to acknowledge that this result is 
influenced by the choice of institutional factors. With the positive coefficient, firms that adopts 
GRI standard tend to disclose more CSR information in their annual reports compared to the 
others.  The result, therefore, supports the findings of Barkemeyer et al. (2015) and Comyns 
(2016) claiming that the use of reporting standard such as GRI increases social reporting. The 
finding also reaffirms the effectiveness of GRI as a key normative body of CSR reporting and 
a successful institutionalisation project (Barkemeyer et al., 2015; Brown et al., 2009; Etzion & 
Ferraro, 2010; Levy et al., 2010). The finding also contributes to the lack of empirical studies 
analysing the contribution of CSR standards like GRI (Perez-Batres et al., 2010) and provided 
evidence that the GRI standard has assisted firms in improving their CSRD practice and in 
achieving legitimacy.  
The other institutional factor that represents the impact of normative pillar is the membership 
of CSR-related associations, however, different from the adoption of GRI standard, the 
relationship between being member of CSR-related associations and the level of CSRD is not 
significant. The finding, therefore, aligns with the insignificant result found in the study of 
Amran and Haniffa (2011). The sign of the relationship is also different from expectation. 
There are several reasons that could be attributed to the insignificant and negative impact of 
the membership of CSR-related associations and CSRD. Firstly, only 22.8% of companies in 
the sample were members of the examined CSR-related associations. The majority of these 
associations’ members are SMEs, NGOs or other institutions. The number of large firms 
participating in associations is not high. The reason behind this low participation rate of large 
firms could be explained by the fact that majority of large firms, with sufficient resources, tend 
to have their own CSR agenda rather than cooperate with other associations and organisations. 
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Therefore, being members of such associations does not necessarily result in better CSRD for 
large firms. Moreover, although motivating firm involvement in CSRD practice is one of the 
objectives of these associations, they might have been focused more heavily on goals, such as 
CSR-awareness development, leaving their impact on encouraging CSRD among firms 
neglected.  
In conclusion, all the three pillars in institutional environment, regulative, cultural-cognitive 
and normative, have impact on CSRD in Southeast Asian countries. The impact of regulative 
pillar on CSRD demonstrates through mandatory disclosure regulation. The effect of cultural-
cognitive pillar presents through the two cultural dimensions, uncertainty avoidance and 
masculinity. Finally, normative pillar influences CSRD through the adoption of GRI standard. 
Among all the institutional factors that have significant impact on CSRD, mandatory disclosure 
was the strongest indicators, followed by the two cultural dimensions, and finally GRI standard. 
The findings also showed that, compared to the internal determinants, external determinants 
have a greater impact in CSRD. The result, therefore, supports the institutional perspective and 
strengthens the role of institutional environment on defining firms’ CSRD practice.  
6.4.6 Section Summary 
 
This section has provided the empirical results to answer the research question 4 regarding the 
impact of institutional factors on CSRD. The empirical findings indicated that four independent 
variables, including mandatory disclosure, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity and the adoption 
of the GRI reporting standard, have significant impact on CSRD. Particularly, while mandatory 
disclosure, uncertainty avoidance and the adoption of GRI standard are positively and 
significantly associated with CSRD, masculinity cultural dimension has significantly negative 
relationship with CSRD. The findings of the other independent variables, legal origin and CSR-
related associations, were found to be insignificant. Compared with the results from the 
regression model (1), the six institutional variables explained higher percentage of CSRDI, 
indicating greater impact of institutional variables than CG variables on CSRD. Furthermore, 
the consistency in findings of sensitivity analyses provided evidences for the robustness of the 
empirical results against non-normal distribution in some variables as well as the use of 
different sub-indices and weighted index. Finally, the section finished with a discussion of the 
empirical findings in relation to previous literature and the study context.  
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6.5 Chapter Summary 
 
The chapter provided the empirical results to answer the three main research questions: 
 What are the differences, if any, among the levels of CSRD across the six Southeast 
Asian countries? 
 To what extent do the CG mechanisms influence the level of CSRD in the six 
countries? 
 To what extent do the institutional factors influence the level of CSRD in the six 
countries? 
The chapter was divided into three main sections presenting the empirical results for each of 
the research questions. In the section 6.2, for the purpose of identifying differences in the levels 
of CSRD across the six countries, both of the parametric ANOVA analysis and the non-
parametric Kruskal-Wallis test were applied. The results of both techniques indicated that there 
is a significant different between the levels of CSRD across the six countries with Thailand as 
the country with highest level of disclosure, followed by Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Philippines and finally Vietnam. The post-hoc tests further identified four comparisons with 
significant difference, Thailand – Philippines, Thailand - Vietnam, Indonesia - Philippines and 
Indonesia - Vietnam. The result, therefore, implied the important role of country in defining 
firms’ CSRD practice. Additionally, the ranking of these countries in terms of CSRD does not 
reflect their levels of economic development. The differences between the levels of CSRD 
among these countries, as a result, could be influenced by other important factors, such as 
institutional environment. Based on the empirical result of this section, the following section 
examined the extent to which CG mechanisms and institutional factors in these countries 
determine their levels of CSRD.  
The section 6.3 presented the empirical results to answer the research question, to what extent 
do the CG mechanisms influence the level of CSRD in the six Southeast Asian countries?. The 
empirical findings indicated that among the six examined CG mechanisms, board size, board 
gender diversity, block ownership and the presence of CSR committee were found to 
significantly influence the level of CSRD. Particularly, board size and the presence of CSR 
committee was significantly and positively associated with CSRD, while board gender 
diversity and block ownership had significantly negative relationship with CSRD. The results 
of the other mechanisms, board independence and CEO duality were insignificant. Diverse 
sensitivity analyses were conducted to examine the sensitivity of the empirical findings against 
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the non-normal distribution of some variables as well as the use of different sub-indices and 
weighted index. Consistency in the results of these analyses with the original model indicated 
that the empirical findings are relatively robust and can be used for further discussion. As a 
result, at the end of this section, the empirical findings of this study regarding the impact of 
CG variables on CSRD were reviewed and discussed based on previous literature and the study 
context.  
In the third section (6.4), the empirical results to address the influence of institutional factors 
on CSRD were presented. The empirical findings indicated the significant impact of all the 
three pillars on CSRD through mandatory reporting, culture (uncertainty avoidance and 
masculinity dimensions) and the adoption of GRI standard. Specifically, mandatory reporting, 
uncertainty avoidance and the adoption of GRI had significant and positive relationship with 
CSRD, while masculinity dimension was negatively and significantly related to CSRD. The 
results of the other two institutional factors, legal origin and CSR-related associations were 
insignificant. Similar with the previous section, these empirical findings were then re-examined 
by the followed up sensitivity analyses. With consistent results, it could be concluded that the 
empirical findings are fairly robust with the non-normal distribution of some variables as well 
as the use of different sub-indices and weighted index. At the end of the section, the empirical 
findings were reviewed and discussed based on previous studies and the research context.  
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CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
7.1 Overview 
  
Chapter Seven is the concluding chapter of this thesis. The chapter firstly re-addresses the 
research questions and discusses how the findings in this study answer each of these questions. 
The chapter then provides arguments for theoretical, empirical and practical contributions of 
the study based on the empirical findings and the context of the six Southeast Asian countries. 
A summary table of the theoretical and empirical gaps, key findings and key contributions is 
also presented to provide a good overview of the study’s contributions. Finally, the limitations 
of the study are addressed before concluding with recommendations for future research in the 
field of CSRD determinants.  
7.2 Research Questions and Key Findings 
 
As mentioned in Chapter One, the key aims of this research were; to compare the level and 
types of CSRD across the six examined Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam; and to examine the impact of both corporate 
governance (CG) practices and institutional factors on the level of CSRD. In order to achieve 
these research aims, four research questions were formed. In this section, relevant key findings 
will be deliberated, answering each of the research questions. Table 41 provides a summary of 
key findings, in congruence with theoretical/empirical gaps and key contributions.
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Table 41: A summary of gaps, key findings and contributions 
Theoretical/ Empirical gaps Key findings Key contribution 
Theoretical Gap 1 
CSRD studies in emerging countries are 
under-theorised (Belal and Momin, 2009) 
 The study examined the impact of internal 
determinants (CG practices) and external 
determinants (institutional factors) using two 
different theoretical frameworks.  
 A multi-theoretical framework, including agency 
theory, stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory, 
is used to investigate the impact of CG, while 
institutional theory is the key theory to identify the 
impact of institutional factors. 
 The study overcomes the criticism of Belal and 
Momin (2009) and the weakness of previous 
studies in the region with the use of relevant 
theories to identify relevant determinants and 
develop hypotheses regarding the impact of such 
determinants on CSRD.  
Theoretical Gap 2 
Very few studies have attempted to 
identify institutional factors that influence 
CSRD in a systematic and comprehensive 
way using institutional theory and the 
Scott’s institutional framework (1995) 
 Based on the institutional theory and the Scott’s 
institutional framework (1995), six institutional 
factors representing the three pillars, regulative, 
cultural-cognitive, and normative, were identified.  
 The empirical findings indicate that mandatory 
disclosure (regulative pillar) has the greatest 
impact on CSRD, following by the two cultural 
dimensions (cultural-cognitive pillar) and finally 
the adoption of GRI standard (normative pillar).  
 The findings also emphasise the impact of 
institutional environment on CSRD through all the 
three pillars with some factors having more 
influence than the others.  
 The study is one of a few studies that have 
attempted to quantify institutional environment 
into measurable factors; and examine the effect of 
such factors on CSRD.  
 The study suggests a more comprehensive 
approach in identifying external/ institutional 
determinants of CSRD.  
 The institutional factors identified in this study 
could be re-used in future research to further 
examine the impact of institutional factors on 
CSRD in different context.  
Empirical Gap 1 
There is a need for more CSRD studies 
conducted in countries with limited 
attention. In Southeast Asia region, 
majority of studies have only been focused 
on the context of Malaysia 
 The findings presented the levels of CSRD across 
the six Southeast Asian countries, including 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand and Vietnam.  
 The levels of CSRD in these countries is relatively 
low. On average, the companies disclosed less than 
half of the information in the checklist 
 The study contributes to the existing literature by 
providing a better understanding and more updated 
levels of CSRD in the six countries, especially for 
the countries with limited attention in literature, 
such as Singapore, Philippines and Vietnam.  
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Empirical Gap 2 
There is a lack of comparative CSRD 
studies in the literature  
 The study compared the levels of CSRD across the 
six countries, in which Thailand has the highest 
extent of CSRD, following by Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines and finally 
Vietnam.  
 The result of statistical test showed that there are 
significant differences in the levels of CSRD 
between the two countries with highest disclosure 
(Thailand and Indonesia) with the two lowest ones 
(Philippines and Vietnam). These differences 
could be explained by the influence of other 
institutional factors.  
 The study contributes to the limited number of 
comparative CSRD studies and allows 
comparisons of CSRD levels across different 
countries.  
 The empirical findings of this study can be used to 
compare and contrast with the results of other 
studies to identify whether the levels of CSRD are 
different in other parts of the world.  
Empirical Gap 3 
There is limited number of studies 
examining the impact of CG in emerging 
and Asian context.  
 The study examined the impact of six CG practices 
on CSRD in the context of six Southeast Asian 
countries; five of which are emerging economies.  
 The findings concluded that firm size, board 
gender diversity, block ownership and the 
presence of CSR committee have significant 
impact on CSRD while the effect of gender 
diversity and board independence are different 
from the theoretical and empirical expectations.  
 The study contributes to the limited number of 
studies looking at the impact of CG on CSRD in 
the context of emerging economies in general and 
Southeast Asia in particular.  
 The empirical findings demonstrate some 
unexpected results which could be explained by 
the context of study.  
Empirical Gap 4 
There are few studies that have examined 
the impact of external determinants of 
CSRD in the existing literature 
 The study investigated the impact of several 
institutional factors on CSRD, including legal 
origin, mandatory disclosure, uncertainty 
avoidance, masculinity, the adoption of GRI 
standard and membership of CSR-related 
associations.  
 The study contributes to the understanding of 
external environment’s effect on CSRD by 
examining various factors representing different 
aspects of institutional environment.  
 The findings highlighted the important role of 
institutional environment in defining CSRD 
practice.  
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RQ 1: To what extent firms in each of the six countries disclose their CSR information in 
annual reports and what type of CSRD category is the most disclosed? 
Out of the 171 companies in the sample, 166 firms (97.08%) disclosed at least one item in the 
CSRD instrument. This percentage is relatively high compared with previous studies conducted 
on these countries (see Hamid, 2004, Ratanajongkol et al., 2006; Thompson and Zakaria, 2004). 
The result, therefore, signals an increased awareness and practice of CSRD among large Southeast 
Asian firms. The average score of CSRD is 0.440 (44%), which means on average these firms 
disclose less than half the items listed in the CSRD instrument. This finding showed that although 
the awareness of CSRD has been increased in Southeast Asian firms, the practice of CSRD is still 
at the early development stage; and the extent of CSRD is relatively low.  
Comparisons among the four categories show that community involvement disclosure (CD) and 
human resources disclosure (HRD) are the two categories that have the highest percentage of firms 
disclosing information (91.813% and 91.228% respectively), followed by environmental 
disclosure (ED) (85.965% of the total firms), and products and consumers disclosure (PCD) 
(66.667% of the total firms). The two categories, CD and HRD, also have the highest disclosure 
indexes with the average disclosure percentage of 58.129% (CD) and 49.773% (HRD). The 
average disclosure percentages of ED, and PCD are 39.246% and 28.626% respectively. This 
finding is consistent with the study of Hackston and Milne (1996) in which community, human 
resources and environment themes are found to be the most commonly disclosed categories across 
countries. The high disclosure level of the community involvement category supports the argument 
of institutional theory that the main purpose for companies to get involved in CSR and CSRD is 
to build and maintain legitimacy (Holder-Webb et al., 2009). Furthermore, the high involvement 
in CD is also aligned with the institutional context in these countries where there are tax deduction 
policies for firms involving in certain charitable and community projects. Apart from CD, HRD is 
also one of the most focused themes in CSRD among Southeast Asian firms. The high level of 
disclosure in HR category can be attributed to the countries’ policies regarding employee welfare 
and the existence of a unionised labour force (Belal and Momin, 2009). Disclosing information 
about companies’ labour policies and practices could additionally help firms ensure the support of 
labour providers and demonstrate value to consumers (Holder-Webb et al., 2009), increase 
employee performance and sustain or improve a firms’ economic advantage (Mirfazli, 2008). In 
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contrast with CD and HRD, the two other themes, ED and PCD, have received limited attention. 
The low level of ED is consistent with some previous studies (Ahmad and Haraf, 2013; Sumiani 
et al., 2007; Thompson and Zakaria, 2004). From the legitimacy perspective, as the level of ED is 
subjected to legitimacy threats on the companies or industry sectors (de Villiers and van Staden, 
2006). The limited extent of ED in this study could be a result of the high number of companies 
from banking and financial sectors, which have less pressures to disclose environmental 
information (Akinpelu et al., 2013). Among the four categories, PCD is the theme with the lowest 
disclosure level with the average idex of 0.286. The low PCD in this study could be explained by 
the choice of sampling and the study context. In relation to sampling choice, as mentioned above, 
due to the high number of companies from banking and financial sectors, majority of the 
companies are not highly visible to final consumers, reducing their needs to disclose for this 
particular stakeholder. Furthermore, arguments from stakeholder and legitimacy perspectives 
suggest that firms disclose CSR information in response to external pressure. However, in the 
Southeast Asian context, low awareness of CSR and consumer activism (Sharma, 2013) potentially 
reduces the pressure of consumers on firms and hence limits firms’ motivations to disclose 
information in PCD category (see Anas et al., 2015; Darus et al., 2014; Ratanajongkol et al., 2006).  
Across the six examined countries, firms from Thailand and Indonesia demonstrate the highest 
average of CSRDI (0.554 and 0.552 respectively), followed by Malaysia (0.459), Singapore 
(0.427), Philippines (0.326), and finally, Vietnam (0.302). The findings are surprising in the sense 
that the levels of CSRD do not reflect a country’ economic development. Thailand (an advanced 
emerging economy) and Indonesia (a secondary emerging economy) have higher CSRDI than 
Singapore (a developed country). The finding, hence, supports the argument of Campbell (2007) 
and suggests that the relationship between economic development and CSRD is mediated by the 
institutional environment. Particularly, in the case of Singapore, for instance, Singapore’s 
government has already invested heavily in education and environmental protection on behalf of 
its citizens, which reduces the necessity of company involvement. Furthermore, the country does 
not experience many social problems and environmental issues due to its economic success and 
the nature of its small land mass, as well as its extremely limited agricultural sector (Chapple and 
Moon, 2005). These all contribute to a lack of motivation when it comes to CSR and CSRD. 
Comparisons of CSRD across the six countries also indicate that the gaps between the two 
countries with the highest CSRD (Thailand and Indonesia) and the two with lowest scores 
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(Philippines and Vietnam) are relatively large. While firms from Thailand and Indonesia disclose 
more than half of the items on average, their counterparts from the Philippines and Vietnam only 
disclose one-third of items. The highest disclosed category in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and 
Vietnam is CD, while Thai firms disclose most in the human resources category. 
RQ2: What are the differences, if any, among the levels of CSRD across the six countries? 
In order to identify if there are any significant differences between the levels of CSRD among the 
six examined countries, both parametric analysis (ANOVA) and non-parametric analysis (the 
Kruskal-Wallis test) were conducted. The results of both tests showed significant difference 
between the CSRD levels. The following post-hoc tests identified four comparisons with 
significant difference, Thailand – Philippines, Thailand – Vietnam, Indonesia – Philippines, and 
Indonesia – Vietnam. The results reflect the significant difference between the two countries with 
highest indexes and the two with lowest indexes. The findings are aligned with the contexts of 
CSR development in these countries and therefore emphasise the role of institutional environment 
in shaping firms’ CSRD practice. For instance, the raised level of CSRD in Thai firms can be 
explained by the active promotion of good CG practices in Thailand since the economic crisis in 
1997 with diverse topics in governance and non-financial disclosure being discussed through a 
variety of newspaper articles, talk shows and conferences by the Institute of Internal Auditors of 
Thailand to raise awareness of good practices (Ratanajongkol et al., 2006). The CSRD practice in 
Thailand is increasingly used as a method by firms to achieve legitimacy. Similarly, the high 
CSRD in Indonesia could be the result of the country’s laws and regulations regarding corporate 
social and environmental responsibility. Indonesia was the first country in 2007 to legislate CSR 
as mandatory (Urip, 2010). Particularly, according to law No.40/2007, all limited liabilities firms 
are required to publish information of their CSR programs in annual reports (Malan, 2013). 
Opposite to the strong encouragement of CSR and CSRD in Thailand and Indonesia, CSR is not 
yet substantial in the contexts of the Philippines and Vietnam (see Chapple and Moon, 2005; 
Nguyen et al., 2015; Binh, 2016), which explains the low CSRD in these two countries. Despite 
having some relevant laws and regulations (Chapter Three, table 7), the level of CSR and CSRD 
in these two countries is still at a minimal level due to weak enforcement frameworks in these 
states (Hamm, 2012; Sharma, 2013). Furthermore, the CSR awareness among consumers are also 
low in these two countries. In Vietnam, for example, due to the lack of national standards and 
263 
 
requirements to protect consumers, consumers either do not have or have limited knowledge about 
CSR and do not realise the importance as well as benefits of CSR (Hieu, 2011). With this low 
awareness amongst consumers, it is not suprising that Vietnamese companies are not willing to 
disclose their CSR activities. The differences in CSRD practice among the six examined countries, 
therefore, have emphasised the importance of considering institutional factors in CSRD studies.  
RQ 3:  What are important corporate governance determinants of CSRD; and to what extent 
do these corporate governance practices influence the level of CSRD in Southeast Asia? 
Based on previous literature (see Esa and Ghazali, 2012; Cowen et al., 1987; Barako and Brown, 
2008; Chakroun and Matoussi, 2012) and the characteristics of CG in Asia (high concentrated 
ownership and family control), the six CG practices, board size, board independence, board gender 
diversity, CEO duality, block ownership and the presence of a CSR committee were used to 
identify the effect of CG on CSRD in the six countries. To examine this effect, OLS regression 
model was run with the dependent variable (CSRDI), independent variables (CG variables) and 
control variables. Diverse sensitivity analyses were also conducted to ensure the robustness of the 
empirical findings. The results provided evidences for the conclusion that among the six CG 
mechanisms, board size, board gender diversity, block ownership and the presence of CSR 
committee are the key predictors of CSRD. The effect of board size, block ownership and the 
presence of CSR committee are aligned with expectations, while the negative impact of board 
gender diversity measured through the percentage of female directors on board is unexpected. The 
results, therefore, confirm hypotheses 1, 5 and 6. 
Large board size appears to be a common CG practice in the six countries. Contrary to the 
argument that a larger board size can be ineffective due to problems in communication, 
coordination and control management (van den Berghe and Levrau, 2004), directors in the 
examined firms seem to be comfortable with a larger board size. Multiple CG reports in several of 
these countries showed that firms with good CG tend to have more directors on their board (see 
World Bank, 2013; IFC, 2012). Board size, uniquely, is found to have a positive impact on CSRD. 
Firms with a larger board size report more CSR information in annual reports. The positive 
relationship between board size and CSRD, therefore, confirms the legitimacy perspective that 
larger boards, with increased diversity of experience, skills and knowledge, can initiate healthy 
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discussions and improve corporate reputation and image through disclosure (Esa and Ghazali, 
2012; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013).  
Similarly, the presence of CSR committee is positively associated with CSRD. Although the 
percentage of firms having CSR committee at the board level is still low in the context of these six 
countries, firms with the presence of CSR committee have higher level disclosure compared to 
their counterparts. The result, therefore, is aligned with the theoretical expectation that the 
presence of a CSR committee indicates firms’ attention to CSR at the board level (Ullman, 1985) 
and its desire to legitimise a company’s social and environmental reputation (Rankin et al., 2011).  
Different from board size and the presence of CSR committee, the percentage of block ownership 
has a negative impact on CSRD. The finding is consistent with the arguments from both legitimacy 
and agency perspectives. According to the legitimacy perspective, the pressures for public 
accountability and from institutional environment to apply new practices such as CSR and CSRD, 
are lower in firms with high level of block ownership (Ghazali, 2007; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). 
Additionally, based on the agency perspective, the agency-principal conflicts are greater in widely 
held companies (Fama and Jense, 1983). As a result, compared with concentrated ownership firms, 
widely held companies are likely to provide more information in their annual reports to reduce 
such conflicts and direct attention of shareholders to appear more accountable (Haji, 2013). The 
practice of CSRD can be further argued to improve firms’ financial reporting and reduce 
information asymmetries (Reverte, 2009). The result of this study, hence, supports these 
theoretical arguments on the negative relationship between block ownership and CSRD.  
The empirical results of this study also present some unexpected findings. Unlike previous studies 
(see Carter et al., 2003; Adams and Ferreira, 2004; Khan, 2010), board gender diversity measured 
through the percentage of female directors on board was found to negatively influence CSRD. The 
finding contrasts with the expectation developed from the stakeholder perspective that boards with 
gender diversity can improve connections with stakeholders (Barako and Brown, 2008) and 
therefore are more likely to engage with multiple stakeholders as well as response to their needs 
(Bowrin, 2013). The finding is also opposite with the argument from the agency perspective that 
board diversity can improve board independence which in turn enhance managerial monitoring, 
attract resources, enhance legitimacy and ultimately lead to better financial performance (Ntim 
and Soobaroyen, 2013). The unexpected result could be attributed to the low proportion of female 
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directors on board in these countries. Specifically, the average percentage of female directors 
across firms in this study is only 11.73%. The finding, hence, supports the suggestion of Kramer 
et al. (2006) that only one or two female directors on board is insufficient to make changes. The 
social pressure from the majority opinions and the pressure to confirm could have reduced the 
competency of minorities (Brewer and Kramer, 1985; Nemeth, 1986), such as female directors in 
this case. Furthermore, the negative association between board gender diversity and CSRD could 
be linked to the observation of Amran et al. (2014b) that the lack of gender diversity could reduce 
the board independence. The finding potentially provides further empirical evidence for the 
inconsistency of empirical findings regarding the positive impact of female directors on board and 
supports the conclusion of Mahadeo et al. (2012) that women presentation on board is purely a 
legitimacy effect to stakeholders.   
The two other independent variables, percentage of independent directors and CEO duality, do not 
have any significant impact on CSRD. In the case of independent directors, the coefficient is so 
minor that one could conclude that the percentage of independent directors have no effect on 
CSRD at all. This finding contrasts with many previous studies (see Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Eng 
and Mak, 2003; Jizi et al., 2014; Petra, 2005); and diverse theoretical arguments. Specifically, the 
contemporary literature has been supportive to the positive association between board 
independence and CSRD with the main argument from the legitimacy and stakeholder perspectives 
that independent directors pay more attention to broader stakeholder objectives (Mahadeo and 
Soobaroyen, 2016) and demonstrate a firm’s attention to legitimacy as well as external 
environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). The limited impact of independent directors in this case, 
however, could be explained using the study context. As proposed by Ntim and Soobaroyen 
(2013), the effectiveness of independent directors in motivating firms to engage more in CSRD 
practice depends on the context of legal environment, independence, experience and expertise. 
With the context of high concentrated ownership and family control, independent directors in these 
firms are not wholly independent, as the family groups, owners of the companies, might have been 
involved in the process of choosing independent directors (Chen and Nowland, 2010). The lack of 
independence as well as ambiguities in the role of independent directors in the context of emerging 
economies has been recognised in previous literature (see Mahadeo and Soobaroyen, 2016), which 
could significantly influence the level of monitoring and supervising management effectively in 
firms. Additionally, the number of independent directors on firms, as found in this study, has been 
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low in a number of countries, such as Indonesia, Vietnam and Philippines. The minor presentation 
of independent directors on board could make it difficult to control management or make any 
change regarding CSR and CSRD practices. Moreover, due to the lack of CSR awareness in some 
countries, such as the Philippines and Vietnam (see Binh, 2016; Chapple and Moon, 2005; Nguyen 
et al., 2015), independent directors might not have sufficient knowledge and experience to be 
effective in their role (Sundarasen et al., 2016). Independent directors, themselves, might not 
realise the importance of CSRD and therefore incapable of convincing the board to adopt and 
develop this practice. In the case of Vietnam, the fact that there was no definition of independent 
directors in law and regulations until recently (IFC, 2012) means that independent directors are 
ambiguous about their role and responsibilities, which leads to unsatisfactory performance.  
Similar to board independence, the impact of CEO duality on CSRD is also insignificant in this 
context. The finding, therefore, is insupportive of diverse theoretical expectation and different with 
some empirical evidences in the literature (see Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Jizi et al., 2014). From 
the agency aspect, CEO duality demonstrates leadership and governance issues (Said et al., 2009) 
which allows greater power and authority to one person. With the abilities to hide essential 
information, limit board independence and manipulate board appointment in their favour (see 
Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Michelon and Parbonetti, 2012; Li et al., 2008), CEOs with Chairman 
power can weaken the monitoring abilities and detriment the disclosure practice (Anderson et al., 
2003; Li et al., 2008; Forker, 1992). Furthermore, instead of considering the interests of other 
stakeholders, powerful CEOs can make decision and use CSR for their personal interests (Jizi et 
al., 2014; Khan et al., 2013a). Despite the strong argument for the negative association between 
CEO duality and CSRD, the relationship was insignificant in this study. Similar with the case of 
board independence, the insignificant impact of CEO duality can be explained by the study 
context. Due to the CG tradition of family control and block ownership, role duality in this context 
might not have much meaning as the two positions, CEO and Chairman, despite being held by 
separate persons, could be given to two members of the same family or major shareholders. As a 
result, not having CEO duality practice on boards does not necessarily improve CSRD in firms.  
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RQ 4: What are the important institutional determinants of CSRD; and to what extent do 
these institutional factors influence the level of CSRD in Southeast Asia? 
Based on the institutional theory and Scott’s institutional framework (1995) as well as previous 
literature (e.g. Barakat et al., 2015; Barkemeyer et al., 2015; Brown et al., 2009; Campbell, 2007), 
six institutional factors were identified to present the impact of institutional environment on CSRD 
through regulative (legal origin and mandatory disclosure), cultural-cognitive (uncertainty 
avoidance and masculinity cultural dimensions), and normative pillar (the adoption of the GRI 
standard and membership of CSR-related associations). The analysis technique used to answer this 
research question is similar with the previous one, in which an OLS regression model including 
the dependent variable (CSRDI), the independent variables (institutional factors) and control 
variables, was run; and the robustness of the empirical findings was carefully examined by diverse 
sensitivity analyses. The results highlighted the significant impact of four independent variables; 
mandatory disclosure from regulative pillar, uncertainty avoidance and masculinity dimensions 
representing cultural-cognitive pillar; and the adoption of GRI standard from normative pillar. The 
findings, therefore, confirm hypotheses 8, 10 and 11, and imply that the institutional environment 
influences the level of CSRD through all three pillars with certain institutional factors have more 
impact than the others.   
The effect of the regulative pillar was examined through the two variables, legal origin and 
mandatory disclosure. As argued from the literature, the coercive pressure from the regulative 
pillar is reflected through the legal system (Barakat et al., 2015; Crawford and Williams, 2010) 
which could be classified into two main secular legal traditions, common law and civil law (La 
Porta et al., 2008). Common law countries, with more developed capital market and diverse share 
ownership, were expected to have higher stakeholder responsibility and more demanding 
legitimacy management (Adelopo et al., 2013). As a result, firms from these countries would have 
more incentives to make CSR communications accessible (Adelopo and Moure, 2010); and hence 
were expected to have higher level of disclosure. However, different with this expectation, findings 
in this study concluded that legal system does not significantly influence the level of CSRD. The 
insignificant impact of legal origin on CSRD might be due to the classification of the traditions. 
Although legal origin, as defined by La Porta et al. (2008), could be classified into two main 
traditions, common law and civil law, this classification might not be straightforward as the 
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countries have been borrowed laws from different traditions. For instance, although Malaysia 
follows common law system, the country also adopts laws from other traditions, including Islamic 
law and customary law. This practice, hence, might have hinder the effect of legal origin on CSRD. 
Besides legal origin, government regulations have been considered as a form of coercive power 
(see Scott, 2008; Campbell, 2007; Kim et al., 2013). As a result, the presence of mandatory 
disclosure was used in this study to present the element of regulative pillar. Unlike legal origin, 
mandatory disclosure was found to have a significantly positive relationship with CSRD, 
emphasising the role of mandatory regulations in putting pressure on firms to disclose more CSR 
information. The findings of both legal origin and mandatory disclosure, therefore, showed that 
not all institutional factors that have regulative elements influence CSRD. Instead, the impact of 
regulative pillar on CSRD could depend on the institutions themselves. The positive relationship 
between mandatory disclosure and CSRD is aligned with empirical evidences from the literature 
(see Barbu et al., 2014; Criado-Jimenez et al., 2008; Frost, 2007; Othman et al., 2011) and the 
conclusion of Othman et al. (2011) that the regulation would increase the level of CSRD as a 
reaction to government’s demand. Mandatory disclosure requirement, therefore, can be an 
effective mechanism to ensure firms consider interests of other stakeholders and behave 
responsibly (Overland, 2007). Amongst all institutional factors considered in this study, mandatory 
disclosure is the strongest indicator of CSRD, emphasising the impact of the regulative pillar 
through mandatory requirements. The finding, hence, is consistent with the institutional 
perspective that corporations are likely to demonstrate responsible behaviour if there is an 
existence of strong and well-enforced regulations (Campbell, 2007). Among the six examined 
countries in the study, Indonesia and Malaysia are two good examples of the positive relationship 
between mandatory disclosure and CSRD.  
Regarding the effect of the cultural-cognitive pillar, both the cultural dimensions representing the 
pillar, uncertainty avoidance and masculinity, were found to be significant, although the sign of 
the relationship between uncertainty avoidance and CSRD contrasts with the expectation in 
hypothesis 9. The uncertainty avoidance dimension had a statistically significant and positive 
effect on CSRD, which opposes the argument that the association between the dimension with the 
subcultural value of secrecy (Gray, 1988) could make firms from high uncertainty avoidance 
societies reluctant in providing CSRD due to the fear of jeopardising the firm’s financial securities 
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(Williams, 1999). However, the positive association between uncertainty avoidance and CSRD is 
aligned with the argument of Adelopo et al. (2013) that firms from high uncertainty avoidance 
socities would disclose more CSR information to follow the society’s expectations and reduce 
uncertainties. Additionally, as these societies are characterised by being rule-oriented (Hofstede, 
2001), the regulative pressure from institutional environment would encourage CSRD across 
firms. On the other hand, firms from societies with low level of uncertainty avoidance can be more 
flexible in their approach as these societies are more relaxed in exploring possibilities (Adelopo et 
al., 2013).  
In contrast to uncertainty avoidance, the significantly negative relationship between masculinity 
and CSRD confirmed the expectation that firms from masculine countries disclose less CSR 
information in their annual reports. The finding, hence, is consistent with the arguments from 
literature. For instance, Orij (2010) suggested that corporations from highly masculine countries 
have weaker social orientation, which could result the lower level of CSRD. According to a 
number of scholars (Steensma et al., 2000; Tice and Baumeister, 1985), masculine societies have 
negative social and environmental responsiveness due to less appreciation of cooperative strategies 
and compassionate behaviour. In comparison with the other significant institutional factors, the 
impact of these two cultural dimensions representing the cultural-cognitive pillar are only lower 
than mandatory disclosure of the regulative pillar. The finding, hence, confirms that through social 
pressure and cultural conformity (Shnayder et al., 2016), institutions with cultural-cognitive pillar 
plays a vital role in encouraging firms’ CSRD behaviour.  
Among the two variables were developed to present the effect of the normative pillar on CSRD, 
only the adoption of the GRI standard was found to have a positive and significant impact on 
CSRD. The study could not find any effect of membership of CSR-related associations on CSRD. 
The finding, therefore, does not support the institutional argument that business and professional 
associations act as agents to provide normative environment that facilitates responsible behaviour 
from corporations (Campbell, 2007); and membership of such organisation would increase firms’ 
understanding of the virtues and benefits of corporate giving as well as putting peer pressure on 
firms to behave more responsibly (Martin, 2002). There are several reasons that could potentially 
provide the explanation for the insignificant relationship between the membership of CSR-related 
associations and CSRD. Firstly, the percentage of firms participating in the associations was not 
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high in this study. Only 22.8% of the firms in the sample were members of the examined 
associations. The low participation rate could be explained by using large firms as the subjects of 
this study. Large firms, with sufficient resources, might be more likely to have their own CSR 
agenda than cooperate with other associations and organisations. As a result, not being members 
of such associations does not mean firms would engage less in CSR and CSRD. Furthermore, 
rather than focussing on the development of CSRD, these associations might pay more attention 
to other objectives, leaving their impact on encouraging CSRD among firms neglected.  
In contrast to the case of membership of CSR-related associations, the adoption of GRI standard 
as one of the factors representing normative pressures, is found to have significant and positive 
impact on CSRD, which means firms adopting GRI standard tend to disclose more CSR 
information in their annual reports than the others. The finding is in line with previous studies 
(Barkemeyer et al., 2015; Comyns, 2016) and reaffirms the effectiveness of GRI as a key 
normative body of CSRD and a successful institutionalisation project (Barkemeyer et al., 2015; 
Brown et al., 2009; Etzion & Ferraro, 2010; Levy et al., 2010). The finding also contributes to the 
lack of empirical studies on role of CSR standards like GRI (Perez-Batres et al., 2010) and 
provided evidence that the GRI standard has assisted firms in improving their CSRD practice and 
in achieving legitimacy.  
Compared with the institutional factors from the other two pillars, the impact of institutional 
factors within the normative pillar seem to have lower impact in the context of this study. The low 
influence of normative pressures is understandable as the number of firms following the GRI 
standard and participating in CSR-related associations is not expansive. Moreover, the finding that 
normative forces have a lower impact on firms’ CSRD practice than regulative and cognitive forces 
is rather comparable with the finding of Yiu and Makino (2002) in their study regarding the impact 
of institutional factors on firms’ mode of entry choice. In this study, Yiu and Makino (2002) also 
found that regulative and cognitive pressures have greater impact than normative pressure. They 
further add that the limited impact of normative pressures is due to difficulties in coding, as they 
are not easily recognised like regulative or cognitive pressures.  
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7.3 Theoretical, Empirical and Practical Contributions 
7.3.1 Theoretical Contributions 
In terms of theoretical contributions, the study firstly followed the suggestion of Haider (2010), 
stating that the choice of theories should be based on factors influencing CSRD. As a result, with 
the choice of internal (CG practices) and external determinants (institutional factors) in this 
research, two different theoretical frameworks are applied to consider the impact of these factors 
on CSRD. While a multi-theoretical framework combining the three theories, agency theory, 
stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory, is considered appropriate to examine the effect of CG 
on CSRD, the choice of institutional theory helped to identify relevant institutional factors and 
examine the impact of these factors on CSRD. The use of different theories in this study, therefore, 
overcomes the criticism that CSRD research in emerging countries is under-theorised (see Belal 
and Momin, 2009).  
Moreover, the research particularly contributes to the implication of institutional theory in CSRD 
studies. Despite the growing argument within literature that the concepts of CSR and CSR 
practices (including CSRD) are strongly dependent on the institutional context (see Campbell, 
2007; Marquis et al., 2007), as presented in Chapter 2, section 2.5, there are only a limited number 
of studies that have examined the impact of one or two institutional factors on CSRD. Additionally, 
although a few recent studies have looked at the effect of institutional framework on CSRD or 
CSR reporting (see Adelopo and Moure, 2010; Cahan et al., 2016), the choice of these factors have 
not been systematically identified from diverse aspects of institutional environment to provide a 
deeper understanding of the role of the institutional environment in defining CSRD levels. As a 
result, to address this theoretical gap in the literature, the study identified relevant institutional 
factors to represent the impact of regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive pillars on CSRD. 
The research, therefore, is one of the first studies that have attempted to quantify institutional 
environment into measurable variables using the Scott’s institutional framework (1995) and 
examine the impact of these variables on CSRD in the context of Southeast Asian countries. These 
institutional measurements could also be used in future research to garner a developed 
understanding of the role of the institutional environment in different contexts. As a result, this is 
a major contribution, given the limitation of current CSRD literature in quantifying institutional 
factors from diverse aspects in a systematic way. The findings of this study have confirmed the 
impact of institutional environment on CSRD through all the three pillars, regulative, normative, 
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and cultural cognitive, with certain institutional factors having more impact than others. 
Specifically, among the six examined institutional factors, mandatory disclosure, cultural 
dimensions and the adoption of GRI standard were found to have significant impact on CSRD 
while the effect of the other factors (i.e. legal origin and CSR-related associations) were 
insignificant. The empirical findings, therefore, imply that despite the presence of diverse 
institutional factors supporting the development of CSRD in the six countries, not all of these 
factors act significantly upon CSRD. Additionally, the empirical results showed that the regulative 
pressure (mandatory disclosure) and cultural-cognitive pressure (uncertainty avoidance and 
masculinity cultural dimensions) have stronger impact on CSRD than normative pressure (the 
adoption of GRI standard) in the context of these six countries, which is a new observation in the 
CSRD field. These institutional factors were also proven to have greater impact on CSRD than CG 
mechanisms. 
7.3.2 Empirical Contributions 
 
The study also contributes to the current literature in terms of its context. The comparative study 
was conducted in the six main economies of Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam to respond to the gap that most of CSRD 
determinants studies have intensively focused on Anglo-Saxon and Western European countries 
(Fifka, 2013; Prieto-Carron et al., 2006; van der Laan Smith et al., 2005). The number of studies 
conducted on the region is growing, however, only Malaysia has been a commonly focused 
country. The study, therefore, provides a developed understanding of CSRD practices amongst 
other Southeast Asian countries which so far have had limited attention, such as Singapore, 
Philippines and Vietnam. Many of these countries still have low levels of CSRD, with less than 
half of the checklist disclosed. This low level of disclosure could be attributed to the low awareness 
of CSR in several countries, such as Philippines and Vietnam. Moreover, as a regional study is 
rare in CSRD determinants literature, this particular comparison, therefore, contributes to the 
existing literature through comparing the levels of CSRD across the six countries in the same 
region, as well as providing empirical findings for future CSRD studies conducted in other regions.  
The findings from cross-national comparisons showed some unexpected results, compared with a 
previous comparative study in the region of Chapple and Moon (2005). While the rankings of 
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several countries are similar, Indonesia, has risen exponentially from being one of the countries 
with lowest disclosure levels in Chapple and Moon (2005)’s study, to becoming the second highest 
in terms of CSRD in the region. This new finding, hence, demonstrates the rapid improvement of 
Indonesian firms in recent years. The improvement of Indonesian firms in practicing CSRD can 
be explained by the changes in the country’s legal framework related to CSRD. As mentioned 
previously, the comparison of the CSRD levels across the six countries is interesting in the sense 
that it differs from the results of previous studies (see Barakat et al., 2015; Lim, 2017; Xiao et al., 
2005). The levels of CSRD in the six countries do not seem to reflect the stages of economic 
development. For instance, while Singapore, the only developed country in the sample, ranks 
middle in terms of CSRD, Indonesia, a secondary emerging economy, has the second-highest level 
of disclosure. This result, therefore, challenges the common perception that developed countries 
have better CSRD practice than less developed countries (Barakat et al., 2015; Lim, 2017).  
Moreover, unlike some previous studies that examine the descriptive statistics of CSRD (see Batra, 
2013; Gunawan and Hermawan, 2012; Kuasirikun and Sherer, 2004; Ratanajongkol et al., 2006), 
this study goes beyond that and provides empirical evidence on the impact of institutional factors 
and CG. Regarding the impact of internal determinants on CSRD, as argued in Chapter 1, section 
1.3, there is a need for increased CSRD studies examining the role of CG in defining CSRD, 
especially in the context of emerging countries and Asian countries due to their distinctive 
characteristics of concentrated ownership and family control. In response to this empirical gap, the 
study examined the impact of six CG practices, including board size, board independence, board 
gender diversity, CEO duality, block ownership and the presence of CSR committee, on CSRD. 
While most of the findings are in conjunction with the theoretical and empirical expectations, there 
are some unexpected results that acquire attention. Particularly, board gender diversity has been 
found to have a significantly negative impact on CSRD and board independence has no effect on 
CSRD in the context of Southeast Asia. These two findings depart greatly from what has been 
identified in existing literature regarding the relationships between these two factors and CSRD 
(see Barako and Brown, 2008; Htay et al., 2012; Jizi et al., 2014). Therefore, in response to the 
question posed by Khan et al. (2013a) on whether the traditional models of CG from developed 
countries is effective in the context of emerging economies, the effectiveness of some practices, 
such as board gender diversity and board independence, is questionable. The negative effect of 
board gender diversity on CSRD could be the result of very low percentage of women on boards, 
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therefore being insufficient enough to influence change and reduce board independence. In terms 
of board independence, due to the characteristics of high concentrated ownership and family 
control, these independent directors may not be wholly independent to have a positive influence 
on CSRD. With these findings, the study contributes to the understanding of the effectiveness of 
CG in the context of emerging economies as well as Asian countries, especially in relation to 
CSRD. 
Furthermore, the study also responds to the empirical gap that there is a limited number of CSRD 
studies examining the impact of external determinants. The study, therefore, investigated the effect 
of six institutional factors representing the three pillars of institutional environment, regulative 
(legal origin and mandatory disclosure), cultural-cognitive (uncertainty avoidance and 
masculinity) and normative (the adoption of GRI standard and membership of CSR-related 
associations). Through identifying the institutional factors from various aspects of the institutional 
environment, the study not only contributes to the existing CSRD literature on external 
determinants but also suggests an approach to examine the impact of institutional environment on 
CSRD in a more comprehensive way. Moreover, it is necessary to emphasise that many of the 
institutional factors in this study, such as legal origin, the adoption of GRI standard and 
membership of CSR-related associations, have not been widely examined in CSRD studies. 
Examining the effect of these factors on CSRD could provide better understanding of CSRD 
practices across different countries and in terms of developing CSRD practice further.  
7.3.3 Practical Contributions 
 
Regarding practical implications, the findings could be useful for companies, users and policy 
makers. The findings of this study raise multiple policy contributions. Firstly, for policy makers 
and regulators, the appreciation of CSRD diversity and factors influencing such practices would 
aid them in managing deficiencies and in being more effective where these are pronounced. The 
findings are particularly important for individual countries, as it promotes collaboration and greater 
opportunities to promote CSR and CSRD as well as learn from the experience of countries with 
successful practices and positively influence firms’ behaviour. For instance, mandatory disclosure 
was found to have a significant and positive impact on CSRD. Particularly, based on the table 7 
presented in Chapter Three, countries with mandatory disclosure requirement, such as Indonesia 
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(Law No.40/2007 and Regulation No.KEP-431/BL/2012) and Malaysia (Bursa Malaysia’s listing 
requirement), tend to disclose more CSR information in annual reports that others. This finding, 
therefore, supports the role of government and statutory authorities in shaping firms’ CSRD 
practices through the release of formal regulations. It could also encourage governments of 
countries with low CSRD, such as Vietnam, to adopt a similar approach based on the relative 
successes.  
Moreover, the study also provides the empirical evidence for the effectiveness of the GRI reporting 
standard as a key normative mechanism. Firms that adopt GRI standard have higher level of 
CSRD. In the context of the six countries, only 64 out of 171 firms adopted the GRI standard for 
their CSR communication, in which 17 firms from Thailand, 13 from Singapore, 12 from 
Malaysia, 12 from Indonesia, 8 from Philippines and only 2 firms from Vietnam. The numbers of 
firms following GRI standard is relatively consistent with the ranking of CSRD at country level, 
which emphasised the role of the GRI standard in supporting firms to achieve better CSRD 
practice. Therefore, to improve the CSRD practice among firms, governments, CSR-related 
associations, NGOs and other relevant institutions, especially in countries with low levels of CSRD 
like the Philippines and Vietnam, firms should be encouraged to adopt the GRI standard for their 
CSR communication and develop their knowledge on GRI through diverse training.  
In terms of CG, based on the empirical findings, it could be concluded that CG practices, such as 
board size, board gender diversity, block ownership and the presence of CSR committee, have 
significant impact on CSRD. Among these factors, board size and the presence of a CSR 
committee have a positive impact while board gender diversity and block ownership have a 
negative effect on CSRD. In response to these empirical findings, if policy makers and regulators 
are looking to develop and improve CSRD practice among firms, they may consider the following 
suggestions. The improvement of the national CG landscape through enacting alternations in 
regulations, listing requirements or code of CG, such as ensuring the sufficient size of boards, 
reducing the high level of block ownership and encouraging the presence of CSR committee at 
board level, might be necessary. For instance, based on the descriptive statistics presented in 
Chapter Five, table 14, the average percentage of block ownership was relatively high in these 
countries (64.435%). This percentage is particularly high in the case of Philippines (86.207%). 
The Philippines government and statutory bodies, therefore, could learn from the experiences of 
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other countries (such as Indonesia and Thailand) in controlling the level of concentrated ownership 
by regulating the percentage of shares held by minority shareholders (Chapter Three, table 6). In 
the cases of board gender diversity, the unexpected impact of this mechanism on CSRD could be 
a result of low percentage of female presentation on board. Therefore, the issue of gender equality 
on boards should be treated with care and attention in the context of these countries. The impact 
of board gender diversity on CSRD will only be effective if gender equality is more balance on 
boards; and female directors, rather than just being a legitimacy effect on stakeholders (Mahadeo 
et al., 2012), are empowered to actively engage in corporate’s decision-making process. 
Additionally, the study could not identify any significant impact of CEO duality and board 
independence on CSRD. As discussed above, the limited impact of these two mechanisms could 
be explained by the high family control practice where important positions were held by family 
members or major stakeholders and the lack of truly independent directors on boards. To tackle 
these CG issues, policy makers and regulators could consider imposing stricter requirements on 
the number of independent directors. The countries with the low percentage of independent 
directors on boards, such as Indonesia, Philippines and Vietnam, could learn from the experience 
of Singapore and Thailand in which the regulations require at least half of the board to be 
independent if (a) the CEO and Chairman positions are held by the same person; (b) CEO and 
Chairman are immediate family; and (c) Chairman is part of the management team or not 
independent.  The empirical findings of this study, therefore, provide various practical implications 
for policy makers and regulators in the six Southeast Asian countries.  
Furthermore, the study also has practical implications for investors and companies. Particularly, 
for investors, as knowledge of CSRD differences across countries could be beneficial in adjusting 
expectations of the types and levels of CSRD of firms in the six Southeast Asian countries. The 
levels of CSRD in these countries is not high. On average, firms disclosed less than half of the 
maximum level of disclosure. The extent of CSRD also differs dramatically across the region. 
CSRD levels are expected to be higher in Thailand and Indonesia and be very low in the 
Philippines and Vietnam. Moreover, firms in these countries tend to disclose more information in 
human resources and community involvement themes.  For companies, with the understanding of 
constraining institutional factors, managers could modify their CSRD practices to appear 
legitimate in new markets, as legitimacy is said to be dependent on the communication between 
the firm and its stakeholders (Elsbach, 1994; Garcia-Sanchez et al., 2016). Specifically, when 
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entering Southeast Asian markets, companies should pay attention to the disclosure regulations 
and the country’s culture. Particularly, the majority of these countries have some extent of 
regulation regarding CSRD (Chapter Three, table 7). Therefore, it is important for firms to aware 
of these regulations as well as the level of legal enforcement in the countries to avoid non-
compliance consequences. Furthermore, countries with high uncertainty avoidance and, or, low 
masculinity cultural dimension, such as Thailand and Indonesia, would expect firms disclose more 
CSR information.  Additionally, if a firm is hoping to improve its CSRD practices, adoption of the 
GRI standard could be an important starting point, as this standard has proven to be effective in 
supporting firms in strengthening their CSRD practices.  
7.4 Limitations 
 
Despite the contributions, this study, however, presents some limitations: 
 Firstly, the subjects of this study are large companies. The choice of only large firms, as 
explained in the methodology, is to ensure the completeness and comparability of the data 
set across the six examined countries. As the countries have different statuses of economic 
development and institutional environments, the concepts of CSR and CSRD could be a 
long tradition in some countries but not others. The selection of only large companies, 
therefore, helps to ensure the completeness of data even in countries such as Philippines 
and Vietnam where CSR is not yet substantial (see Binh, 2016; Chapple and Moon, 2005; 
Nguyen et al., 2015). As a result, the findings provide limited interpretation and cannot be 
applied to small and medium sized businesses. Moreover, the results also cannot be 
interpreted in other context beyond that of the six examined countries due to the differences 
in institutional environments and CG practices.  
 The total sample size of 171 companies in this study could be considered small for a 
quantitative study, however, this sample size is appropriate considering all sections of each 
annual report were examined manually to avoid the loss of information and ensure the 
correctness of information. With limited time and resources, a larger data set could be 
overwhelming. The findings, therefore, cannot be generalised above this sample size. 
 Only annual reports were used as the primary source to collect data and examine CSRD of 
firms. Despite the criticism that the use of annual reports alone does not capture the 
278 
 
completeness of firms’ CSRD, as firms could publish their CSR information through 
different channels and documents (see Roberts, 1992; Gray et al., 1995b), the use of annual 
reports to examine CSRD is considered appropriate for this study due to the cross-national 
context which makes it difficult to apply the same set of data for all countries. Moreover, 
according to previous studies (see Naser et al., 2006; Haider, 2010) annual reports is the 
main channel for disclosing CSR information, especially in the context of developing 
countries, which make up a substantial proportion of the sample. Despite the 
appropriateness of using annual reports as the main channel to examine CSRD in this study, 
a small number of firms in the study does publish stand-alone reports; and therefore this 
study has not considered the possible influence of firm’s decision to have a stand-along 
CSR report on CSRD in annual reports. This limitation opens an opportunity for future 
studies to examine this potential influence.  
 CSRD in this study was measured using quantitative aspect of disclosure, specifically the 
non-weighted disclosure index. Although the use of quantitative approach to measure 
CSRD has been widely used in the literature, it is important to acknowledge that the 
quantitative measurement of disclosure in annual reports does not present a complete 
picture of CSRD practice. The quantitative assessment of disclosures is unable to provide 
a deep insight of how CSR information is reported (Tregidga et al., 2007, and hence limit 
the ability to infer from such approach (Soobaroyen and Mahadeo, 2016). Therefore, the 
use of qualitative methodologies, such as discourse analysis, interviews or case studies, can 
provide further empirical and theoretical insights of the practices as well as motivations for 
firms to engage in CSRD.  
 The study is one of the first that attempted to identify relevant institutional factors that 
potentially influence CSRD based on institutional theory literature and Scott’s institutions 
framework (1995). Six institutional factors were identified following the arguments in the 
literature view in Chapter 3, section 3.3.2, however, it is possible that there are more 
institutional factors that could influence CSRD that were not considered.   
 In order to measure the effect of culture on CSRD, the study used Hofstede’s cultural 
dimenisons. However, not all of the dimensions were considered in the study. Due to the 
certain similarities among the countries’ culture, the study only addressed two cultural 
dimensions, uncertainty avoidance and masculinity, with the main argument that these two 
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dimensions are connected to the value of secrecy (Gray, 1988) which could potentially 
influence firms’ decision to disclose CSR information. As a result, other important 
dimensions, such as power distance, individualism, long-term orientation and indulgence, 
have not been addressed. Since these cultural dimensions might also influence firms’ 
CSRD practice, future studies are advised to include these dimensions for further 
investigation on the relationship between culture and CSRD.   
 In terms of data analysis, in response to the main research aims, the study simply identified 
the effect of diverse CG and institutional factors on CSRD. However, the impact of these 
factors on CSRD might not be straightforward. As a result, one of the limitations of this 
study is that the study did not consider interaction variables. Future studies, hence, are 
encouraged to develop the findings of this study further and consider the use of interaction 
variables. For instance, as explained in the section 7.2, the impact of certain CG 
mechanisms on CSRD could be mediated by other contextual factors, such as the high 
levels of block ownership and family control. These factors could be applied as interaction 
variables to further examine the effectiveness of CG in shaping CSRD practice in different 
national contexts.  
 
7.5 Recommendations for Future Research 
 
 The literature review in this thesis showed that despite the growing number of studies 
conducted in Southeast Asia, the majority of these studies have focused solely on Malaysia, 
leaving other countries in the region with limited attention. To hold businesses accountable 
for social problems through the transparency mechanism of CSRD, it is important to 
understand the current situation of CSRD in each of the countries, especially countries with 
low level of CSRD and factors that could help to develop this practice. As a result, future 
research is encouraged to conduct more in-depth study of countries such as Philippines and 
Vietnam. A larger sample size within an individual country is also important to examine 
the patterns of CSRD in detail.  
 Moreover, as mentioned previously in the section 7.4, the use of qualitative research, such 
as interviews, discourse analysis and in-depth case studies, might provide better theoretical 
and empirical insights of the CSRD practice as well as motivations for firms to engage in 
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such practice. Future studies, therefore, are encouraged to consider qualitative dimensions 
of CSRD as well as the usefulness of qualitative research to explore further the practice of 
CSRD in these Southeast Asian countries. For instance, interested researchers could use 
discourse analysis to ascertain the changes of disclosure over the times in the context of a 
specific country. Such approach can be helpful in “framing” how companies rely on CSRD 
practices (Soobaroyen and Mahadeo, 2016). Alternatively, future studies can also conduct 
interviews with top management in these countries’ firms to unearth motivations behind 
firms’ engagement in CSRD.  
 Comparative studies in CSRD between this region and other parts of the world could 
provide some interesting findings regarding differences between CSRD practice and 
institutional contexts, in addition to whether factors influencing such practice also differ.  
 Besides the use of large companies, future researchers can also consider small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs), as SMEs have been increasingly involved in CSR and CSRD practices. 
A larger sample size along with diverse types of companies across different sectors could 
also increase the generalisability of empirical findings.  
 The study has attempted to use institutional theory to identify relevant institutional factors 
that could influence CSRD. The use of institutional theory in this field has only been a 
recent one (e.g. Amran and Devi, 2008; Othman et al., 2011). With the growing literature 
stressing on the role of institutional environment on CSR practices (see Brammer et al., 
2012; Campbell, 2007; Cormier et al., 2005; Matten and Moon, 2008), it is important to 
examine further the effect of diverse institutions on CSRD as empirical findings of such 
studies could be useful to develop supporting external mechanism for CSRD. Future 
studies could identify relevant institutional factors through interviewing firms and relevant 
stakeholders. These factors could then be quantified and examined their effect on CSRD.  
 Empirical findings and additional tests in this study showed that the relationships between 
certain determinants and CSRD might not be straightforward and emphasised the needs to 
consider the interacting effect of other factors. For instance, the effect of some CG 
mechanisms on CSRD was found to be different from theoretical and empirical 
expectations. Such differences were argued to be influenced by a number of contextual 
elements, such as concentrated ownership and family controlled. Fellow researchers, 
therefore, are encouraged to incorporate interaction variables to enable a more meaningful 
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discussion on the effectiveness of CG in shaping firms’ CSRD practice in Southeast Asian 
context. Furthermore, the results of the additional test in section 6.4.4 demonstrated that 
the relationship between culture and CSRD could be mediated by CG mechanisms. Hence, 
based on this finding, future research should examine further the role of culture in defining 
firms’ CSRD practice while considering the interacting effect of other internal 
mechanisms, such as CG.  
7.6 Chapter Summary 
 
The concluding chapter provided a summary of the research findings based on the four research 
questions, followed by a discussion of theoretical and empirical contributions. The chapter 
continued with the practical implications for statutory bodies, regulators, users as well as 
companies based on the empirical findings of the study. A summary table of gaps, key findings 
and contributions was also presented. Finally, the last two sections addressed the study’s 
limitations as well as presented suggestions for future research.  
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1: CSRD CHECKLIST 
(adopted from Branco and Rodrigues, 2008) 
ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE 
 
 Environmental policies or expression of environmental concerns  
 Environmental management systems and audit 
 Pollution from business conduct 
 Pollution created from the use of company’s products 
 Prevention or repair of environmental damage 
 Conservation of natural resources and recycling 
 Sustainability issues 
 Environmental aesthetics 
 Energy conservation in operations 
 Energy efficiency of products 
 Discussion of environmental laws and regulations 
 
HUMAN RESOURCES DISCLOSURE 
 
 Employee Health and Safety 
 Employment of minorities or women 
 Human resources profile 
 Employment remuneration 
 Employee share ownership schemes 
 Employee assistance/ benefits 
 Employee training 
 Employee morale 
 Industrial relations 
 
PRODUCTS AND CONSUMER DISCLOSURE 
 Product safety 
 Product quality 
 Disclosing of consumer safety practices 
 Consumer complaints and satisfaction 
 Provision for disabled, aged, and difficult-to-reach consumers 
 
 
COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT DISCLOSURE 
 Charitable donations and activities 
 Support for education 
 Support for arts and culture 
 Support for public health 
 Sponsoring sporting or recreational projects 
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APPENDIX 2: DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF CSRD SUB-CATEGORIES 
Category 1: Environmental disclosure 
1. Environmental policies or expression of environmental concerns  
 Environmental policy  
 General environmental considerations and statements 
2. Environment management, system and audit 
 Reference to environmental review and assessment  
 Environmental audit 
3. Pollution from business conduct 
 Addressing pollution issues related to air, water, noice and/ or visual  
 Discharge process of wastes 
 Statements regarding the level of pollution from company’s operations and 
compliance with pollution laws and regulations.  
4. Pollution created from the use of company’s products 
 Reducing pollution from product use 
5. Prevention or repair of environmental damage 
 Pollution control in business conduct 
 Research and Development fund for reducing pollution 
 Statements or goals regarding how pollution from operations has been or will be 
reduced 
 Natural resources damage prevention or repair  
 Receiving an award regarding environmental policies or programmes 
 Attempts to identify, improve or prevent waste and pollution  
 Environmental education programs and studies 
6. Natural resources conservation and recycling 
 Conservation of natural resources and wildlife 
 Using recycled materials 
 Using material resources efficiently 
 Supporting anti-litter campaigns 
 Actions demonstrating protection towards the environment 
7. Sustainability issues 
 Mention of sustainability and sustainable development 
8. Environmental aesthetics 
 Designing facilities in harmony with the environment 
 Contributions (cash or art) to beautifying the environment 
 Repairing or renovating historical buildings or structures 
 Landscaping  
9. Energy conservation  
 Disclosing the company’s energy policies 
 Actions related to energy conservation, efficiency and savings 
 Research on energy conservation 
 Receiving an award for energy conservation 
 Addressing concern relating to energy shortage  
 Exploration, development or use of new sources 
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10. Energy efficiency of products 
 Improving of product efficiency 
 Disclosing products’ energy efficiency 
 Research on increasing products’ energy efficiency  
11. Discussion of environmental laws and regulations 
 
Category 2: Human Resources Disclosure 
1. Employee Health and Safety 
 Promoting health and safety 
 Initiating a health and safety policy, committee or department  
 Health care programs for employees 
 Complying with health and safety standards/ regulations 
 Receiving an award related to health and safety 
 Eliminating or reducing toxic substances and pollutants in the work environment 
 Disclosing accident statistics 
 Conducting research to improve work safety 
2. Employment of women or minorities 
 Recruitment policy (equal opportunities policy) for women and/ or racial minorities 
 Employment of other special interest groups (e.g. the disabled, drug addicts or ex-
convicts) 
 Disclosing the number (percentage) of female and/ or minority employees  
 Goals to improve the presentation of women and/ or minorities in the workforce 
 Programme for the advancement of women and/ or minorities 
3. Employee profiles 
 Providing employee statistics in relation to age, race, gender and/ or qualifications 
 Providing the number of employees in the company or at subsidiary level 
 Providing information about positions and/ or managerial levels of employees 
4. Employee remuneration 
 The company’s remuneration policies 
 Providing information regarding employee remuneration 
5. Employee share ownership schemes (excluded for the case of executives and/ or directors 
only) 
 Disclosing information on employee share ownership scheme 
 Disclosing information on other profit sharing scheme 
 Employee participation in share ownership and/ or profit sharing schemes 
6. Employee assistance/ benefits 
 Activities/ facilities to promote work-life balance at work 
 Providing guidance and/ or assistance for retiring or redundant staffs  
 Providing accommodation for staffs 
7. Employee training 
 Training programs for staffs 
 Assisting employees financially for educational purposes  
 Establishing training centers  
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8. Employee morale 
 Addressing information regarding the relationship and/ or communication between 
company (management) and employees in an effort to increase motivation and job 
satisfaction.  
 Disclosing information about company’s future and job’s stability for employees  
 Providing information on employee report (if available) 
 Receiving award on effective communication with employees  
9. Industrial relations 
 Disclosing information about the company’s relationship with trade unions  
 Providing information about any industrial action and its consequences in term of 
productivity and time  
 Disclosing information on how industrial action was managed 
 
Category 3: Products and Consumers Disclosure 
1. Product safety 
 Providing information on product safety 
 Disclosing that products meet applicable safety standards 
 Improvement in product satefy 
 Conducting research on product safety 
 Providing information on more sanitary procedures in the products’ processing and 
preparation  
2. Product quality 
 Receiving award/ prize related to product’s quality 
 Verifying product’s quality (e.g. ISO 9000) 
3. Consumer safety practices 
 Practices relating to consumers’ rights and safety protection  
4. Consumer complaints/ satisfaction 
 Consumer satisfaction and complaints 
 Disclosing information on how consumers are responded 
5. Provision for disabled, aged and difficult-to-reach consumers 
 
Category 4: Community involvement disclosure  
1. Charitable donations and activities 
 Donations to support community activities (through cash, facilities, products or 
employee services) 
 Donations to community groups and charitable bodies 
 Supporting government sponsored campaigns 
 Supporting the development of local industries 
 Disclosing information about political donations  
2. Support for education 
 Sponsoring educational events 
 Providing fund for scholarship 
3. Support for the arts and culture 
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 Sponsoring art exhibits, national and cultural events  
4. Support for public health 
 Sponsoring or conducting public health programs 
 Supporting medical research 
5. Sponsoring sporting or recreational projects 
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APPENDIX 3: LIST OF CSR-RELATED ASSOCIATIONS 
 
Country Association’s name Description Main activities 
Indonesia Global Compact Network 
Indonesia 
Indonesia Global Compact Network (IGCN) 
was established in 2006 in Jakarta with the 
chief aim to promote United Nations Global 
Compact Principles in Indonesia. The network 
started with a mutual commitment of twenty-
two companies and organisations.  
URL: http://indonesiagcn.org/ 
The organisation provides platforms for sharing and 
learning, organising public events and webinars, 
facilitating dialogues as well as performing training 
programmes related to CSR. These are based on the 
United Nation Principles and sustainable 
development goals. Some examples of these events 
are multi-stakeholder dialogue series, business 
sustainability forum, and CEO briefing and dialogue.  
Malaysia Business Council for 
Sustainability and 
Responsibility Malaysia 
The Business Council for Sustainability and 
Responsibility Malaysia (BCSRM) is a 
national organisation established in 1992 by 
business leaders from a diverse set of 
industries to promote responsible and 
sustainable practices. The BCSRM is also a 
regional partner of the World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development 
(WBCSD). The organisation’s key mission is 
to act as the government’s advocate council 
for sustainability in Malaysia.  
URL: http://www.bcsrmalaysia.org 
 
The organisation’s activities support the 
sustainability agenda of the WBCSD and increasing 
the awareness of its members. Some examples of its 
activities include the East Malaysia Dialogue, CEO 
mentoring program, the establishment of Technical 
Standards Working Group, and the launch of 
BCSRM Youth Council.  
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Philippines The Philippine Business 
for Social Progress 
The Philippine Business for Social Progress 
(PBSP) was established in 1970 as one of the 
first associations of its kind in Southeast Asia. 
PBSP is the largest business-led social 
development NGO in Philippines and 
advocates sustainable development and 
poverty reduction. The organisation partners 
with a range of companies that want to add 
strategic value to their CSR programs.  
PBSP has more than 267 large, small and 
medium enterprises as members that 
participate in social development programs 
focusing on health, education, the 
environment and Livelihood and enterprise 
development (HEEL). The organisation has 
been the main advocator for stronger 
corporate citizenship.  
URL: http://www.pbsp.org.ph 
The organisation’s activities focus largely on 
engaging in different projects, promoting collective 
actions, as well as offering strategic and operational 
services to other corporations. Some examples of 
these activities are TB reach, pharmaceutical 
transparency through technology, classroom 
construction, workforce development, watershed 
management, and inclusive business.   
 
Singapore Singapore Compact for 
CSR 
The Singapore Compact for CSR was 
established in 2005 as part of the United 
Nations Global Compact (UNGC) network. 
The network encourages and supports 
companies in aligning their operations and 
strategies with UNGC’s principles. The main 
role of the network is to work with diverse 
stakeholders and promote responsible 
business practices.  
URL: http://www.csrsingapore.org 
 
The organisation regularly organises seminars, 
networking events and education programmes 
related to CSR and the development of its members. 
The organisation also offers diverse training 
programs for CSR and sustainability sectors. Some 
examples of these activities include the Global 
Compact Network Singapore Summit, sustainability 
reporting course, green productivity and green 
factory.  
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Thailand Thailand Business 
Council for Sustainable 
Development 
The Thailand Business Council for 
Sustainable Development (TBCSD) was 
founded in 1993 by a former Prime Minister 
of Thailand with the main objective of 
promoting environmental awareness in the 
business sector under the concept of 
sustainable development.  
URL: http://www.tei.or.th/tbcsd/ 
 
The TBCSD concentrates on three main programs: 
public awareness of environmental and cultural 
issues, policy development and business 
competitiveness in addition to generating models of 
good practice. Some representative projects of the 
TBCSD are ‘Young Creative Environment Artist’, 
green meetings, carbon reduction certification for 
buildings, and carbon reduction label.  
Vietnam Global Compact Network 
Vietnam 
The Global Compact Network Vietnam 
(GCNV) was established in 2007 with the 
partnership between Vietnam Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry (VCCI) and the 
United Nations in Vietnam (UN). The 
network goal is to become the national CSR 
centre of excellence, promoting sustainable 
businesses.  
URL: http://www.globalcompactvietnam.org/ 
 
The main activities of the organisation include 
providing guidance and advice regarding CSR 
issues, supporting the development of CSR 
programs and reporting frameworks, organising 
diverse trainings and networking events, as well as 
promoting CSR in Vietnam through partnershiping 
with other companies and agencies. Some examples 
of representative events are student contest on CSR, 
CSR Calendar Forum, Responsible Business Forum 
on Food and Agriculture, and workshop on 
Responsible and Sustainable Business.  
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APPENDIX 4: LIST OF COMPANIES IN THE SAMPLE 
 
Number Company’s name Code Industry  
INDONESIA 
1 Astra Agro Lestari Tbk AALI Consumer goods 
2 Adhi Karya (Persero) Tbk. ADHI Industrials 
3 Adaro Energy Tbk. ADRO Basic materials 
4 Astra International Tbk. ASII Conglomerate 
5 Alam Sutera Realty Tbk ASRI Industrials 
6 Bank Central Asia Tbk. BBCA Financials 
7 Bank Negara Indonesia (Persero) Tbk. BBNI Financials 
8 Bank Rakyat Indonesia (Persero) Tbk. BBRI Financials 
9 Bank Mandiri (Persero) Tbk. BMRI Financials 
10 Global Mediacom Tbk. BMTR Consumer services 
11 Bumi Serpong Damai Tbk. BSDE Industrials 
12 Charoen Pokphand Indonesia Tbk. CPIN Consumer goods 
13 Gudang Garam Tbk. GGRM Consumer goods 
14 Indofood CBP Sukses Makmur Tbk. ICBP Consumer goods 
15 Vale Indonesia Tbk. INCO Basic materials 
16 Indofood Sukses Makmur Tbk. INDF Consumer goods 
17 Indocement Tunggal Prakarsa Tbk. INTP Industrials 
18 Jasa Marga (Persero) Tbk. JSMR Industrials 
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19 Kalbe Farma Tbk. KLBF Healthcare  
20 Lippo Karawaci Tbk. LPKR Conglomerate 
21 Matahari Department Store Tbk. LPPF Consumer services 
22 PP London Sumatra Indonesia Tbk. LSIP Basic materials 
23 Media Nusantara Citra Tbk. MNCN Consumer services 
24 Perusahaan Gas Negara (Persero) Tbk. PGAS Oil & Gas 
25 Semen Indonesia (Persero) Tbk. SMGR Industrials 
26 Telekomunikasi Indonesia (Persero) Tbk. TLKM Telecommunications 
27 United Tractors Tbk. UNTR Industrials 
28 Unilever Indonesia Tbk. UNVR Consumer goods 
29 Wijaya Karya (Persero) Tbk. WIKA Industrials 
30 Waskita Karya (Pesero) Tbk. WSKT Industrials 
MALAYSIA 
31 Public Bank BHD 1295 Financials 
32 Malayan Banking 1155 Financials 
33 CIMB Group Holdings  1023 Financials 
34 Tenaga Nasional 5347 Utilities 
35 Axiata Group Bhd 6888 Telecommunications 
36 Sime Darby Bhd 4197 Industrials 
37 Genting 3182 Consumer services 
38 Digi.com 6947 Telecommunications 
39 Petronas Chemicals Group Bhd 5783 Basic materials 
292 
 
40 IOI Group  1961 Conglomerate 
41 Petronas Gas 6033 Oil & Gas 
42 Maxis Bhd 6012 Telecommunications 
43 Sapura Kencana Petroleum 5218 Oil & Gas 
44 Kuala Lumpur Kepong 2445 Consumer goods 
45 Telekom Malaysia 4863 Telecommunications 
46 Genting Malaysia Bhd 4715 Consumer services 
47 AMMB Holdings 1015 Financials 
48 IHH Healthcare 5225 Healthcare  
49 British American Tobacco Malaysia 4162 Consumer goods 
50 MISC Bhd 3816 Industrials 
51 PPB Group 4065 Consumer goods 
52 YTL Corporation  4677 Utilities 
53 Hong Leong Bank 5819 Financials 
54 Felda Global Ventures Holdings 5222 Consumer goods 
55 Petronas Dagangan Bhd 5681 Oil & Gas 
56 UMW Holdings 4588 Conglomerate  
57 RHB Capital 1066 Financials 
58 Astro Malaysia Holdings 6399 Consumer services 
59 KLCC Property Holdings Berhad  5235 Industrials 
PHILIPPINES 
60 Aboitiz Equity Ventures, Inc AEV Conglomerate 
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61 Alliance Global Group, Inc AGI Conglomerate 
62 Ayala Corporation AC Industrials 
63 Ayala Land, Inc ALI Industrials 
64 Bank of the Philippine Islands BPI Financials 
65 BDO Unibank, Inc BDO Financials 
66 DMCI Holdings, Inc DMC Conglomerate 
67 Emperador Inc EMP Consumer goods 
68 Energy Development Corporation EDC Utilities 
69 First Gen Corporation FGEN Utilities 
70 Globe Telecom, Inc GLO Telecommunications 
71 GT Capital Holdings, Inc GTCAP Conglomerate 
72 International Container Terminal Services ICT Industrials 
73 JG Summit Holdings, Inc JGS Conglomerate 
74 Jollibee Foods Corporation JFC Consumer goods 
75 LT Group, Inc LTG Conglomerate 
76 Manila Electric Company MER Utilities 
77 Megaworld Corporation MEG Industrials 
78 Metro Pacific Investments Corporation MPI Conglomerate 
79 Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company MBT Financials 
80 Petron Corporation PCOR Utilities 
81 Robinsons Land Corporation RLC Industrials 
82 San Miguel Corporation SMC Conglomerate 
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83 SM Investments Corporation SM Conglomerate 
84 SM Prime Holdings, Inc SMPH Industrials 
85 Semirara Mining and Power Corporation SCC Basic materials 
86 Universal Robina Corporation  URC Consumer goods 
SINGAPORE 
87 Ascendas Real Estate Investment Trust A17U Industrials 
88 Capitaland C31 Industrials 
89 CapitaMall Trust C38U Industrials 
90 City Developments C09 Industrials 
91 ComfortDelGro C52 Industrials 
92 DBS Group Holdings D05 Financials 
93 Genting Singapore G13 Consumer services 
94 Global Logistic Properties MC0 Industrials 
95 Golden Agri-Resources M5H Consumer goods 
96 Hutchison Port Holdings Trust NS8U Industrials 
97 Jardine Cycle & Carriage C07 Industrials 
98 Keppel BN4 Conglomerate 
99 Noble Group N21 Industrials 
100 Olam International O32 Consumer services 
101 Oversea-Chinese Banking O39 Financials 
102 SembCorp Industries U96 Conglomerate 
103 Sembcorp Marine S51 Industrials 
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104 SIA Engineering S59 Industrials 
105 Singapore Airlines C6L  Consumer services  
106 Singapore Exchange S68 Financials 
107 Singapore Press Holdings T39 Consumer services 
108 Singapore Technologies Engineering S63 Technology 
109 Singapore Telecommunications Z74 Telecommunications 
110 StarHub CC3 Telecommunications 
111 United Overseas Bank U11 Financials 
112 Wilmar International Limited F34 Consumer goods 
THAILAND 
113 Shin Corporation INTUCH Industrials 
114 Glow Energy GLOW Utilities 
115 Electricity Generating PCL EGCO Utilities 
116 Total Access Communication DTAC Telecommunications 
117 Central Pattana CPN Industrials 
118 Charoen Pokphand Foods PCL CPF Consumer goods 
119 CP ALL CPAll Consumer services 
120 Banpu PCL BANPU Basic materials 
121 Advanced Info Services ADVANC Telecommunications 
122 Big C Supercenter BIGC Consumer services 
123 Bangkok Dusit Medical Services PCL BGH Healthcare  
124 BEC World BEC Consumer services 
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125 Bangkok Bank BBL Financials 
126 Bank of Ayudhya BAY Financials 
127 Land & Houses LH Industrials 
128 Krung Thai Bank KTB Financials 
129 Indorama Ventures PCL IVL Basic materials 
130 PTT Public Company Limited PTT Oil & Gas 
131 PTT Exploration and Production PTTEP Oil & Gas 
132 PTT Global Chemical PTTGC Basic materials 
133 Ratchaburi Electricity Generating Holding RATCH Utilities 
134 Siam Commercial Bank PCL SCB Financials 
135 Siam Cement SCG Industrials 
136 Siam City Cement Public Company Limited SCCC Industrials 
137 TMB Bank Public Company Limited TMB Financials 
138 Thai Oil TOP Oil & Gas 
139 True Corp TRUE Telecommunications 
140 Airports of Thailand AOT Consumer services  
141 Siam Makro MAKRO Consumer services 
142 Kasikombank KBANK Financials 
VIETNAM 
143 Bao Viet Holdings BVH Financials 
144 Hochiminh City Infrastructure Investment  CII Industrials 
145 The Southern Rubber Industry  CSM Industrials 
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146 Viet Nam Joint Stock Commercial Bank for 
Industry and Trade 
CTG Financials 
147 PetroVietnam Fertilizer and Chemicals 
Corporation 
DPM Basic materials 
148 Danang Rubber Joint Stock Company DRC Industrials 
149 Vietnam Export Import Commercial Joint 
Stock Bank 
EIB Financials 
150 FLC Group Joint Stock Company FLC Conglomerate 
151 FPT Corporation  FPT Conglomerate 
152 Gemadept Corporation GMD Industrials  
153 Hoang Anh Gia Lai Joint Stock Company HAG Industrials 
154 Ho Chi Minh City Securities Corporation HCM Financials 
155 Hoa Phat group Joint Stock Company HPG Conglomerate 
156 Hoa Sen Group HSG Conglomerate 
157 Becamex Infrastructure Development Joint 
Stock Company 
IJC Industrials 
158 Tan Tao Investment and Industry Corporation ITA Industrials 
159 Kinh Do Corporation KDC Consumer goods 
160 Military Commercial Joint Stock Bank MBB Financials 
161 Ma San Group Corporation MSN Conglomerate 
162 Ocean Group Joint Stock Company OGC Conglomerate 
163 PetroVietnam Drilling & Well Service 
Corporation 
PVD Basic materials 
164 PetroVietnam Transportation Corporation PVT Industrials  
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165 Refrigeration Electrical Engineering 
Corporation 
REE Industrials 
166 Sai Gon Securities Incorporation SSI Financials 
167 Sai Gon Thuong Tin Commercial Joint Stock 
Bank 
STB Financials  
168 Joint Stock Commercial Bank for Foreign 
Trade of Viet Nam 
VCB Financials 
169 VINGROUP Joint Stock Company VIC Industrials 
170 Viet Nam Dairy Products Joint Stock 
Company 
VNM Consumer goods 
171 Vinh Son - Song Hinh Hydropower Joint 
Stock Company 
VSH Utilities 
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